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DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION

A Tradition of Excellence

1973-2008

1973
DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION
DEA
SPECIAL
AGENT
2008

DEA
DEA
DEA MUSEUM
DEA
The Drug Enforcement Administration
Wall of Honor
Traffickers, Terror
2004 ENRIQUE "KIKI" CAMARENA
RED RIBBON RALLY
DEA
IRS
WELCOME
DEA
DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION
DEA
MONEY LAUNDERING GROUP
DEA
DEA
DEA

DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION

A Tradition of Excellence
1973-2008

1973
DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION
DEA
SPECIAL AGENT
2008

This book is dedicated to DEA employees
and their families who, with honor and courage,
have led the way for those who follow.

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Acknowledgements

DEA gratefully acknowledges the offices and employees who contributed photos, historical material, and stories, to this 35th Anniversary History Book. Many thanks to those who helped create, compile, and edit this book.

DEA 35th Anniversary Message
July 1, 2008

Today, the world's premiere drug law enforcement agency, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), turns 35. On July 1, 1973, DEA was born through an Executive Order signed by President Nixon. Earlier in the year, the President had declared "an all-out global war on the drug menace" and sent Reorganization Plan No. 2 to Congress, which proposed the creation of a single federal agency to consolidate and coordinate the government's drug control activities. "Right now," he pointed out, "the federal government is fighting the war on drug abuse under a distinct handicap, for its efforts are those of a loosely confederated alliance facing a resourceful, elusive, worldwide enemy."

In 2008, we face that same cold-blooded and resourceful enemy. The difference is, that 35 years later, DEA combats that enemy as the world's top drug fighter—an established, strong, and singularly focused agency, teamed with our local and global partners, dedicated to destroying the drug trade.

DEA has proven for the past 35 years that we can—and are—destroying powerful drug organizations. DEA's ability to hunt down major drug traffickers, wherever the case may lead, has been our signature. Time and again, we've taken down kingpins and collapsed powerful, violent drug trafficking operations that were once considered untouchable. In the 1970s, we brought down the notorious French Connection traffickers and New York City's Nicky Barnes. In the 1980s, we targeted and ultimately destroyed the infamous Medellin Cartel. In the 1990s, we focused on dismantling the sophisticated Cali Cartel, which is now extinct. Today, we're taking apart the powerful Tijuana Cartel piece by piece and bringing to justice Afghan narco-terrorists. Those are of course just a few examples where DEA has dismantled the drug trade—from the dealer on the street corner to the drug lords at the very top of the trafficking pyramid.

DEA skillfully has disrupted and dismantled the world's most powerful drug organizations. In just the last decade, we have seized record amounts of drugs, cash, and assets, which has had tremendous impact—from fewer drugs on the street, to millions of dollars kept out of the hands of terrorists, to fewer dangerous drugs in the hands of our children, and less violence in our communities. Every day, this agency shuts down criminal networks, bolsters national security, and restores peace and safety to countless grateful families.

We've seen this agency grow from a Special Agent workforce of 1,470 to about 5,000 today, and we've seen our budget grow from less than $75 million to over $2.4 billion today. This agency has grown and matured, adjusted and refined, to be what we are today: the most respected and successful drug law enforcement agency in the world. DEA's success lies in our determination and flexibility, taking on new challenges and creating new strategies to adapt to a changing drug world, but what has stayed the same throughout our history is the talent, courage, and dedication of our people.

For 35 years, DEA employees—whether they're agents, analysts, diversion investigators, chemists, support personnel, or attorneys—have made this agency great. DEA's earliest employees created the strong DEA family we have today with its traditions, loyalty, camaraderie, and passion for the job.

We believe so fully in our mission that we put our lives on the line for it. Seventy-six brave DEA employees and law enforcement partners have made the ultimate sacrifice to free this country of drugs, and we honor them by continuing to fight for the cause to which they gave their lives.

I know you are as proud as I am of this agency and our many accomplishments over 35 years. Whether you're new on the job or are at the end of your career, and whether you carry a badge or not, you are contributing to the success of our small "can-do" agency. I want to take this opportunity on our anniversary to thank each and every one of you for your contributions, dedication, and passion for our mission. You have helped make DEA what we are today: an agency with a 35-year tradition of excellence fighting to free this nation of illegal drugs.

Michele Leonhart

Michele M. Leonhart
Acting Administrator

DEA Genealogy

History of Federal Drug Law Enforcement

July 1, 1973	**Drug Enforcement Administration** U.S. Department of Justice
1972	Office of Drug Abuse Law Enforcement (ODALE) Office of National Narcotics Intelligence (ONNI)
1971	Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention
1968	Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) U.S. Department of Justice
1966	Bureau of Drug Abuse Control (BDAC) Food and Drug Administration Department of Health, Education and Welfare
1930	Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN) U.S. Department of Treasury
1927	Bureau of Prohibition U.S. Department of Treasury
1922	Prohibition Unit Bureau of Internal Revenue
1914	Bureau of Internal Revenue U.S. Department of Treasury

DEA was created on July 1,1973, under the Nixon Administration. An Executive Order abolished BNDD, ODALE and ONNI, and placed their functions under the new DEA, along with certain functions of the Customs Service, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) and the White House Office of Science and Technology. All aspects of Federal drug law enforcement were, thus, combined under DEA's leadership.

In the spring and summer of 1973, the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate heard months of testimony on Richard Nixon's Reorganization Plan Number 2, which proposed the creation of a single federal agency to consolidate and coordinate the Government's drug control activities.

1970-1975

Drug use had not reached its all-time peak, but the problem was serious enough to warrant a serious response.

The long, proud, and honorable tradition of federal drug law enforcement began in 1915 with the Bureau of Internal Revenue. In the following decades, several federal agencies had drug law enforcement responsibilities. By the 1960s, the two agencies charged with drug law enforcement were the Bureau of Drug Abuse Control (BDAC) and the federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN). It was during this period that America underwent a significant change. The introduction of drugs into American culture and the efforts to "normalize" drug use started to take a terrible toll on the nation. Nevertheless, American children could still walk to school in relative safety, worrying only about report cards or the neighborhood bully. Today however, as children approach their schools, they see barbed wire, metal detectors, and signs warning drug dealers that school property is a "drug free zone." In too many communities, drug dealers and gunfire force decent, law-abiding citizens to seek refuge behind locked doors.

In 1960, only four million Americans had ever tried drugs. Currently, that number has risen to over 74 million. Behind these statistics are the stories of countless families, communities, and individuals adversely affected by drug abuse and drug trafficking.

Prior to the 1960s, Americans did not see drug use as acceptable behavior, nor did they believe that drug use was an inevitable fact of life. Indeed, tolerance of drug use resulted in terrible increases in crime between the 1960s and the early 1990s, and the landscape of America has been altered forever.

By the early 1970s, drug use had not yet reached its all-time peak, but the problem was sufficiently serious to warrant a serious response. Consequently, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) was created in 1973 to deal with America's growing drug problem.

At that time, the well-organized international drug trafficking syndicates headquartered in Colombia and Mexico had not yet assumed their place on the world stage as the preeminent drug suppliers. All of the heroin and cocaine, and most of the marijuana that entered the United States was being trafficked by lesser international drug dealers who had targeted cities and towns within the nation. Major law enforcement investigations, such as the French Connection made by agents in the DEA's predecessor agency, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD), graphically illustrated the complexity and scope of America's heroin problem.

In the years prior to 1973, several important developments took place which would ultimately have a significant impact on the DEA and federal drug control efforts for years to come. By the time that the DEA was created by Executive Order in July 1973 to establish a single unified command, America was beginning to see signs of the drug and crime epidemic that lay ahead. In order to appreciate how the DEA has evolved into the important law enforcement institution it is today, it must be understood that many of its programs have roots in predecessor agencies.

On December 14, 1970, at the White House, the International Narcotic Enforcement Officers' Association (INEOA) presented to President Nixon a "certificate of special honor in recognition of the outstanding loyalty and contribution to support narcotic law enforcement." Standing with President Nixon were (from left) John E. Ingersoll, Director of BNDD; John Bellizzi, Executive Director of INEOA; and Matthew O'Conner, President of INEOA.

DEA Special Agents
1973..........1,470
1975..........2,135

DEA Budget
1973..........$74.9 million
1975..........$140.9 million

BNDD

John E. Ingersoll
Director, BNDD
1968-1973

John E. Ingersoll *served as Director of the U.S. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) from 1968 until 1973. He began his career as a patrolman and then sergeant for the Oakland, California, Police Department from 1956 until 1961, when he became the Director of Field Services for the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP). He served with the IACP until 1966, when he became the chief of police for Charlotte, North Carolina, until his appointment as Director of BNDD in 1973. He was also the U.S. Representative to the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs from 1969 to 1973. From 1973 to 1993, Mr. Ingersoll worked for the IBM Corporation, serving as Director of Security for IBM's International Business Unit and the IBM World Trade Subsidiary. Since April 1993, he has worked as an independent consultant to business and government.*

Before the creation of the DEA in 1973, multiple law enforcement and intelligence organizations carried out federal drug enforcement policies.

In 1968, with the introduction into Congress of Reorganization Plan No. 1, President Johnson proposed combining two agencies into a third new drug enforcement agency. The action merged the Bureau of Narcotics, in the Treasury Department, which was responsible for the control of marijuana and narcotics such as heroin, with the Bureau of Drug Abuse Control (BDAC), in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, which was responsible for the control of dangerous drugs, including depressants, stimulants, and hallucinogens, such as LSD. The new agency, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD), was placed under the Department of Justice, which is the government agency primarily concerned with federal law enforcement.

According to the Reorganization Plan, "the Attorney General will have full authority and responsibility for enforcing the federal laws relating to narcotics and dangerous drugs. The BNDD, headed by a Director appointed by the Attorney General, would:

(1) consolidate the authority and preserve the experience and manpower of the Bureau of Narcotics and Bureau of Drug Abuse Control;

(2) work with state and local governments in their crackdown on illegal trade in drugs and narcotics, and help to train local agents and investigators;

(3) maintain worldwide operations, working closely with other nations, to suppress the trade in illicit narcotics and marijuana; and

(4) conduct an extensive campaign of research and a nationwide public education program on drug abuse and its tragic effects."

The BNDD became the primary drug law enforcement agency and concentrated its efforts on both international and interstate activities. By 1970, the BNDD had nine foreign offices—in Italy, Turkey, Panama, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Thailand, Mexico, France, and Colombia—to respond to the dynamics of the drug trade. Domestically, the agency initiated a task force approach involving federal, state, and local officers. The first such task force was set up in New York City.

In addition, the BNDD established Metropolitan Enforcement Groups, which were based on the regional enforcement concept that provided for sharing undercover personnel, equipment, and other resources from different jurisdictions. The BNDD provided training and operational support for these units. By February 1972, the BNDD's agent strength had grown to 1,361, its budget had more than quadrupled, and its foreign and domestic arrest totals had doubled. In addition, the BNDD had regulatory control over more than 500,000 registrants licensed to distribute licit drugs, and it had six sophisticated forensic labs.



SPECIAL

BNDD BULLETIN

Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs / U.S. Department of Justice

THE PRESIDENT

Proclamation 3981

DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION WEEK, 1970

By the President of the United States of America

A Proclamation

Richard Nixon

ABOVE: With Proclamation 3981, President Richard Nixon designated the week of May 24 as Drug Abuse Prevention Week in 1970.

BELOW: Vol.III No.I BNDD Bulletin

March-April 1971

BNDD BULLETIN

BUREAU OF NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS DRUGS / U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

The seal for the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs is bold and contemporary in design, reflecting the Bureau's approach to the world of today. The words radiating around the outside show the U.S. Department of Justice on top, and the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs underneath.

The circle symbolizes unity and stability.

The eagle in full flight represents the traditional bald eagle in the official Presidential Seal. It is a dignified, strong bird who soars through the atmosphere, symbolizing the Bureau's unceasing vitality and energy, in surveillance of world-wide drug trafficking.

The globe is the eagle's territory, symbolizing the international scope of the Bureau's activities. The positioning of the globe shows the focal point of our Bureau, which is the United States of America.

The sunburst of radiating light is taken from the badge, worn proudly by the Special Agents of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, symbolizing enforcement through knowledge and enlightenment.

The Attorney General

ODALE

Myles J. Ambrose
Director, ODALE
1972-1973

On January 28, 1972, President Nixon created the Office of Drug Abuse Law Enforcement (ODALE), within the Department of Justice by Executive Order 11641. The Office was headed by Myles Ambrose, who had served as U.S. Commissioner of Customs at the Treasury Department from 1969 until 1972. As Director of ODALE, Mr. Ambrose served as Special Assistant Attorney General and as Special Consultant to the President. ODALE was established for an 18-month period as an experimental approach to the problem of drug abuse in America. During that time, ODALE conducted intensive operations throughout the country, then evaluated their impact on heroin trafficking at the middle and lower distribution levels. ODALE's objective was "to bring substantial federal resources to bear on the street-level heroin pusher."

Organizationally, the office drew heavily upon the expertise of existing federal law enforcement agencies to coordinate and focus resources and manpower. ODALE programs involved close, full-time working relationships among participating federal, state, and local officers who, while reporting administratively to their respective agencies, took direction from ODALE.

ODALE provided common office space for the personnel assigned to it, and all salaries and other costs were borne by the parent organization on a nonreimbursable basis. Justice Department entities involved included the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Immigration and Naturalization Service, U.S. Marshals Service, the Tax Division, and offices of the U.S. Attorneys in the cities where the heroin problem was concentrated. Treasury Department entities included the Internal Revenue Service, the Bureau of Customs, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. In addition, non-law enforcement federal agencies contributing personnel and other assistance included the Atomic Energy Commission, the U.S. Air Force, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Interstate Commerce Commission.

By 1972, ODALE headquarters had 79 authorized positions and nine regional offices. It targeted street-level drug dealers through special grand juries and pooled intelligence data for federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. Regional offices were based in Los Angeles, Denver, Houston, Kansas City, Chicago, Cleveland, Atlanta, New York City, and Philadelphia. ODALE task forces operated in 38 target cities through investigation-prosecution teams and special grand juries which considered indictments.

In 1998, Mr. Ambrose was with Arter and Hadden, LLP, in Washington, D.C.

DEA Genealogy


Bureau of Prohibition
Department of the Treasury
1927-1930
Bureau of Internal Revenue
Department of the Treasury
1915-1927
Bureau of Narcotics
Department of the Treasury
1930-1968
Bureau of Drug Abuse Control
Food & Drug Administration
Dept. of Health, Education & Welfare
1966-1968
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
Department of Justice
1968-1973
U.S. Customs Service
(Drug Investigations)
Department of the Treasury
Office of National Narcotics Intelligence
Department of Justice
Drug Enforcement Administration
Department of Justice
1973
Office of Drug Abuse Law Enforcement
(ODALE)
Department of Justice
Narcotics Advance Research Management Team
Executive Office of the President

Foreign Offices Opened

1960	Paris, France
1960	Rome, Italy
1961	Istanbul, Turkey
1963	Bangkok, Thailand
1963	Mexico City, Mexico
1963	Monterrey, Mexico
1963	Hong Kong
1963	Singapore
1966	Lima, Peru
1966	Seoul, S. Korea
1969	Guadalajara, Mexico
1970	Buenos Aires, Argentina
1970	Frankfurt, Germany
1970	Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
1970	London, England
1970	Madrid, Spain
1970	Manila, Philippines
1970	Santiago, Chile
1970	Tokyo, Japan
1971	Ankara, Turkey
1971	Asuncion, Paraguay
1971	Caracas, Venezuela
1971	Chiang Mai, Thailand
1971	Brasilia, Brazil
1971	Hermosillo, Mexico
1971	Milan, Italy
1972	Bogota, Colombia
1972	Bonn, Germany
1972	Brussels, Belgium
1972	La Paz, Bolivia
1972	New Dehli, India
1972	Panama City, Panama
1972	Quito, Ecuador
1973	Islamabad, Pakistan
1973	Mazatlan, Mexico
1973	Ottawa, Canada
1974	Guayaquil, Equador
1974	Karachi, Pakistan
1974	Kingston. Jamaica
1974	San Jose, Costa Rica
1974	Songkhla, Thailand
1974	The Hague, Netherlands
1974	Vienna, Austria

New York Task Force (1970)



1970: Bruce E. Jensen, Chief, New York Drug Enforcement Task Force, explained how the prototype of the Task Force began with 43 investigators from federal, state, and city personnel, along with a small support staff.

In 1970, the first narcotics task force was established in New York under the auspices of the BNDD to maximize the impact of cooperating federal, state, and local law enforcement elements working on complex drug investigations. Bruce Jensen, former chief of the New York Drug Enforcement Task Force, described it "not as a monument...but a foundation firm enough to withstand the test of time." At the time, heroin was a significant problem, and law enforcement officials were seeking ways to reduce availability and identify and prosecute those responsible for heroin trafficking. Federal, state, and municipal law enforcement organizations put aside rivalries and agreed to collaborate within the framework of the New York Joint Task Force. The task force program also became an essential part of the DEA's operations and reflected the belief that success is only possible through cooperative investigative efforts. The BNDD, the New York State Police, and the New York City Police Department contributed personnel to work with Department of Justice lawyers and support staff. The rationale behind the Task Force was that each representative brought different and valuable perspectives and experiences to the table and that close collaboration among the membership could result in cross-training and the sharing of expertise. Since then, the Task Force expanded from the original 43 members. In 1971 it increased to 172 members, and by 2003 it had 211 law enforcement personnel assigned.

In February 1972, the New York Joint Task Force seized $967,000 during a Bronx arrest. New York City Police Captain Robert Howe (left) and BNDD agent Theodore L. Vernier are shown counting the money.

In April 1973, New York City Police and federal agents arrested 69 drug traffickers who were believed to be capable of distributing 100 kilograms of cocaine a week.

Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act (1970)

In response to America's growing drug problem, Congress passed the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), Title II of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970. It replaced more than 50 pieces of drug legislation, went into effect on May 1, 1971, and was enforced by the BNDD, the DEA's predecessor agency. This law, along with its implementing regulations, established a single system of control for both narcotic and psychotropic drugs for the first time in U.S. history.

It also established five schedules that classify controlled substances according to how dangerous they are, their potential for abuse and addiction, and whether they possess legitimate medical value. Thirty three years later, the CSA, though amended on several occasions, remained the legal framework from which the DEA derived its authority.

Members of a 1972 Compliance Investigator class were trained in drug identification.

1970: BNDD's Compliance Investigators frequently found that pharmacy violators of narcotics and drug laws also lacked professional responsibility in other areas. The unsavory sanitary conditions of the storage room pictured here were found during a BNDD pharmacy investigation in Louisiana.

Diversion Control Program (1971)

In the 1969 U.S. Senate hearings on the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), witnesses estimated that 50 percent of the amphetamine being produced annually during the 1960s had found its way into the illicit drug traffic. Following the passage of the CSA in 1970, it was imperative that the U.S. Government establish mechanisms to ensure that this growing diversion of legal drugs into the illicit market be addressed. In 1970, over two billion dosage units of amphetamine and methamphetamine were producing excessive amounts of pharmaceuticals.

Thus, the controls mandated by the CSA encompassed scheduling, manufacturing, distributing, prescribing, importing, exporting, and other related activities. They also provided the BNDD with the legal tools needed to deal with the diversion problem as it existed at that time. Prior to the CSA, investigations involving the diversion of legitimate pharmaceuticals were conducted solely by special agents as part of their enforcement activities. However, shortly after implementation of the CSA, BNDD management recognized that the investigation of diversion cases differed significantly from investigation of traditional narcotics cases.

In late 1971, the Compliance Program, later renamed the Diversion Control Program, was created to provide a specialized work force that could focus exclusively on the diversion issue and take full advantage of the controls and penalties established by the CSA.

This work force developed an in-depth knowledge of the legitimate pharmaceutical industry and the investigative techniques needed to make cases that were essential to investigate legitimate organizations and professionals engaged in drug diversion. The program was placed under the BNDD's Office of Enforcement and staffed by compliance investigators, later called diversion investigators.

The first major challenge these investigators faced was the extraordinary amount of amphetamines and barbiturates being diverted at the manufacturer and distributor levels. The year the CSA went into effect, over 2,000 provisional registrations were issued to manufacturers and distributors who had been operating under the Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914 and the Drug Abuse Control Amendments. In order to stem the diversion problem, it was necessary to enlist the support of manufacturers, wholesalers, distributors, and pharmacists for regular inspections of records and premises. It was also necessary to establish a system of registration to ensure that law enforcement investigators had access to the records and physical plants maintained by those responsible for the manufacture and distribution of drugs.

The first inspections of registrants revealed instances where drug handlers were operating out of basements and garages with little or no security and were unable to account for the receipt or distribution of the drugs they handled. In order to ensure that the diversion of dangerous drugs did not continue, it was critical that meaningful punitive measures could be taken against the minority of registrants responsible for the diversion of drugs into the illegal market. Offenders were given the option of either surrendering their controlled substances registration or instituting strict controls necessary to prevent diversion in their offices and organizations. Establishments and individuals who continued to violate the law were subject to criminal, civil, or administrative actions.

As the program developed, it became clear that the diversion of drugs was not simply a domestic issue. It became essential that controls on international supplies of legal drugs also be established. In the early 1970s, there were several examples of foreign subsidiaries of U.S. drug manufacturers becoming the main suppliers of illicit drugs, such as amphetamine, to the black market in the United States. Through revocation of drug manufacturers' export licenses, the BNDD, and then the DEA, were able to successfully reduce the influx of illegal licit drugs into the United States.



Drug Abuse Prevention Commemorative U.S. Postage Stamp

On October 4, 1971, the U.S. Postal Service issued a stamp to commemorate the Prevention efforts of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. It was designed by Suzanne Rice and K. Gardner Perine of the BNDD Graphic Section.

Diplomat-trafficker Mauricio Rosales, the Guatemalan ambassador to Belgium, was using his diplomatic status to smuggle in 100 kilos of heroin in these three suitcases.

At Idlewild Airport (now JFK) in New York, Etienne Tarditi, a French Corsican trafficker (trenchcoat),. He was coming to meet his drug courier, help deliver heroin to New York gangsters, and collect payment.

Bureau of Narcotics agents who worked on Rosales case pose with suitcases filled with heroin.

Illegal heroin labs were first discovered near Marseilles, France, in 1937. These labs were run by the legendary Corsican gang leader Paul Carbone. For years, the French underworld had been involved in the manufacturing and trafficking of illegal heroin abroad, primarily in the United States. It was this heroin network that eventually became known as the French Connection.

Historically, the raw material for most of the heroin consumed in the United States came from Turkey. Turkish farmers were licensed to grow opium poppies for sale to legal drug companies, but many sold their excess to the underworld market, where it was manufactured into heroin and transported to the United States. It was refined in Corsican laboratories in Marseilles, one of the busiest ports in the western Mediterranean. Marseilles served as a perfect shipping point for all types of illegal goods, including the excess opium that Turkish farmers cultivated for profit.

The convenience of the port at Marseilles and the frequent arrival of ships from opium-producing countries made it easy to smuggle the morphine base to Marseilles from the Far East or the Near East. The French underground would then ship large quantities of heroin from Marseilles to Manhattan, New York.

The first significant post-World War II seizure was made in New York on February 5, 1947, when seven pounds of heroin were seized from a Corsican seaman disembarking from a vessel that had just arrived from France.

It soon became clear that the French underground was increasing not only its participation in the illegal trade of opium, but also its expertise and efficiency in heroin trafficking. On March 17, 1947, 28 pounds of heroin were found on the French liner, *St. Tropez*. On January 7, 1949, more than 50 pounds of opium and heroin were seized on the French ship, *Batista*.

The first major French Connection case occurred in 1960. In June, an informant told a drug agent in Lebanon that Mauricio Rosal, the Guatemalan Ambassador to Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, was smuggling morphine base from Beirut, Lebanon, to Marseilles. Narcotics agents had been seizing about 200 pounds of heroin in a typical year, but intelligence showed that the Corsican traffickers were smuggling in 200 pounds every other week. Rosal alone, in one year, had used his diplomatic status to bring in about 440 pounds.

The FBN's 1960 annual report estimated that from 2,600 to 5,000 pounds of heroin were coming into the United States annually from France. The French traffickers continued to exploit the demand for their illegal product, and by 1969, they were supplying the United States with 80 to 90 percent of the heroin consumed by addicts. The heroin they supplied was approximately 85 percent pure.

Because of this increasing volume, heroin became readily available throughout the United States. In an effort to limit the source, U.S. officials went to Turkey to negotiate the phasing out of opium production. Initially, the Turkish Government agreed to limit their opium production starting with the 1968 crop.

Following five subsequent years of concessions, combined with international cooperation, the Turkish government finally agreed in 1971 to a complete ban on the growing of Turkish opium, effective June 30, 1972. During these protracted negotiations, law enforcement personnel went into action. One of the major roundups began on January 4, 1972, when BNDD agents and French authorities seized 110 pounds of heroin at the Paris airport. Subsequently, traffickers Jean-Baptiste Croce and Joseph Mari were arrested in Marseilles.

In February 1972, French traffickers offered a U.S. Army Sergeant $96,000 to smuggle 240 pounds of heroin into the United States. He informed his superior who in turn notified the BNDD. As a result of this investigation, five men in New York and two in Paris were arrested with 264 pounds of heroin, which had a street value of $50 million. In a 14-month period, starting in February 1972, six major illicit heroin laboratories were seized and dismantled in the suburbs of Marseilles by French national narcotics police in collaboration with U.S. drug agents. On February 29, 1972, French authorities seized the shrimp boat, *Caprice de Temps*, as it put to sea near Marseilles heading towards Miami. It was carrying 415 kilos of heroin. Drug arrests in France skyrocketed from 57 in 1970 to 3,016 in 1972. The French Connection investigation demonstrated that international trafficking networks were best disabled by the combined efforts of drug enforcement agencies from multiple countries. In this case, agents from the United States, Canada, Italy, and France had worked together to achieve success.

February 14, 1973: A 20-kilo heroin seizure in Paris, France. Pictured left to right are,S/A Pierre Charette, S/A Kevin Finnerty, and French anti-drug counterparts.

From a 1973 French Connection seizure in France, (pictured above) are 210 pounds of heroin worth $38 million .

First Female Special Agents

1933: Mrs. Elizabeth Bass was appointed the first of many female narcotics agents in the United States and served as District Supervisor in Chicago. A longtime friend of First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt, she played a prominent role in gaining political support for the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act.

1971: The DEA's predecessor agency, the BNDD, became one of the first federal agencies to implement a program for hiring female special agents.

1973: Ms. Mary Turner became the first female DEA special agent to graduate from the DEA's training program. She finished first in her class.

1974: Twenty-three female special agents were working in DEA field offices throughout the United States.

Creation of the DEA (July 1, 1973)

In 1973, President Richard Nixon signed the Executive Order which created the DEA.

No. 11727

July 10, 1973, 38 F.R. 18357

DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT

Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1973, which becomes effective on July 1, 1973, among other things establishes a ***Drug Enforcement Administration*** in the Department of Justice. In my message to the Congress transmitting that plan, I stated that all functions of the Office for Drug Abuse Law Enforcement (established pursuant to Executive Order No. 11641 of January 28, 1972) and the Office of National Narcotics Intelligence (established pursuant to Executive Order No. 16676 of July 27, 1972) would, together with other related functions be merged in the new Drug Enforcement Administration.

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and laws of the United States, including section 5317 of title 5 of the United States Code, as amended, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. The Attorney General, to the extent permitted by law, is authorized to coordinate all activities of executive branch departments and agencies which are directly related to the enforcement of laws respecting narcotics and dangerous drugs. Each department and agency of the Federal Government shall, upon request and to the extent permitted by law, assist the Attorney General in the performance of functions assigned to him pursuant to this order, and the Attorney General may, in carrying out those functions, utilize the services of any other agencies, federal and state, as may be available and appropriate.

Sec. 2. Executive Order No. 11641 of January 28, 1972,[1] is hereby revoked and the Attorney General shall provide for the reassignment of the functions of the Office for Drug Abuse Law Enforcement and for the abolishment of that Office.

Sec. 3. Executive Order No. 11676 of July 27, 1972,[1] is hereby revoked and the Attorney General shall provide for the reassignment of the functions of the Office of Narcotics Intelligence and for the abolishment of that Office.

Sec. 4. Section 1 of Executive Order No. 11708 of March 23, 1973,[2] as amended, placing certain positions in level IV of the Executive Schedule is hereby further amended by deleting —

(1) "(6) Director, Office for Drug Abuse Law Enforcement,
Department of Justice"; and
(2) "(7) Director, Office of Narcotics Intelligence,
Department of Justice."

Sec. 5. The Attorney General shall provide for the winding up of the affairs of the two offices and for the reassignment of their functions.

Sec 6. This order shall be effective as of July 1, 1973.

Richard Nixon
THE WHITE HOUSE,
July 6, 1973

In 1973, President Richard Nixon declared "an all-out global war on the drug menace" and sent Reorganization Plan No. 2 to Congress. "Right now," he pointed out, "the federal government is fighting the war on drug abuse under a distinct handicap, for its efforts are those of a loosely confederated alliance facing a resourceful, elusive, worldwide enemy. Certainly, the cold-blooded underworld networks that funnel narcotics from suppliers all over the world are no respecters of the bureaucratic dividing lines that now complicate our anti-drug efforts."

In the spring and summer of 1973, the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate heard months of testimony on President Nixon's Reorganization Plan Number 2, which proposed the creation of a single federal agency to consolidate and coordinate the government's drug control activities.

At that time, the BNDD, within the Department of Justice, was responsible for enforcing the federal drug laws. However, the U.S. Customs Service and several other Justice entities (ODALE and the Office of National

Narcotics Intelligence) were also responsible for various aspects of federal drug law enforcement. Of great concern to the Administration and the Congress were the growing availability of drugs in most areas of the United States, the lack of coordination and the perceived lack of cooperation between the U.S. Customs Service and the BNDD, and the need for better intelligence collection on drug trafficking organizations.

According to the final report from the Senate Committee on Government Operations issued on October 16, 1973, the benefits anticipated from the creation of the DEA included:

1. Putting an end to the interagency rivalries that have undermined federal drug law enforcement, especially the rivalry between the BNDD and the U.S. Customs Service;

2. Giving the FBI its first significant role in drug enforcement by requiring that the DEA draw on the FBI's expertise in combatting organized crime's role in the trafficking of illicit drugs;

3. Providing a focal point for coordinating federal drug enforcement efforts with those of state and local authorities, as well as with foreign police forces;

4. Placing a single Administrator in charge of federal drug law enforcement in order to make the new DEA more accountable than its component parts had ever been, thereby safeguarding against corruption and enforcement abuses;

5. Consolidating drug enforcement operations in the DEA and establishing the Narcotics Division in Justice to maximize coordination between federal investigation and prosecution efforts and eliminate rivalries within each sphere; and

6. Establishing the DEA as a superagency to provide the momentum needed to coordinate all federal efforts related to drug enforcement outside the Justice Department, especially the gathering of intelligence on international narcotics smuggling.

John R. Bartels, Jr.
DEA Administrator
1973-1975

On September 12, 1973, the White House selected John R. Bartels, Jr., a native of Brooklyn, New York, a former federal prosecutor, and Deputy Director of the ODALE, to be the DEA's first Administrator. He was confirmed by the U.S. Senate on October 4, 1973. Prior to his employment with the ODALE and the DEA, Mr. Bartels had been an Assistant U.S. Attorney, Southern District of New York, from 1964-1968. From 1969-1971, he was an Adjunct Professor, Rutgers University School of Law. From 1972-1973, Mr. Bartels was the Chief of the Organized Crime Strike-Force, U.S. Department of Justice, Newark, New Jersey; Counsel to Governor Nelson Rockefeller; and Deputy Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal Division. He was later a delegate for the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs in 1974. He currently resides in White Plains, New York.

Early Developments in the DEA

When John R. Bartels, Jr., was confirmed as the DEA's first Administrator on October 4, 1973, he had two goals for the new agency: (1) to integrate narcotics agents and U.S. Customs agents into one effective force; and (2) to restore public confidence in narcotics law enforcement. From the very beginning, Mr. Bartels was faced with the unenviable task of unifying the efforts of several drug law enforcement entities. One of the most serious obstacles arose from conflicting philosophies of various agencies, particularly the BNDD and the U.S. Customs Service. To ease the process, U.S. Customs agents were placed in top positions throughout the DEA. For example, Fred Rody, Regional Director in Miami, became the DEA's Deputy Administrator in December 1979; John Lund was appointed as Deputy Assistant Administrator; and John Fallon named as Regional Director in New York. Administrator Bartels issued specific instructions to federal narcotics agents: "This Statement of Policy outlines the measures taken by the Drug Enforcement Administration to prevent incidents which might infringe on individual rights or jeopardize the successful prosecution of a case. The guidelines require clear-cut lines of command and control in enforcement situations and stress that operations must be carried out in a manner that is legally correct, morally sound, with full respect for the civil rights, human dignity of persons involved, and the sanctity of the home." The guidelines also restricted vehicular arrests and prohibited participation in raids by non-law enforcement personnel.

Creation of the DEA Intelligence Program (1973)

Intelligence had long been recognized as an essential element in the success of any investigative or law enforcement agency. Accurate and up-to-date information was required to assess the operations and vulnerabilities of criminal networks, to interdict drugs in a systematic way, to forecast new methods of trafficking, to evaluate the impact of previous activities, and to establish long-range drug strategies and policies. Included in the DEA mission was a mandate for drug intelligence. The DEA's Office of Intelligence came into being on July 1, 1973, upon implementation of Presidential Reorganization Plan No. 2. The Code of Federal Regulations charged the Administrator of the DEA with:

> The development and maintenance of a National Narcotics Intelligence system in cooperation with federal, state, and local officials, and the provision of narcotics intelligence to any federal, state, or local official that the Administrator determines has a legitimate official need to have access to such intelligence.

To support this mission, specific functions were identified as follows:

- Collect and produce intelligence to support the Administrator and other federal, state, and local agencies;
- Establish/maintain close working relationships with all agencies that produce or use drug intelligence;
- Increase the efficiency in the reporting, analysis, storage, retrieval, and exchange of such information; and
- Undertake a continuing review of the narcotics intelligence effort to identify and correct deficiencies.

The DEA divided drug intelligence into three broad categories: tactical, operational, and strategic. Tactical intelligence provides immediate support to investigative efforts by identifying traffickers and movement of drugs. Operational intelligence provides analytical support to investigations and structuring organizations. Strategic intelligence focuses on developing a comprehensive and current picture of the entire system by which drugs are cultivated, produced, transported, smuggled, and distributed around the world. These definitions remain valid in 1998.



George M. Belk
Assistant Administrator for Intelligence
July 1973-July 31, 1975

To build upon its drug intelligence mandate in 1973, the DEA's Intelligence Program consisted of two major elements: the Office of Intelligence at Headquarters and the Regional Intelligence Units (RIU) in domestic and foreign field offices. The structure of the Office of Intelligence was divided into five entities: International and Domestic Divisions, Strategic Intelligence Staff, Special Operations and Field Support Staff, and the Intelligence Systems Staff. Its structure paralleled that of the Office of Enforcement.

The RIUs had four objectives: (1) Provide a continuing flow of actionable intelligence to enhance the tactical effectiveness of regional enforcement efforts; (2) Support management planning of the overall regional enforcement program; (3) Contribute to interregional and strategic collection programs of the Office of Intelligence; and (4) Facilitate exchange of intelligence information with state and local law enforcement domestically and with host-country enforcement abroad.

Initially, the Intelligence Program was staffed by DEA special agents, with very few professional intelligence analysts (I/As). In DEA's first I/A class in 1974, there were only eleven I/As. However, during the last 30 years, the Intelligence Program has grown significantly. From only a few I/As in the field and Headquarters in 1973, the cadre of I/As now numbers 730.

The Unified Intelligence Division (UID) (1973)

In October 1973, the DEA's first field intelligence unit based on the task force concept was created. The unit, named the Unified Intelligence Division (UID), included DEA special agents, DEA intelligence analysts, New York State Police investigators, and New York City detectives. Along with its unique status as an intelligence task force, the UID was also one of the first field intelligence units to systematically engage all aspects of the intelligence process, specifically collection, evaluation, analysis, and dissemination. This pioneering role expanded the horizons of drug law enforcement field intelligence units, which, at the time, were often limited to collecting information, maintaining dossiers, and providing limited case support. This proactive stance was immediately successful as UID was able to develop and disseminate extensive intelligence on traditional organized crime-related drug traffickers and identify not only the leaders, but also those who were likely to become leaders. UID also developed and disseminated intelligence throughout the federal, state, and local law enforcement community on the members, associates, and contacts of infamous heroin violator Leroy "Nicky" Barnes. Significant intelligence operations continued through the 1980s, with UID taking a leading role in providing intelligence on the crack cocaine epidemic and on Cali cocaine mafia operations in New York. The UID's proactive intelligence task force concept continues to build upon successes of the past.

Shortly after the creation of UID, the Drug Enforcement Coordinating System (DECS) was developed. DECS is a repository index system of all active drug cases in the New York metropolitan area. The DECS system connects agencies that have common investigative targets or common addresses that are part of their investigations. It was created to enhance officer safety and to promote greater cooperation and coordination among drug law enforcement agencies by preventing duplication of effort on overlapping investigations being conducted by member agencies. DECS, which began as a joint venture of DEA/NYSP/NYPD housed in the UID, now has a membership of 40 investigative units involved in drug law enforcement, and is the prototype for many similar systems that have since been developed across the country.

DEA Intelligence Analyst Training School #1

DEA Intelligence Analyst Training School #1 (November 1974)

SA Robert McCall
SA Thomas Shreeve
SA Leonard Rzepczynski
SA Charles Henry
SA John Hampe
SA Thomas Anderson
SA Robert Janet
SA Christopher Bean
SA Michael Campbell
SA Donald Bramwell
SA Murry Brown
SA Donald Stowell
SA Arthur Doll
SA Frank Gulich
SA Norman Noordweir
SA Lynn Williams
SA Omar Aleman
SA Ron Garribotto
SA Angelo Saladino
IA Beverly Singleton
IA Ann Augusterfer
IA Adrianne Darnaby
IA Beverly Ager
IA Janet Gunther
IA Joan Philpott
IA Wiliam Munson
IA Brian Boyd
IA Joan Bannister
IA Jennifer Garcia-Tobar
IA Eileen Hayes

National Narcotics Intelligence System (NADDIS)

In 1973, the DEA developed the National Narcotics Intelligence System (NADDIS), which became federal law enforcement's first automated index. The creation of NADDIS was possible because the DEA was the first law enforcement agency in the nation to adopt an all-electronic, centralized, computer database for its records. NADDIS, composed of data from DEA investigative reports and teletypes, provided agents in all DEA domestic offices with electronic access to investigative file data. NADDIS searches could be conducted NADDIS contained approximately 4.5 million records, with 5,000 new records being added every week. NADDIS remains the largest and most frequently used of the 40 specialized information systems operated by the DEA.

Graduation of the First DEA Special Agents

The first DEA Special Agent Basic Training Class (BA-1) graduated on November 16, 1973. Reverend James W. McMurtie, Principal of Bishop Denis J. O'Connell High School in Arlington, Virginia, gave the Invocation honoring the 40 men and women of BA-1, and DEA Administrator Bartels gave the welcome and introductions. The Training Division chief was Paul F. Malherek, and the class counselors were Calvin C. Campbell of the Miami Regional Office, Allen L. Johnson of the New Orleans Regional Office, and Henry S. Lincoln of the San Diego District Office.

BA-1 Graduates

Ralph Arroyo
Terry T. Baldwin
Richard J. Barter
Richard E. Bell
Donald H. Bloch
Henry J. Braud, Jr.
Michael E. Byrnes
James W. Castillo
Andrew G. Cloke
George L. Coleman
Cruz Cordero, Jr.
Salvadore M. Dijamco
Clark S. Edwards
John H. Felts
Andrew G. Fenrich
Carliese R. Gordon
Annabelle Grimm
Bernard Harry
Richard Phillip Holmes
Antonio L. Huertas
Dennis F. Imamura
James Jefferies, Jr.
Richard C. Kazmar
Anthony V. Lobosco
Sherman A. Lucas III
John W. Lugar, Jr.
Edward C. Maher
Charles E. Mathis
Thomas L. Mones
Donald E. Nelson
Dennis A. O'Neil
Juan R. Rodriguez
Thomas J. Salvatore
Edward J. Schlachter
Arthur T. Tahuari
Frank Torres, Jr.
Mary A. Turner
Robert Bruce Upchurch
Adis J. Wells
James Hiram Williams

BA 2 graduate Michael Vigil accepts his certificate from William Dirken, Perry Rivkind, and Paul Malherek of DEA Training.

Joint Efforts with Mexico (1974)

By 1972, the quantity of brown heroin from Mexico available in the United States had risen 40 percent higher than the quantity of white heroin from Europe. Traditional international border control was no longer effective against the problem, and in 1974, the Government of Mexico requested U.S. technical assistance. On January 26, 1974, Operation SEA/M (Special Enforcement Activity in Mexico) was launched in the State of Sinaloa to combat the opium and heroin traffic. One month later, a second joint task force, Operation Endrun, began operations in the State of Guerrero, concentrating on marijuana and heroin interdiction. Meanwhile, a third effort, Operation Trident, focused on controlling the traffic of illegally manufactured dangerous drugs produced in Mexico. Despite the fact that law enforcement in Mexico had some successes, these early efforts did not, in the long term, prevent the development of powerful drug trafficking organizations based in Mexico.

Administrator John R. Bartels, flanked by two armed members of the Mexican Federal Judicial Police, made an on-the-spot inspection of the poppy eradication program during a 1974 visit to Mexico.

The Collapse of the DEA Miami Office Building (1974)

The DEA was still a new agency when tragedy struck the Miami Field Division. On August 5, 1974, at 10:24 a.m., the roof of the Miami office came crashing down, killing seven and trapping others in a pile of twisted steel and concrete. Between 125 and 150 people worked in the building. Those who died included: Special Agent Nicholas Fragos; Mary Keehan, Secretary to the Acting Regional Director; Special Agent Charles Mann; Anna Y. Mounger, Secretary; Anna Pope, Fiscal Assistant; Martha D. Skeels, Supervisory Clerk-Typist; and Mary P. Sullivan, Clerk-Typist. Although the people who were in the building thought it was an explosion or an earthquake, officials initially theorized that the dozens of cars in the parking facility on the roof were too heavy for the six-inch-thick slab of concrete supporting them. Later, it was found that the resurfaced parking lot, coupled with salt in the sand, had eroded and weakened the supporting steel structure of the building. The section that collapsed contained a processing room and a laboratory. The building was erected in 1925, and in 1968 had undergone a full engineering inspection, at which time it was cleared to house DEA offices.

Rescue workers took injured victims from the Miami building.

El Paso Intelligence Center (1974)

In 1973, with increasing drug activity along the Southwest Border, the BNDD found that information on drugs was being collected by the DEA, Customs, BNDD, FBI, and FAA, but was not being coordinated. The DEA and the INS were also collecting information on the smuggling of aliens and guns. In 1974, the Department of Justice submitted a report from that BNDD study entitled, "A Secure Border: An Analysis of Issues Affecting the U.S. Department of Justice" to the Office of Management and Budget that provided recommendations to improve drug and border enforcement operations along the Southwest Border. One of the recommendations proposed the establishment of a regional intelligence center to collect and disseminate information relating to drug, illegal alien, and weapons smuggling to support field enforcement agencies throughout the country. As a result, in 1974, the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) was established to provide tactical intelligence to federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies on a national scale. Staffed by representatives of the DEA and the INS, EPIC has since expanded into a national drug intelligence center supporting U.S. law enforcement entities that focus on worldwide drug smuggling.

Drug Abuse Warning Network (1974)

In 1974, the Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN) was designed and developed by the scientific staff of the DEA's Office of Science and Technology. DAWN was created to assist the federal government in identifying and evaluating the scope and extent of drug abuse in the United States. It was jointly funded with the National Institute of Drug Abuse. DAWN incorporated data from various sources of intelligence within the DEA and from such outside sources as federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, the pharmaceutical industry, and scientific literature. Over 1,300 different facilities supply data to the program.

Beginning in the early 1970s, DAWN collected information on patients seeking hospital emergency treatment related to their use of an illegal drug or the nonmedical use of a legal drug. Data were collected by trained reporters (nurses and other hospital personnel) who reviewed medical charts. They monitored notations by the hospital personnel who treated the patients that drug use was the reason for the emergency visit.

Hospitals participating in DAWN are non-federal, short-stay general hospitals that feature a 24-hour emergency department. Since 1988, the DAWN data was collected from a representative sample of these hospitals located throughout the United States, including 21 specific metropolitan areas. The data from this sample were used to generate estimates of the total number of emergency department drug episodes and drug mentions in all such hospitals.

Narcotic Addict Treatment Act (1974)

Public Law 93-281

The Narcotic Addict Treatment Act was passed in 1974 and amended the Controlled Substances Act to provide for the separate registration of doctors and other practitioners who used narcotic drugs in the treatment of addicts. It also provided physicians who were treating narcotic addiction with specific guidelines and medications. This act eliminated the indiscriminate prescription of narcotics to addicts and reduced the diversion of pharmaceutical narcotics.

In 1972, Timothy Leary (center) was brought to justice by DEA Special Agents Don Strange (right) and Howard Safir (left). Leary, a psychology instructor, was fired from his post at Harvard University as a result of his experimentation with LSD. In 1969, he founded a clandestine drug-trafficking ring, known as the Brotherhood of Eternal Love, that became the largest supplier of hashish and LSD in the United States.

A 1970 raid on a Washington, D.C., apartment by metropolitan police officers resulted in the seizure of LSD and marijuana, as well as the unusual antique chandelier pictured above. The light fixtures on the chandelier had been removed and replaced with rubber hose, creating a giant marijuana pipe.

Aviation

In 1971, the BNDD launched its aviation program with one special agent/pilot, one airplane, and a budget of $58,000. The concept of an Air Wing was the brainchild of Marion Joseph, an experienced former United States Air Force pilot and a veteran special agent stationed in Atlanta, Georgia. Over the years, Special Agent Joseph had seen how the police used aircraft for surveillance, search and rescue, and the recapturing of fugitives. His analysis led him to conclude that a single plane "could do the work of five agents and five vehicles on the ground."

As drug trafficking increased nationwide, it became evident that it had no boundaries and that law enforcement needed aviation capabilities. Although Special Agent Joseph convinced his superiors of the merits of his idea, no funding was available. Management told Agent Joseph that if he could find an airplane, they would further consider the Air Wing concept. At this point, Special Agent Joseph approached the United States Air Force, and under the Bailment Property Transfer Program that allows the military to assist other government entities, he secured one airplane—a Vietnam war surplus Cessna Skymaster.

The benefit of air support to drug law enforcement operations became immediately apparent, and the request for airplanes grew rapidly. By 1973, when the DEA was formally established, the Air Wing already had 41 special agent pilots operating 24 aircraft in several major cities across the United States. Most of these aircraft were fixed-wing, single-engine, piston airplanes that were primarily used for domestic surveillance.

Training

The National Training Institute, the DEA's first training program, was located at DEA headquarters, 1405 "Eye" Street in Washington, D.C. At that time, training was divided into three major divisions: special agent training, police training, and international training.

Training was carried out in a three-story bank building adjacent to DEA headquarters that had been converted for training purposes. The building had a gymnasium located on the first floor, lockers and showers in the basement, and a 5-point firing range on the second floor. Special agent trainees were housed in hotels within walking distance of DEA headquarters.

In the absence of the realistic "Hogan's Alley," a life-sized, simulated neighborhood of today, training practicals were conducted on public streets. The DEA had leased a 20-acre farm near Dulles Airport in rural Virginia, as well as a house in Oxen Hill, Maryland, to practice raids and field exercises. Basic Agent training lasted 10 weeks, and the Training Institute supported three classes, with 53 students per class, in session at all times. Graduations occurred every three weeks. Coordinators were from the headquarters staff, and counselors were brought in from the field for temporary training duty. In addition to training basic agents, the DEA also offered training programs for compliance investigators, intelligence analysts, chemists, supervisors, mid-level managers, executives, technical personnel, state and local police officers, and international law enforcement personnel.

Trainee John Wilder

Technology

Over the years, the combination of technology and law enforcement have solved some of the biggest criminal cases in the world. However, by 1998, the DEA's technology ranked among the most sophisticated. That was not always the case. During the DEA's formative years, technical investigative equipment was limited both in supply and technical capabilities. In 1971, the entire budget for investigative technology was less than $1 million. This budget was used to buy radio and investigative equipment and to fund the teletype system.

1975: After seized drugs were used as evidence, they were burned by DEA evidence technicians using special ovens in the presence of responsible witnesses.

Video surveillance was rare because of the size and expense of camera equipment. Cameras were tube type, required special lighting, and could not be concealed. Early video tape recorders were extremely expensive and were reel-to-reel or the very early version of cassettes called U-Matic.

Pen registers, or dialed number recorders, were more advanced than the older versions, which actually punched holes in a tape, similar to an old ticker tape, in response to the pulses from a rotary dialed phone. Pen registers were also limited because federal law at the time required the same degree of probable cause as was required for a Title III Wire Intercept.

Title IIIs were conducted with reel-to-reel tape recorders. However, the DEA did not conduct many Title IIIs because they were labor intensive, and the agency seldom had sufficient personnel to work the intercepts.

In 1973, *body-worn recorders* used by agents during investigations had advanced from large belt packs to smaller versions. However, reliability was always a concern. These old belt types, called KELsets, consisted of a transmitter and a belt of batteries worn by the undercover agent. Unfortunately, the belt was not easily concealable, and the batteries would occasionally overheat and burn the backs of the agents.

When the BNDD was formed it did not have a radio system, but in 1971, the agency began installing a nationwide UHF *radio system* for operations. (The DEA's radio system was installed in 1973.) When an early facsimile machine was installed in 1972, it took six minutes to transmit one page, and pages often had to be re-sent due to communication failures. No paging equipment was available because dedicated frequencies had to be used for each pager. Only doctors and a few select individuals could obtain pagers.

Although *cellular phones* did not exist, there was a mobile telephone service. However, only the DEA Administrator had a mobile phone, and the service was slow and unreliable.



Laboratories

Creation of the Federal Drug Laboratory System

One of the essential functions carried out by the DEA and its predecessor agencies was providing laboratory support. The success of cases made against major drug traffickers depended in part upon analysis of the drug evidence gathered during narcotics investigations. The DEA's laboratory system, one of the finest in the world, has roots in the DEA's predecessor agencies. Although the two predecessor agencies, BDAC and FBN, did not have laboratories under their direct supervision, lab support was available within their respective departments. Ultimately, the DEA's laboratory system began to take shape through the consolidation and transfer of several lab programs within the U.S. Government. The first laboratory personnel transferred to the BNDD came from the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) Division of Pharmaceutical Chemistry and Microanalytical Group in Washington, D.C. They were primarily responsible for performing the ballistics analyses of tablets and capsules, identifying newly-encountered compounds found in drug traffic, and conducting methods development. According to the agreement with the FDA, the new agency would take control of one of the FDA labs. In August 1968, six chemists formed what eventually became the Special Testing and Research Laboratory. The first of the five regional DEA laboratories was the Chicago Regional Laboratory that opened in December 1968. The New York, Washington, Dallas, and San Francisco Regional Laboratories were formed in April 1969. The original chemist work force for these laboratories came from several field laboratories run by government agencies. The professional staffing of the six laboratories consisted of 36 "bench" chemists doing physical lab research, supplemented by five supervisory chemists. In 1970, the first full year of operation, the laboratories analyzed almost 20,000 drug exhibits. During the next two years, the laboratories' work load increased by 46 percent and 19 percent, respectively. To meet the increased work load demand, staffing more than doubled to 94 by 1972 (including laboratory and BNDD headquarters management personnel.) In 1971, both the Washington and Dallas Regional Laboratories moved to larger facilities, and in January 1972, the BNDD opened its sixth regional laboratory in Miami. After the DEA was created, a seventh field laboratory was opened in San Diego in August 1974.

DEA forensic chemist Dr. Albert Tillson is shown analyzing an illegal drug.



The analysis of seized drugs performed by DEA forensic chemists provides evidence that is often essential for the successful prosecution and conviction of drug traffickers.

The Original DEA Forensic Chemists

Headquarters
Frederick Garfield, John Gunn, Richard Frank, and William Butler.
Special Testing and Research Laboratory
Director Stanley Sobol, Albert Tilson, Joseph C. Koles, Victor A. Folen, Robert Ferrera, Francis B. Holmes, and Albert Sperling.
Chicago Regional Laboratory
Director Jerry Nelson, Roger B. Fuelster, Ferris H. Van, David W. Parmalee, Nora L. Williams, Lawrence O. Buer, Dennis E. Korte, and James P. Done.
New York Regional Laboratory
Director Anthony Romano, Elinor R. Swide, Robert Bianchi, Roger F. Canaff, and Paul DeZan.
Washington DC Regional Laboratory
Director Jack Rosenstein, Richard Moore, Thaddeus E. Tomczak, Richard Fox, and Benjamin A. Perillo.
Dallas Regional Laboratory
Director Jim Kluckhohn, Buddy R. Goldston, Charles B. Teer, John D. Wittwer, Richard Ruybal, and Michael D. Miller.
San Francisco Regional Laboratory
Director Robert Sager, Robert Countryman, Claude G. Roe, James Look, James A. Heagy, and John D. Kirk.

Killed in the Line of Duty

Hector Jordan
Died on October 14, 1970
Working as a Supervisory Special Agent with the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Special Agent Jordan died in Chicago in an unprovoked attack by a roving gang.

Gene A. Clifton
Died on November 19, 1971
Palo Alto, California Police Officer Clifton died from injuries received during a joint operation with the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs.

Frank Tummillo
Died on October 12, 1972
Working in the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Special Agent Tummillo was killed during an undercover operation in New York City.

George F. White
Died on March 25, 1973
Special Agent Pilot White of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs was killed when his plane hit a power line near Tucson, Arizona.

Richard Heath, Jr.
Died on April 1, 1973
Special Agent Heath of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs died in Quito, Ecuador, from a gunshot wound received during an undercover operation in Aruba, Netherlands Antilles.

Emir Benitez
Died on August 9, 1973
DEA Special Agent Benitez died from a gunshot wound he received during an undercover cocaine investigation in Fort Lauderdale, Florida.

Gerald Sawyer
Died on November 6, 1973
Detective Sawyer of the Los Angeles, California Police Department, was killed while working in a joint undercover investigation with the DEA.

Leslie S. Grosso
Died on May 21, 1974
Investigator Grosso of the New York State Police was shot during an undercover operation in New York City. He was assigned to the DEA's New York City Joint Task Force.

Nickolas Fragos
Died on August 5, 1974
DEA Special Agent Fragos was killed on his first day of work as a DEA Special Agent. He died as a result of the collapse of the Miami Regional Office Building.

Mary M. Keehan
Died on August 5, 1974
Ms. Keehan, secretary to the Acting Regional Director of the DEA's Miami Regional Office, died as a result of the collapse of the Miami Regional Office building.

Charles H. Mann
Died on August 5, 1974
DEA Special Agent Mann was killed on his first day of work after returning from an overseas assignment. He died as a result of the collapse of the Miami Regional Office building.

Anna Y. Mounger
Died on August 5, 1974
Ms. Mounger, a secretary at the DEA's Miami Regional Office, died as a result of the collapse of the Miami Regional Office building.

Anna J. Pope
Died on August 5, 1974
Mrs. Pope, a fiscal assistant at the DEA's Miami Regional Office, died as a result of the collapse of the Miami Regional Office building.

Martha D. Skeels
Died on August 5, 1974
Ms. Skeels, a supervisory clerk-typist at the DEA's Miami Regional Office, died as a result of the collapse of the Miami Regional Office building.

Mary P. Sullivan
Died on August 5, 1974
Ms. Sullivan, a clerk-typist at the DEA Miami Regional Office, died as a result of the collapse of the Miami Regional Office building.

Because marijuana and cocaine were now considered high status drugs, law enforcement efforts to [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] both drugs.

MASSON
BRANDY

1975-1980

DEA

Henry S. Dogin
Acting
Administrator
1975-1976

Henry S. Dogin was appointed Acting Administrator by Attorney General Edward H. Levi on May 30, 1975, following the resignation of Administrator Bartels. Prior to his appointment, Mr. Dogin was Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Criminal Division and was responsible for directing the Department of Justice's organized crime strike forces as well as overseeing prosecutions related to narcotics. Dogin served as Acting Administrator until January 23, 1976, when he assumed the position of Deputy Commissioner of the Division of Criminal Justice Services for the State of New York.

DEA Special Agents
1975.....2,135
1980.....1,941

DEA Budget
1975.....$140.9 million
1980.....$206.6 million

By 1979, 26 million Americans were considered regular drug users.

During this period, drug use in America escalated, and by 1979, 26 million Americans were considered regular drug users. Government policies urged law enforcement organizations to de-emphasize marijuana and cocaine investigations in favor of increased heroin enforcement activities. Because marijuana and cocaine were not considered high priorities for law enforcement agencies, many Americans believed they were free to use both drugs. Consequently, cocaine and marijuana use became widespread throughout the United States.

The White House White Paper

In early 1975, drug abuse was escalating and the nation faced new challenges on the drug front. By September 1975, President Ford set up the Domestic Council Drug Abuse Task Force, chaired by Vice President Nelson Rockefeller, to assess the extent of drug abuse in America and to make recommendations for handling it. The resulting report, the White Paper, maintained that "all drugs are not equally dangerous. Enforcement efforts should therefore concentrate on drugs which have a high addiction potential..." This report deemed marijuana a minor problem and declared that cocaine was not a problem. "Cocaine," the report stated, "is not physically addictive...and usually does not result in serious social consequences, such as crime, hospital emergency room admissions, or death." The report recommended that "priority in both supply and demand reduction should be directed toward those drugs which inherently pose a greater risk—heroin, amphetamines...and mixed barbiturates."

Specifically, the panel recommended that the DEA and U.S. Customs Service de-emphasize investigations of marijuana and cocaine smuggling and give higher priority to heroin trafficking. This policy shifted enforcement efforts, resources, and manpower away from cocaine cases towards heroin. The report recommended that agents focus on Mexico, a source of both heroin and dangerous drugs, rather than on domestic posts, such as Miami, where they are more likely to "make a cocaine or marijuana case."

Government policy makers were primarily concerned with heroin, and to a lesser extent, amphetamines and barbiturates. Marijuana was still considered by many to be a harmless recreational drug, typically used by college students, and cocaine wasn't considered a serious drug problem. This lack of emphasis on marijuana and cocaine meant that the marijuana smugglers from Colombia and cocaine traffickers faced minimal law enforcement opposition. Moreover, it allowed the traffickers from Colombia to lay the foundations for what would become the powerful Medellin and Cali drug cartels. Both were to pose significant threats to the United States by the late 1970s and early 1980s. Having already established marijuana distribution networks along the East Coast, they were easily able to add cocaine to their illegal shipments.

Central Tactical Units (1975)

In April 1975, the DEA created the first of its central tactical units (CENTAC) to concentrate enforcement efforts against major drug trafficking organizations. Prior to this, due to lack of coordination on a national level, many drug investigations were terminated following the arrest of low-level dealers or an occasional top figure, who was quickly replaced. However, CENTAC targeted major worldwide drug trafficking syndicates from a central, quick-response command post in Washington, D.C. Eight CENTACs investigated heroin manufacturing organizations in Lebanon, Asia, and Mexico. Three other CENTACs targeted large cocaine organizations from Latin America that operated in the United States. Yet other CENTACs dismantled criminal groups that manufactured and distributed LSD, PCP, and amphetamines.

DEA Miami special agents pose with 854 pounds of cocaine seized in May 1980. Pictured from left are: Special Agents Richard Fiano, Rafael Saucedo, John Lawler, Richard Vandiver, David Kunz, and David Gorman.

One CENTAC, 16, was split into West Coast and East Coast investigations, and extended its investigations into Mexico, Puerto Rico, and the Dominican Republic. It dismantled a major international heroin organization, three import groups, and five major New York distribution networks. In addition, it seized approximately $1 million and reaped another $1 million in bail left by fleeing defendants. CENTAC 16 ultimately indicted 100 major traffickers, along with 61 lesser criminals.

The CENTAC program was considered extremely successful. According to a 1980 General Accounting Office Report, "The results of CENTAC investigations have been impressive, not only in terms of the number of high-level traffickers arrested, but also the sentences the traffickers have received...CENTAC results are particularly impressive in light of the small percentage of the DEA's enforcement effort CENTAC comprised." Using only 3 percent of the DEA's enforcement staff and 1.3 percent of its expenditures for information and evidence, CENTAC arrested 2,116 traffickers. This total represented over 12 percent of all Class I violators arrested by the DEA over a three-year period.

Operation Trizo (1976)

In 1976, the DEA and the Mexican government began a poppy eradication program called Operation Trizo. The operation called for Mexican nationals to fly helicopters donated by the U.S. State Department to spray herbicides onto poppy fields in the states of Durango, Sinaloa, and Chihuahua.

By the end of 1977, approximately 22,000 acres of poppy, enough to be processed into eight tons of heroin, had been destroyed. Because of Operation Trizo, by 1979 the purity of Mexican heroin fell to just five percent, its lowest level in seven years. In addition, 4,000 members of organizations in Mexico were arrested. Operation Trizo lessened the demand for Mexican heroin in the U.S. market.

The large numbers of arrests that resulted from Operation Trizo caused an economic crisis in the poppy-growing regions of Mexico. In order to reduce the social upheaval, the Mexican government formally asked the DEA to stop participating in the surveillance flights. Operation Trizo was called off in the spring of 1978 at the request of the Mexican government. While successful in the short term, the operation did not prevent the growing sophistication of these drug organizations and their distributions systems in the United States.

DEA

Peter B. Bensinger
Administrator
1976-1981

"......I met with the executive staff members and people and found a lot of talent, dedication, and great ability. I was very impressed with the investigative skills...."

On December 9, 1975, Peter B. Bensinger, a native of Chicago and graduate of Yale University, was nominated as DEA Administrator. Peter Bensinger became the second DEA Administrator, following John Bartels, who had resigned in May 1975. He immediately followed Henry Dogin, who had served as acting head of the DEA, filling in until Administrator Bensinger took office. When tapped for the job, Mr. Bensinger was serving as the first director of the Illinois Department of Corrections. In this position, he was in charge of all state penitentiaries, reformatories, training schools, parole supervision, and jail inspection. Previously, he had served as chief of the Crime Victims Division of the Illinois Attorney General's Office and executive director of the Chicago Crime Commission. He was also the general sales manager (Frankfurt, London, Chicago) with the Brunswick Corporation (1958-1968). He became Acting Administrator on January 23, 1976, was confirmed by the Senate on February 5, 1976, and was sworn in on February 23, 1976.

Mr. Bensinger began his term by writing a mission statement for the agency, and then he launched efforts to repair the DEA's image with the public and with Congress. Administrator Bensinger stated that " (I did not come to the DEA) to reorganize everything right away...I arrived and set about doing work and listening...[I] met the executive staff members and people and found a lot of talent, dedication, and great ability. I was very impressed with the investigative skills that were clearly there and the type of work that was done. But the agents didn't have the sense that they were appreciated. And I felt there was a lack of communication with both the public and Congress. So one of the first steps I tried to take was to put out a mission statement that the DEA was here to protect the lives of the citizens of the United States and to curb drug abuse through effective enforcement, investigations, regulation of legitimate drugs, and through reaching to our counterparts overseas, at the state and local law enforcement, and in other branches of the government."

Mr. Bensinger also began to focus the agency's investigations away from a statistical emphasis on arrest and seizure totals, to a focus on arresting major traffickers who had a large impact on the drug trade. He stepped down as Administrator on July 10, 1981. Currently, Mr. Bensinger is president and chief executive officer of Bensinger, DuPont & Associates, a privately owned professional services company.

Jaime Herrera-Nevares

Jaime Herrera-Nevares was the patriarch of a huge criminal syndicate based in the mountain top village of Los Herreras, Durango, Mexico. As far back as 1957, the Herrera organization ran a farm-to-the-arm heroin operation that cultivated opium poppy plants, processed and packaged heroin in Mexico, and transported it to Chicago. There it was either sold locally or distributed to other U.S. cities. This group was extremely difficult to penetrate because family members controlled the entire heroin process from top to bottom.

While criminal syndicates such as the Jaime Herrera organization were trafficking heroin into the United States, cocaine trafficking was also a major problem facing law enforcement officials. In September 1977, DEA agents at JFK Airport in New York seized 85 pounds of cocaine that had been concealed in 4,500 pounds of chocolate bars. Special Agent Michael J. Tobin displayed how the cocaine had been hidden in the candy bars.

U.S. law enforcement agencies were well acquainted with the Herrera organization and its "Heroin Highway," a drug trafficking network that stretched from Durango to Chicago. The family frequently smuggled heroin in their invention, the "Durango drive-shaft," a sleeve-like device that surrounded the vehicle's drive-shaft and held several kilos of heroin. They also used compartmentalized gas tanks and door panels to conceal the contraband.

At one time, Chicago area law enforcement agencies believed the Herreras controlled as much as 90% of local heroin distribution. The DEA estimated that the Herrera organization imported 746 pounds of pure heroin into the United States each year. When cut, this amounted to over eight tons of five-percent pure heroin. The Herreras were considered the largest heroin trafficking organization in Mexico, with profits estimated at $1 million a year. They returned the majority of their profits to their home in Mexico, using neighborhood currency exchanges to send money orders back to Durango. In the mid-1970s, the DEA traced just under $2 million from these exchanges and Western Union records. This figure represented approximately one percent of the total cash transferred to Mexico by the Herrera organization annually.

By 1978, the Chicago Herreras were grossing $60 million a year and had established branches in Denver, Los Angeles, Miami, and Pittsburgh. By 1980, the family had established connections in South America and had diversified into cocaine. By the mid-1980s, the family's gross income had reached approximately $200 million a year.

CENTAC 19, launched in 1979, targeted the Herrera family trafficking organization and eventually resulted in the seizure of 39 kilograms of heroin, as well as the arrest and long-term incarceration of three key Chicago-based members of the Herrera organization.

During the 1980s investigations against the Herreras continued. On July 23, 1985, as a result of a two-year investigation called Operation Durango, between 450 and 500 federal, state, and local law enforcement officers in Chicago, Illinois, and Gary, Indiana, arrested 120 traffickers (of the 132 indicted) connected to the polydrug trafficking Herrera and Zambrana families. Officers seized 10 pounds of heroin, 13 pounds of cocaine, 47 properties, and $300,000. In August 1988, the Mexican leaders of the organization, Jaime Herrera-Nevarez, Sr., and Jaime Herrera-Herrera, Jr., were arrested in Mexico on drug charges and remain incarcerated in Mexico City. They continued being listed as DEA fugitives based on prior indictments in Miami, Florida.

Fire at DEA Headquarters (1976)

In October 1976, a small fire erupted on the second floor of DEA headquarters at 14th and "Eye" streets in Northwest Washington, D.C. Through the quick actions of DEA employee Marc Cunningham of the Forensic Science Division, the fire was brought under control, limiting the damage to a corner of the room in which it started. As D.C. firefighters arrived on the scene, DEA headquarters was evacuated and no injuries were reported as a result of the incident. Nevertheless, the fire prompted a thorough review and an updating of the DEA's Facility Self-Protection Plan.

The Black Tuna Gang and Operation Banco

In 1979, a joint DEA/FBI task force in Miami immobilized the Black Tuna Gang, a major marijuana smuggling ring responsible for bringing 500 tons of marijuana into the United States over a 16-month period.

The Black Tuna gang derived its name from the radio code name for a mysterious Colombian sugar grower and drug dealer, Raul Davila-Jimeno, who was the major supplier of the organization. Many of the gang members wore solid-gold medallions bearing a black tuna emblem. The medallions served as a talisman and symbol of their membership in this smuggling group. With the assistance of this small private army, Davila, who called himself a sugar, coffee, and petroleum exporter, virtually ruled Santa Marta, Colombia, where the majority of Colombian marijuana was grown. It was a highly organized ring, with gang members maintaining security and eavesdropping on radio frequencies used by police and U.S. Customs officials.

The Black Tuna gang operated, at least briefly, from a suite in Miami Beach's Fontainebleau Hotel and arranged bulk deliveries to a moored houseboat. They were affiliated with the vice-president of a prestigious Ft. Lauderdale yacht brokerage and were thus able to obtain specialized boats that could carry tons of marijuana without sitting suspiciously low in the water. The contraband was transported in these modified boats and unloaded at a series of waterfront "stash houses" in posh neighborhoods.

The Black Tuna Gang ran an elaborate operation, complete with electronically equipped trucks used to maintain contact with the freighters and to monitor law enforcement channels. They were also creative. As a signal that they were ready to proceed with a drug deal, the smugglers sent Davila a box of disposable diapers. This meant, "the baby is ready, send the mother."

Ultimately, partners in a Miami used car agency were indicted as the masterminds of the Black Tuna Gang, which federal prosecutors called the "biggest and slickest" gang yet uncovered. It was the meticulous work of a DEA-FBI probe of Florida banks called Operation Banco, which began in 1977, that led investigators to the auto dealers and ultimately resulted in the downfall of the Black Tuna Gang. Operation Banco traced the group's drug profits through South Florida banks until members of the Black Tuna Gang made a large cash deposit in Miami Beach Bank. This case was notable as the first combined investigation by the DEA and the FBI on drug profits behind the marijuana trade.

Raul Davila-Jimeno's fingerprint chart.

Year	Foreign Office Opened
1975	Copenhagen, Denmark
1975	Guatemala City, Guatemala
1976	Merida, Mexico
1977	Lahore, Pakistan
1979	Nassau, Bahamas

Heroin from Mexico

For decades, traffickers based in Mexico had been involved in the production and smuggling of drugs. During World War II, when fighting cut the Allies off from other legal sources of drug supplies, Mexico became a source of morphine for the legal market and heroin for the illegal market. The war also created a need for hemp fiber for rope, which led to large-scale cultivation of marijuana in both Mexico and the United States. Until the 1960s, when major traffickers began operating in Mexico, the marijuana issue was not considered a very serious one.

By the late 1960s, Mexico was a major source of both heroin and marijuana, as well as barbiturates and amphetamines. As a result, many U.S. enforcement efforts were directed toward stemming the tide of drugs coming across our southern border. In 1969, in an effort to stop trafficking across the Southwest Border, the Nixon Administration ordered that each person and vehicle crossing the border be inspected. However, Operation Intercept, as the project was called, tied up border traffic, angered the Mexican government, and disturbed the economy on both sides of the border. As a result, Operation Intercept was soon terminated. Recognizing that interdiction alone was not a successful strategy, the United States Government subsequently increased aid to Mexico, and offered greater cooperation and technical assistance to eradicate cannabis and opium poppy plants.

It was not until 1972, with the dismantling of the French Connection, that heroin market structures and distribution patterns radically shifted. At that point, drug trafficking from Mexico expanded and the cultivation of opium poppy fields increased. "Mexican mud," or brown heroin, was suddenly in great demand and from 1972 through 1976, groups from Mexico dominated the heroin trade and supplied an ever-increasing demand for marijuana. By 1974, traffickers from Mexico controlled three-fourths of the U.S. heroin market.

Development of the Heroin Signature Program (1977)

In 1977, the DEA developed the Heroin Signature Program (HSP). This program classified samples of heroin according to the process by which they were manufactured, enabling investigators to determine the geographic areas where the samples were produced. Data from the HSP were used in conjunction with investigative intelligence, drug production, and seizure data to develop an overall assessment of heroin trafficking to and within the United States. The Special Testing and Research Laboratory conducted the analysis for the program and developed the protocol that revolutionized the way analytical data were used for tracking the origins of heroin exhibits. With this information, law enforcement was alerted to emerging drug problems and developed strategies to counter them. For example, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the HSP documented the decrease in the proportion of Mexican heroin seized in the United States and the concomitant increase in heroin seized from Southwest Asia.

保証千足
品質優良
Super 1
100%
GUARANTEED 100%

Shown above are brand name labels of heroin sold in the illicit market in Southeast Asia during the late 1970s.

Tighter PCP Controls (1977)

In the mid-1970s, the abuse of phencyclidine (PCP) was an increasing problem. PCP-related deaths had increased 60 percent from 1976 to 1977, and PCP was involved in 35 of the 36 deaths attributed to hallucinogens for that year. In addition, the number of PCP laboratory seizures during 1977 was 42 percent higher than the combined totals of the two previous years.

In 1977, Administrator Bensinger recommended to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare that PCP, an animal tranquilizer, be rescheduled from Schedule III to Schedule II of the Controlled Substances Act of 1970. In 1977, the Food and Drug Administration's scientific and medical evaluations confirmed the necessity for this action, and effective February 24, 1978, PCP was moved from Schedule III to the Schedule II classification.

The DEA also combated escalating nationwide manufacture and abuse of PCP or "angel dust" by creating a new Special Action Office (SAO/PCP) in 1977. During its first 18 months, the SAO/PCP was responsible for initiating 96 PCP investigations and arresting 149 defendants. In addition, more than 5.1 million dosage units of PCP and 23 clandestine labs were seized.

Carlo Boccia (right), coordinator of a special operation that targeted PCP distribution and abuse, was photographed consulting with Special Agent Joe Brzostowski, who helped initiate the operation in 1978.

The DEA's success in curbing PCP trafficking continued on December 17, 1978, when it completed one of the largest PCP seizures in the agency's history. In a pre-dawn search, more than 50 special agents and several deputies confiscated $300 million worth of PCP in a clandestine lab in Los Angeles. Upwards of 900 pounds of PCP, in either the finished or intermediate stage, was seized. This quantity of PCP would have yielded 36 million dosage units. A large amount of lab equipment, including a sophisticated high-speed pill press, was also seized. Five suspects were arrested at the scene. The lab was by far the largest of its kind ever dismantled in the West and one of the largest of any type ever seized in the United States. The seizures and arrests concluded a year-long joint investigation between the DEA and the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department.

Colombian Marijuana

In the mid-to-late 1970s, trends in drug abuse were beginning to change. In fact, drug smuggling was taking on an entirely different scope. Cocaine and Colombian marijuana had become the drugs of choice, and the burgeoning drug organizations in Colombia took full advantage of new markets in the United States. It was no longer unusual for law enforcement to seize cocaine in 100-pound shipments. Also, marijuana was being shipped to the United States in ton quantities, as evidenced by a 113-ton seizure from a single ship off the northeastern coast of Florida in August 1978.

Colombian marijuana, or "Colombian Gold," a highly potent marijuana, was reaching the United States in "mother ships," which were large maritime vessels that carried bulk shipments of marijuana to prearranged points off the U.S. coast. These ships were moored far enough away from the shore to avoid notice, and off-loaded smaller quantities of the drug to smaller yachts, "go fast" boats, and fishing vessels that could smuggle the drug ashore less conspicuously and avoid detection by law enforcement. During the mid-to-late 1970s and early 1980s, the DEA conducted a number of notable operations targeting the organizations behind these mother ships. One such program, Operation Stopgap, was created in December 1975. As part of this program, DEA pilots flew up and down the coast of La Guajira, Colombia, which was a major source of drug smuggling. They reported suspect vessels to the DEA's El Paso Intelligence Center, which then relayed the information to U.S. Coast Guard cutters. The operation also used U.S. Navy satellites to track the suspect vessels.

Pictured above are porcelain vases concealing thai-sticks (marijuana) that were confiscated as part of a 1977 seizure of 100 pounds of thai-sticks in Tijuana, Mexico.

By 1978, Operation Stopgap effectively reduced the flow of marijuana from Colombia to the United States by at least one-third. The Stopgap program seized over one million pounds of marijuana. These significant seizures caused the price of marijuana in Colombia to increase from $20 a pound to as much as $80. In addition, more than 220 people were arrested, almost all of whom were Colombian nationals.

SAC Charles Hill of the San Diego District Office helped unload a 2.5 ton marijuana seizure in 1977.

The Arrest of Nicky Barnes

N.Y.C. POLICE
30 1349

Leroy "Nicky" Barnes, convicted on December 2, 1977.

Leroy "Nicky" Barnes, a former street addict and common thief turned multi-millionaire drug lord, was the subject of one of the DEA's most significant investigations of the 1970s. Since the 1940s, African-American criminal groups had controlled portions of the heroin traffic in New York City, and their influence increased significantly after the French Connection in the early 1970s. Growing up in Harlem, Barnes saw that people who controlled the drug trade had considerable power. While in his 20s, Barnes became a mid-level drug dealer until sent to prison in 1965. There, he teamed up with gangster "Crazy Joey" Gallo who taught him how to operate a drug trafficking organization. Gallo had wanted to be a major force in the Harlem drug trade, but he lacked the personnel. He urged Barnes to recruit African-Americans into the business. With the help of a lawyer provided by Gallo, Barnes' conviction was reversed and he was released from prison. Barnes went back to the streets of New York and began establishing his own trafficking network.

Barnes' organization was among the first of a new trend of African-American and Hispanic trafficking groups which took over from long-entrenched Italian organizations. His syndicate made enormous profits by cutting and packaging low-quality heroin. Barnes controlled heroin sales and manufacture throughout New York State and extended his business into Canada and Pennsylvania. By 1976, he had at least seven major lieutenants working for him, each of whom controlled a dozen mid-level distributors, who in turn supplied up to 40 street-level retailers.

Barnes modeled his growing empire after some of the more successful organized crime families and built administrative layers between himself and his crimes. Even though he was arrested numerous times, few charges against Barnes himself were able to stick, which earned him the nickname of "Mr. Untouchable." Barnes reveled in his nickname. He developed an aggressive style when dealing with police, often leading surveillance teams on hundred-mile-an-hour car rides into New York City and then out again with no apparent purpose. Also, he would make scores of pointless stops, just to aggravate his surveillance officers.

In 1976, he estimated that his trafficking income was at least several million dollars, and like most organized crime leaders, he lived a life of extravagant self-indulgence. He owned five homes, wore expensive, hand-tailored outfits and furs, owned luxury cars, and surrounded himself with a half dozen bodyguards.

In 1977, a New York Times article reported that Barnes owned 300 suits, 100 pairs of shoes and 50 leather coats. His fleet of cars included a Mercedes-Benz, a Citroen-Macerate, and several Thunderbirds, Lincoln Continentals, and Cadillacs. To prevent his cars from being seized and forfeited, Barnes set up phony leasing companies to make it appear that the cars he drove were not owned by him, but merely rented. Eventually federal agents unraveled his scheme and proved that his front companies were phony.

Working closely with the U.S. Attorney in New York, DEA agents infiltrated the Barnes syndicate and put together a case that led to his conviction. On January 19, 1978, in the Federal District Court in Manhattan, Leroy "Nicky" Barnes was sentenced to life in prison on a federal charge that he headed, in the words of the prosecutor, "the largest, most profitable and venal drug ring in New York City." For many DEA agents, the arrest of Leroy "Nicky" Barnes was the most significant of their careers, the result of almost four years of dangerous undercover work.

The Office of Compliance and Regulatory Affairs

In October 1976, the DEA established the Office of Compliance and Regulatory Affairs, under the direction of Kenneth Durrin. The office was created to provide a specialized work force that could focus exclusively on the diversion of legitimate drugs and take full advantage of the controls and penalties established by the Controlled Substances Act (CSA).

From 1971 through 1978, 33 previously uncontrolled drugs of abuse were brought under CSA control. The best known of these drugs was methaqualone, which was controlled in Schedule II. An additional 11 drugs, including amphetamine, methamphetamine, and the fast-acting barbiturates were rescheduled from lower schedules into Schedule II, where the tightest security, import, record-keeping and reporting controls were applied. For example, a Schedule II drug could only be distributed on official order forms between registrants, exported only by official permit, and produced only in limited quantities. This significantly curtailed the amount of many popular drugs that were available for diversion.

While the DEA had been successful in regulating manufacturers and distributors, it now had the opportunity to work cooperatively with doctors and pharmacists at the retail level. The 1979 National Institute on Drug Abuse survey showed that non-medical use of prescription drugs was second only to marijuana use. More startling statistics came from the Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN), which measured hospital emergency room episodes and medical examiner reports concerned with specific drugs.

In 1980, legally produced drugs accounted for 15 of the 20 most frequently mentioned controlled drugs in DAWN emergency mentions and 75 percent of total mentions of controlled drug use. In addition, legally produced drugs constituted 74 percent of controlled substance mentions in deaths reported by medical examiners.

Up until then, diversion by unscrupulous practitioners had not been the major investigative focus of the DEA because the huge quantities of drugs diverted at the manufacturer and distributor level had overshadowed this problem. However, when estimates indicated that 80-90 percent of diversion was now occurring at the practitioner level, it became time to increase efforts against practitioner diversion. Because practitioners and pharmacies had emerged as the main sources of diverted controlled substances, the Office of Compliance and Regulatory Affairs changed its priorities to deal with this problem. This was a daunting challenge for a work force of about 200, because by the late 1970s, there were over 550,000 practitioners and pharmacies registered under the CSA. An example of practitioner-level abuse in the mid-1970s occurred at "weight" clinics where "patients" were able to obtain many diverted drugs. In October of 1979, the DEA initiated Operation Script, a pilot program designed to focus the DEA's technical, investigative, and legal expertise on this problem. A total of 94 priority targets in 23 cities were identified by analyzing drug sales data reported to DEA by manufacturers and distributors through a system known as the Automated Reports and Consummated Orders System (ARCOS). This ARCOS system contained information for estimating drug requirements and alerted investigators to sources of diversion in the legal drug distribution chain. In September 1980, a DEA internal review of Operation Script showed that investigations had resulted in 28 convictions, 10 additional indictments, 5 surrenders or revocations, and 17 state board actions.

An important aspect of the overall investigative program was that data developed through these investigations was used to initiate significant regulatory actions. For example, the maximum quantity of commonly abused drugs that could be manufactured legally was reduced through the quota process. Manufacturing quotas were applied to Schedule I and II substances and limited production to the actual amount necessary for legitimate medical and scientific need. Information documenting the diversion of these substances was used to justify reductions in these quotas, greatly reducing the amount of drugs available for diversion.

The DEA also actively pursued the enhancement of state-level investigative capabilities by funding Diversion Investigation Units (DIUs). The DIUs combined state law enforcement and regulatory bodies into a single unit dedicated to investigating and taking action against practitioners who were diverting controlled substances.

By the late 1970s both the U.S. Congress and the General Accounting Office (GAO) recognized the significant contributions that DEA's efforts had achieved in eliminating diversion at the manufacturer and distributor level. These efforts were able to successfully shore up the weakest portions of the upper end of the distribution chain. Drug manufacturers and distributors either improved their controls or ceased controlled substance activity altogether. The Office of Compliance and Regulatory Affairs was ultimately changed to the Office of Diversion Control in 1982.



This was the Kansas City plant where drugs that had been surrendered to compliance investigators were burned in blast furnaces at multi-thousand degree temperatures.

South Florida

By the mid-1970s, Miami had become the drug capital of the Western Hemisphere because of its geography and cooperative international banks. Within a short time, South Florida was overwhelmed by violent cocaine and marijuana traffickers from Latin America.

In 1975, the U.S. Customs Service seized 729 pounds of cocaine, up from only 108 pounds in 1970. During that same period, in Miami Airport alone, cocaine seizures increased from 37 pounds to over 271. By 1979, the South Florida illegal drug trade was the state's biggest industry and was said to be worth $10 billion a year wholesale. "There is so much money, they weigh it instead of counting it," commented Administrator Bensinger. In what had once been a tranquil vacation spot, violence was becoming commonplace. In July 1979, an incident that occurred in the Dadeland Mall, Florida's largest shopping center, offered a startling glimpse of the emerging drug trade in South Florida. In broad daylight, two gunmen exited a paneled truck, entered a liquor store, gunned down two men and wounded the store clerk. The dead men were eventually identified as a Colombia-based cocaine trafficker and his bodyguard.

HAPPY TIME
COMPLETE PARTY SUPPLY

The disguised truck that the two gunmen exited before murdering two men and wounding another in a liquor store.

One of the two bodies found in the Dadeland Mall massacre.

1976-77

Heroin was a major problem in 1976, but cocaine was gaining in popularity. As a result, the DEA was featured in ABC-TV's five-part television report on cocaine, titled "Snow Blind: The Cocaine Connection." Shown here are two publicity posters for the series that aired in 1977.


FIND OUT WHERE "SNOW" COMES FROM
-AND WHO PROFITS.
Snow Blind: The Cocaine Connection
ABC EVENING NEWS


FIND OUT WHAT THE LAW IS DOING
ABOUT "SNOW."
Part A: the Law
Snow Blind: The Cocaine Connection
ABC EVENING NEWS
7:00PM

1978

1978 lab seizure.

1979

Special Agent Bob Parks posed with a 1964 Rolls Royce seized during the June 1979 arrest of 20 heroin traffickers.

Paraphernalia Law (1979)

As drug use grew in America, especially on college campuses, the paraphernalia industry developed to support the drug culture. Retailers sold items such as "bongs," "roach clips," and specialized razor blades purchased to enhance the use of marijuana, hashish, heroin, cocaine and a variety of other drugs. These "head shops," as they were called, became big business. In 1980, it was estimated that 25,000 retail outlets for drug paraphernalia grossed up to $3 billion annually in sales. The sale and advertising of drug paraphernalia glamorized the drug culture, promoted drug use, and undermined educational and community programs designed to prevent drug abuse among our youth.

In 1979, in response to the growing problem, President Carter asked the DEA to draft a model anti-drug paraphernalia law which could be adopted by state and local governments. Early state laws aimed at controlling drug paraphernalia were ineffective because they had dealt with the problem on a piecemeal basis, and were so vaguely worded they could not withstand a constitutional attack. In contrast, the Model Act, which was designed by Harry Myers in the DEA's Office of Chief Counsel, was clear and comprehensive and contained a detailed definition of "drug paraphernalia." It also included lists of criteria that courts could use in order to determine if particular objects should be considered paraphernalia.

The Model Act made the possession of paraphernalia, with the intent to use it with illicit drugs, a crime. Manufacturing and delivering paraphernalia was a crime, and the delivery of paraphernalia to a child by an adult was a special offense. In addition, the publication of commercial advertisements promoting the sale of paraphernalia was unlawful.

By mid-1981, 20 states had enacted DEA's Model Drug Paraphernalia Act. However, the head shops did not go without a legal fight. One Illinois business challenged a drug paraphernalia ordinance on the grounds that it was unconstitutionally broad and vague. However, on March 3, 1982, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the ordinance did not violate the head shop owner's First Amendment rights nor was there a danger of arbitrary enforcement, which is necessary to render a law void for vagueness. As more and more states adopted these anti-drug measures, thousands of paraphernalia shops were essentially legislated out of business.

Cocaine

By the late 1970s, a flood of cocaine was entering the country in Miami and being transported north to New York City and to cities and towns all along the East Coast. Cocaine, however, was not yet considered a major threat because many believed that its use was confined to the wealthy.

Cocaine Use: However, statistics indicated otherwise: by 1974, 5.4 million Americans acknowledged having tried cocaine at least once. By 1979, cocaine use was at its peak. That year, the Household Survey showed that almost 20 percent of Americans had used cocaine in the past year, and 9.3 percent had used cocaine in the previous month. By the early 1980s about 22 million Americans admitted to having tried cocaine.

The rise in drug use was fueled, in part, by the tolerant attitudes prevalent in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Many people saw cocaine as a benign, recreational drug, celebrated for its "pleasureability" in the media. Dr. Peter Bourne, drug advisor to Jimmy Carter and Special Assistant for Health Issues, wrote, "Cocaine...is probably the most benign of illicit drugs currently in widespread use. At least as strong a case could be made for legalizing it as for legalizing marijuana. Short-acting....not physically addicting, and acutely pleasurable, cocaine has found increasing favor at all socioeconomic levels." This was an attitude shared by the public at large.

Cocaine Trafficking: In 1974 the DEA began to make connections between cocaine seizures and realized that cases that appeared to be isolated were actually linked. It became obvious that a well-organized smuggling effort was being orchestrated from abroad. Traffickers from Colombia monopolized the cocaine business in Queens and Manhattan, New York. However, a large-scale cocaine problem was still believed to exist only in Miami.

In January 1980, a joint investigation by the Peruvian Investigation Police and the DEA Lima and Mexico City Offices resulted in the seizure of 506 kilograms of cocaine base and the arrest of 11 defendants. DEA Special Agents Russell Reina (left) and Gary Wheeler are shown pointing out Chosica, Peru, where the cocaine convoy was intercepted.

The DEA estimated that Colombia-based traffickers had been processing 70 percent of the cocaine entering the United States each year, which was estimated to yield approximately $150 million in gross profits to the dealers. In more and more investigations around the nation, the DEA encountered trafficking networks controlled from Colombia, who were running stash houses, moving money, and developing drug market networks for their suppliers back home.

Initially, traffickers from Cuba controlled the distribution organizations in South Florida and New York. Eventually, however, through violence and the so-called "cocaine wars," Colombia-based traffickers wrested control of the cocaine business. Other groups were allowed into the cocaine business, but strictly on terms set by the traffickers from Colombia who controlled the market. Meanwhile, law enforcement continued to make small seizures that were viewed as isolated, independent cases.

The Origins of the Medellin Cartel

The 1979 incident at Dadeland Mall in Florida that had received national attention was the first visible evidence of the growing presence of a network of Colombia-based drug dealers in the United States. This drug alliance had been conceived by Carlos Enrique Lehder-Rivas, who had met George Jung, a drug trafficker, while in prison. Jung had been transporting tons of marijuana in private planes. Noting how successful this method of smuggling marijuana had been, Lehder reasoned that cocaine could also be moved in ton quantities.

In the late 1970s, Carlos Enrique Lehder-Rivas began cooperating with other Colombia-based traffickers in the manufacturing, transportation, and distribution of tons of cocaine to the United States and around the world. Lehder's idea evolved into of the most lucrative, powerful, and deadly partnerships known—the Medellin cartel. Its membership included some of the most notorious drug lords of the 1980s—Jorge Ochoa, Pablo Escobar, Griselda Blanco, Gustavo and Benjamin Herrera, and Jose Rodriguez-Gacha.

By the summer of 1976, Jung and Lehder were out of jail and in the cocaine business. Lehder bought Norman's Cay, an island in the Bahamas, which served as a base for air smuggling between Colombia and the United States. Lehder was just one of the hundreds of Colombia-based traffickers expanding the cocaine business.

By the mid-1970s, these traffickers, already active in marijuana trade, had established a virtual monopoly over cocaine distribution. The Andean city of Medellin, Colombia's second largest city, was home to most of these traffickers. With cooperation, the cartels began processing even greater amounts of cocaine—from 25 tons in the late 1970s to 125 tons by the early 1980s. In the United States in 1978, a kilo of 12-percent purity cocaine had sold on the street for an average of $800,000. But by early 1984, cocaine was so plentiful that there were substantial price reductions in many U.S. cities. Prices for a kilo of cocaine dropped as low as $30,000 in New York City and $16,000 in South Florida.

Carlos Lehder (left) is shown using cocaine with his former prison buddy Steven Yakovac on Norman's Cay in 1978.

Lehder purchased Norman's Cay, shown here in 1981, to facilitate his smuggling operations.

Major Cocaine Seizures

In late 1979, the DEA and the U.S. Customs Service conducted a two-part drug air interdiction campaign in the Turks and Caicos islands near the Bahamas. The campaign, which was called Operation Boomer/Falcon, mostly focused on South Caicos island. The island had become an established transshipment and refueling point for drug smugglers from South America because many corrupt South Caicos government officials were easily bribed.

One phase of the operation involved a covert surveillance of nearby uninhabited West Caicos island, which was also used as a transhipment point. When aircraft laden with illicit drugs landed on the island, DEA agents and local law enforcement officers were on-hand to seize the aircraft and arrest the pilots. The other phase of the operation was an undercover investigation used to collect intelligence about aircraft transporting drugs. Two DEA agents posing as mechanics lived in a DEA DC-3 plane for six weeks. During that time, they collected identification information about planes that were smuggling drugs and relayed this information to a command post in Miami, Florida. Using this information, which included the tail identification numbers and take-off times of planes transporting illicit drugs, the command post launched aircraft to intercept the traffickers.

The operation was enormously successful and resulted in the seizure of 27 aircraft, 1,203 pounds of Quaaludes and almost 8 tons of marijuana, as well as the 1985 arrest and conviction of the Prime Minister of South Caicos, Norman Saunders, who had accepted bribes from drug traffickers. Operation Boomer/Falcon was responsible for the seizure of a total of 785 pounds of cocaine, of which two seizures were of record quantities—329 and 384 pounds. Previously, agents rarely seized more than 10-20 pounds at a time. These large seizures alerted law enforcement of the increase in cocaine trafficking from South America.

In addition to significant cocaine cases, the DEA also confronted major heroin trafficking. In this photograph, DEA New York Regional Director John Fallon (right) examined 24 kilograms of high-quality heroin confiscated at Kennedy Airport in 1980.

U.S. Drug Use Peaks (1979)

Drug use by Americans reached its all-time high in 1979. With relaxed attitudes regarding the harmfulness of marijuana, cocaine, and other illegal substances, young people recklessly experimented with these drugs and suffered severe consequences as a result. According to the 1979 National Survey on Drug Abuse, more than two-thirds of young adults, age 18-25, reported experience with an illicit drug. About three in ten youth, age 12-17, and one in five older adults, age 26 and older, reported having used an illicit drug. These statistics sent shock waves through the law enforcement, civic, and educational communities. As a result, in subsequent years, anti-drug campaigns and concerted efforts were launched by governments and communities across the nation aimed at decreasing teen drug use.

Katy's coloring book was originally conceived and illustrated by Suzie Rice in 1970. It was innovative in that it was the first publication which addressed the subject at a child's level.



Domestic Cannabis Eradication and Suppression Program (1979)

Marijuana was the only major drug grown within U.S. borders, and since the 1960s, had been the most widely used drug in the United States. In the late 1970s, it was estimated that the United States was producing almost 25 percent of all the marijuana consumed domestically. During the two-year period from 1977 to 1979, the demand for it was confirmed by the percentage of adults who admitted to ever having tried marijuana in their lifetime. These rates increased from 59.9 percent to 68.2 percent for young adults, and from 15.3 percent to 19.6 percent for older adults.

In 1979, an estimated 10-15,000 tons of marijuana were consumed in the United States. It is believed that up to 10 percent of that amount was cultivated in the United States, a majority from California and Hawaii. In response to this serious problem, the DEA began its Domestic Cannabis Eradication and Suppression Program in 1979 with only two states participating, California and Hawaii. The DEA provided three special agents to work with local authorities in California on case development and intelligence gathering.

The DEA Air Wing also provided aircraft and pilots as part of the search effort, and local police received aerial search techniques instruction. In the same year, three DEA agents also worked with the U.S. Customs Service and U.S. Coast Guard in Operation Green Harvest that targeted marijuana growers in the Hawaiian Islands. More and more states joined the cannabis eradication program and by 1982, 25 states had joined.

This program was established as a partnership of federal, state, and local agencies. In addition to cultivating an illegal drug that contributed to wholesale abuse, marijuana growers presented other problems to law enforcement and the environment. They encroached on national forests and parks and threatened innocent people. To protect their marijuana crops, many growers equipped their marijuana patches with booby traps, trip wires, and explosives. Marijuana growers also threatened the environment by using pesticides, building harmful dams for irrigation, and cutting down trees. By 1982, 25 states were participating in the cannabis eradication program.

Women Competing

Four DEA women ran in the 10,000 meter Bonnie Belle Classic in Washington, D.C. Over 1500 women competed in the race which was held at Haines Point.
Colleen Finnegan, Cardie Dalton, Dee Zugby and Eileen Scire all finished the race in about an hour.

121
323
206
582

International Cooperation

Cooperative international law enforcement efforts allowed the DEA to stop the flow of drugs at the source. Pictured above, Colonel Choktip (left) of the Thai Office of Narcotics Control Board and DEA Case Agent Paul Salute (right) questioned a defendant after the 1980 arrest of 10 morphine traffickers in Thailand.

Training

In 1975, the DEA began adjusting the focus of its Basic Agent training class, and by 1977 the length of the course had increased from 10 weeks to 12 weeks. Students trained from 9 a.m. to 8 p.m. and were given only five days off, receiving what would be equivalent to 16 weeks of training. The rigorous schedule insured that DEA agents-in-training would be prepared to face the challenges ahead of them. Other changes to the training class included an increase in field training and report writing exercises, as well as the addition of a three-day conspiracy school. Students also spent more hours studying law than did their predecessors. These changes were made in response to the DEA's increasing focus on conspiracy cases and to a survey to agents in the field that indicated more training was needed. Starting in June 1977, basic agents received increased training in law, the use of technical investigative aids, and new conspiracy techniques. Training was still performed at the National Training Institute, which was located at DEA Headquarters, 1405 "Eye" Street in Washington, D.C.

In April 1978, the Philadelphia District Office staff designed and implemented a clandestine methamphetamine laboratory school that proved to be a catalyst for similar seminars conducted throughout the United States. This school combined laboratory exercises with realistic, practical exercises on the street.

A major improvement in lab training occurred in April 1979, when the DEA began clandestine laboratory synthesis training, coordinated by Forensic Chemist Alan B. Clark of the Southwest Regional Laboratory. Groups of three agents per class were trained in the synthesis of PCP and methamphetamine, the two substances most frequently produced in clandestine lab operations. Previously, new agents were trained only in the investigative aspects of clandestine labs, but had little or no training in chemical synthesis. With this new training, they were better equipped to identify what substances were being synthesized and which procedures were being used in the clandestine labs they encountered. This training not only increased agents' investigative capabilities, but also improved safety by increasing their knowledge of the toxic dangers encountered in clandestine labs.

At a firearms instruction school held in May 1977, instructor Neal Crane demonstrated a Remington Model 870P 12-gauge shotgun.

Firearms classes were originially conducted in two inside ranges in the "bank" building on Eye Street.

Physical Fitness was also a part of training given to state and local police officers. The gymnasium was located in a former bank, which was next door to the original Headquarters building at 14th and Eye streets in Washington, D.C.

Police officers from these classes would often later become DEA Agents. This is class P-19, 1978.

Technology

During the period 1975 through 1980, the DEA continued to take advantage of the latest in law enforcement technology. For example, in 1976, the DEA employed the Policefax DD-14, a new system for transmitting information about criminals. The system, a precursor to modern-day fax machines, transmitted photo-quality fingerprints over the conventional telephone network. This communication tool served as a link between DEA field offices and the DEA's Central Identification Bureau. Transmitting fingerprints via Policefax DD-14 allowed the field offices to quickly determine if suspects had previous records and obtain those records, when necessary.

These Policefax machines required several hours to transmit data to a receiving machine, which would then take 14 minutes per page to print eight-inch square reproductions of the original fingerprint card. Nevertheless, according to Dr. Al Glass of the DEA's Office of Enforcement, the new system was the fastest way to send fingerprints and significantly reduced the time spent waiting for 'rap sheets.'

The DEA also made use of the best available communication technology at its improved its communication centers. The Dallas Regional Communications Center (DRCC), which began providing around-the-clock support in February 1976, was one of the first to operate 24 hours a day, seven days a week. The center provided tactical, near-real-time response support for agents in the field, as well as day-to-day support for regional and district offices. DEA personnel used the center to quickly access intelligence sources such as NCIC, driver's license checks, and NADDIS. This center was the first fully operational DEA network, with 16 manned sub-stations and 11 unmanned base-repeaters, and covered the entire Texas and Oklahoma area. In addition to Dallas, similar DEA communications centers began operating in the Los Angeles, New York and Seattle regions.

Herb Thompson of the Research and Engineering Division in Merrifield, Virginia, was photographed working on his CAT system, which tracked suspect vehicles in real time.

In 1978, Special Agents Steve Prator (left) and Ron Hall examined chemical equipment seized from a clandestine methamphetamine lab in Shreveport, Louisiana.

1980

The 1980 arrest of Leroy Butler, one of the most significant heroin traffickers in New York City, also led to the seizure of the $40,000 Rolls Royce shown here. Posing with the car are, from left to right: SA Lewis Rice, SA Thor Nowozeniuk, and GS Fred Gormandy.

Aviation

By the mid-1970s, the DEA Air Wing was comprised of 38 pilots stationed across the country. Many had commercial flight experience, or had flown in Vietnam or World War II. Air Wing service became available to every DEA regional and district office in the continental United States.

Supervision of Air Wing operations was divided between the chief pilot, Marion Joseph, at the central Air Wing facility in Addison, Texas, and four regional air coordinators. The air coordinators were responsible for the four Air Wing regions—Eastern, Central, Midwestern, and Western—that were centered in Miami, Dallas, Denver, and Los Angeles, respectively. The chief pilot had jurisdiction over the aircraft, while the air coordinators supervised personnel. This division of supervision over Air Wing resources made it difficult to coordinate aircraft and personnel for Air Wing missions. In 1975, supervision was centralized and the chief pilot at Addison became responsible for both the Air Wing personnel and aircraft. The program became more structured as it grew, and eventually included uniform safety and flight procedures. While the Addison facility handled the coordination of resources, headquarters established and standardized administrative procedures and developed an official aviation manual. When additional air support was needed, planes and pilots were rescheduled on a temporary duty basis or were provided by the Central Air Wing in Addison.

In 1978, the chief pilot position was reassigned to headquarters to focus on program management, budget, and policy. The deputy chief pilot assumed responsibility for the day-to-day operations of the Addison Aviation Facility. At the same time, four area supervisor positions were transferred to Addison from regional offices to improve management structure. Shortly thereafter, a full-time safety/training position was created at Addison. By the late 1970s, Air Wing operations provided eradication support and transportation of prisoners, personnel, and evidence. Air Wing employees also performed undercover work and surveillance.

Laboratories

In early 1975, the DEA was busy constructing a new regional lab in the San Diego area. The impetus behind the decision to build it was the dramatic increase in heroin trafficking from Mexico into the southwestern United States. For two years, San Diego lab employees worked in a temporary facility, the old U.S. Customs Bureau Laboratory, while their new lab was being designed and constructed. The new building, which was completed in July 1976, featured the latest in safety and efficiency features. The fact that the structure was only one-story high allowed for safer utilization of extremely heavy equipment. The building also contained a vault space that was four times larger than that in any other DEA lab at that time.

Another important event for DEA laboratories occurred in the fall of 1976, when chemists from around the world studied in DEA lab facilities as part of the International Forensic Chemist Seminar. Fourteen chemists from Hong Kong, Germany, France, Iran, Belgium, and the Netherlands spent two weeks at the DEA's Special Testing Research Lab in McLean, Virginia. They also visited the DEA's Southeast Regional Lab.

The program included advanced training for the already proficient chemists. Courses covered such subjects as the history of drug abuse and control, advanced techniques, and ballistics.

1977: DEA Chemists Chuck Harper and Al Spurling analyzed findings at the Special Testing and Research Lab.

1977: Chemists at the Special Testing and Research Lab supported many DEA investigations. From left to right: Phil Patterson, Ted Kram, Jim Moore, and Joe Koles.

Mexico City Management Team June 1980

Left to right back: CA Rudy Ramirez, Costa Rica CO, RAC Richard Canas, Monterey RO, RAC Ruben Salinas, Mazatlan RO, CA Guatemala, RAC William Rochon, Guadalajara RO, RAC William Farnan, Merida RO, RAC Thomas Telles, Hermosillo RO. Left to right front: GS Charlie Lugo, Mexico City,Asst. Regional Director Frank Macolini, Mexico City, DEA Administrator Peter Bensinger, Regional Director Edward Heath, Mexico City, GS Frank Cruz, Mexico City

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Killed in the Line of Duty

Larry D. Wallace
Died on December 19, 1975
DEA Special Agent Wallace, of the Tokyo District Office, died at the Naval Regional Medical Center in Guam from gunshot wounds received during an undercover drug investigation.

Ralph N. Shaw
Died on May 14, 1976
DEA Special Agent Shaw, of the Calexico, California District Office, died in a plane crash north of Acapulco during an operations flight in support of Mexico's opium eradication program.

James T. Lunn
Died on May 14, 1976
DEA Special Agent Lunn, a pilot assigned to the Office of Enforcement at DEA headquarters, died in a plane crash north of Acapulco during an operations flight in support of Mexico's opium eradication program.

Octavio Gonzalez
Died on December 13, 1976
DEA Special Agent Gonzalez was the Country Attache in Bogota, Colombia, when he was shot and killed in the office by an informant.

Francis J. Miller
Died on March 5, 1977
DEA Special Agent Miller, a Group Supervisor at the Newark Division, was killed in an automobile accident in New York.

Robert C. Lightfoot
Died on November 23, 1977
DEA Special Agent Lightfoot died in a firearms accident in Bangkok, Thailand.

During the 1980s, the Medellin drug lords [illegible] and began operating on an unprecedented scale. The rise of the Medellin cartel, the influx of cocaine into the United States and the violence associated with drug trafficking and drug use complicated the task of law enforcement at all levels.

[illegible]

1980-1985

Francis M. Mullen, Jr.
Administrator, DEA
July 10, 1981 (acting)- March 1, 1985

Francis M. "Bud" Mullen, Jr., a career FBI agent of almost 20 years, was appointed Acting Administrator of the DEA on July 10, 1981. He began his FBI career in May 1962 at the Bureau's Los Angeles office, serving from 1963 to 1969. From there, he was assigned to the Administrative Services Division in Washington (1969-1972), the Planning and Inspection Division (1972), and was Assistant Special Agent in Charge in Denver, Colorado (1973-1975). Later, he served as Special Agent in Charge in Tampa, Florida (1975-1976) and in New Orleans, Louisiana (1976-1978), and he was the FBI's Inspector and Deputy Assistant Director, Organized Crime & White Collar Crime (1978-79); Assistant Director, Criminal Investigative Division (1979-80); and Executive Assistant Director, Investigations from 1980 until his appointment to DEA Administrator. He continued to serve in an acting capacity from July 1981 until he was confirmed by the U.S. Senate on September 30, 1983, and sworn in as the DEA's third administrator on November 10, 1983. He is currently the Director of Mohegan Tribal Gaming Commission in Uncasville, Connecticut.

Administrator Mullen began his term at a time when the tremendous impact of drug abuse was being felt across the United States. The problem was especially acute in southern Florida, where unprecedented drug-related violence accompanied the cocaine transit routes of the Colombian cartels. It was clear to the Reagan Administration that U.S. drug fighting agencies needed help.

Acting Administrator Mullen stressed multi-agency cooperation with other members of the enforcement and intelligence communities. He made the policy official in a July 14, 1981, memo to DEA employees: "On policy, strategy and tactical levels, your cooperation with other agencies in all current and future DEA efforts is hereby ordered."

Special Agents	**DEA Budget**
1980......1,941	1980.....$206.6 million
1985......2,234	1985.....$362.4 million

During the early 1980s, international drug trafficking organizations reorganized and began operating on an unprecedented scale. The rise of the Medellin cartel, the influx of cocaine into the United States, and the violence associated with drug trafficking and drug use complicated the task of law enforcement at all levels. Violent crime rates rose dramatically during this period and continued to rise until the early 1990s. The "normalization" of drug use during the previous two decades continued as the U.S. population rediscovered cocaine. Many saw cocaine as a benign, recreational drug. In 1981, *Time* magazine ran a cover story entitled, "High on Cocaine" with cover art of an elegant martini glass filled with cocaine. The article reported that cocaine's use was spreading quickly into America's middle class: "Today...coke is the drug of choice for perhaps millions of solid, conventional and often upwardly mobile citizens." Drug abuse among U.S. citizens in the early 1980s remained at dangerously high levels.

The Rise of the Medellin Cartel

By the early 1980s, the drug lords of the Medellin cartel were well established in Colombia, where they used murder, intimidation, and assassination to keep journalists and public officials from speaking out against them. Law enforcement officers and judges were favored targets of these brutish drug cartels that controlled entire towns and economies to support their criminal business. By 1985, Colombia had the highest murder rate in the world. In Medellin alone, 1,698 people were murdered, and the following year, that number more than doubled to 3,500. The Medellin cartel was fast becoming the richest and most feared underworld crime syndicate the world had ever encountered.

During the period 1980 through 1985, the Medellin mafias delivered to the United States a large measure of the wholesale violence and terror that their drug trafficking activities had inflicted on their home country. In a grim parody of their campaign to control Colombia, they insinuated themselves into legitimate, and useful, sectors of the U.S. economy, such as the banking and import industries. The United States suffered badly from the cartel's presence as local drug gangs began to form, communities were terrorized, and drug use among teens continued to climb.

Colombian Marijuana

Colombian marijuana continued to be a problem in the early 1980s as Colombia-based traffickers brought boatloads of high-potency marijuana to the shores of the United States. Consequently, the DEA ran several investigations targeting these smugglers, including Operations Grouper and Tiburon.

In 1981, Operation Grouper was conducted in cooperation with the U.S. Coast Guard and 21 other federal, state, and local government agencies. It was one of the largest enforcement operations launched against marijuana traffickers from Colombia. The operation targeted 14 separate Florida, Louisiana, and Georgia-based trafficking organizations that were smuggling large-scale, multi-ton quantities of marijuana and millions of dosage units of methaqualone into the United States. For 22 months, nine DEA special agents operated undercover, some posing as off-loaders to a number of smuggling organizations. The smuggling network had negotiated deliveries to states as far away as Maine and New York. As a result of the operation, agents ultimately arrested 122 out of the 155 indicted subjects, and seized more than $1 billion worth of drugs, and $12 million worth of assets, including 30 vessels, two airplanes and $1 million in cash.

The following year, the DEA concluded Operation Tiburon, another major operation targeting marijuana smuggling from Colombia. Tiburon resulted in the arrest of 495 people and the seizure of 95 vessels, 1.7 million pounds of marijuana in the United States, and 4.7 million pounds of marijuana in Colombia. U.S. Attorney General William French Smith praised this operation as a "classic example of how agencies, and indeed entire governments, can work together sharing intelligence and expertise and zeroing in on the sea and air routes used by major smugglers."

Operation Swordfish (1980)

In December 1980, the DEA launched a major investigation in Miami aimed against international drug organizations. The operation was dubbed Operation Swordfish because it was intended to snare the "big fish" in the drug trade. The DEA set up a bogus money laundering corporation in suburban Miami Lakes that was called Dean International Investments, Inc. The DEA agents teamed up with a Cuban exile who had fallen on hard times and was willing to lure Colombian traffickers to the bogus bank. In addition to spending time in Cuban prisons after the Bay of Pigs invasion, the exile had also served jail time in the United States for tax fraud and was heavily in debt to the U.S. Internal Revenue Service. During the 18-month investigation, agents were able to gather enough evidence for a federal grand jury to indict 67 U.S. and Colombian citizens. At the conclusion of the operation, drug agents seized 100 kilos of cocaine, a quarter-million methaqualone pills, tons of marijuana, and $800,000 in cash, cars, land, and Miami bank accounts. Operation Swordfish was a significant attack on South Florida's flourishing drug trade.

FDLE
FDLE
FDLE

On February 20, 1981, DEA Miami Field Division special agents of Group No. 1 and the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) seized 826 pounds of cocaine—a record seizure at that time. Florida Governor Bob Graham (center) applauded their success.

In 1981, DEA Albuquerque, the New Mexico State Police, and the Taos Police Department seized the first cocaine processing laboratory in the Southwest. Pictured (left) are special agents and 7.5 pounds of cocaine, which had been impregnated into articles of clothing.

Members of DEA Philadelphia Group 1 seized 20 pounds of methamphetamine in a joint DEA/FBI investigation of organized crime in 1981. From left are SAs Dennis Malloy, Richard B. Shapiro, and William McGinn.

International Security & Development Cooperation Act of 1981

The International Security and Development Act, Public Law 97-113, was passed in 1981. Among its provisions, this act authorized appropriations for the International Narcotics Control program under section 482 of the Foreign Assistance Act, specifically, $37.7 million for each of the fiscal years 1982 and 1983. The act allowed for the use of herbicides in drug crop eradication while requiring the Secretary of Health and Human Services to monitor any potentially harmful impacts of the use of such herbicides. Finally, the act directed the President to make an annual report to Congress on U.S. policy for establishing an international strategy to prevent narcotics trafficking. This mandated report was the forerunner of the International Narcotics and Controlled Strategy Report (INCSR), which the President issues every March and which highlighted the drug control efforts in every foreign country that receives aid from the United States.

Concurrent Jurisdiction with the FBI (1982)

In January 1982, Attorney General William French Smith announced a federal law enforcement reorganization. In an effort to bolster the drug effort with more anti-drug manpower and resources, the FBI officially joined forces with the DEA. The DEA would continue to be the principal drug enforcement agency and continue to be headed by an administrator, but instead of reporting directly to Associate Attorney General Rudy Giuliani, as Administrator Bensinger had, Administrator Mullen would report to FBI Director William H. Webster. Therefore, the FBI gained concurrent jurisdiction with the DEA over drug offenses. This increased the human and technical resources available for federal drug law enforcement from 1,900 agents to almost 10,000.

Administrator Mullen was the first FBI special agent to head the DEA. The Administration intended to increase cooperation between the two agencies by combining the street savvy of DEA agents with the variety of unique FBI investigative skills, especially in the area of money laundering and organized crime.

During the previous summer, high-ranking Justice Department officials had formed a committee to study the most effective method of coordinating the efforts of the DEA and FBI. Although the committee had considered an outright merger of the two agencies, they decided that formalizing a closer working relationship would be the most effective way to enhance the nation's drug fighting effort. In order to implement concurrent investigations, the two agencies began an intensive cross-training program, and similar programs were established to coordinate intelligence gathering efforts and laboratory analyses. Several DEA executives were reassigned to make room for additional FBI agents who assumed managerial responsibility for the DEA.

Over time, the FBI and the DEA shared many administrative practices, and the years between 1981 and 1986 proved to be a time of growth and development for both agencies. The DEA expanded its global responsibilities and placed greater emphasis on conspiracy and wiretap cases.

Southwest Asian Heroin

After years of aggressive law enforcement efforts aimed against heroin traffickers, several significant benefits were achieved. During the 1970s, the heroin addict population was reduced from over a half million to 380,000 addicts; heroin overdose deaths dropped by 80 percent; and heroin-related injuries decreased by 50 percent. In 1981, it was estimated that there was 40 percent less heroin available than in 1976. But, by the early 1980s, a new wave of heroin from the poppy fields of the "Golden Crescent" countries in southwest Asia—primarily Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan—began to flood the U.S. East Coast. Heroin traffickers reopened the notorious French Connection drug route of the 1970s, using many of the same organized crime smugglers in Italy, France, and West Germany. In 1980, DEA and U.S. Customs intercepted one of the largest illicit shipments of heroin since the French Connection. In Staten Island, New York, U.S. Customs detector dogs pointed to a shipment of furniture imported from Palermo, Italy. Inside the furniture, officers discovered 46 pounds of 65 percent-pure southwest Asian heroin. DEA agents then posed as truck drivers to make a controlled delivery of the furniture in New York City and Detroit, resulting in the Detroit arrest of a naturalized U.S. citizen from Sicily. In addition, three others were arrested in New York City.

Year	Foreign Office Opened
1981	Athens, Greece
1981	Tegucigalpa, Honduras
1982	Cairo, Egypt
1982	Barranquilla, Colombia
1982	Curacao, Netherlands Ant.
1982	Nicosia, Cyprus
1982	Peshawar, Pakistan
1982	Santo Domingo, Dom. Rep.
1984	Bern, Switzerland
1984	Santa Cruz, Bolivia



Chemist Romulo Reyes reviewed a drug analysis at the Southwest Regional Laboratory.

Methaqualone (1982)

Methaqualone, also called "Quaalude," was first marketed in the United States in 1965 as a sedative. By 1972, methaqualone had become one of the most popular drugs of abuse in the United States. Methaqualone abuse then increased suddenly in the late 1970s and early 1980s. According to the Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN) survey, methaqualone abuse in 1979 increased almost 40 percent.

One contributing factor to the increase of methaqualone abuse was the establishment of "stress clinics" in New York, New Jersey, and Florida. The sole purpose of these clinics was to issue prescriptions for methaqualone. Investigation of these clinics was complicated by the fact that patients underwent physical examinations so that there was a facade of legitimate medical treatment.

Responding to the alarming increase in methaqualone abuse in the early 1980s, the DEA targeted the major stress clinics. By mid-1982, these investigations resulted in 38 indictments. In addition, Florida and Georgia placed methaqualone in Schedule I, eliminating its medical use in those states.

At the peak of the U.S. methaqualone problem in the early 1980s, an estimated 85 percent of the methaqualone tablets that were being abused in the U.S. were counterfeit Quaalude tablets from overseas sources. In response, the DEA Diversion Control Program (renamed in 1982 from the Office of Compliance and Regulatory Affairs), in cooperation with the U.S. Department of State, launched a series of successful diplomatic initiatives with the major drug manufacturing and exporting countries in Europe and Asia. As a result, five source countries placed more stringent controls on the exportation of methaqualone. Also, cooperative investigations with foreign law enforcement agencies and the development of a "Drug and Chemical Watch Manual" by the DEA and the U.S. Customs Service resulted in more effective interdiction measures.

By the end of 1982, there were clear signs that the comprehensive effort against methaqualone diversion was working. Then, in 1984, Congress rescheduled methaqualone into Schedule I, effectively eliminating its domestic production and medical use. That same year, the United Nations reported that there were only two countries in the world manufacturing methaqualone. By 1985, there were so few methaqualone emergency room mentions (down 83 percent from 1980 levels) that it no longer showed up on the DAWN Top 20 controlled substance list. The results of the coordinated domestic and international actions were described as a total victory against methaqualone abuse.



1983: FBI Director William Webster (left) and DEA Acting Administrator Francis Mullen are shown at the unveiling of an exhibit focusing on the cooperative DEA/FBI efforts to enforce drug laws.

Reorganization of DEA Headquarters Functions

In 1982, when the FBI gained joint jurisdiction over drug investigations with the DEA, CENTAC was replaced with drug-specific operations, and the headquarters functions of the DEA were restructured into major drug enforcement investigations sections, known as the heroin, dangerous drugs, cocaine, and cannabis "drug desks." Each drug desk assumed responsibility for the direction, funding, and coordination of worldwide investigations for that drug category. Individual CENTAC investigations were renamed Special Enforcement Operations (SEOs), were removed from any central, overall control, and assigned to the drug desks. The new structure replaced the former geographical organization (domestic and foreign) with the expectation that it would improve the control and coordination of major investigations.

Centralizing Operations (1982)

With the FBI being assigned concurrent jurisdiction, Administrator Mullen reorganized the nine-year-old DEA structure to centralize operations. Upper-level management positions were moved from the regional offices to headquarters. Field divisions reported directly to headquarters in accordance with FBI management procedures. Administrator Mullen also raised the qualifications bar for new recruits, making college degrees mandatory for new agents, and reorganized the office responsible for investigating internal cooperation. Cross-training programs were developed and each of the 10 field offices received a training coordinator (previously, training coordinators were located only at the five regional offices). The major policy shift, however, was to eliminate quotas or arrest goals once mandated for all DEA regions, and then to establish pursuing major traffickers as an agency-wide goal. "In the past," Mullen explained, "we concentrated on arrests. Now we're concentrating on convictions at the highest levels."

Task Force on South Florida (1982)

As the drug trade grew in South Florida, murder and crime rates soared. In 1979, there were 349 murders—almost one drug killing per day in Miami. By 1981, murders had climbed to 621. Local law enforcement and politicians pleaded for help. In February 1982, President Reagan announced that "massive immigration, rampant crime, and epidemic drug smuggling have created a serious problem" in South Florida. Soon, hundreds of additional federal agents were detailed to the Southern Florida Task Force. The DEA added 20 agents and the FBI 43 agents to their Miami offices. The U.S. Treasury Department contributed 20 analysts to track drug money, and for the first time, the U.S. armed services became involved in drug interdiction. Meanwhile, because drug traffickers were also establishing offshore banks to facilitate their money laundering, the U.S. Government heightened its emphasis on financial investigations. Vice-president Bush stated that "Our investigative efforts will be as stringent on bankers and businessmen who profit from crime, as on the drug traffickers, the pushers, the hired assassins, and others. There will be no free lunch for the white collar criminal."

Domestic Marijuana

By the 1980s, more than 60 percent of American teenagers had experimented with marijuana and 40 percent became regular users. Supply also continued to increase. In addition to the smuggling of Colombian marijuana across U.S. borders, domestic cultivation of marijuana continued to be a problem. As cultivation techniques improved, the potency of marijuana (THC content) also climbed from 3.68 percent in 1979 to 7.28 percent in 1985. To counter this trend, the Domestic Cannabis Eradication/Suppression Program, initiated by Hawaii and California in 1979, rapidly expanded to encompass all 50 states by the close of 1985.

Administrator Mullen cuts cannabis plants during South Dakota seizures in 1983.

Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (1982)

On October 14, 1982, Attorney General William French Smith announced an 8-point program (see side-bar) to crackdown on organized crime, particularly syndicates involved with illegal drug trafficking. One highlight of the program was to establish 12 additional Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF), modeled after the successful South Florida Task Force, which was initiated under the leadership of Vice President George Bush. The President explained that "these task forces...will work closely with state and local law enforcement officials.

Following the South Florida example, they'll utilize the resources of the federal government, including the FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation), the DEA, the IRS (Internal Revenue Service), the ATF (Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms), Immigration and Naturalization Service, United States Marshal Services, the U.S. Customs Service, and the Coast Guard. In addition, in some regions, Department of Defense tracking and pursuit capability will be made available...These task forces will allow us to mount an intensive and coordinated campaign against international and domestic drug trafficking and other organized criminal enterprises."

OCDETF was one of the first multi-jurisdictional task forces to combat drug trafficking, and over the years, the DEA has participated in 85 percent of all OCDETF investigations.

8-Point Crackdown on Organized Crime

- **Establish 12 additional task forces, modeled after the South Florida Task Force, in key areas of the United States.**
- **Create a 15-member panel to monitor organized crime's influence, hold public hearings on the findings for legislative recommendations and to heighten public awareness.**
- **Launch a project to enlist the nation's governors' support to strengthen criminal justice reforms against organized crime.**
- **Bring under a cabinet-level committee, chaired by the Attorney General, all federal agencies and law enforcement bureaus to bring a comprehensive attack on organized crime. The committee will review interagency and intergovernmental cooperation and report the findings directly to the President.**
- **Found a national center for state and local law enforcement training at the federal facility in Glynco, Georgia.**
- **Open a new legislative offensive aimed to reform criminal statutes concerning bail, sentencing, criminal forfeiture, exclusionary rule, and racketeering.**
- **Direct the Attorney General to submit an annual report on the fight against organized crime and organized drug trafficking groups.**
- **Allocate millions of dollars for prison and jail facilities.**

Scheduling of Dangerous Drugs

The scheduling of dangerous drugs and precursor chemicals has long been a mainstay in DEA's arsenal in curtailing drug trafficking. For example, in early 1980, phenylacetone (P2P), a precursor chemical favored by outlaw motorcycle gangs in manufacturing methamphetamine, was placed in Schedule II, which forced drug traffickers to search for alternative chemicals that were more difficult to obtain and synthesize.

50th State Joins EPIC (1984)

On October 24, 1984, the State of Pennsylvania signed a participation agreement with EPIC, becoming the 50th state to do so. A signing ceremony and news conference were held at the Pennsylvania State Police Headquarters in Harrisburg. Also announced at the conference was the opening of the DEA's new Harrisburg office, comprised of a supervisor and three agents.

Fitness for EVERYONE

Deputy Administrator Jack Lawn and Administrator "Bud" Mullen stretch before a fitness run.

OPBAT (1982)

Operation Bahamas and Turks and Caicos Islands (OPBAT), launched in 1982, continued in the 1990s to combat the flow of illegal drugs through the Caribbean into the southeastern United States. Historically, the United States had an excellent working relationship with both the Commonwealth of the Bahamas and the Government of the Turks and Caicos Islands (as a dependent territory of the United Kingdom). The DEA, along with U.S. Coast Guard, Department of State, Army, Customs Service, Southern and Atlantic Military Commands, actively supported the Royal Bahamas Police Force and Royal Turk and Caicos Police Forces in combating drug trafficking through 100,000 square miles of open water surrounding 700 islands with a land mass of 5,382 square miles. With increasingly effective law enforcement efforts along the Mexican border, there had been a resurgence of smuggling through the Caribbean. The traffickers used turboprop twin-engine aircraft, large "go fast" high-powered vessels, global positioning systems, cellular telephones, and Cuban territorial air and seas as cover for their trade. All of these factors made OPBAT's law enforcement operations exceedingly difficult.

Joint DEA/FBI SAC Conference (1983)

In March 1983, the first joint DEA/FBI Special Agent in Charge Conference was held. Attorney General William French Smith joined the assembly for the first day of the conference. In his address, the Attorney General expressed his personal satisfaction with the progress of the DEA/FBI relationship, and commended those present for working to ensure the program's success. The Attorney General also spoke about the significance of drug law enforcement in the Reagan Administration's overall crime control program and acknowledged the danger inherent in the drug control mission.

First Joint DEA/ National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (1983)

In March 1983, President Reagan announced the formation of the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS) to interdict the flow of narcotics into the United States. NNBIS was headed by then Vice President George Bush, and had an Executive Board made up of members from the State Department, Treasury, Defense, Justice, Transportation, Central Intelligence Agency, and White House Drug Abuse Policy Office. Acting Administrator Mullen also participated as a member of the board.

Special Agents Mark Johnson (left) and Dempsey Jones (right) met with Vice President George Bush during his 1984 trip to the National Narcotic Border Interdiction System (NNBIS) at Long Beach, CA.

NNBIS was designed to coordinate the work of those federal agencies with existing responsibilities and capabilities for interdiction of seaborne, airborne, and cross-border importation of narcotics. The role of NNBIS was to complement, but not to replace, the duties of the regional Drug Enforcement Task Forces operated by the Department of Justice. NNBIS monitored suspected smuggling activity originating outside national borders that targeted the United States, and coordinated the seizure of contraband and the arrest of suspects involved in illegal drug trafficking. The DEA committed one agent and one analyst to each of the six regional centers (South Florida, Los Angeles, El Paso, New Orleans, Chicago, and New York City) in liaison capacities.

Career Board (1983)

The Career Board was established in 1983 by Acting Administrator Francis M. Mullen, Jr., as a way to ensure a more comprehensive career mobility system within the DEA. In the words of Administrator Mullen, "the Career Development Program has been designed to reinforce the concepts of equal opportunity for advancement, mobility, diversity of assignment and centralized selection of managerial personnel. The objective of the special agent career ladder is to assist DEA criminal investigators in attaining the highest level of competence while, at the same time, developing a highly capable managerial corps." When formed, the Career Board was composed of the Deputy Administrator (as chairman) and three Assistant Administrators. A Senior Special Agent at the GS-15 level was selected to serve as Executive Secretary for the Career Board to provide administrative and technical support. This configuration assured diversity and tried to ensure that the most qualified personnel for promotions were selected. To do so, the Board evaluated each employee's overall record of experience and expertise, the Special Agent in Charge's personal recommendations, the overall needs of the DEA, and most important, the fair and equitable treatment of each individual.

Operation Pisces (1984)

In 1984, the DEA set up an undercover money laundering operation called Operation Pisces with the IRS and several state and local agencies.

This two-year, undercover intelligence investigation successfully revealed a direct connection between the Colombian cartels, including drug kingpin Pablo Escobar, and street gangs in the United States, as well as deals negotiated in Denmark and Italy.

During the operation, DEA agents, posing as money launderers, also discovered that the drug lords were moving a ton of cocaine per week and reaping profits of almost $4 million a month. The organizations used check cashing businesses to launder the enormous proceeds from the sale of cocaine. When the operation ended in 1987, law enforcement had arrested 220 drug dealers and seized $28 million in cash and assets and more than 11,000 lbs. of cocaine in Southern California. The investigation was further proof of the continuous flow of drugs and money between Colombia and the United States.

Operation Pipeline (1984)

As drug traffickers established their networks within U.S. borders, they began to rely heavily on the highway system to move their wares from entry points to distribution hubs around the country. Beginning in the early 1980s, New Mexico state troopers grew suspicious when they noticed a sharp increase in the number of motor vehicle violations that resulted in drug seizures and arrests. At the same time, and unknown to the troopers in New Mexico, troopers in New Jersey began making similar seizures during highway stops along the Interstate-95 "drug corridor" from Florida to the Northeast. Independently, troopers in New Mexico and New Jersey established their own highway drug interdiction programs. Over time, as their seizures mounted, law enforcement officers found that highway drug couriers shared many characteristics, tendencies, and methods. Highway law enforcement officers began to ask key questions to help determine whether or not motorists they had stopped for traffic violations were also carrying drugs. These interview techniques proved extremely effective. The road patrol officers also found it beneficial to share their observations and experiences in highway interdiction.

The success of the highway interdiction programs in New Jersey and New Mexico led to the creation of Operation Pipeline. This DEA-funded training program featured state police and highway patrol officers with expertise in highway interdiction who provided training to other officers throughout the country. Pipeline, a nationwide highway interdiction program, was one of DEA's most effective operations and continued to provide essential cooperation between the DEA and state and local law enforcement agencies. The operation was composed of three elements: training, real-time communication, and analytic support. Each year, state and local highway officers delivered dozens of training schools across the country to other highway officers. These were intended to inform officers of interdiction laws and policies, to build their knowledge of drug trafficking, and to sharpen their perceptiveness of highway couriers. Training classes focused on: (1) the law, policy, and ethics governing highway stops and drug prosecution; and (2) drug trafficking trends and key characteristics, or indicators, that were shared by drug traffickers. Also, through EPIC, state and local agencies shared real-time information with other agencies, obtained immediate results to their record checks, and received detailed analysis of drug seizures to support their investigations.

In December 1984, over 1,600 pounds of cocaine were seized in the New York area as a result of a six-month investigation by the New York Drug Enforcement Task Force. Pictured with the cocaine seized are, from left to right: Raymond Jones, Chief of the Organized Crime Control Bureau, New York City Police Department; Thomas A. Constantine, Deputy Superintendent of the New York State Police; Raymond Dearie, U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of New York; New York Field Division SAC Bruce Jensen; and John Luksic, U.S. Customs SAC at the JFK airport office.

The Crime Control Act (1984)

In 1984, the Crime Control Act targeted various aspects of civil and criminal sanctions related to drug trafficking. Specifically, federal criminal and civil asset forfeiture penalties were expanded and increased. The law also established a determinate sentencing system for drug offenses. In addition, it amended the Bail Reform Act to target pretrial detention of defendants accused of serious drug offenses. The National Drug Policy Board was created by the Act to coordinate international and criminal justice issues related to drugs. Chaired by the Attorney General and composed of members of the Departments of Treasury and Defense, it was the forerunner to the Office of National Drug Control Policy.



Explorers wait for a signal from DEA agents participating in a mock exercise at the 1984 National Law Enforcement Explorer Conference at Ohio State University. This was the third year that the DEA took part in the conference, which is sponsored by the Boy Scouts of America.

Tranquilandia (1984)

In March of 1984, another very important discovery signaled just how sophisticated the Medellin cartel's operations had become. Colombian law enforcement officials conducted a raid against Tranquilandia or "Quiet Village." It was much more than a cocaine lab located 160 miles south of San Jose del Guaviare. What they found was a fully equipped cocaine factory, complete with living quarters for 100 people, several storage rooms for chemicals and supplies, and workshops for automobiles and airplanes. With this efficient production line, traffickers were synthesizing 20 tons of cocaine a month, putting $12 billion in the coffers of the Medellin cartel in only two years. Authorities seized more than 10 tons of cocaine and cocaine base at Tranquilandia and found more labs and similar compounds in the surrounding jungle. The police destroyed drugs and material conservatively estimated to be worth $1.2 billion.

This startling discovery had actually begun when the DEA country attache in Bogota asked for a study on chemical imports, especially ether and acetone entering Colombia. The study determined that 98 percent of the imported ether (90 percent originating from the United States and West Germany) was being used to make cocaine. Due to the findings of the chemical report, the DEA contacted U.S. chemical companies to ask for their cooperation in alerting law enforcement about unusually large chemical orders.

When an individual from Colombia walked into the chemical company office in New Jersey requesting to pay cash for nearly two metric tons of ether—an amount equivalent to half of all the legitimate ether imports for the entire country of Colombia for 1980—the chemical company notified the DEA.



The processing of cocaine base to paste.

A cache of precursor chemicals near a South American cocaine processing lab.

Seizing this opportunity, the DEA set up a sting in Chicago code-named Operation Scorpion. A front company called North Central Industrial Chemical (NCIC), purposely using the same initials as the National Crime Information Center, was established and contacted the individual with an offer to fill his order. Eventually, 76 drums of ether were sent to New Orleans. Two of the drums had been wired with electronic tracking devices. By satellite, agents were able to monitor the movements of the chemicals. After several days, the chemicals were traced to a dense jungle area in Colombia. The DEA worked with the Colombian National Police to help raid the site, never anticipating the magnitude of the operation.

The DEA had long understood the vital link of chemicals and drugs. Without chemicals, traffickers could not manufacture their drugs. One of the DEA's early attacks on the chemical trade had occurred in 1982 with Operation Chem Con, short for Chemical Control. The DEA gradually expanded its efforts to control chemicals essential to the processing of coca to cocaine with governments worldwide, and it was this chemical tracking that led to major laboratory seizures in South America, including Tranquilandia.

Owners and Commissioners of Professional Sports Leagues met with President Ronald Reagan to express their support and to participate in prevention efforts. DEA sponsored a series of posters featuring the Washington Redskins which augmented Nancy Reagan's "Just Say No" campaign.

Drug Prevention Programs

With skyrocketing drug seizures, trafficker arrests, and drug use, public awareness about the drug issue was greatly heightened. Concerned citizens called on their elected officials to do more to control the destructive tide of drugs washing across the country. Parents of teens and young children were particularly alarmed, and some 4,000 formal parent organizations formed all over the United States. It was this national awareness and outcry that led to First Lady Nancy Reagan's "Just Say No" program that was formally announced in February 1985.

The DEA realized that the unharnessed energy of parents, teachers, and other concerned citizens in communities across the nation could be a vital asset in reducing drug use among teens. Over the next few years, the DEA ventured into a new and very important aspect of our nation's drug problem—prevention and education. The DEA had long understood the important equation between supply and demand, and knew that enforcement efforts alone would not solve the drug problem. Law enforcement officials recognized that without a dramatic reduction in the U.S. public's demand for illegal drugs, the problem would never go away.

In September 1984, President Reagan signed a proclamation for National Drug Abuse Education and Prevention Week, saying, "We are on the right track."

In June 1984, the DEA joined forces with the National High School Athletic Coaches Association in a cooperative education and prevention program that focused on 5.5 million high school athletes. The Sports Drug Awareness Program, as the program was called, began with Frank Parks, a high school coach in Washington, D.C., who believed that high school athletes, with their coaches as leaders, could serve as positive role models to help young people resist the temptation of drugs. More than 40 organizations of professional, college, and high school sports joined the program. The DEA also recruited and trained many professional athletes to work with the Sports Drug Awareness Program. These popular sports figures captured the attention of the children and helped instill the message that drug use was dangerous.

1984 Amendment to the Controlled Substances Act

Legislation passed in 1984 addressed many of the problems that had emerged since passage of the CSA in 1970. The most important amendment was the inclusion of a "public interest revocation" provision. This amendment provided additional authority for the denial or revocation of a practitioner controlled substance registration based on a demonstration that such registration was contrary to the public interest.

This is the same authority that the DEA always had under the CSA with respect to manufacturers and distributors. However, the DEA needed the tools to eliminate a source of diversion without solely relying on a state regulatory action or having to go through a lengthy and labor intensive criminal prosecution. For the practitioner, this provision also provided a means of removing controlled substance privileges without affecting their medical license or giving them a criminal record.

After the Public Interest Revocation (PIR) program was initiated, revocations and surrenders rose from less than 100 per year, prior to PIR authority, to more than 400 per year. Subsequently, by 1989, DAWN emergency room mentions for prescription drugs had dropped to 33 percent of total mentions for all controlled substances.

Under the provisions of the CSA, the formal administrative scheduling process could take years to complete. In the interim, the DEA was unable to take effective action against the traffickers responsible for these new and often dangerous drugs. The amendments provided for one-year emergency scheduling of a drug if the abuse of that drug constituted an "imminent hazard to the public safety," while normal scheduling procedures were being pursued. As a result of this amendment, incidents of controlled substance analogue abuse significantly declined.

Training

Until 1981, the DEA continued its training at the National Training Institute, located at DEA Headquarters, 1405 "Eye" Street, in Washington, D.C. That year, DEA's Domestic Training Division was moved to the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) in Glynco, Georgia. In addition to Basic Agent training, the program included subject matter training, such as intelligence collection, executive development, and technical skills, as well as occupational training for compliance investigators, intelligence analysts, chemists, supervisors, mid-level managers, state and local police officers, and international law enforcement officers. With the exception of FBI training, all other federal law enforcement training was conducted at FLETC. The first FBI/DEA firearms instructor school was held in November 1984 at the FBI Academy in Quantico. Training included current firearms training concepts practiced by the FBI, and practical training in various combat shooting courses utilizing revolvers and semiautomatic pistols. Shoulder weapons training included shotgun, M-16, and H&K and K-MP5 machine guns. Additional training included stress obstacle shooting courses, building entry and clearance, arrest, and handcuff procedures.

Vehicle stops and ammunition ballistics were also addressed and applied to practical situations. This was the first of several such schools that fostered the sharing of ideas and concepts in the application and training of firearms in federal law enforcement.

Special Agent Jerry Jensen, the Regional Director of Los Angeles, headed up the new institute in Glynco. Special Agent Frank Monastero, who had served as director of training, was reassigned to the position of chief pilot.

On December 17, 1982, the DEA graduated its first class of Basic Agents from the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) located at Glynco, Georgia. The BA-18 class was composed of 32 men and 2 women who ranged in age from 23 to 35. The 34 members of BA-18 were selected from a pool of more than 4,000 candidates. Admission to BA-18 was a highly prized honor because it had been two years since the graduation of the previous BA-17 class. The DEA continued to train at Glynco until it moved its training facilities to the FBI Training Academy at Quantico, Virginia, in 1985.

Participants in DEA's first firearms instructor school held at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia, in 1984.

Aviation

In March 1980, the DEA Air Wing completed its 20,000th airborne law enforcement mission. Working in close support of domestic regional and district offices, Air Wing personnel daily provided a unique surveillance and role enhancement capability. Additionally, aviation resources and special agent / pilots were called upon to support special operation both domestically and overseas. Focusing on maximum use of current aircraft and assignment personnel, the Air Wing brought this valuable support element to many priority investigations.

During fiscal year 1983, the DEA Aviation Wing logged more than 12,000 hours of flight time in support of domestic and overseas enforcement missions. Because the missions were progressively more complex, demanding, and hazardous, a new safety program was implemented. The Aviation Safety Council, which was a five-member group, composed of four agents and one maintenance specialist, met on a regular basis for the purpose of eliminating conditions which represented hazards to DEA aviation operations.

Rocky Andresano and Vance Huffman in a DEA Aero Commander.

Technology

In 1981, the DEA, in coordination with the Department of State, represented by Thomas M. Tracy, Assistant Secretary for Administration, signed an agreement that provided the DEA with telecommunication facilities supporting automated data processing (ADP) in the DEA's foreign offices.

The ADP support safeguarded the DEA's computerized data holdings worldwide. This program formulated the procedures for the protection of DEA sensitive and administratively controlled information promulgated by other federal agencies. This automated support also provided for the rapid interchange of vast amounts of information with other federal and state law enforcement agencies.

In May 1994, Special Agent Bob Johannsen showed Deputy Administrator Lawn the Title III room during a Washington Field Division briefing.

Special Agents Charles R. Henderson (left) and Dennis E. Checkoway displayed technological equipment seized during the 1981 raid of a clandestine amphetamine laboratory in Campe Verde, Arizona. Shown above are a voice stress analyzer, a telephone scrambler, two scanners, and lab equipment capable of producing six pounds of amphetamine a day.

Laboratories

In 1977, field laboratory and headquarters personnel prepared the first edition of the Clandestine Laboratory Guide for Agents and Chemists. This was the first compilation of illicit drug manufacturing procedures and investigative techniques published in a single volume. The Guide was revised and reissued in 1981. This publication has since been revised several times to keep up with changing clandestine laboratory practices and newly encountered illicitly manufactured drugs.

DEA tape librarian Dorothy Dupree from the Office of Information Services prepared tapes for use in support of DEA investigations and prosecutions.

In the early 1980s, communications equipment operator Bobbie Peters transmitted messages on this teletype machine.

The workload of DEA laboratories increased in the early 1980s. When the Attorney General of the United States announced that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) would be given concurrent jurisdiction with DEA over federal drug law violations in 1982, DEA laboratories became responsible for conducting analysis of all drug evidence purchased or seized by FBI agents in connection with their investigations. Also, a dramatic increase in the number of exhibits submitted by the District of Colombia Metro Police Department as a result of "Operation Clean Sweep" gave rise to a period of mandatory Saturday overtime, as well as reinforcement and support from the Special Testing and Research Lab in McLean and the North Central Laboratory in Chicago.

Killed in the Line of Duty

Thomas J. Devine
Died on September 25, 1982
DEA Special Agent Devine, a Group Supervisor at the Newark Field Division, died in Passaic, NJ, from gunshot wounds received during an undercover investigation in New York City.

Larry N. Carwell
Died on January 9, 1984
DEA Special Agent Carwell of the Houston District Office died in a helicopter crash during an operations flight near the Bahamas.

Marcellus Ward
Died on December 3, 1984
Detective Ward of the Baltimore, Maryland Police Department was shot and killed while working on an undercover assignment. He was assigned to the DEA's Baltimore District Office Task Force.

Many U.S. communities were ravaged by violence stemming from the drug crack.

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1985-1990

John C. Lawn
July 26, 1985-
March 23, 1990

On March 1, 1985, Francis M. Mullen retired and John C. "Jack" Lawn, Deputy Administrator since 1982, became Acting Administrator. On April 4, 1985, he was nominated as DEA Administrator. Mr. Lawn was confirmed by the U.S. Senate on July 16, 1985, and sworn in on July 26, 1985, as the DEA's fourth Administrator. Before coming to the DEA, Mr. Lawn had been an FBI Agent for 15 years. As FBI Special Agent in Charge in San Antonio from 1980 to 1982, he had directed the successful investigation into the assassination of Federal Judge John H. Wood, Jr. Before this historic case, Mr. Lawn had supervised all FBI civil rights cases, including allegations of police brutality and color of law complaints. In addition, he was responsible for background investigations of White House officials, federal judges, and U.S. attorney nominees. He also served in the Criminal Division of FBI headquarters where he supervised Congressional review of the assassinations of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and President John F. Kennedy. From 1990-1994, Mr. Lawn served as vice-president and chief of operations of the New York Yankees. In 1998, he was serving as the chairman and CEO of The Century Council, a national organization dedicated to fighting alcohol abuse.

DEA Special Agents

1985.....2,234
1990.....3,191

DEA Budget

1985.....$362.4 million
1990.....$769.2 million

During the late 1980s, the international drug trafficking organizations grew more powerful as the cocaine trade dominated the Western Hemisphere. Mafias headquartered in the Colombian cities of Medellin and Cali wielded enormous influence and employed bribery, intimidation, and murder to further their criminal goals. Many U.S. communities were gripped by violence stemming from the drug trade. At first, the most dramatic examples of drug-related violence were experienced in Miami, where cocaine traffickers fought open battles on the city streets. Later, in 1985, the crack epidemic hit the United States full force, resulting in escalating violence among rival groups and crack users in many other U.S. cities. By 1989, the crack epidemic was still raging and drug abuse was considered the most important issue facing the nation. DAWN data showed a 28-fold increase in cocaine-related hospital emergency room admissions over a four-year period.

The Crack Epidemic

In the early 1980s, the majority of cocaine being shipped to the United States was coming through the Bahamas. Soon there was a huge glut of cocaine powder in these islands which caused the price to drop by as much as 80 percent. Faced with dropping prices for their illegal product, drug dealers made a shrewd marketing decision to convert the powder to "crack," a smokeable form of cocaine. It was cheap, simple to produce, ready to use, and highly profitable for dealers to develop. As early as 1981, reports of crack appeared in Los Angeles, San Diego, Houston, and in the Caribbean.

At this time, powder cocaine was available on the street at an average of 55 percent purity for $100 per gram, and crack was sold at average purity levels of 80-plus percent for the same price. In some major cities, such as New York, Detroit, and Philadelphia, one dosage unit of crack could be obtained for as little as $2.50. Never before had any form of cocaine been available at such low prices and at such high purity. More important from a marketing standpoint, it produced an instant high and its users became addicted in a very short time. Eventually, Caribbean immigrants taught young people in Miami how to produce crack, and they in turn went into business in the United States.

With the influx of traffickers and cocaine, South Florida had become a principal area for the "conversion laboratories" that were used to convert cocaine base into cocaine HCl, the form in which cocaine is sold. The majority of these labs were found in South Florida, but they also appeared in other parts of the country, indicating the expansion of Colombian trafficking. For example, in 1985, four conversion laboratories were seized in New York State [see "Minden Lab" on page 65], four in California, two in Virginia, and one each in North Carolina and Arizona. One year later, 23 more conversion labs were seized in the United States.

The first crack house had been discovered in Miami in 1982. However, this form of cocaine was not fully appreciated as a major threat because it was primarily being consumed by middle class users who were not associated with cocaine addicts. In fact, crack was initially considered a purely Miami phenomenon until it became a serious problem in New York City, where it first appeared in December 1983. In the New York City area, it was estimated that more than three-fourths of the early crack consumers were white professionals or middle-class youngsters from Long Island, suburban New Jersey, or upper-class Westchester County. However, partly because crack sold for as little as $5 a rock, it ultimately spread to less affluent neighborhoods.

The crack epidemic dramatically increased the numbers of Americans addicted to cocaine. In 1985, the number of people who admitted using cocaine on a routine basis increased from 4.2 million to 5.8 million, according to the Department of Health and Human Service's National Household Survey. Likewise, cocaine-related hospital emergencies continued to increase nationwide during 1985 and 1986. According to DAWN statistics, in 1985, cocaine-related hospital emergencies rose by 12 percent, from 23,500 to 26,300; and in 1986, they increased 110 percent, from 26,300 to 55,200. Between 1984 and 1987, cocaine incidents increased fourfold.

Approximately 5,000 pounds of cocaine, valued at $250 million, were seized in Chicago in July 1987. The cocaine was smuggled in 130 banana boxes. Pictured in front of the seized cocaine are, left to right, Chicago ASAC John T. Peoples; Police Superintendent Fred Rice; Attorney General Edwin Meese III; Chicago SAC Philip V. Fisher; and ASAC Garfield Hammonds, Jr.

By this time, the Medellin cartel was at the height of its power and controlled cocaine trafficking from the conversion and packaging process in Colombia, to the transportation of cocaine to the United States, as well as the first level of wholesale distribution in U.S. communities. While the Medellin cartel had established a foothold in U.S. communities, its rival, the Cali mafia, began to dominate markets in the Northeastern United States. The Cali mafia was less visible, less violent, and more businesslike than the Medellin cartel. Operating through a system of cells, where members were insulated from one another, the Cali mafia steadily began establishing far-reaching networks that eventually ensured that they would dominate the cocaine trade well into the 1990s.

By early 1986, crack had a stranglehold on the ghettos of New York City and was dominated by traffickers and dealers from the Dominican Republic. Crack distribution and abuse exploded in 1986, and by year-end was available in 28 states and the District of Columbia. According to the 1985-1986 National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee Report, crack was available in Atlanta, Boston, Detroit, Kansas City, Miami, New York City, Newark, San Francisco, Seattle, St. Louis, Dallas, Denver, Minneapolis, and Phoenix.

By 1987, crack was reported to be available in the District of Columbia and all but four states in the Union. Crack was *abundantly* available in at least 19 cities in 13 states: Texas (Dallas), Oklahoma (Tulsa, Oklahoma City), Michigan (Detroit), California (Los Angeles, Riverside, Santa Barbara), Florida (Miami, Ft. Lauderdale, Tampa), New York (New York City), Oregon (Portland), Washington (Seattle), Missouri (Kansas City), Minnesota (Minneapolis), Colorado (Denver), Nevada (Las Vegas), and Maryland (Hagerstown, Salisbury). By 1988, crack had replaced heroin as the greatest problem in Detroit, and it was available in Los Angeles in multi-kilo quantities.

Meanwhile, wholesale and retail prices for cocaine had declined, while purity levels for kilogram amounts of the drug had remained at 90 percent or higher. Street-level gram purity rose from 25 percent in 1981, to 55 percent in 1987, to 70 percent in 1988. By the late 1980s, over 10,000 gang members were dealing drugs in some 50 cities from Baltimore to Seattle. The crack trade had created a violent sub-world, and crack-related murders in many large cities were skyrocketing. For example, a 1988 study by the Bureau of Justice Statistics found that in New York City, crack use was tied to 32% of all homicides and 60% of drug-related homicides. On a daily basis, the evening news reported the violence of drive-by shootings and crack users trying to obtain money for their next hit. Smokeable crack appealed to a new group of users, especially women, because it did not have the stigma associated with needles or heroin, and because it was smoked, many mistakenly equated crack with marijuana.

As a result, a generation of addicted children were born to—and frequently abandoned by—crack-using mothers. By the late 1980s, about one out of every 10 newborns in the United States (375,000 per year) had been exposed in the womb to one or more illicit drug.

In October 1986, Attorney General Edwin Meese explained the U.S. anti-crack strategy: "The most effective long-term way to reduce crack trafficking is to reduce the amount of cocaine entering this country. The federal government's main priorities against cocaine are reducing production in source countries, interdicting shipments entering the United States, and disrupting major trafficking rings." Thus, the DEA attacked the major trafficking organizations, primarily the Medellin and Cali cartels, which were producing cocaine and smuggling it into the United States.

To help accomplish this, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 allocated $8 million for domestic cocaine enforcement. A portion of this budget was used to establish DEA Crack Teams. Each of these teams consisted of two DEA special agents who assisted state and local law enforcement agencies in the investigation of large-scale violators and interstate trafficking networks. The agents either worked with existing DEA-funded state and local task forces or with local law enforcement agencies that had established their own special crack groups. In addition, DEA Crack Teams were also deployed to states experiencing extensive crack problems. Examples included Arizona, which was vulnerable to a rapid influx of crack dealers from Los Angeles street groups, and Louisiana, where traffickers from Haiti were dealing to migrant workers in rural areas.

Another significant source of support for the Crack Teams was the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 that provided for asset forfeiture sharing with state and local law enforcement agencies.

The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 later provided $44 million to the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) grant program for urban law enforcement agencies, and $1.5 million was made available for the establishment of five Crack Task Forces. By the late 1980s, the DEA's domestic crack cocaine enforcement activities were conducted through three multi-agency initiatives: DEA Crack Teams, Department of Justice's BJA Crack TAsk Forces, and State and Local Task Forces. Cocaine investigations dominated DEA enforcement activities, as cocaine arrests accounted for nearly 65 percent of DEA's total arrests in 1988. Simultaneously, DEA seizures substantially increased. The DEA had seized only 200 kilos of cocaine in 1977; but the number of seizures jumped to 60,000 kilos by 1988.

1985: Chicago Division personnel were photographed with the results of raids developed through Operation Durango. The 6-month investigation into the Chicago and Durango, Mexico-based polydrug trafficking group led to the arrest of 120 defendants and the seizure of heroin, cocaine, marijuana and $25 million in assets.

Trafficking Via Mexico

During the latter half of the 1980s, the role of traffickers based in Mexico and the use of Mexican territory increased dramatically. Mexico's strategic location, midway between source and consumer nations, and an increasingly powerful international drug mafia headquartered in Mexico made it an ideal transit point for South American-produced cocaine. Mexico's topography offered several seaports along its Pacific and Gulf coasts and countless airstrips scattered across its interior allowed vessel and aircraft refueling to be quickly and easily accomplished. Equally significant was Mexico's 2,000-mile land border with the United States, over 95 percent of which had no fences or barricades. Moreover, the remoteness of many border areas made patrolling and surveillance exceedingly difficult. Cocaine traffickers from Colombia expanded their trafficking routes to include Mexico, and increasingly used Mexico as a shipping point.

Meanwhile, the Guadalajara mafia was formed in Mexico with close ties to Colombian mafia, to ship heroin, marijuana, and cocaine to the United States. Included in these shipments would be smaller quantities of Mexican black tar or brown powder heroin, piggybacked on the larger Colombian drug loads. Drug-laden private aircraft from Colombia began using thousands of registered and unregistered airstrips located throughout Mexico to deliver their product. However, the preferred method of smuggling drugs remained the overland routes, and 90 percent of cocaine seizures made by U.S. law enforcement on the southwest border in 1989 were land seizures. Cocaine seizures made by U.S. law enforcement increased from under 2,000 kilograms in 1985 to over 40,000 kilograms in 1989.

Employee Assistance Program Expanded (1985)

Recognizing the importance of meeting the unique needs of DEA agents, support personnel, and families, the DEA had created an Employee Assistance Program (EAP) in 1978, which was expanded in 1985. By April 1986, the EAP provided each of the DEA's field divisions with access to an area clinician and at least one backup clinician, enabling all DEA employees and their families to become eligible to receive professional, confidential assistance in marital/family/parenting and relationship concerns, alcohol and drug abuse, job stress and other emotional/psychological problems, as well as guidance regarding financial and legal concerns. The DEA also implemented a program whereby each division had a team of personnel trained to assist employees and their families following traumatic incidents related to the dangerous nature of working in drug law enforcement. This Trauma Team program was originally established in 1978, when Yvonne Conner, the head of the EAP, conducted extensive research to determine the special needs of DEA personnel. This enabled her to design a professional and confidential program that is uniquely responsive to DEA employees and their families.

Drug-Free Workplace (1986)

On September 15, 1986, President Reagan issued Executive Order 12564, The Drug-Free Federal Workplace Program. He called on all federal employees to refuse drugs and instructed each federal agency to set up programs to "test for the use of illegal drugs by employees in sensitive positions."

By March 1988, the DEA established its own Drug-Free Workplace Program. The Drug Deterrence Staff, along with a state-of-the-art contract laboratory, conducted almost 2,000 drug tests at 51 DEA sites. Over 1,600 of those tests were conducted by the unannounced, random test method using a computer-generated program to select employees for testing.

National Security Decision Directive 221

On April 8, 1986, President Reagan proclaimed that drug production and trafficking constituted a threat to the security of the United States, and extended executive sanction to an active war on drugs with National Security Decision Directive 221.

Foreign Office Opened

1986	Cochabamba, Bolivia
1987	Canberra, Australia
1987	Lagos, Nigeria
1987	Port-au-Prince, Haiti
1988	Bridgetown, Barbados

The Murder of DEA Special Agent Enrique Camarena

Perhaps no single event had a more significant impact on the DEA than the abduction and murder of Special Agent Enrique Camarena in Mexico in 1985. His murder led to the most comprehensive homicide investigation ever undertaken by the DEA, which ultimately uncovered corruption and complicity by numerous Mexican officials.

Known as "Kiki" to his friends, Special Agent Camarena had a reputation for believing that the actions of each and every individual made a difference in the drug war. He was assigned to the DEA's Guadalajara Resident Office in Mexico, and was working to identify drug trafficking kingpins when he left his office to meet his wife for lunch on February 7, 1985. A late-model car pulled up beside Camarena and four men grabbed him, threw him into the back of the car, and sped off. Hours later, Alfredo Zavala Avelar, a Mexican Agriculture Department pilot working with anti-drug authorities, was also abducted.

Immediately after Mrs. Camarena reported her husband missing, the DEA Guadalajara Resident Office made every effort to locate him. After determining that Special Agent Camarena's disappearance had no innocent explanation, Resident Agent in Charge James Kuykendall promptly notified his superiors and began attempting to enlist the support of the Mexican police. Meanwhile, special agents assigned to the Guadalajara Resident Office began to query confidential informants and police contacts for information about the whereabouts of Special Agent Camarena. Mexico Country Attache Edward Heath then requested assistance from U.S. Ambassador Gavin, who called the Mexican Attorney General and requested his assistance in resolving the disappearance of the special agent. Next, all DEA domestic SACs and country attaches in Latin America were notified of the agent's disappearance and were requested to query all sources knowledgeable about Mexican trafficking organizations for any intelligence that might lead to his rescue. DEA headquarters then quickly established a special group to coordinate the investigation and 25 special agents were sent to Guadalajara to assist in the search for Special Agent Camarena.

Throughout February 1985, the DEA continued its efforts to locate Special Agent Camarena. Witnesses were interviewed and numerous leads were followed. Searches of several residences and ranches in Mexico. Based on the information that was developed, the DEA requested the Mexican Federal Judicial Police (MFJP) to consider Rafael Caro-Quintero, Miguel Felix-Gallardo, and Ernesto Fonseca-Carrillo as suspects in the kidnapping. All three were notorious narcotics traffickers based in Guadalajara, and were believed to have the resources and motive to commit such an act.

On February 9, 1985, Rafael Caro-Quintero was confronted by MFJP officers at the Guadalajara Airport as he was preparing to leave on a private jet with several of his associates. After an armed stand-off, the Mexican officer in charge, an MFJP Comandante, spoke privately with Caro-Quintero and then allowed him and his associates to depart.

Administrator Lawn comforted Geneva Camarena, widow of Agent Enrique Camarena.

Subsequently, a local farm worker discovered two bodies in a field adjacent to a busy road about one kilometer from a ranch in Michoacan, Mexico. The bodies, which apparently had been dumped there, were identified as those of Special Agent Camarena and Captain Zavala. Soil samples taken from the two bodies by FBI special agents in Mexico proved the bodies had

"Kiki" Camarena with Nicole Telles,(daughter of RAC Tom Telles, in Hermosillo, Mexico). SA Camarena stayed in the Telles home for security reasons while he helped launch an operation against a Mexican marijuana trafficking organization.

previously been buried elsewhere and then moved. On March 7 and 8, 1985, a U.S. pathologist and forensic team analyzed the discovery site and performed an autopsy. The pathologist's findings made positive identifications and indicated that death in both cases was due to blunt force injuries to the head.

On March 8, 1985, Agent Camarena's body was returned to the United States for burial. For the DEA and the American public, the 1985 torture and murder of Agent Camarena marked a turning point in the war on drugs. His violent death brought the American public face-to-face with the vicious brutality of drug trafficking.

Camarena Investigation Leads to Operation Leyenda

On March 14, 1985, the DEA was notified by MFJP officials that they had taken into custody five Jalisco State Police officers who were believed to have participated in the abduction of Special Agent Camarena. However, the DEA was neither advised in advance of this operation, nor invited to participate in the subsequent interviews of the suspected Jalisco State Police officers.

Under Mexican police questioning, the Jalisco officers gave statements implicating themselves and others in the abduction of Special Agent Camarena. One suspect died during the interrogation. The statements of the Jalisco officers implicated Caro-Quintero and Fonseca-Carrillo, among others, in planning and ordering the abduction of Special Agent Camarena.

On March 17, 1985, Mexican newspapers reported that 11 individuals had been arrested by the MFJP for the kidnapping of Special Agent Camarena. Arrest orders were also issued for seven international drug traffickers, including Caro-Quintero, on kidnapping and murder charges.

The DEA subsequently discovered that Caro-Quintero was in Costa Rica. On April 4, 1985, the DEA Office in San Jose, in conjunction with the local authorities in Costa Rica, located and apprehended Caro-Quintero and seven of his associates. The Mexican Government then sent MFJP officials to Costa Rica after persuading the Costa Rican Government to expel Caro-Quintero to Mexico on immigration violations. On April 5, 1985, Caro-Quintero and the others arrested with him left Costa Rica for Mexico aboard two jets belonging to the Mexican Government. In Mexico City, Caro-Quintero was interrogated for several days by police officials. Ultimately he gave a statement implicating himself and others in the abduction of Special Agent Camarena.

But Caro-Quintero denied any knowledge of who actually killed Special Agent Camarena or how he died. He also denied any knowledge of the abduction and death of Captain Zavala.

On April 7, 1985, drug trafficker Ernesto Fonseca-Carrillo and several of his bodyguards were arrested by Mexican police officials and military forces in Puerto Vallarta and taken to Mexico City for questioning. Fonseca and his right-hand man, Samuel Ramirez-Razo, gave statements to the MFJP implicating themselves in the abduction of Special Agent Camarena. However, neither individual admitted having any knowledge of Camarena's death or Captain Zavala's abduction.

Although there were some discrepancies in the testimony of Caro-Quintero, Fonseca-Carrillo, and Ramirez-Razo, all claimed that they had nothing to do with the death of the DEA agent and further stated that these crimes were probably the work of another narcotics trafficker, Miguel Angel Felix-Gallardo.

Meanwhile, in April 1985, the DEA learned that certain members of the Mexican Government had in their possession a series of audio tapes of Camarena's torture and interrogation. These tapes allegedly had been seized by Mexican military authorities from Fonseca during his arrest in Puerto Vallarta. When the DEA confirmed that the voice on the tape was Camarena, the Mexican Government, after great pressure from the U.S. Government, turned over copies of all five tapes.

On April 12, 1985, a team of one DEA and four FBI agents arrived in Guadalajara, Jalisco, Mexico, via DEA aircraft. These agents were advised that the house where Special Agent Camarena was alleged to have been taken after his abduction had been located by the MFJP in Guadalajara.

On May 3, 1985, a new DEA investigative team was established to coordinate and investigate the abduction of Camarena and Captain Zavala. This investigation was given the name Operation Leyenda (the Spanish word meaning "lawman"). Through evidence gained from cooperating individuals and relentless investigative pursuit, this team was able to ascertain that five individuals abducted Special Agent Camarena and took him to a house at 881 Lope de Vega in Guadalajara on February 7, 1985. Ultimately, the agents were successful in securing the indictments of several individuals connected to the abduction and murder. The hard work, long hours, and total agency commitment had yielded positsive results.

In retrospect, Operation Leyenda was a long and complex investigation, made more difficult by the fact that the crime was committed on foreign soil and involved major drug traffickers and government officials from Mexico. It took several years to develop the facts, to apprehend the perpetrators, and to finally bring them to justice.

Red Ribbon Campaign

The National Red Ribbon Campaign was sparked by the murder of DEA Special Agent Enrique Camarena by drug traffickers. Within weeks of his death in March of 1985, Camarena's Congressman, Duncan Hunter, and high school friend Henry Lozano launched "Camarena Clubs" in the Imperial Valley, California, Camarena's home. Hundreds of club members pledged to lead drug-free lives to honor the sacrifices made by Camarena and others on behalf of all Americans. That spring, two club members presented the "Camarena Club Proclamation" to then-First Lady Nancy Reagan, bringing the program national attention. That summer, parent groups in California, Illinois, and Virginia began to expand the Camarena Club program and promoted the wearing of red ribbons nationwide during one week in late October. In 1988 the National Federation of Parents organized the first National Red Ribbon Week, an eight-day event proclaimed by the U.S. Congress and chaired by President and Mrs. Reagan. The Red Ribbon Campaign also became a symbol of support for the DEA's efforts to reduce demand for drugs through prevention and education programs.

Speaking at a 1985 Memorial Day Service, Vice President Bush noted, "Today we honor the men and women of the Drug Enforcement Administration who sacrificed for an honorable cause."

Demand Reduction Section (1987)

In 1987, the DEA took another step forward in the demand reduction arena by establishing the Demand Reduction Section. "If we are truly the leaders in drug efforts," said DEA Administrator Jack Lawn, "we must also establish a leadership role in drug education efforts . . . I believe . . . that our personnel can do more to direct the attitudes of young people than can many other professions because our personnel know the reality of drugs."

Following its establishment, the DEA's Demand Reduction Program provided leadership, coordination, and resources for drug prevention and education. Each of the DEA's domestic field divisions was assigned a demand reduction coordinator whose role was to provide leadership and support to local agencies and organizations as they developed drug education and prevention programs. The program soon evolved from a few drug awareness presentations, to a nationwide effort that worked to change attitudes about drugs in sports, schools, and communities all across the nation.

At the 1987 National High School Athletic Coaches Association Convention, Nancy Reagan greeted Jacquelyn D. Rice, an assistant in the DEA's Demand Reduction Section, as Administrator Lawn looked on.

Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986

In 1986, Congress approved a significant bill authorizing $6 billion over three years for interdiction and enforcement measures, as well as demand reduction education and treatment programs. On the enforcement side, increases in criminal penalties were passed as part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act. Mandatory prison sentences for large scale marijuana distribution were reinstated and Federal Drug Control scheduling was expanded to include analogues (designer drugs). A federal grant program for state drug enforcement was also created to assist local efforts at thwarting traffickers. On the demand side, federal funds were allocated for prevention and treatment programs, giving these programs a larger share of federal drug control funds than did previous laws. Prevention efforts were expanded under this law with the creation of the White House Conference for a Drug-Free America and the establishment of the Office for Substance Abuse Prevention (OSAP), aimed at community prevention strategies. In the international arena, the 1986 law established a requirement that foreign assistance be withheld from countries if the President could not certify that they had cooperated fully with the United States or taken adequate steps on their own to prevent drug production, drug trafficking, and drug-related money laundering.

The Certification Process (1986)

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended by the Anti-Drug Abuse Acts of 1986 and 1988, required the President to make yearly determinations and file a report to Congress regarding the progress of drug producing and/or drug transit countries' efforts to eliminate the drug threat.

After the President's certification of a country for fully cooperating in counter-drug efforts, decertification for noncooperation, or decertification with a waiver for vital U.S. national interests, the Congress had 30 days in which to disapprove of the President's certification decisions by a simple majority vote before the decisions took effect. If the President vetoed a disapproval action, Congress could override the veto with a two-thirds vote. Decertification resulted in reduction of foreign aid by 50 percent and U.S. opposition to loans from any international agency, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

For those countries not certified, the Act required that most forms of U.S. foreign assistance, with the exception of counternarcotics assistance and humanitarian aid, be withheld, and further required the United States to vote against bank lending to non-certified countries.

As part of the certification process, the U.S. Department of State, through its Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, presented findings on the drug strategies and policies, as well as current drug trafficking and abuse situations in every country listed as a major drug producing and/or drug-transit country, precursor chemical source country, or money laundering country. This Department of State report, known as the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, provided an objective basis for the certification determinations and was issued at the same time as the list of certification.

The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 also required that every certified country have a treaty in effect with the United States addressing drug eradication, interdiction, demand reduction, chemical control, and cooperation with U.S. drug law enforcement agencies. The DEA's role in the certification process is limited to providing the Attorney General and other U.S. policy makers with an assessment of the level of cooperation between the DEA and foreign law enforcement counterparts.

The success of Operation Blast Furnace set the stage for one of the DEA's most extensive and unprecedented enforcement efforts— Operation Snowcap. This initiative was developed by the DEA and the Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics Matters (INM) in 1987, and was designed to disrupt the growing, processing, and transportation systems supporting the cocaine industry.

The DEA and INM coordinated Operation Snowcap operations in 12 countries including Guatemala, Panama, Costa Rica, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, and Mexico. The Department of Defense and the U.S. Border Patrol also participated in the operation. The majority of Snowcap activity was concentrated in Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador because of the prevalence of coca processing in these nations.

Planning for Operation Snowcap began in September 1986, two months before Operation Blast Furnace was concluded. When the 1987 operation was launched, there was a smooth transition of responsibility for air operations from the U.S. Army to the Government of Bolivia. Six Bell UH-1 Huey helicopters, loaned by the U.S. Army to the INM, and a U.S. Army training team arrived on the same C5-A transport that withdrew the Blast Furnace equipment from Bolivia.

Besides coca suppression operations, the Snowcap strategy included chemical control, vehicular interdiction, and marine law enforcement interdiction operations. The marine law enforcement and vehicular interdiction concepts mirrored successful programs in the United States. The marine law enforcement operations grew from the DEA's close coordination with the U.S. Coast Guard, while vehicular interdiction originated from the DEA's Operation Pipeline, EPIC's national highway interdiction program.

With DEA support, Bolivian troops burned a cocaine conversion lab.

Carlos Lehder Extradition (1987)

In 1981, Carlos Lehder was indicted on U.S. federal charges in Jacksonville, Florida, and a request for his extradition from Colombia was formally presented to that government in 1983. Up until that time, no extradition requests had been honored by the Colombian Government. Lehder, a major cocaine trafficker, had formed his own political party and adopted a platform which was vehemently opposed to extradition. He viewed cocaine as a very powerful weapon that could be used against the United States and referred to the substance as an atomic bomb. Lehder also claimed that he was allied with the Colombian guerilla movement, M-19, in an effort to protect Colombian sovereignty.

Fanatical in his efforts to prevent extradition, Lehder was instrumental in forcing a political debate on the merits of extradition and publicly faced off against Colombia's Justice Minister, Rodrigo Lara-Bonilla. When Lara-Bonilla was suddenly murdered in 1984, Lehder and the Medellin cartel, who had hidden behind the pseudonym "The Extraditables," were suspected. Embarrassed and outraged by the terrorist tactics employed by the Medellin organization, the Colombian Government turned Lehder over to the DEA and extradited him to the United States in February 1987. Lehder was convicted and sentenced to 135 years in federal prison. He subsequently cooperated in the U.S. investigation of Panama dictator Manuel Noriega and received a reduced sentence in return for his testimony. However, the Medellin reign of terror did not end. The Medellin cartel was responsible for the murders of many government officials, including Attorney General Carlos Mauro Hoyos-Jiminez in 1988, and presidential candidate Luis Carlos Galan in 1989.

Carlos Lehder conceived the idea of transporting loads of cocaine from Colombia to the United States.

The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988

The 1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Act (PL 100-690) increased criminal penalties for offenses related to drug trafficking and created new federal offenses and regulatory drug control requirements. Federal funding for state and local drug enforcement grant programs were also bolstered under this law.

The 1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Act also expanded a change to the certification process established by the 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act. The 1986 legislation required all certified countries to sign a treaty with the United States that addressed drug eradication, interdiction, demand reduction, chemical control, and cooperation with U.S. drug enforcement agencies. The 1988 act went a step further and made it unlawful to certify a country's compliance unless it had signed such a treaty.

Another requirement called for the Secretary of the Treasury to initiate negotiations with governments whose banks were known to engage in significant U.S. dollar transactions. This requirement helped to identify money laundering and illicit drug transaction funds.

Perhaps the most significant provision of this legislation was the creation of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) and it's director, the "Drug Czar."

The Creation of a Drug Czar (1988)

The Anti-Drug Abuse and Control Act of 1988 established the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) and its director became the nation's "Drug Czar." ONDCP was charged with setting national priorities and implementing a national drug control strategy. The ONDCP director was required to ensure that the national drug control strategy was research-based, contained long-range goals and measurable objectives, and sought to reduce drug abuse, drug trafficking, and their consequences. In 1993, Executive Orders No. 12880, 12992, and eventually 13023 (1996), extended ONDCP as the leading entity for drug control policy. The Executive Orders also created the President's Drug Policy Council. In 1994, the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act extended ONDCP's mission to assessing budgets and resources related to the National Drug Control Strategy. It also established specific reporting requirements in the areas of drug use, availability, consequences, and treatment.

Colombian Government Helps Seize Gacha Funds (1989)

In 1989, a successful international cooperative effort helped to bring down one of the highest ranking members of the Medellin drug cartel, Jose Rodriguez-Gacha, the right-hand man of cocaine kingpin Pablo Escobar. First, the Government of Colombia provided the investigation and enforcement actions that revealed the extent and location of Gacha's drug assets. These efforts also uncovered documents disclosing that some of Gacha's assets were hidden in accounts in Switzerland and elsewhere. Next, the DEA and other law enforcement agencies in Europe and Latin America, working closely with the Colombian National Police, froze over $80 million of Gacha's assets in bank accounts throughout the world. Large amounts of Gacha's financial empire were forfeited and disbursed to the governments of countries aiding in the cooperative effort to bring down Gacha. Over $1.5 million was allotted to the Government of Colombia. This investigation and seizure represented one of the largest financial efforts in the history of the DEA and underscored the importance of attacking a cartel's financial holdings as well as its physical assets.

Rescheduling of Marijuana Denied (1989)

During the late 1980s, as a proposed solution to the enormous drug problem in the United States, a small, but vocal minority began supporting the wholesale legalization of drugs, particularly marijuana. However, in December 1989, DEA Administrator Jack Lawn overruled the decision of one administrative law judge who had agreed with marijuana advocates that marijuana should be moved from Schedule I to Schedule II of the Controlled Substances Act. This proposed rescheduling of marijuana would have allowed physicians to prescribe the smoking of marijuana as a legal treatment for some forms of illness.

Administrator Lawn maintained that there was no medicinal benefit to smoking marijuana. While some believed that smoking marijuana alleviated vomiting and nausea experienced by cancer patients undergoing radiation, scientific studies indicated otherwise. These also showed that smoking marijuana did not benefit patients suffering from glaucoma or multiple sclerosis. In addition, it was found that smoking marijuana might further weaken the immune systems of patients undergoing radiation and might speed up, rather than slow down, the loss of eyesight in glaucoma patients.

It was found that pure Delta-9-Tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), one of 400 chemicals commonly found in marijuana, had some effect on controlling nausea and vomiting. However, pure THC was already available for use by the medical community in a capsule form called Marinol. For these reasons, and the fact that no valid scientific studies offered proof of any medicinal value of marijuana, Administrator Lawn maintained that marijuana should remain a Schedule I controlled substance.

Joint Investigation

Agents of the DEA's Phoenix Field Division and the Arizona Department of Public Safety (DPS) posed with 700 pounds of cocaine seized in 1987. The seizure, which took place 50 miles south of Phoenix, was the result of a joint DEA, U.S. Customs Service, and Arizona DPS investigation.

Operation Snowcap (1987)

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Planning for Operation Snowcap began in September 1986, two months before Operation Blast Furnace was concluded. When the 1987 operation was launched, there was a smooth transition of responsibility for air operations from the U.S. Army to the Government of Bolivia. Six Bell UH-1 Huey helicopters, loaned by the U.S. Army to the INM, and a U.S. Army training team arrived on the same C5-A transport that withdrew the Blast Furnace equipment from Bolivia.

Besides coca suppression operations, the Snowcap strategy included chemical control, vehicular interdiction, and marine law enforcement interdiction operations. The marine law enforcement and vehicular interdiction concepts mirrored successful programs in the United States. The marine law enforcement operations grew from the DEA's close coordination with the U.S. Coast Guard, while vehicular interdiction originated from the DEA's Operation Pipeline, EPIC's national highway interdiction program.

Operation Snowcap depended on agents who volunteered for temporary assignments in foreign countries. These special agents left domestic field divisions for temporary tour of duty assignments to work closely with host country law enforcement counterparts. As envisioned, Operation Snowcap was designed to be a temporary program to assist law enforcement entities in Latin America with training and investigative work.

Organized Crime Targeted

January 8, 1986: Enforcement Group 31 in New York specialized in traditional Italian organized crime targets. This case targeted the Philipp Vasta trafficking organization and resulted in 18 arrests and seizures totaling $6 million including drugs, real estate, cars and currency.

Operation Polar Cap (1989)

Operation Polar Cap involved two international organizations that were laundering the proceeds of cocaine sales by using false gold sales and wholesale jewelry businesses as cover. Between 1988 and 1990, these two organizations laundered almost $1.2 billion in drug proceeds. Operation Polar Cap led to the first conviction of a foreign financial institution, Banco de Occidente/Panama, for violating U.S. money laundering laws. As a result of this operation, over 100 people were arrested, and more than $105 million in assets, including currency, bank accounts, real estate, jewelry, gold, and vehicles were seized. The money forfeited by the Banco de Occidente/Panama was shared with other governments, including Canada and Switzerland, which each received $1 million.

Sylmar Seizure (1989)

On September 29, 1989, the American public was presented with irrefutable evidence of the enormous volume of cocaine coming into the country when the DEA raided a warehouse in Sylmar, California, and seized 21.5 tons of cocaine. Such a huge amount of cocaine was amassed at the Sylmar warehouse because of a conflict between Colombia-based distributors and the Mexico-based group they had hired to transport the drug. The group from Mexico had continued to transport cocaine to the warehouse but refused to release it to the Colombian distributors until they were paid for their transportation services. This was the largest cocaine seizure in U.S. history. Colombian drug traffickers responded to the staggering Sylmar seizure by changing the way they compensated transportation groups from Mexico; they began to pay Mexico-based smuggling organizations up to 50 percent of each cocaine shipment in product rather than in cash. This shift to using cocaine as compensation for transportation services radically changed the role and sphere of influence of Mexico-based trafficking organizations in the U.S. cocaine trade. Criminal groups from Mexico became not only transporters, but also distributors of cocaine.

DEA Headquarters Relocated (1989)

By the late 1980s, the DEA headquarters building at 1405 "Eye" St. in Washington, D.C., was no longer large enough to house the increasing headquarters staff. In fact, many of the 1,500 headquarters employees had already been dispersed to 13 nearby buildings in an effort to accommodate the agency's continued growth.

The search for a new headquarters location included an evaluation of land in Arkansas and Mississippi, as well as abandoned military bases around the country. However, Attorney General Edwin Meese determined that the DEA headquarters had to be located in close proximity to the Attorney General's offices. Thus, the location selected for the new headquarters building was on Army-Navy Drive in Arlington, Virginia. The new facility consisted of two buildings that provided 292,000 square feet of available space.

The relocation of headquarters was the largest non-enforcement related project ever undertaken by the DEA or its predecessor agencies. The physical relocation began in May 1988.

Arrest of Noriega (1989)

On February 4th, 1989, Manuel A. Noriega and 15 defendants were indicted by the grand jury in Miami, Florida. The structure of the RICO indictment alleged that Noriega was a drug facilitator for the Medellin cartel. Noriega had utilized his position as the Commander of the Panamanian Defense Forces and as the ruler of Panama to assist the Medellin cartel in shipping cocaine; procuring precursor chemicals for the manufacture of cocaine; providing a safe haven for cartel members following the assassination of Colombian Minister of Justice Rodrigo Lara-Bonilla on April 30, 1984; and sponsoring the laundering of narco-proceeds in Panamanian banks.

When the United States invaded the country of Panama on December 20, 1989, Noriega eluded capture by the U.S. military for the next several weeks. Finally, Noriega surrendered to the DEA in Panama and was immediately taken to Miami to answer the indictment. Over the next 21 months, enforcement Group 9 in Miami interviewed hundreds of individuals and reviewed reams of seized papers in the United States and Panama. In September 1991, the drug "Trial of the Century" began.

During the next eight months, over 100 prosecution witnesses, including Carlos Lehder, ex-DEA Administrators Bensinger, Mullen, and Lawn, an ex-Panamanian Attorney General, cartel leader Pepe Cabrera, and others testified at the trial. In supporting the prosecution, the DEA had special agents deployed in 15 countries around the world, including Panama, Colombia, Spain, Luxembourg, Germany, France, and Cuba.

Finally, on April 9, 1992, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on eight of the ten counts in the indictment. Noriega, who had become Panama's political leader in 1988 after President Eric Arturo Delvalle was ousted, was convicted on racketeering and cocaine-trafficking charges for protecting Colombian smugglers who had routed drugs through Panama. On July 9, 1992, Manuel Noriega was sentenced to 40 years in federal prison.

On April 6, 1998, he failed to overturn his drug trafficking conviction and the 40-year prison sentence it drew. Noriega's appeal contended that the drug cartel had paid $1.25 million to a witness to testify falsely against him, and that the government must be held responsible for the alleged bribe. The U.S. Supreme Court, acting without comment, let stand a ruling that said Noriega received a fair trial. The Noriega case was the most notorious drug trial in U.S. history and demonstrated to the American public the global scope of corruption that accompanied international drug smuggling.

General Manuel Antonio Noriega surrendered to U. S. authorities on January 3, 1990.



Manuel Noriega

Aviation

During this period, the DEA's Air Wing program was expanding rapidly. From 1975 to 1985, the number of Air Wing planes had doubled, rising from 30 to 61. After a budget increase from $1,310,00 in 1980 to $3,760,000 in 1985, the Aviation Division anticipated purchasing more aircraft and increasing the Air Wing's staff.

With the rapid growth of the Air Wing, the facility at Addison quickly became inadequate. Operations had been separated among several buildings and security had become a problem because the airport was located right on the street with public access to several ramps. In addition, airplanes were parked in the open and were subject to vandalism. From 1986 to 1988, the DEA's Air Wing looked for a secure location in Texas in order to be equally accessible for DEA officials located on the East and West Coasts. In addition, Texas was an ideal location based on its proximity to Central and South America, where many Air Wing support operations were performed. The location chosen for the new facility was a 12.3 acre site adjacent to Alliance Airport, north of Forth Worth, Texas. The site selected was spacious and accommodated future expansion. The new facility also offered greater security and included a guarded fence.

Facilities

Although DEA training had been conducted at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) in Glynco, Georgia since 1981, Administrator Lawn wanted the DEA to establish a unique training facility that focused specifically on drug law enforcement. Because FBI and DEA agents cooperated on many cases and would benefit from a degree of shared training, Administrator Lawn decided that the new training center should be located near the FBI Training Academy in Quantico, Virginia. Ultimately, he acquired 155 acres of land adjacent to the FBI Academy from U.S. Marine Corps Commandante Alfred M. Gray for the construction of the new training center.

Originally the move was expected to take several months, with new classes not beginning until January 1986, but a special appropriation from Congress was earmarked for agent classes starting in 1985. Consequently, the pace of the move was accelerated and the DEA Office of Training officially moved to Quantico on October 1, 1985.

Members of the first basic agent class to train at Quantico are shown learning how narcotics test kits work.

On June 27, 1987, the DEA flag was flown at the FBI Academy in Quantico for the first time. The occasion was the graduation of Basic Agent Training Class 43. The guest speaker was Attorney General Edwin Meese III.

Laboratories

In 1989, the Western Field Laboratory, under the leadership of Robert Sager, moved to a new location in San Francisco, California. The new laboratory featured 17,000 square feet of floor space and had benches for 16 chemists, special purpose instrument rooms, and natural light from several windows.

1989: Evolving computer technology improved the speed of complex searches for references. Pictured above are Dr. Judy Lawrence (left) and DEA librarian Lavonne Wienke.

Technology

The first office automation (OA) system for the DEA was procured in 1986 for a contract cost of $36 million. The operating system of this computer network provided DEA employees with E-mail, word processing, spreadsheets and other standard desktop tools. Based on its experience with the OA system, the DEA's introduction to and reliance on automation tools to assist in all facets of the agency's day-to-day operations were established. This computerization of the agency produced increased demands for more capabilities through the office automation infrastructure.

In January 1989, members of the DEA Phoenix Task Force seized 4.5 kilograms of black tar heroin, the largest seizure of its kind in Arizona at that time. The task force members from left are: Sgt. Doug Stine, Task Force Agent Charlie Adams, SA Steff Stewart, Group Supervisor Bill Ruzzamenti, SA Michelle Ashley, Task Force Agents Ben Quezada, Tom Reynolds, Phil Smyth, and Bob Hajek, SA Gerry Courtney, and Task Force Agents Garry Applegate, Adam Kurgan, and Dan Kelly.

El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) Dedication (1989)

To celebrate the opening of a new facility, the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) held a dedication ceremony on February 22, 1989, in Ft. Bliss, Texas. The new installation was dedicated in the name of slain DEA SA Enrique Camarena. Heartfelt remarks made by Dora Camarena, his mother, were the highlight of the ceremony.

Pictured at the EPIC groundbreaking ceremony in September 1987 are, from right to left, William I. Norsworthy, EPIC staff assistant; Larry L. Orton, EPIC SAC; Thomas G. Byrne, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of Intelligence; and Fort Bliss staff.

Killed in the Line of Duty

Enrique S. Camarena
Died on February 9, 1985
DEA Special Agent Camarena of the Guadalajara, Mexico Resident Office was kidnapped, tortured, and killed by drug traffickers from Mexico.

James A. Avant
Died on July 24, 1986
Deputy Sheriff Avant of the Pulaski County, Arkansas, Sheriff's Office, was killed in a helicopter crash in Mount Ida, Arkansas. He was assigned to the DEA's Task Force in Little Rock, Arkansas.

Charles M. Bassing
Died on July 24, 1986
Criminal Investigator Bassing of the Arkansas State Police was killed in a helicopter crash in Mount Ida, Arkansas. He was assigned to the DEA's Task Force in Little Rock, Arkansas.

Kevin L. Brosch
Died on July 24, 1986
Criminal Investigator Brosch of the Jefferson County, Arkansas, Sheriff's Office, was killed in a helicopter crash in Mt. Ida, Arkansas. He was participating in a DEA Marijuana Eradication Spotter School.

Susan M. Hoefler
Died on August 16, 1986
Ms. Hoefler, an office assistant at the DEA Office in Guadalajara, Mexico, died from injuries suffered in an automobile accident in Guadalajara.

William Ramos
Died on December 31, 1986
DEA Special Agent Ramos of the McAllen District Office was shot and killed by a drug-trafficking suspect during an undercover investigation at Las Milpas, Texas, near the Mexican border.

Raymond J. Stastny
Died on January 26, 1987
DEA Special Agent Stastny of the Atlanta Field Division died from gunshot wounds he received six days earlier while working in an undercover operation in Atlanta.

Arthur L. Cash
Died on August 25, 1987
DEA Special Agent Cash, who was in charge of the Sierra Vista Post of Duty in Arizona, was killed in a traffic accident while transporting three prisoners to Tucson.

Terry W. McNett
Died on February 2, 1988
Detective McNett of the Sedwick County, Kansas Sheriff's Office was shot and killed in the execution of a search warrant in Wichita, Kansas, while assigned to a DEA task force.

George M. Montoya
Died on February 5, 1988
DEA Special Agent Montoya of the Los Angeles Field Division was shot and killed during an undercover operation in Los Angeles, California.

Paul S. Seema
Died on February 6, 1988
DEA Special Agent Seema of the Los Angeles Field Division died of gunshot wounds received during an undercover operation in Los Angeles, California.

Everett E. Hatcher
Died on February 28, 1989
DEA Special Agent Hatcher of the New York Field Division was shot and killed during an undercover investigation in New York City.

Rickie C. Finley
Died on May 20, 1989
DEA Special Agent Finley was killed in a plane crash as he was returning from a jungle operation to a base camp in Lima, Peru.

DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION

UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION
US
SPECIAL AGENT
DRUG ENFORCEMENT
ADMINISTRATION

President George Bush began to immediately focus national efforts on a comprehensive drug enforcement strategy that targeted both supply and demand reduction.

1990-1994

Robert C. Bonner
August 16, 1990 - October 31, 1993

[illegible]

When John Lawn retired on March 23, 1990, Terrance M. Burke, a career DEA agent, was named Acting Administrator. On May 11, 1990, President George Bush nominated Robert C. Bonner, a Federal Judge and United States Attorney from Los Angeles, as Administrator. He was confirmed by the Senate on July 27, 1990 and sworn in as the DEA's fifth Administrator on August 13, 1990.

In prior years, Mr. Bonner was the United States Attorney for the Central District of California (1984-1989) and Federal Judge, United States District Court for the Central District of California (1989-1990). He had worked closely with the DEA on two record-breaking money laundering cases, Operations Pisces and Polar Cap, and had led the prosecution team against the killers of DEA Special Agent Camarena. Judge Bonner understood that the drug trade was a global enterprise, and because of this, federal drug law enforcement had to target drug trafficking organizations overseas, as well as their networks within our borders.

After leaving DEA, Mr. Bonner was a partner in the Los Angeles and Washington, D.C., law firm Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher. In September 2001, he was sworn in as Commissioner of the U.S. Customs Service, and in 2003, he became the first head of the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, a new agency under the Department of Homeland Security.



Robert C. Bonner was sworn in as the DEA's Fifth Administrator in August 1990. Attending the inaugural ceremony at headquarters were (from left): Administrator Bonner, Mrs. Bonner, Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, and Attorney General Dick Thornburgh.

DEA Special Agents
1990.....3,191
1994.....3,418

DEA Budget
1990.....$769.2 million
1994.....$1,050 million

Year	**Foreign Office Opened**
1990	**Freeport, Bahamas**
1990	**Rangoon, Burma**
1990	**Udorn, Thailand**
1992	**Belize, Belize**
1992	**San Salvador, El Salvador**

During the late 1980s and early 1990s, Americans considered the drug issue a major concern, and public awareness about drug trafficking and drug abuse increased significantly. The media had provided the American people with critical information about the damage caused by drugs.

President George Bush began immediately to focus national efforts on a comprehensive drug enforcement strategy that targeted both supply and demand reduction. On one hand, his strategy called for the DEA and other federal agencies to work with our counterparts overseas and at home to reduce the supply of drugs in the country. At the same time, complementary efforts were directed at reducing the demand for drugs through prevention, education, and treatment, including a comprehensive advertising program launched by the Partnership for a Drug-Free America.

Cocaine and crack remained the number one drug challenge facing law enforcement, and the Colombian cartels and their cells were firmly entrenched in virtually every U.S. city and in many countries around the globe. Both the Medellin Cartel and the Cali mafia had a devastating impact on U.S. communities. In the Northeast, especially the New York area, the Cali mafia had quietly established a network of cells to carry out all of the mafia's various tasks involving the shipment of cocaine, its storage, communications between Colombia and the United States, and the return of profits to Colombia. The Cali mafia sent armies of surrogates into the United States to ensure that the cocaine business was run smoothly and profitably.

In 1992, the DEA instituted the Kingpin Strategy to attack the drug organizations at their most vulnerable areas—the chemicals needed to process the drugs, their finances, transportation, communications, and leadership infrastructure here in the United States. The Kingpin program essentially controlled investigations from DEA headquarters and selected a finite number of targets for intensive investigative activity.

Because extradition of Colombian nationals to the United States was prohibited by Colombia's 1991 constitution, it was essential that Colombian drug lords were arrested, prosecuted, and incarcerated in their own country. With the help of law enforcement counterparts overseas and at home, most notably the Colombian National Police (CNP), one by one the Medellin leaders were toppled. By the time Pablo Escobar, the most notorious and murderous drug lord of the Medellin Cartel, was killed by the CNP on a Colombian rooftop in 1993, the cartel had already been severely damaged. But there would be no rest, because waiting to emerge on the world scene was the Cali mafia, which over the years had been less visible, but no less formidable than its Medellin counterpart.

Decline of the Medellin Cartel and the Rise of the Cali Mafia



SE BUSCA

PABLO EMILIO ESCOBAR GAVIRIA

SOLICITADO POR LA JUSTICIA
A quien suministre informacion que permita
su captura, se le ofrece como recompensa

$ 2.700'000.000.oo
DOS MIL SETECIENTOS
MILLONES DE PESOS.

y por cada uno de estos prófugos la suma de

$ 100'000.000.oo
(CIEN MILLONES DE PESOS)

Pablo Escobar "Wanted" poster with faces crossed out signifying that he and his entourage had been killed or catured.

In the early 1990s the Medellin Cartel was waging a campaign of terror and bribery to pressure the Colombian government to prohibit the extradition of native Colombians. Pablo Escobar and several other Medellin leaders, labeled "The Extraditables," took increasingly violent measures to try to force the government to accept legislation that would protect them from extradition. The cartel was responsible for the assassinations of dozens of government officials, and the bribery of many more. When, in July 1991, the Colombian congress adopted a new constitution that prohibited the extradition of the Colombian natives, it was considered a major victory for the Medellin Cartel.

However, the many law enforcement efforts to topple the Medellin cartel were resulting in numerous surrenders and arrests that eventually led to the cartel's demise. For example, in December 1990, cartel leader Fabio Ochoa surrendered to authorities near Medellin. Shortly, after, in January 1991, Fabio Ochoa's brother,

Fabio Ochoa-Vasquez

Juan Ochoa-Vasquez

Jorge Ochoa-Vas[illegible]

Miguel Rodriguez-Orejuela

Gilberto Rodriguez-Orejuela

Jose Santacruz-Londono

Jorge Luis, also turned himself into the CNP. The brothers, along with Pablo Escobar, had been the top leaders of the cartel. Also, in January 1991, the CNP killed David Ricardo Prisco Lopera, Pablo Escobar's top assassin, along with his younger brother, Armando Alberto Prisco. The Priscos were wanted for ordering the murders of 50 Medellin police officers, for several terrorist bombings, and for nine assassinations, including that of a Colombian Justice Minister in 1984. In February 1991, a third Ochoa brother, Juan David surrendered.

Law enforcement efforts were increasingly directed at Pablo Escobar, the kingpin of the Medellin cartel. In June 1991, Escobar surrendered to authorities, and was put in Envigado prison. However, the Colombian government had agreed in Escobar's surrender negotiations that security at Envigado prison would be the responsibility of Army guards and Escobar's own, handpicked bodyguards. In reality, Envigado prison protected, rather than incarcerated him. Escobar's period at the prison was considered his "Golden Age," during which time he ran his drug empire without fear of being hunted by the Colombian Government or assassinated by his rivals.

In July 1992, Escobar "escaped" from Envigado prison in order to avoid being transferred to a Bogota jail after it was confirmed that Escobar had ordered the murder of some 22 of his own drug mafia associates. One or two of Escobar's victims were even tortured, killed, and buried on the grounds of Envigado prison. Escobar clearly had prior warning of the plan to transfer him to a more secure prison, and 28 guards were later charged with aiding and abetting Escobar's "break out." For 17 months, Escobar was the target of the largest manhunt in Colombian history. In December 1993, the CNP killed Escobar in a fire fight at a private residence in downtown Medellin. Escobar's death, along with the surrender and arrest of the Ochoa brothers marked the decline of the Medellin cartel.

The Cali mafia had been formed in the early 1970s by Gilberto Rodriguez-Orejuela and Jose Santacruz-Londono, and rose quietly alongside its violent rival, the Medellin Cartel. But while the Medellin Cartel gained an international reputation for brutality and murder, the Cali traffickers posed as legitimate businessmen. This unique criminal enterprise initially involved itself in counterfeiting and kidnapping, but gradually expanded into smuggling cocaine base from Peru and Bolivia to Colombia for conversion into powder cocaine.

Up through the early 1990s, the Medellin Cartel had dominated the drug trade, but its reign of relentless public terror against the Colombian government had driven Colombian authorities to serious action that led to their ultimate defeat. By the early 1990s, the Medellin drug lords were either killed or incarcerated. Having observed the fate of the brutal and violent Medellin Cartel, the Cali leaders passed themselves off as law-abiding businessmen, investing in their country's future, earning public respect, and taking economic control of the Cali region. Because they operated in a less violent manner, the government did not aggressively pursue them, thereby allowing the Cali mafia leaders to operate and grow in wealth and power with virtual impunity.

In the global arena, the cartels began expanding their markets to Europe. After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1990, they quickly moved into Eastern Europe, taking advantage of the political and economic chaos by using these newly-created democracies as the "backdoor" to transit their cocaine to Western Europe. For example in 1992, large loads of cocaine were seized in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary. In 1993, Russian authorities seized 1.1 tons of cocaine hidden in cans of corned beef hash. This shipment originated in Cali, Colombia, and was destined for the Netherlands, via St. Petersburg, Russia.

In the new, post-Cold War Europe, without border controls and an eastern border sealed against communism, international businesses and world governments were threatened by the drug cartels from Colombia.

In the early 1990s, the DEA estimated that they collectively produced and exported from Colombia between 500 and 800 tons of cocaine a year. The organizations were structured and operated much like major international corporations. They had enormous financial resources, with which they could afford to buy the best legal minds, the most sophisticated technology, and the most skilled financial experts.

On December 2, 1993, Escobar's exact location was determined using electronic, directional-finding equipment. With authorities closing in, a fire fight with Escobar and his bodyguard ensued. The two fugitives attempted to escape by running across the roofs of adjoining houses to reach a back street, but both were shot and killed by Colombian National Police.

Among the major Cali drug lords, the Rodriguez-Orejuela brothers—Gilberto and his younger brother, Miguel—were known as the transportation specialists who moved cocaine out of Colombia into the United States and other countries. Gilberto was responsible for the strategic, long-term planning of the organization. Miguel was the hands-on manager who ran the day-to-day operations. Jose Santacruz-Londono was responsible for establishing distribution cells in the United States.

These Cali leaders ran an incredibly sophisticated, highly-structured drug trafficking organization that was tightly controlled by its leaders in Cali. Each day, details of loads and money shipments were electronically dictated to heads of cocaine cells operating within the United States. The Cali drug lords knew the how, when, and where of every cocaine shipment, down to the markings on the packages. The Cali bosses set production targets for the cocaine they sold and were intimately involved in every phase of the business—production, transportation, financing, and communications.

Each organization had its own hierarchy of leaders, its own distribution networks, and customers in nations around the world. The operations were divided into separate cells. Each cell was run by a cell director—always a Colombian national—who reported directly to the drug lords in Colombia. These organizations were truly international operations run with efficiency and geared for huge profits. The massive scale of their trafficking operations dwarfed law enforcement efforts in Colombia, in the United States, and in the transit nations between them.

Heroin

During the 1980s, worldwide illicit opium production had doubled, with Southeast Asia then emerging as the major source of the world's heroin supply. In Burma, self-styled rebels, like drug lord Khun Sa, financed private armies and generated an estimated $200 million gross profits per year from his heroin and opium enterprises. This wealth made him so powerful that the Burmese government allowed him to operate with impunity, and he controlled most of the Shan State of Burma.

In the early 1990s, the United States was faced with a resurgence of heroin. As the decade progressed, the heroin became purer and cheaper than ever before in U.S. history. New traffickers and new sources for the drug also contributed to the tide of heroin abuse.

In South America, the Colombian cocaine cartels were beginning to diversify into the production and distribution of heroin. Colombian heroin seizures in the United States began to rise. It was estimated that the Colombian cartels had financed the cultivation of up to 25,000 hectares. That made Colombia one of the largest cultivators of illicit opium, behind Burma and Laos, but ahead of the traditional opium-producing nations, such as Pakistan, Afghanistan and Lebanon. In February 1992, the first heroin lab was seized and destroyed in Colombia, and in that year, the Colombian National Police eradicated more than 10,000 hectares of opium poppies.

More heroin was available in the United States than ever before, and this drove prices down and purity up. The national average purity level of an ounce of heroin being sold on U.S. streets was 66 percent in 1993, compared to less than 5 percent in the early 1980s. In some cases, the DEA seized heroin that was 95 percent pure. Aggressive international heroin traffickers, such as those based in Nigeria, emerged to join the traditional heroin trafficking organizations based in China, Turkey, and the Middle East.

In 1991, DEA made the largest seizure of heroin in U.S. history when over 1,000 pounds of Southeast Asian white heroin, with an estimated wholesale value of more than $1 billion, was seized in San Francisco. Agents from San Francisco, Sacramento, and New York monitored a controlled delivery of the heroin 24-hours-a-day for nearly a month prior to the arrest of five suspects. The heroin was found in 59 of 1,360 cartons of plastic produce bags imported from Taiwan. Each of the 59 cartons contained two cylinders of heroin coated in white wax or wrapped in "happy birthday" paper. By 1993, Southeast Asian heroin, which was smuggled by both China and Nigeria/West Africa-based traffickers, was one of the greatest threats to the United States. At that time, roughly 68 percent of the heroin seized in the United States came from Southeast Asia's Golden Triangle—Burma, Laos, and Thailand. China-based traffickers controlled sophisticated international networks that smuggled multi-hundred kilo quantities of heroin in commercial cargo on a regular basis.

Police examined a test sample of the 977 pounds of heroin seized in the Gulf of Thailand in 1991. Looking on are (from left): General Sawat Amornvivat, Director General of Police; DEA Country Attache Glennon L. Cooper (third from left); General Pow Sarasin (fifth from left), Deputy Prime Minister; and Thai Police General Pratin Santiprapop (upper right corner).

DEA Mini-Series

Network series lasted 6 episodes before being cancelled.

Marijuana



With the explosion in the use of crack, cocaine, and heroin in the 1980s, public concern about marijuana was diminished, despite the fact that marijuana continued to be the most commonly used illegal drug in the United States. According to the 1991 National Household Survey on Drug Abuse, 13 percent of young adults, age 18 to 25, were regular users of marijuana. In addition, 4 percent of youth, age 12-17, and 10 percent of older adults, age 26 to 34, reported using marijuana regularly.

The marijuana of the early 1990s was an entirely different drug from the version that was available in the 1960s or 1970s. Due to modern sophisticated cultivation techniques, U.S.-grown marijuana became one of the most potent and highly-prized cannabis products in the world. While the THC (the psychoactive ingredient) content of marijuana averaged 1.5 percent in 1970, by the 1990s it was 7.6 percent. The sinsemilla (seedless) variety ranged from 8 to 19 percent, and marijuana seizures in Alaska registered a THC potency of almost 30 percent.

In addition, marijuana growers continued to encroach on national forests and parks and to threaten the environment by using harmful pesticides. With the wholesale price of high-quality sinsemilla averaging between $3,000 and $8,000 a pound, marijuana cultivation became big business. It was estimated that domestically grown marijuana constituted 25 percent of the supply for the United States.

In recognition of the growing threat from marijuana, by the 1990s, all 50 states were actively participating in the Domestic Cannabis Eradication and Suppression Program. With the marijuana market increasing, the program looked for more efficient ways to eradicate the plant. Along with the traditional "whack and stack" method, the DEA added herbicidal eradication. One of the first herbicidal eradication efforts, Operation Wipe Out in Hawaii, was an overwhelming success. In the summer of 1990, almost 90 percent of Hawaii's cannabis crop was eradicated. Half of the crop was destroyed by spot herbicidal spraying, a new and more efficient eradication technique, which had little, if any, environmental impact.

Nationwide eradication efforts, such as Wipe Out, put so much pressure on growers that many abandoned their outdoor cultivation on public and private land for the safety of indoor cultivation. Indoor cultivated marijuana created new concerns for law enforcement; it was of such high quality and potency that American marijuana became the most sought-after cannabis in the world.

One of the most important enforcement tools that had developed during the late 1980s was thermal imagery, which was used to identify indoor marijuana operations. With the availability of this new heat-seeking technology, seizure records for indoor grows jumped from 951 in 1985 to 3,849 in 1992.

Throughout the early 1990s, the DEA closed down thousands of indoor marijuana grows. For example, in August 1993 at the Advance Mine site in northern California, investigators found sinsemilla plants, which ounce for ounce, could produce extremely high-grade marijuana. The mine, which had been an operational gold mine during the late 1800s and the early 1900s, contained everything needed to grow more than 3,000 marijuana plants. The 8-section complex included five rooms for growing plants, and a pumping system that continually supplied water and nutrients to the marijuana plants.

The total value of the plants found inside the mine was estimated to be between $6 and $9 million. Four people were arrested. It took 40 DEA, U.S. Forest Service, and county law enforcement personnel two days to remove more than 5 tons of marijuana cultivation equipment from inside the mine.

DANGER
EXPLOSIVES

1993: The Advance Mine was one of the largest marijuana growing operations discovered in California. Special agents removed 2,394 cannabis plants from the former gold mine.

Steroids

In the 1980s and 1990s, abuse of steroids, particularly by young athletes, became a problem. Trafficking in steroids had become increasingly common, and as the market expanded, use of steroids was seen in younger and younger populations. Steroid sources included doctors, trainers, and foreign suppliers. A Government Accounting Office (GAO) study of the problem, published in 1989, reviewed 15 separate studies and reported one which showed that more than six percent of male high school seniors, mostly athletes, used or had used steroids. Another survey indicated that 20 percent of athletes in five colleges surveyed used steroids. It also reported on the significant side effects of steroid use. The GAO supported federal and state efforts to exercise greater control over steroid distribution and use. A 1990 study by the Inspector General of Health and Human Services reported that over a quarter of a million adolescents used steroids.

Congress responded to the steroid problem by passing The Anabolic Steroid Enforcement Act of 1990, which placed certain anabolic steroids in Schedule III of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). Previously, steroids had been unscheduled and controlled only by state and local laws. The Anabolic Steroid Enforcement Act brought anabolic steroids under the record-keeping, reporting, security, prescribing, import and export controls of the CSA. Because steroids were now classified as a Schedule III substance, all manufacturers and distributors of steroids were required to register with the DEA.

This legislation, combined with an aggressive enforcement effort, virtually eliminated domestic sources of illicit steroid use and provided the legal authority to attack the smuggling of steroids from foreign sources. In order to heighten international awareness of the steroid problem, the DEA sponsored an international conference which was attended by nations where steroids were produced, as well as nations concerned with steroid abuse. This conference was also attended by scientific experts in the field of steroids and representatives of the U.S. and the International Olympic Committees.

US
DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION

Operation Man (1990)

Through the 1980s and early 1990s, the forfeiture of traffickers' assets became an important and effective tool for law enforcement. In 1991, President Bush signed a bill expanding the the DEA's authority to administratively forfeit assets from $100,000 to an unlimited amount with respect to financial instruments, including cash, CD's and bonds; and $100,000 to $500,000 on all other items except real estate. One of the DEA's most successful financial cases was Operation Man, where agents tracked and forfeited drug assets laundered through banks based in the British Isle of Man, off the West Coast of England. Assets seized from this operation included a $9.5 million bank account and the Bicycle Club, a gambling establishment in Bell Gardens, California, valued at $150 million. In April 1990, after a club partner was convicted of smuggling marijuana, the U.S. Government seized the club, believed to be the world's largest card casino, assumed 30 percent ownership in the club, and received almost $600,000 a month in profits.

After Hurricane Andrew struck Florida in August 1991, nearly 200 employees of the DEA's Miami regional office assisted employees and other Florida residents whose homes had been damaged by the hurricane. The DEA employees pictured above helped repair damaged roofs to protect employees' homes. From left, are: SA Pete Sarron, SA Tom Golden, Mrs. Margarita Milan, homeowner; Jorge Milan, homeowner and DEA seized asset specialist; SA Brad Brown; SA Milo Grasman; and, kneeling, SA Mike Stokes.

Operation REDRUM (1991)

The REDRUM (*murder* spelled backwards) program had been established in 1985 to create a multi-agency operational force to pursue investigations that demonstrated an association between drug trafficking and the violence that it fostered. The primary goals of the program were the identification of major drug traffickers and organizations; the seizure of drugs and assets; and the analysis of strategic intelligence provided by informants.

On January 1, 1991, a Metropolitan Area Drug Enforcement Task Force (MATF), was formed as a pilot project under Operation REDRUM and addressed the influx of illegal drugs and accompanying violence associated with drug trafficking in Northern Virginia, Washington, D.C., and the contiguous suburban Maryland counties. The MATF was divided into several operational units designed to focus on different aspects of the drug problem. This 90-day project investigated individuals based in New York City who were responsible for drug-related homicides in the Washington, D.C., area. In addition to 15 state and local agencies working to reduce violent drug-related crime, participating federal agencies included the DEA, FBI, INS, and the Marshals Service. According to Attorney General Richard Thornburgh in April 1991, "The urgency of the nation's war on drugs has intensified the need for information on innovative programs and approaches to counter illicit drug trafficking and its related violence. This project will test and evaluate a promising cooperative enforcement initiative that can be replicated by state and local law enforcement agencies nationwide."

Because of the success of this operation and other REDRUM pilot projects, Administrator Bonner in April 1992 expanded Operation REDRUM to include drug-related homicide investigative units or task forces in Chicago, Detroit, Houston, Los Angeles, and New Orleans. REDRUM, based in DEA headquarters, provided the divisional task forces with the funding for their investigations. In 1990, the program was initially funded with $48,000, and during the ensuing years the funds increased to a high in 1993 of $189,000.

DEA agents are shown making an arrest during Operation REDRUM.

EA MPD
OMICIDE
VESTIGATOR
D RUM

LSD Conference (1991)

The early 1990s saw a resurgence of the popular 1960s and 1970s drug, LSD. While the use of most other illegal drugs had declined, LSD use was on the rise and was particularly popular among teenagers, as evidenced by rising emergency-room mentions for LSD as well as LSD-related arrests and violence. For example in 1991, LSD led to violence in Fairfax County, Virginia, where a high school student who allegedly had taken six or more hits of LSD shot a police officer, wounding her seriously. In San Marcos, Texas, a college student used a rifle to kill two acquaintances and wound his girlfriend after taking several hits of LSD.

To call attention to increasing abuse of the drug and to emphasize the need for stronger cooperative law enforcement and a commitment to reduce demand, Administrator Bonner held an LSD Conference in San Francisco in December 1991. This conference was held in California because it was a major source for LSD production and was attended by demand reduction experts from across the nation as well as law enforcement representatives from local, state, and federal levels.

In May 1992, Philadelphia Division ASAC Lewis Rice (left) briefed President George Bush and Philadelphia Police Commissioner Willie L. Williams (center) on the division's strategy to dismantle neighborhood drug gangs and street organizations.

Medical Use of Marijuana Denied (1992)

In 1989, former Administrator Lawn had officially denied the petition of the National Organization for Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) to reschedule marijuana from Schedule I to Schedule II of the Controlled Substances Act. When NORML appealed that decision, Administrator Bonner had to review the issue and assess whether or not marijuana had any medicinal value. In order to develop a concrete, objective means of determining if marijuana should be rescheduled, Administrator Bonner relied on a five-point test, based somewhat on the criteria Congress had used to decide if certain drugs should be rescheduled. If the drug failed to meet just one of the five criteria, it could not be rescheduled, asserted Administrator Bonner. Marijuana failed to meet all five. The criteria consisted of:

1. The drug's chemistry must be known and reproducible.
2. Adequate safety studies must have been performed on the drug.
3. There must have been adequate and well-controlled studies proving the drug's efficacy.
4. The drug's medicinal value must be accepted by qualified experts.
5. The scientific evidence of the drug's safety and efficacy must be widely available.

Administrator Bonner ruled that marijuana had no currently accepted medical use on March 26, 1992.

DEA Special Agent Promotion Program

In 1992, the DEA implemented the Special Agent Promotion Program (SAP), a bias-free system for testing and promoting its special agents. It was based upon an objective identification of the most qualified candidates, regardless of their race or gender. The SAP resulted in important gains for female employees, in addition to African-American and Hispanic employees.

Operation Green Ice (1992)

By the late 1980s, the DEA's financial investigative skills had evolved to such a high degree that the agency set up its own bank to lure drug traffickers looking to launder their profits. In 1989, the investigative team created Trans America Ventures Associates (TARA) and established its credentials in the financial community. The result was so convincing that *Hispanic Business Weekly* listed TARA as one of the top 500 Hispanic Corporations in America. Undercover agents then posed as money launderers and offered to pick up funds anywhere in the world. They used informants to identify drug money brokers from Colombia who acted as middlemen between Cali mafia kingpins and money laundering operations in the United States.

Beginning in San Diego and Los Angeles, the investigations took undercover agents to Houston, Ft. Lauderdale, Miami, Chicago, and New York to pick up money and to establish "fronts," such as leather goods shops, in these cities. During the course of the investigation, DEA agents laundered more than $20 million for the Colombia-based cartels. As the investigation developed, cartel operatives asked the undercover agents to provide money laundering services in Europe, Canada, and the Caribbean. Consequently, Operation Green Ice was expanded into a coordinated international law enforcement effort involving Canada, the Cayman Islands, Colombia, Costa Rica, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

In September 1992, undercover agents finally arranged a meeting with top-ranking Cali financial managers at locations in the United States, Italy, Spain, and Costa Rica. The drug lords arrived, expecting to discuss plans for their criminal business, but instead were arrested. Operation Green Ice was an unprecedented collaboration of talent and financial expertise that successfully formed the first international task force to attack the monetary networks of the Cali mafia. Operation Green Ice led to the arrest of seven of the Cali maifa's top financial managers, the seizure of more than $50 million in assets worldwide, and the arrest of 177 persons, including 44 in the United States.

Major Cocaine Seizure (1992)



In 1992, 500 pounds of cocaine belonging to the Cali mafia were found by DEA agents in a Texas oil field mud pump.



A welder used a high-tech torch to cut through the bottom plate of the pump to remove cocaine packages.

The packages had been covered in red grease to conceal the scent from drug-sniffing dogs.

Creation of the Intelligence Division(1992)

For most of its first 20 years, the DEA's headquarters intelligence function and responsibility for managing DEA's intelligence program was located in the Operations Division. The DEA was responsible for managing a National Narcotics Intelligence System with federal, state, local, and foreign officials, and coordinating the collection, analysis, and dissemination of drug intelligence. However, as drug trafficking around the world increased and more law enforcement, intelligence, and military entities joined in the anti-drug effort, it became clear that the DEA had to focus additional resources and attention on drug intelligence. In August 1992, the Office of Intelligence became the Intelligence Division. The primary purposes of the change in status was to bring together all intelligence functions within the DEA, enhance the profile of the DEA's entire intelligence program, place increased emphasis on the DEA's intelligence mission, and improve the span of control of senior management.

Federal drug efforts and the demands of the law enforcement, intelligence, and defense communities were growing at a rapid and sometimes uncoordinated manner. Their demands on the DEA intelligence program were increasing dramatically at a time when the DEA was barely able to meet its own intelligence needs. The information collected by DEA special agents around the world constitutes one of the richest sources of federal drug information. Programs needed to be established to ensure that the information was properly shared and that other agencies dedicated and focused resources to add to that information for law enforcement purposes. More and better analysis had to be conducted in order to provide the details that could link apparently unrelated cases and support the development of successful prosecutions.

By establishing the Intelligence Division, the DEA sought to achieve a uniformity of purpose among federal drug intelligence efforts, establish intelligence program and policy functions, and provide a more proactive direction for DEA's intelligence program. Intelligence management resources were expanded to ensure that the intelligence programs of the interagency drug community were addressing the tactical, operational, and strategic needs of the DEA.

The Intelligence Division included three entities: the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), the Office of Investigative Support, and the Office of Intelligence Policy and Liaison. EPIC continued to expand its support to law enforcement officers across the country with its Pipeline and Jetway Programs, and the timely provision of information from the Watch. The Office of Investigative Support, collocated with its enforcement counterparts, provided intelligence support to the Kingpin Strategy. Functions of the Office of Intelligence Policy and Liaison included: establishing programs and policies to ensure support from the interagency community; strategic intelligence; planning, policy analysis, and program development; and, the Special Field Intelligence Program (SFIP). Although a separate entity, the functions and programs of the Intelligence Division remained focused on supporting DEA's enforcement mission.

The Kingpin Strategy (1992)

In 1992, the DEA instituted the Kingpin Strategy that focused investigative and enforcement efforts on specific drug trafficking organizations. The DEA planned to disable major organizations by attacking their most vulnerable areas—the chemicals needed to process the drugs, their finances, communications, transportation, and leadership structure.

The Kingpin Strategy held that the greatest impact on the drug trade took place when major drug organizations were disrupted, weakened, and destroyed. This strategy focused enforcement efforts and resources against the highest-level traffickers and their organizations, and provided a systematic way of attacking the various vulnerabilities of the organizations. By systematically attacking each of these vulnerabilities, the strategy aimed to destroy the entire organization, and with it, the organization's capacity to finance, produce, and distribute massive amounts of illegal drugs. Each blow weakened the organization and improved the prospects for arresting and prosecuting the leaders and managers of the organizations.

The Kingpin Strategy evolved from the DEA's domestic and overseas intelligence gathering and investigations. It was a strategy that encompassed the DEA's enforcement actions in the United States, in the transit nations of the Caribbean, Mexico and Central America, and in the source countries of the Andes. The DEA also expanded Operation BAT in the Caribbean to include Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, and the Lesser Antilles.

Eventually, the Kingpin Strategy would be revised, although the DEA retained the emphasis on going after the top level of the international drug trade. When Mr. Constantine became the Administrator, the SACs of DEA field divisions requested greater flexibility within their areas of command to target the major drug trafficking figures who were having a significant impact in their regions. Under the original Kingpin Strategy, DEA headquarters often dictated the selection of Kingpin targets. In response to the SACs' concerns, Administrator Constantine agreed to allow them more latitude in target selection. In conjuction with this decision, he established the Special Operations Division at Newington, Virginia, in 1994 to coordinate multi-jurisdictional investigations against major drug trafficking organizations responsible for the flow of drugs into the United States.

In November 1991, the DEA destroyed two major distribution cells of Cali Kingpin Helmer "Pacho" Herrera in New York City. Herrera was the primary supplier of cocaine to the New York market, and his organization was shut down through a massive wiretap effort, using as many as 100 simultaneous, court-authorized wiretaps on cellular phones. Almost 100 traffickers were arrested, more than $20 million in cash and assets were seized, and 2.7 tons of cocaine were taken off the streets. In addition, computerized records of transactions and personnel were seized, providing valuable insight into the Cali distribution cell operations and was an indication that the Cali drug lords were becoming more dependent on computer systems.

In November and December 1991, the DEA teamed up with the CNP to carry out the first major raids ever against Cali mafia in Cali, Colombia. As a result, the DEA seized important financial records that permitted it to freeze trafficker bank accounts in Colombia, Miami, and London. In addition, during one of these successful raids, the CNP arrested Ivan Urdinola, one of the most violent of the Cali kingpins.

At the close of 1991, collective law enforcement efforts against the cartels resulted in the seizure of more than 300 metric tons of cocaine worldwide. Almost two-thirds of this amount was seized in the Andes and the transit nations, such as Mexico and Guatemala.

In another investigation, the DEA, working with the U.S. Customs Service, exposed one of the Cali mafia's principal means of smuggling cocaine into the United States. In December of 1991, more than 15 tons of cocaine hidden in cement fence posts were seized in Miami and Texas and five Cali distributors based in the U.S. were arrested. The posts were shipped from Venezuela.

As a follow-up to that investigation, the DEA and the U.S. Customs Service seized 7.5 tons of cocaine concealed in shipments of broccoli and okra. Ten members of the organization were arrested in Miami, Florida, including one of the Cali mafia's top managers in the United States. Federal agents also seized $1.6 million in cartel bank accounts located in Florida, California, New York, and New Jersey.

Finally, in July 1992, Panamanian police and the DEA raided a warehouse in Panama and seized 5.3 tons of cocaine concealed in boxes of hollowed-out ceramic tiles.

Brooklyn Clandestine Cocaine Lab Seizures (1992)

The Mid-Hudson Drug Enforcement Task Force, which consisted of three DEA special agents, six New York state troopers, and seven local police officers, conducted an intensive investigation of the Jose Santa Cruz- Londono trafficking organization. The cooperative, year-long operation required multiple wiretaps and sophisticated video surveillance, which was installed inside the warehouse lab and captured several individuals actually going through the cocaine processing procedures. These efforts came to fruition on June 15, 1992, when the Task Force seized two major clandestine cocaine laboratories in Brooklyn, New York. Agents found 100 pounds of cocaine base chemically altered into ceramic floor tiles for smuggling into the United States. It was believed that each lab was capable of producing 50 to 100 kilograms of cocaine HCl a day, making them two of the largest labs seized during that time period. Unique to these labs was the use of Dupont gun-cleaning solvent in the extraction process as well as the use of an "extractor," a piece of equipment that used dry ice to condense vapors in the laboratory. This device enabled the lab to function in a densely populated area without the presence of strong chemical odors usually associated with clandestine labs. The other lab had been abandoned following an unrelated New York City Police raid of a nearby building. As a result of these seizures, an additional 70 pounds of cocaine were seized on March 3, 1993, when one of the cooperating Brooklyn lab defendants led the task force to a crack cocaine laboratory located in Liberty, New York. In addition, the chemist responsible for the tile method of smuggling was arrested, and one of the Brooklyn arrestees was later charged in the conspiracy to kill an editor of *El Diario*, a Spanish-language newspaper published in New York City. The drug lords from Colombia had threatened the editor's life when the newspaper ran several articles condemning their activities. At the conclusion of these investigations, the labs were traced to the Jose Santa Cruz-Londono trafficking organization and 30 of its members were brought to justice.

Hudson Task Force officers display some of the crushed cocaine "tiles" recovered from the clandestine lab in Liberty, New York.

The Tucker

Special Agent Claude Powers of the San Diego Division Narcotics Task Force posed with the 1948 Tucker automobile seized from a major methamphetamine trafficker in 1992.

Rules of the Game (1993)

For years after the DEA first began operating in Mexico in the early 1970s, special agents worked there, as in most countries of the world, without formal regulations other than their own agency's guidelines. This changed in April 1990, when a physician, Dr. Humberto Alvarez Machain, was kidnaped in Guadalajara by four men who identified themselves as members of the Mexican Judicial Police. Machain was then driven to a neighboring state, held overnight in a hotel, and forced to board a plane that took him to United States.

U.S. authorities maintained that the Guadalajara gynecologist had injected DEA Special Agent Enrique Camarena with stimulants to keep him conscious during the final interrogation before his murder in 1985, and they were frustrated by Mexico's failure to arrest Machain after his earlier indictment in Los Angeles. As a result, American officials paid Mexican bounty hunters to kidnap Machain and take him to El Paso, Texas. This fact aroused Mexican furor, and even more so when the United States Supreme Court ruled in June 1992 that the abduction did not violate American law. In 1992, the Government of Mexico imposed the first written regulations that the DEA had faced anywhere in the world. The rules capped the number of DEA agents in Mexico, designated a half-dozen cities in which they must live, prohibited them from traveling without written Government of Mexico permission, denied them diplomatic immunity from prosecution, and stipulated that all useful intelligence information "must be immediately transmitted to the competent Mexican authorities." They also prohibited weapons. Dr. Machain was ultimately released in December 1992 due to a directed verdict of acquittal.

Aviation

In late 1991, the Chief Pilot position was moved out of headquarters and sent to Addison to run operations. By this time, the DEA's Aviation Section had grown to 115 special agent/pilots, 110 DEA-owned aircraft, 152 contractor maintenance technicians, and an operating budget of $23 million. In the 1990s, about 85 percent of the air fleet was from asset forfeiture and the remainder was from military surplus and newly-purchased aircraft.

In June 1992, ground was broken for the new Aviation Operation Center at the Alliance Airport, which was four times larger than the facility at Addison. The three-story hanger included large bays with an overhead crane for working on every kind of aircraft from small fixed-wing, single-engine planes, to large turbine-powered transports and helicopters. The facilities provided for machine repairs, engine shops, avionics, spare parts, modification work, metal work, and hydraulic repairs.

Air intelligence, photo labs, maintenance, and the operations center and office space were also housed in the new facility. In the connected two-story office building were workstations, training rooms, conference areas, and computer systems.



Training

When Administrator Robert C. Bonner began his tenure in August 1990, one of the first challenges facing him was the issue of overcrowding at the FBI Training Center at Quantico, Virginia. The training needs of the FBI had grown to such an extent that there was literally no space to accommodate the DEA training functions that were likewise expanding. As a result, the DEA was given notice to find another place to conduct its training.

The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Glynco, Georgia, offered to provide the DEA some space, but after evaluating a number of facilities in other states, Administrator Bonner determined that it was in the DEA's interest to retain a training facility at Quantico, Virginia. Mr. Bonner confirmed the U.S. Marine Corps' offer of land to the DEA, and set about to acquire the funding for a DEA training center.

In 1992, with the approval of Attorney General Dick Thornburgh, Administrator Bonner was successful in obtaining $7 million for architectural plans and an engineering study. However, it was not until FY 1997 that sufficient funds were appropriated to build and complete the DEA Training Center at Quantico.

Office of Investigative Agency Policies (1993)

On November 18, 1993, the Attorney General established the Office of Investigative Agency Policies (OIAP) at the Department of Justice. This new office, reporting directly to the Attorney General, was created to increase efficiency within the Department of Justice by coordinating specified activities of the department's criminal investigative components that warrant uniform treatment or coordination. Agencies that fell under this program included the DEA, FBI, U.S. Marshals Service, and Immigration and Naturalization Service. Some resolutions/issues addressed by this office that affected the DEA included drug intelligence (February 1994), wireless communications (April 1994), criminal investigations overseas (May 1994), aviation policy (September 1994), armor piercing ammunition (October 1994), Interagency Laboratory Working Group (June 1995), post-shooting incidents (October 1995), law enforcement training (December 1995), and confidential informants and cooperating witnesses (May 1996).

Technology

Given the evolving sophistication of criminal drug organizations around the world in the 1990s, the DEA was challenged to keep pace, particularly technologically. With the cartels' extensive wealth, these international criminal organizations purchased the latest and most sophisticated state-of-the-art technological equipment, and used this equipment to control every phase of their drug business—production, transportation, financing and communications. Technology provided them with the vital link to their managers and dealers here in the United States and around the world, allowing the mafia leaders to maintain total control over every detail of the drug business from their safe havens abroad.

Cellular Phones: Mafia leader surrogates who controlled operations in the United States engaged in complicated efforts to avoid having their telephone communications vulnerable to legal wiretaps. These criminal surrogates within the United States bought cell phones in lots of 10-20, which were used for a few weeks or even days and then quickly discarded and replaced. This was done in order to evade wiretaps by moving from phone to phone more quickly than law enforcement could keep up.

Digital Pagers: The use of digital pagers also created new problems. Traffickers sent messages, often in code, to set up deliveries, cancel meetings, or warn of problems. But law enforcement's ability to intercept these transmissions was limited. The DEA's primary method was to use a clone of a pager used by a suspected trafficker. However in order to set up the clone, specific information was needed from the company providing the paging service, and the suspect was often tipped by the paging service that he was under investigation. In response and with the cooperation of the cellular and paging industries, the DEA developed equipment to intercept cellular and paging services.

Debit Telephone Cards: Traffickers also used debit cards to avoid detection by law enforcement. From stores, such as the 7-11, traffickers bought telephone debit cards similar to telephone credit cards that are not billed to any specific person or telephone number and are difficult to trace.

Encryption: Encrypted communications became a major problem for law enforcement in the 1990s. To help counter the threat of criminal organizations exchanging encrypted messages with impunity, Congress approved the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act in 1994. It required telephone companies to ensure that their systems and networks had the capability to accommodate federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies' court-approved intercepts as new technology was developed.

Digital Communications: Another important technological development occurred in the 1990s when new carriers, such as cable television companies and electric companies, entered the "telephone business." Where once a pair of wires carried only one analogue signal conversation, today's communications were sent in pulses of digital information over wires or fiber optic cables, allowing for multiple, simultaneous voicand data transmissions, known as multiplexing. This meant that telephone calls were forwarded to a different location without detection by law enforcement intercept equipment.

Laboratories

The laboratory system marked its 25th anniversary in August 1993. From the original staff of 6 chemists at the Washington, D.C., BNDD laboratory, the authorized staff had grown to a nationwide staff of 159 bench chemists, 12 latent fingerprint specialists, 36 laboratory managers and supervisors, 4 headquarters upper managers, 12 headquarters program managers, 2 hazardous waste specialists, 2 diversion investigators, and numerous support personnel.

Killed in the Line of Duty

Joseph T. Aversa
Died on March 5, 1990
Criminal Investigator Aversa of the New York State Police was shot to death on March 5, 1990, while serving on the New York Drug Enforcement Task Force.

Wallie Howard, Jr.
Died on October 30, 1990
Police Investigator Howard of the New York Police Department was shot and killed during an undercover operation with the Central New York Drug Enforcement Task Force.

Eugene T. McCarthy
Died on February 2, 1991
DEA Special Agent Pilot McCarthy was on a second Snowcap tour in November 1990 when he was called to active duty in the Persian Gulf War. He was killed in a helicopter accident in Saudi Arabia during the Persian Gulf War.

Alan H. Winn
Died on August 13, 1991
DEA Special Agent Pilot Winn was killed in a helicopter crash during an operations flight over the island of Hawaii.

George D. Althouse
Died on May 28, 1992
DEA Special Agent Althouse was killed during an attempted car theft in Shelby County, Alabama.

Becky L. Dwojeski
Died on October 21, 1993
DEA Special Agent Dwojeski, who was assigned to the Office of Training, was killed in an automobile accident on the Quantico Marine Corps Base, Quantico, Virginia.

Stephen J. Strehl
Died on November 19, 1993
Detective Strehl, a St. Louis, Missouri Police Officer, was killed in a helicopter crash during a surveillance mission. He was assigned to a DEA task force.

DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION

The drug trade had evolved into a well-organized, highly structured enterprise that spanned the world.



1994-1998

Thomas A. Constantine

April 15, 1994 - July 1, 1999

Thomas A. Constantine was appointed Administrator of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) by President William J. Clinton on March 11, 1994. Prior to this appointment, Mr. Constantine had been serving as the Superintendent of the New York State Police and was a veteran law enforcement officer with over 34 years of service with that agency.

When Mr. Constantine was selected by Governor Mario Cuomo in 1986 to be Superintendent of the New York State Police, it was the first time in 30 years that a member of that agency had risen through the ranks from Trooper to Superintendent. During his tenure as Superintendent, the 4,800-member New York State Police received numerous awards, including the Governor's Excelsior Award as the best quality agency in state government.

Upon assuming the leadership of the DEA, Administrator Constantine said that the agency would play a leading role in changing attitudes about drugs and reducing violence. However, he emphasized that "DEA cannot do it alone." He explained, "The key is cooperation with state and local police departments...and federal agencies, which leaves no room for turf wars or jurisdictional conflicts."

Mr. Constantine now serves as a Public Service Professor at the State University of New York in Albany, Rockefeller College of Public Affairs and Policy.

Year	Foreign Office Opened
1997	Moscow, Russia
1997	Pretoria, South Africa
1998	Trinidad, Bolivia
1998	Sao Paulo, Brazil
1998	Beijing, China
1998	Vietiane, Laos
1998	Ciudad Juarez, Mexico
1998	Tijuana, Mexico
1998	Managua, Nicaragua
1998	Port of Spain, Trinidad/Tobago

Two of the most significant features of the drug trade in the mid-1990s were its scope and sophistication. The drug trade had expanded into a global problem, and the unprecedented power and wealth of the traffickers allowed them to manage their worldwide business with the most sophisticated technology and communications equipment that money could buy. The drug trade had evolved into a well-organized, highly structured enterprise that spanned the world. Drug trafficking activities were conducted in a seamless continuum, with individual organizations controlling all aspects of the drug trade, from cultivating or manufacturing drugs in source countries to transporting them through international zones and eventually selling them on the streets of American communities.

The DEA adjusted its strategy to address the unprecedented influence and power of the international drug mafias while working to reduce violent drug-related crime in American communities. Initially hampered by budget cutbacks in the late 1980s, by the mid-to-late 1990s, the agency had increased its budget, its staffing, and its cooperation with law enforcement counterparts in the United States and abroad.

During this time period, violent drug gangs proliferated around the country. Violence and drug trafficking went hand-in-hand. More than 1.5 million Americans were arrested for drug law violations in 1996. Many crimes (e.g., assault, prostitution, and robbery) were committed under the influence of drugs or motivated by a need to get money for drugs. Competition and disputes contributed to violence as did the location of drug markets in areas where legal and social controls on violence tended to be ineffective.

The availability of automatic weapons also made drug violence more deadly. In addition to the rampant violence and denigration of neighborhoods, child abuse, crack babies, AIDS, homelessness, and a host of other drug-related afflictions also degraded the quality of life in many communities. Some influential intellectuals in America, in their frustration, began to advocate the wholesale legalization of drugs as a solution to the drug problem.

Another challenge facing drug law enforcement was the fact that heroin, which previously had been smuggled mostly from Asia, was being smuggled into the United States from a new source—South America.

DEA Special Agents

1994.....3,418

1998.....4,261

DEA Budget

1994.....$1,050 million

1998.....$1,349.4million



1995: Special Agent Jake Carter (far right) helped with an enforcement operation against the Northwest Raiders in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida.

Conviction of Dandeny Munoz- Mosquera (1994)

Dandeny Munoz-Mosquera, the Medellin cartel's chief assassin, was arrested in Queens, New York, on September 25, 1991, for making false statements to a DEA special agent. Following Munoz's trial, conviction, and subsequent six-year sentence under the false statement charge, Munoz was then tried for his involvement in the 1989 midair bombing of Avianca flight-203, in which 107 people died when the cartel wanted to kill one informant on the plane. Because two American citizens were on board, the United States was able to charge Munoz with homicide in that case. Munoz was also linked to hundreds of other murders that he committed while serving as the cartel's most prolific assassin. In December 1994, Munoz was convicted in New York and sentenced to 10 life terms for the Avianca homicide charges, as well as two 20-year terms and one 5-year term on a variety of drug trafficking and RICO charges, all to be served consecutively.

Operation Snowcap is Concluded (1994)

Operation Snowcap was one of the major issues of concern that the SACs brought to the attention of incoming Administrator Constantine. The program was originally instituted to eliminate the flow of cocaine by building up internal law enforcement resources in the source countries and by teaching enforcement techniques to foreign counterparts. However, it had evolved to the point that DEA agents were also participating in drug law enforcement activities.

Snowcap was envisioned as a temporary program, but after seven years of operation it became a serious drain on DEA domestic field division resources. The constant rotation of individuals from domestic field investigations made it difficult for the agents to initiate and follow through on casework and follow-up court testimony. In addition, because of the dangerous terrain the agents worked in, many agents who volunteered for Snowcap tours underwent intensive jungle training to prepare for the adversity that their tours of duty to the Latin American jungles created. This training, although a necessity to the agents, further depleted the domestic field divisions of badly needed special agents.

These personnel limitations made it increasingly difficult for the domestic field divisions to combat the rising tide of drug-related violent crime in their regions. In order to address the SACs concerns, and because Operation Snowcap had achieved its goal of helping other countries' drug law enforcement agencies become more self-sufficient, a decision was made to phase out Snowcap and refocus the DEA's role in overseas operations. As a result, Snowcap's temporary positions were gradually eliminated. Nevertheless, the DEA continued to support permanent positions in Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia. The agents in these positions provided support and training assistance and served as liaison officers and advisors. The phase-out of Operation Snowcap marked a significant change in the role of DEA agents in certain overseas posts.

Peru Airplane Crash (1994)

On August 27, 1994, during a routine reconnaissance mission near Santa Lucia, Peru, a DEA airplane carrying five special agents crashed, killing all aboard. The DEA special agents were assigned to Operation Snowcap [see page 72], which had provided support and training for Peruvian and Bolivian law enforcement personnel between 1987 and 1994. The crash site was 15 miles west of Santa Lucia, an airstrip in the foothills of the Andes Mountains of western Peru in the Upper Huallaga River Valley, where much of the world's coca leaves for cocaine were grown. They were searching for clandestine drug operations in an area that is known for its multitude of laboratories and airstrips. The DEA transport plane had been traveling from Santa Lucia when it lost contact with air traffic control.

The DEA, the Peruvian Air Force, the Peruvian Police, and U.S. Special Forces teams assigned to Peru joined in the search for the lost aircraft. On August 28 they were scouring the area around Puerto Piana, about 285 miles northeast of Lima, when they spotted the wreckage of the twin-engine cargo aircraft. A six-man search team began hacking through the jungle but was slowed by heavy rains and nightfall. The search team, which included two DEA agents, reached the site on Monday, August 29, and discovered the bodies of the two pilots and the three agents amid the wreckage of the Casa aircraft.

The special agents were: Frank Fernandez, Jr., stationed at DEA headquarters; Jay W. Seale, stationed in Los Angeles; Meredith Thompson, stationed at the Miami office; Juan C. Vars, stationed at the San Antonio office; and Frank S. Wallace, Jr., stationed at the Houston office. Their bodies arrived back in the United States on September 3, 1994, on a C-141 transport jet that landed in front of hundreds of family members, friends, and DEA agents, each of whom wore black ribbons over their badges.

"This is just so tragic. They were fine special agents and fine young people," DEA Administrator Thomas Constantine said. "For those people who say there is no price to pay for casual drug use, tell that to the families and friends going through this tragic time." In May 1995, the families of the five special agents received the Administrator's Award of Honor. This posthumous award recognized the bravery of Special Agents Wallace, Vars, Thompson, Seale, and Fernandez.

Operation Dinero (1994)

Operation Dinero, a joint DEA/IRS (Internal Revenue Service) operation, was launched by the DEA's Atlanta Division in 1992. In this investigation, the U.S. Government successfully operated a financial institution in Anguilla for the purpose of targeting the financial networks of international drug organizations. In addition, a number of undercover corporations were established in different jurisdictions as multi-service "front" businesses designed to supply "money laundering" services such as loans, cashier's checks, wire transfers, and peso exchanges, or to establish holding companies or shell corporations for the trafficking groups. Believing these services were legitimate, the Cali mafia engaged the bank to sell three paintings, a Picasso, a Rubens, and a Reynolds. These paintings, estimated to have a combined value of $15 million, were seized by the DEA and IRS in 1994. The operation resulted in 116 arrests in the United States, Spain, Italy, and Canada and the seizure of nine tons of cocaine, and the seizure of more than $90 million in cash and other property. The two-year joint enforcement operation was coordinated by the DEA, IRS, INS, FBI, and international law enforcement counterparts in the United Kingdom, Canada, Italy, and Spain.

DEA
DEA
POLIZIA

Charlestown, Massachussetts

Between 1975 and 1992, Charlestown, a small community in North Boston, Massachusetts, experienced 49 murders, 33 of which were unsolved. The difficulty in finding information about the murders was caused by the unspoken "Code of Silence" that the Charlestown citizens had adopted. The community was unwilling to share information that would facilitate homicide investigations, possibly because of fear of retaliation by criminals, anti-police sentiment, or reliance on vigilante justice. Charlestown was a major PCP and cocaine distribution center that was run by the "Irish Mob," a group of career criminals. Because drugs were a large part of Charlestown's crime problem, the DEA got involved and joined forces with the Massachusetts State Police, Boston Police Department, and Boston Housing Police Department. DEA agents and local officers worked together to establish a comprehensive case against the criminals in the neighborhood and found informants and other intelligence critical to solving both drug and murder cases. Agents arranged to protect any witnesses who agreed to testify against the Charlestown criminals. As a result of three years of extensive investigations in Charlestown, by July 1994, 40 defendants were indicted on charges that included racketeering, murder, attempted murder, conspiracy to distribute cocaine, and armed robbery. Once the violent criminals were taken from Charlestown community, the threat of retaliation was removed and the code of silence was broken. A hotline set up by the DEA yielded hundreds of calls from community residents that resulted in valuable leads and more significant arrests. The cooperative efforts by the DEA and local law enforcement agencies greatly diminished Charlestown's violence problem.

Creation of the 20th Field Division: Special Operations (1994)

In a decision to elevate the level of attention given to targeting the highest levels of the international drug traffic, Administrator Constantine approved the creation of a new division called Special Operations (SOD) which became fully functional in 1994. Its mission was to target the command and control capabilities of major drug trafficking organizations from Mexico, Colombia, and elsewhere. Originally, the division was exclusively operated by the DEA. In 1995, the FBI became full partners in the division, followed by the U.S. Customs Service in 1996. SOD was given the ability to collect, collate, analyze, evaluate, and disseminate intelligence derived from worldwide multi-agency elements. This information was then passed to domestic field divisions and foreign country offices for real-time or near real-time support to programmed investigative and enforcement activity directed against major trafficking organizations that operated on a regional, national, or international basis. With regard to domestic enforcement, the division's formost function was to help field divisions build national conspiracy cases derived from multi-jurisdictional wiretap investigations.

New Wall of Honor (1995)

In order to pay a fitting tribute to the men and women of the DEA and state and local task forces who have given their lives in the line of duty, Administrator Constantine directed that a new, more visible Memorial Wall of Honor be erected in the lobby of DEA headquarters. The 20-foot memorial displayed a picture of each DEA agent and state and local task force member who died in the line of duty.



Operation Tiger Trap (1994)

Operation Tiger Trap was conceived at DEA's Bangkok Office during June of 1994 with the goal of identifying and targeting the major heroin traffickers in the region. Operation Tiger Trap was the first of its kind, a multi-agency international operation designed to dismantle or disrupt the trafficking activities of the world's largest heroin trafficking organization, the Shan United Army (SUA). Also known as the Mong Tai Army, it was located primarily in the areas of Burma adjacent to the northern border provinces of Thailand. The SUA Warlord Khun Sa claimed that his army, which was financed primarily through heroin trafficking, was fighting the Burmese for the independence for the Shan people.

The SUA controlled the cultivation, production, and transportation of heroin from the Shan State. Although other insurgent groups in Burma also trafficked heroin, the SUA had been the dominant force in worldwide distribution. Prior to Operation Tiger Trap, the percentage of southeast Asian heroin from the DEA's Heroin Signature Program rose from 9 percent in 1977 to 58 percent in 1991.

Tiger Trap was divided into phases which would all target key Shan United Army (SUA) functionaries. On November 27, 1994, the operation culminated when teams of Royal Thai Police, Office of Narcotics Control Board Officers, and Royal Thai Army Special Forces Soldiers working with DEA agents lured targets in Burma into Thailand where they were then arrested. This action significantly damaged the ability of the SUA to distribute heroin. The Royal Thai Army then worked with the Thai Border Patrol Police to close the Burma border to "commercial quantities" of goods entering the Shan State.

When law enforcement authorities had completed their operations, 13 senior SUA traffickers were arrested, and all were pursued for extradition/expulsion to the United States. These 13 principal defendants in Operation Tiger Trap included some of the most persistent and high-level heroin traffickers operating out of Thailand. They were all subjects of U.S. indictments in the Eastern District of New York (EDNY). The defendants were a mixture of three distinct categories: those who were eligible for expulsion (illegal aliens in Thailand); those who possessed fraudulent identification; and authentic Thai citizens.

Operation Tiger Trap toppled SUA Warlord and heroin trafficker Khun Sa.

On December 3, 1993, law enforcement authorities seize 315 kilos of heroin in Pae, Thailand.

Khun Sa's men. From left to right, Chang Tetsa, Liu Fangte, Meedian Pathummee, Kuo Fa Mou, Ma Tsai Kuei, Chao Fusheng.

Mobile Enforcement Teams (1995)

Many communities across America were suffering the devastating effects of drug-related crime and violence. Numerous drug-related homicides were unsolved, and, in too many cases, witnesses were afraid to come forward with information. Administrator Constantine believed that the DEA had a great deal of expertise and the resources necessary to assist state and local law enforcement agencies address drug-related problems in their communities. He established the Mobile Enforcement Team (MET) program in April 1995 to overcome two major challenges that faced state and local agencies in drug enforcement: limited resources—equipment, funding, and diversification of personnel—that were needed to effectively perform drug enforcement; and the fact that local law enforcement personnel were often recognizable to local drug users and sellers, making undercover buys and penetration of local distribution rings difficult and dangerous.

The MET teams, composed of specially trained and equipped DEA special agents, were strategically located across the country to facilitate rapid deployment to communities where police chiefs or sheriffs requested their assistance. MET investigations were immediately successful in reducing the impact of drug-related violence.

One of the DEA's first MET deployments was in Galveston County, Texas, in May 1995. In a single week, Galveston County had experienced five drive-by shootings, and the Sheriff of Galveston County requested assistance from the DEA's Houston Division to combat the increasing violence. The Galveston Narcotics Task Force, working with the Houston MET, launched an investigation of the drug gang believed to be connected to the shootings. Only days later, five adults were arrested on charges of attempted homicide and deadly conduct. Two juveniles were also arrested and charged with the theft of the firearms used in the shootings. On June 12, 1995, three additional suspects were arrested; one was believed to be responsible for multiple homicides in the area.

In another example of a DEA MET success, a MET team dispatched to Opa-Locka, Florida, worked to dismantle a dangerous crack cocaine organization. This group was headed by Rickey Brownlee, a violent trafficker who had intimidated the citizens of Opa-Locka for years and was alleged to have been involved in 13 murders since 1993. In a letter to the Attorney General, Mayor of Opa-Locka Robert B. Ingram, thanked the DEA for its expertise in the January 1998 dismantling of one of South Florida's most notorious criminal enterprises. To further show his appreciation, Mayor Ingram issued an official proclamation declaring March 19, 1998, "Drug Enforcement Administration/Mobile Enforcement Team Day."

Similar MET success stories were recorded all across the country as state and local law enforcement requested assistance from the DEA. From their 1995 inception through September 1998, the Mobile Enforcement Teams arrested over 6,800 violent drug traffickers across the country, seized vast quantities of drugs, and helped many state and local police departments restore peace to their communities.

A.V SAYS "THANKS
TO
L.A. COUNTY SHERIFF'S AND D.E.A.
FOR HELPING KEEP A.V. A GREAT PLACE TO RAISE OUR FAMIL

This highway billboard proclaimed public appreciation of DEA efforts.

(To Left) 1995: DEA Special Agent Michael Moser and Galveston County Narcotics Task Force Agent Hugh Hawkins arrest a member of one of Galveston's violent drug dealing gangs.

Oklahoma City Bombing (1995)

The DEA was again touched by tragedy on April 19, 1995, when a bomb exploded at the Alfred E. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and killed 168 people, including 19 children. Five DEA employees were killed and three additional DEA personnel sustained injuries in the explosion. DEA offices on the seventh and ninth floors were completely destroyed. Twenty-seven employees had been assigned to the DEA's Oklahoma City Resident Office, including ten DEA special agents, four DEA diversion investigators, three secretaries, and several task force personnel.

Within minutes of the blast, DEA agents were assisting the fire and rescue workers in evacuating the federal building. The DEA sent personnel from the Tulsa, McAlester, Dallas, Tyler, Lubbock, St. Louis, Los Angeles, Ft. Lauderdale, and San Antonio Offices to assist in rescue and investigative efforts. By the first afternoon, the DEA had a command post set up at the scene and a DEA trauma team was providing counseling for the survivors. The rescue efforts were extremely difficult and time consuming, and DEA employees joined in the search for lost personnel. The first priority was to locate the bodies of the employees that were unaccounted for and to take care of their families.

On April 21, 1995, the DEA confirmed the deaths of two employees assigned to the Oklahoma City Resident Office, Kenneth G. McCullough and Carrie Ann Lenz and her unborn son, Michael James Lenz, III. Mrs. Lenz was six months pregnant with her first child. Rescue workers next recovered the bodies of DEA employee Rona L. Chafey and DynCorp Legal Technician Shelly Bland. During the early morning hours of April 24, 1995, workers recovered the body of office assistant Carrol Fields from the ruins.

Upon learning of the deaths, DEA Administrator Constantine flew to Oklahoma City to offer support to the grieving families. He stated that "Our condolences go out to the families of these...good people, and to all the families who have lost loved ones in this cowardly and inhumane attack. The entire DEA family mourns their loss." Administrator Constantine then pledged to commit the DEA's "resources and professional expertise, in collaboration with other agencies, to bring all of the perpetrators of this crime to justice."

On June 2, 1997, Timothy McVeigh was convicted of 11 counts of conspiracy and first-degree murder after a jury trial. The same panel later recommended the death penalty for the murders of 168 people, including eight federal law enforcement agents, in the April 19, 1995, bombing.

For their heroic actions in response to the Oklahoma City Bombing, Midwest City Police Corporal Regina Bonny and DEA Special Agent David Schickedanz were recipients of the 1996 Police Officer of the year Award given by Parade and the International Association of Chiefs of Police. Regina Bonny was an undercover narcotics officer on assignment with the DEA at the time of the explosion. After initially being knocked unconscious by the blast, she assisted an ATF officer before exiting the collapsed building. Although she was injured (and was later diagnosed with irreparable nerve damage, brain injury, and hand and shoulder wounds), she returned to the building, sprinted up the stairs to the ninth floor, and searched for other DEA employees. David Schickedanz was in an elevator with ATF supervisor Alex McCauley when the explosion dropped the elevator six floors. After he escaped from the elevator through a trap door, he returned to the destroyed DEA office to look for survivors. He suffered from smoke inhalation and a partial loss of hearing.

After the bombing, the DEA Oklahoma City Resident Office made efforts to recover some of the law enforcement resources lost in the explosion. The office rebuilt its record file by obtaining copies of any records available at headquarters. As all evidence at the office was destroyed, the evidence collection had to be completely rebuilt. The DEA relocated the office to 990 Broadway Extension, Oklahoma City, approximately 10 miles from the former Murrah Building.



April 19, 1995: The Alfred Murrah Federal Building

Operation Green Ice II (1995)

Green Ice II, a spin-off of the successful 1992 Green Ice investigation, culminated in April 1995 with the arrest of 109 individuals and the seizure of 13,882 pounds of cocaine, 16 pounds of heroin, and $15.6 million in cash. This second phase operation concentrated on the Cali mafia's money brokers and cocaine distribution networks from Mexico to the United States. Once again, the DEA established storefront operations and bank accounts throughout the world, then convinced drug traffickers that undercover DEA agents had connections to launder their drug proceeds. Most of the individuals arrested were high-ranking Cali cell leaders or money brokers in the United States. Green Ice II had three distinct phases. The first targeted certain *Casas de Cambio* and check cashing institutions along the Southwest border. *Casas de Cambio* are legal, unregulated money exchange houses that operated much like banks. These organizations wire-transferred large sums of money and did not keep records of the source or owner of the funds. Second, the DEA agents working on this case created their own money exchange houses and also infiltrated existing *Casas de Cambio* to identify major narcotic traffickers, money launderers, and the financial institutions used by the traffickers. The third portion of the investigation followed the money into Colombia and linked specific cartel members with the narcotics proceeds. Ultimately, more than 200 federal agents from 27 federal, state, and foreign law enforcement agencies contributed to the indictment of over 80 individuals. In addition, Operation Green Ice II enabled the DEA to gain a wealth of knowledge on wire transfer information, bank accounts, and identification of money couriers/brokers. It also proved that corrupt businessmen, bankers, and attorneys had created an alliance with drug dealers to funnel their drug profits back to them.

Agents counted money seized during Operation Green Ice II.

Operation Global Sea (1995)

In 1994, Southeast Asian heroin, which was smuggled by ethnic China and Nigeria-based traffickers, was one of the greatest drug threats to the United States. Almost 60 percent of the heroin that came to the United States at that time originated in Southeast Asia's "Golden Triangle"—Burma, Laos, and Thailand. Those mainly responsible were ethnic Chinese traffickers who controlled sophisticated international networks that smuggled hundreds of kilograms of heroin in commercial cargo on a regular basis. In addition to the China, Nigeria and West Africa-based trafficking organizations helped smuggle the heroin, typically using the "shotgun" approach to smuggling by recruiting third party couriers to travel aboard commercial airlines and smuggle from one to 10 kilograms of heroin per trip. In response to this facet of the drug trade, Operation Global Sea targeted a Nigerian, female-led, drug trafficking organization that was responsible for smuggling into the United States $26 million worth of high-purity Southeast Asian heroin. Global Sea, an Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force operation, was comprised of the DEA, the U.S. Customs Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and law enforcement authorities in Thailand, Great Britain, France, Switzerland, Mexico, and the Netherlands. By the end of this 18-month investigation, Operation Global Sea had immobilized the Chicago-based drug organization by seizing 55.5 kilograms of heroin with an average purity of 80 percent and arresting 44 defendants in Bangkok, Chicago, New York City, Detroit, and Pakistan.

The heroin distribution operation targeted in Operation Global Sea was directed by Ms. Kafayat Majekodunmi, shown after her arrest by DEA special agents.

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Arrest of Cali Leaders (1995)

CNP Gen. Rosso Serrano (right) is pictured with Miguel Rodriguez-Orejuela (center) shortly after his 1995 arrest.

"No one has sacrificed more than the Colombian National Police."

During the summer of 1995, six top leaders of the Cali mafia surrendered or were arrested by Colombian authorities under the leadership of CNP Director General Rosso Serrano, and the Cali mafia began to collapse. The arrest of the entire hierarchy of the wealthiest and most powerful international criminal organization was the most significant enforcement action taken against organized crime leaders since the Apalachin Gangster Raid in 1957 that exposed the existance and power of organized crime syndicates in the United States.

On June 9, 1995, Gilberto Rodriguez-Orejuela was arrested by the Colombian National Police (CNP) during a house raid in Cali. When the police searched the home several days earlier, Rodriguez-Orejeula hid in a hollowed-out bathroom cabinet with an oxygen tank. The CNP's excellent police work led to his arrest. After he was taken into custody, police discovered that he had a copy of an unclassified DEA report titled "The Kings of Cocaine" that had been translated into Spanish. He was sentenced to a prison term of 13 years.

On June 19, 1995, Henry Loiaza-Ceballos, who had overseen the mafia's military infrastructure, surrendered to police. He was considered one of the most violent members of the Cali drug mafia and was linked to at least three massacres in Colombia.

On June 24, 1995, Victor Julio Patino- Fomeque, who was responsible for ensuring the security and effectiveness of the mafia's maritime operations, also surrendered and was sentenced to 12 years behind bars.

On July 4, 1995, Jose Santacruz-Londono, the number three leader in the Cali mafia, was arrested by the CNP as he dined with associates at a Bogota steak house. He was never sentenced because he escaped from prison and was killed in March 1996 during a confrontation with the CNP.

Finally, on August 6, 1995, Miguel Rodriguez-Orejuela, the brother of Gilberto, was arrested when the CNP broke down the door of his apartment and found him hiding in a secret closet during another house raid. He was sentenced to 21 years.

Less than one year later, there were two more arrests of major Cali mafia leaders. In March 1996, Juan Carlos "Chupeta" Ramirez-Abadia, surrendered to Colombian authorities and was later sentenced to 24 years in prison.

On September 1, 1996, Helmer "Pacho" Herrera-Buitrago surrendered to Colombian authorities. He was one of the charter members of the Cali mafia and was the remaining "Kingpin" being sought by Colombian authorities. He was sentenced to six years in prison.

These arrests marked the beginning of the decline of the Cali mafia and were the results of extensive investigation by the DEA. However, the investigations of the Cali mafia would not have been as successful if not for the outstanding efforts of the CNP. Remarking on the CNP's contributions to combatting the drug problem in Colombia, Administrator Constantine remarked in 1998, "No one has sacrificed more than the Colom bian National Police. At great sacrifice to themselves, and in the face of extraordinary temptations for corruption, General Rosso Serrano and his brave law enforcement officers have fought the powerful drug traffickers in Colombia."

Henry Loiaza-Ceballos

Gilberto Rodriguez-Orejuela was fingerprinted following his arrest.

Victor Patino-Fomeque

Jose Santacruz-Londono was arrested while meeting with associates in Colombia on July 4, 1995.

Helmer "Pacho" Herrera-Buitrago

Rise of Traffickers in Mexico

When enforcement efforts intensified in South Florida and the Caribbean, the Colombian organizations formed partnerships with the Mexico-based traffickers to transport cocaine through Mexico into the United States. This was easily accomplished because Mexico had long been a major source of heroin and marijuana, and drug traffickers from Mexico had already established an infrastructure that stood ready to serve the Colombia-based traffickers.

Mexican cocaine trafficking had been pioneered by Juan Ramon Matta-Ballesteros, a Honduran who, from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s, was actively involved with the Mexican Guadalajara cartel. This was the group largely responsible for the kidnapping, torture, and murder of DEA Special Agent Enrique Camarena in 1985. By the mid-1980s, the organizations from Mexico were well-established and reliable transporters of Colombian cocaine.

Throughout the 1990s, the United States was faced with trafficking organizations from Mexico that worked with the Cali drug organizations to smuggle more and more cocaine into the United States. By the 1990s, traffickers from Colombia were buying large cargo and passenger jets similar to 727s, gutting them, and using them to transport multi-ton loads of cocaine to Mexico. The planes were then refueled and returned to Colombia loaded with millions of dollars in cash. At first, the Mexican gangs were paid in cash for their transportation services. But in the late 1980s, the Mexican transport organizations and the Colombian drug traffickers settled on a payment-in-product arrangement. Transporters from Mexico usually were given 35 to 50 percent of each cocaine shipment. This arrangement meant that organizations from Mexico became involved in the distribution, as well as the transportation, of cocaine, and became formidable traffickers in their own right.

The criminal organizations based in Mexico demonstrated an ability to corrupt officials serving in high-level positions. Drug-related corruption was probably the single greatest obstacle that law enforcement faced in its battle against drug traffickers from Mexico. Ernesto Zedillo, the President of Mexico, recognized drug-related corruption as a threat to Mexican national security and, in 1998, announced a national initiative to fight, crime, violence, and corruption. In another attempt to overcome the problem of widespread corruption in law enforcement, the Mexican Government replaced civilian authorities with military officers. The following describes the most powerful drug traffickers and their status as of 1998.

The Amado Carrillo-Fuentes Organization

When Amado Carrillo-Fuentes died in Mexico City on July 4, 1997, after undergoing plastic surgery, he was considered the most powerful trafficker in Mexico. In 1999, the Carrillo-Fuentes organization , based in Juarez, is still involved in the trafficking of cocaine, heroin, and marijuana. Its regional bases are in Juarez, Hermosillo, and Reynosa, where the organization stores drugs for eventual shipment into the United States. Amado Carrillo-Fuentes' organization has been associated with the Cali-based Rodriguez-Orejuela organization and the Ochoa brothers of Medellin.

Amado
Carrillo-Fuentes

The Arellano-Felix Brothers Organization

This Tijuana-based organization is one of the most powerful, violent, and aggressive trafficking groups in the world. The Arellano-Felix Organization has high-level contacts within the Mexican law enforcement and judicial systems and is directly involved in street-level trafficking within the United States. This criminal organization is responsible for the transportation, importation, and distribution of multi-ton quantities of cocaine and marijuana, as well as large quantities of heroin and methamphetamine. The Arellano family, composed of seven brothers and four sisters, inherited the organization from Miguel Angel Felix-Gallardo upon his incarceration in Mexico in 1989 for his complicity in the murder of DEA Special Agent Enrique Camarena. Alberto Benjamin Arellano-Felix assumed leadership of the family enterprise and provides a businessman's approach to the management of their drug empire which operates in Tijuana, Baja California, and parts of the States of Sinaloa, Sonora, Jalisco, and Tamaulipas. Benjamin coordinates the activities of the organization through his brothers Ramon, Eduardo, and Francisco.

Benjamin

Francisco

Ramon

Eduardo

The Juan Garcia-Abrego Organization

The Juan Garcia-Abrego organization was involved in smuggling drugs from the Yucatan area in Mexico to South Texas and north to New York. This organization transported large quantities of cocaine for the Cali mafia, as well as marijuana and heroin for other traffickers. Garcia-Abrego pioneered deals in which Mexican traffickers were compensated in cocaine. This substantially raised their profits and allowed them to distribute, as well as smuggle, cocaine. He and his organization were notorious for their violence. In 1996, Juan Garcia-Abrego was added to the FBI's top ten most wanted fugitives, with a $2 million reward for his capture. This was the first time an international drug trafficker had been included on the FBI list. In January 1996, he was arrested in Mexico and brought to the United States for trial. He was sentenced to 11 life terms and fined $128 million.

Juan Garcia-Abrego

The Miguel Caro-Quintero Organization

The Miguel Caro-Quintero organization is based in Sonora, Mexico. It is involved in cultivating, processing, smuggling, and distributing heroin and marijuana, and in transporting methamphet-amine and Colombian cocaine into the United States. It was led by Rafael Caro-Quintero, known as the "Mexican Rhinestone Cowboy," until he was arrested and placed in a Mexican maximum security prison for his involvement in the kidnapping, torture, and murder of DEA Special Agent Enrique Camarena. Rafael Caro-Quintero was also convicted on marijuana and cocaine trafficking charges. His brothers, Miguel, Jorge, and Genaro, assumed control of the organization. Miguel was arrested in 1992, but was able to use a combination of threats and bribes to have the charges dismissed by a federal judge in Hermosillo, Mexico, under questionable circumstances.

Miguel
Caro-Quintero

Creation of 21st Field Division: The Caribbean (1995)

While it is true that the majority of cocaine that entered the United States came across the United States-Mexican border, traffickers were beginning to reactivate their trafficking routes in the Caribbean. Many trafficking groups from Colombia, particularly those who had risen to power since the Cali syndicate's fall, returned to traditional Caribbean routes to transport their product to market. As these groups from Colombia reestablished their ties with their Caribbean confederates, increasingly larger shipments of cocaine and heroin were shipped through the Caribbean. The resulting drug activity in Puerto Rico led to a tremendous increase in violence on the island, and Puerto Rico became the nation's 7th major High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area.

In response to this escalating problem, in 1995, the DEA established the Caribbean Division based in San Juan, Puerto Rico, as its 21st Field Division. The division was responsible for five country offices that had previously reported to the Miami regional office: Netherlands Antilles, Barbados, Haiti, Jamaica, and the Dominican Republic, in addition to the St. Thomas Resident Office and the St. Croix Post of Duty in the U.S. Virgin Islands and the Ponce Resident Office in Ponce, Puerto Rico.

Automated Booking System (1995)

1995: An agent checked data stored in the Automated Booking System.. The program can retrieve images of evidence and surveillance photos (weapons, crime scenes, license plate numbers), mug shots, and fingerprints.

Vice President Al Gore looked through a device at DEA headquarters that magnified and compared ballistic markings on evidence to prove that two bullets were fired from the same weapon.

Atlanta Olympics (1996)

The White House requested that the DEA and other federal law enforcement agencies assist with security during the 1996 Olympic games in Atlanta, Georgia. As a result, over 200 men and women from the DEA were detailed to Atlanta. Security was an important issue because national leaders from some 197 participating nations, athletes, coaches, and visitors from all over the world attended the event. The DEA had previously provided assistance at the Los Angeles Olympics in 1984 and at the 1987 Pan American Games in Indianapolis, Indiana. When a bomb exploded in Centennial Olympic Park in Atlanta on the ninth day of the Olympic games, DEA agents were instrumental in preserving the safety of hundreds of spectators. They had been on hand when FBI and Defense Department experts identified a suspicious-looking knapsack as a bomb just minutes before it exploded. DEA agents, along with Georgia State patrol and other law enforcement officers, hurriedly began evacuating the few hundred people in the park. The agents risked their own safety by attempting to evacuate nearby civilians and, after the explosion, administering first aid. The agents' ability to remain calm and focused during this chaotic situation undoubtedly saved many lives. One DEA agent, Craig Wiles, was injured in the blast. He was stationed just 25 to 30 feet from the explosion and was struck in the back of the head by a piece of wood. Despite his injuries, Special Agent Wiles continued to help fellow agents and wounded civilians. He was later taken to nearby Georgia Baptist Medical Center where doctors removed wood splinters from his head. Wiles fully recovered within a few days and was the first agent to receive the DEA's Purple Heart Award. All of the DEA agents who helped evacuate Centennial Olympic Park were honored for their courage when that group, Atlanta Olympic Division Squad 23, was given the Administrator's Award for Outstanding Group Achievement in 1997.

Left: Honoring Heroism: During an August 1998 visit to Colombia, Administrator Constantine and General Serrano met with a wounded Colombian National Police officer who survived an attack by a rebel group against Colombian anti-narcotics headquarters. (Photo courtesy Semana Publicaciones.)

Below: March 1997, DEA Ft. Worth and DEA Midland, Texas offices jointly investigated a large-scale drug smuggling operation and seized 2,175 pounds of marijuana in Odessa, Texas.

The Methamphetamine Problem

In the mid-nineties, trafficking groups from Mexico became deeply involved in the methamphetamine trade, replacing domestic outlaw motorcycle gangs as the predominant methamphetamine producers, traffickers, and distributors. Their involvement was made tragically clear when, during an undercover operation, DEA Special Agent Richard Fass was shot and killed in Tucson, Arizona, on June 30, 1994, by a methamphetamine trafficker from Mexico.

By the late 1990s, these trafficking organizations had virtually saturated the western United States market with high-purity methamphetamine, known also as "speed" or "crank." In some areas of California, methamphetamine replaced cocaine as the drug of choice. With a saturated West Coast market, the traffickers then began to expand their markets to the East Coast, South, and the Mid-West.

As supplies increased, prices fell, making it a cheap alternative to cocaine. Some called it the "poor man's cocaine." In 1991, for example, the lowest price nationwide for a pound of methamphetamine was $6,000. By 1995, in California, methamphetamine sold for between $2,500 and $3,600 per pound.

With increased availability, methamphetamine use increased. According to the Drug Abuse Warning Network, the number of emergency room episodes involving methamphetamine increased steadily after 1991, particularly in the West. From 1991 to 1993, episodes more than doubled in both Los Angeles and Phoenix.

The sophistication of the organizations from Mexico was also clear. Their long-standing expertise in polydrug smuggling and the smuggling skills developed while transporting cocaine for the Cali mafia had enabled these organizations to branch out into other contraband, such as the precursor chemicals ephedrine and pseudoephedrine that are used in the manufacture of methamphetamine.

They also established international connections in Europe, Asia, and the Far East to have tons of precursor chemicals, particularly ephedrine, shipped to addresses in both the United States and Mexico. During 1993 and 1994, the majority of ephedrine shipments destined for Mexico were supplied by such diverse countries as China, India, the Czech Republic, and Switzerland. From mid-1993 to early 1995, the DEA documented the diversion of almost 170 tons of ephedrine used in illicit methamphetamine production.

Unlike other drugs, methamphetamine is one that these criminal organizations from Mexico controlled entirely from beginning to end. They had the international contacts to obtain the necessary precursor chemicals to make the drug. They also had the clandestine labs to process the chemicals into methamphetamine on both sides of the border. They expanded their distribution networks across the nation by the use and intimidation of illegal aliens. Also, unlike when they served as middlemen moving cocaine and heroin, they kept 100 percent of the profits from their methamphetamine sales.

In late 1994, state and local authorities in California requested a meeting with Administrator Constantine to express their growing concerns about escalating methamphetamine abuse and the increasing number of clandestine meth labs being encountered in that state. Their concerns and the information they provided mirrored intelligence the DEA was receiving about a scourge of meth abuse cases in many areas of the country. Working closely with California law enforcement, the DEA hosted a National Methamphetamine Conference in February 1996.

The conference brought together experts from around the United States to examine enforcement and policy options. It was structured to incorporate not only the input of knowledgeable DEA personnel, but also the experience of the state and local law enforcement agencies that had been encountering the problem. Conferees heard reports from state, local, and other federal agencies about the methamphetamine situation and exchanged ideas on a number of strategies to address the problem in the United States.

In his opening remarks, Administrator Constantine stated that the benefit of holding the conference was that it allowed those with extensive experience in drug law enforcement "to help identify the scope of the methamphetamine problem and to ensure that [there would be] a coordinated response." Participants offered their input by filling out surveys and taking part in group discussions.

Billion Dollar Budget (1997)

In 1997, the DEA achieved its first-ever billion dollar direct appropriation budget. This $1.054 billion budget was approximately $200 million, or 23 percent, greater than the DEA's 1996 budget, which had been the previous all-time high budget. That the DEA's funding would increase in a time of fiscal belt-tightening was a tribute to the outstanding work that DEA personnel were performing worldwide and to the DEA's many achievements in 1996. The DEA's fiscal year (FY) 1997 appropriation contained significant resources aimed at restoring the agency's source country drug trafficking programs to FY 1992 funding levels. The DEA also received $29 million in the 1997 appropriations for construction of a DEA Training Center at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia.

Comprehensive Methamphetamine Control Act of 1996

The Comprehensive Methamphetamine Control Act of 1996 was passed unanimously in Congress and signed into law by President Clinton on October 3, 1996. This act augmented the DEA's effort to control precursor chemicals and lab equipment used to produce methamphetamine. Several provisions of this Act had an impact on DEA operations:

1. Restricting access to precursor chemicals such as iodine, red phosphorous, and hydrochloric gas used to make methamphetamine, and tightening controls on the sale of pseudoephedrine, phenylpropanolamine, and ephedrine combination products, all common ingredients found in over-the-counter diet pills and cold medicines.
2. Tracking mail-order purchases of precursor chemicals.
3. Establishing civil penalties of up to $250,000 for firms that distribute laboratory supplies with "reckless disregard" for the illegal purposes for which the supplies might be used.
4. Doubling the maximum criminal penalty to 20 years in jail for possession of chemicals or equipment used to make methamphetamine.
5. Increasing penalties for trafficking and manufacturing methamphetamine or its precursor chemicals.
6. Directing the Attorney General to coordinate international drug enforcement efforts to reduce trafficking in methamphetamine and its precursor chemicals.
7. Making it a crime to manufacture precursor chemicals outside the United States with the intent to smuggle them into the country.
8. Allowing courts to order restitution for the extensive costs (often as much as $8,000) associated with the clean-up of methamphetamine labs and for any person injured as a result of the lab's operation.
9. Creating the Methamphetamine Interagency Task Force to design and implement methamphetamine education, prevention, and treatment strategies and establishing an advisory board to educate chemical companies to identify suspicious transactions.

Purple Heart Awards

The Hispanic Advisory Committee suggested to the Administrator the establishment of an award to honor the "thousands of men and women sworn to enforce the drug laws of the United States...who deserve the full benefit of our recognition of the inherent dangers of our profession."

In response to that suggestion, the DEA Purple Heart Award was instituted.

As of January 1, 1996, any DEA Agent wounded in the line of duty became eligible to receive the DEA's new Purple Heart Award. Based on the design of the military's Purple Heart Award presented for battle injuries, the DEA emblem honors agents who suffered injuries that required medical treatment or caused death and were incurred during the performance of official duties as the direct result of a hostile or criminal action.

The heart-shaped pendant, with a DEA Special Agent's badge embossed on a purple background, is suspended from a red, white, and blue ribbon. The award is presented in a glass-front shadowbox and was accompanied by a lapel pin in a smaller version of the pendant. With the creation of this award, the DEA established an appropriate and significant way to recognize those employees who were injured while confronting the everyday dangers faced by those in drug law enforcement.

In 1998, the DEA's SAC Advisory Committee expanded the awarding of Purple Hearts to state and local law enforcement officers killed or wounded in the line of duty while working with the DEA.

Operations Reciprocity and Limelight (1996)

Two investigations in the late 1990s demonstrated that Mexico-based drug traffickers had displaced some of the Colombia-based cocaine organizations that had traditionally dominated the New York City cocaine traffic.

During a highway interdiction stop on October 30, 1996, near Tyler, Texas, two state troopers discovered over $2 million in cash concealed in a van heading south. This stop was the first seizure linked to Operation Reciprocity. On December 3, investigators seized 5.3 tons of cocaine from a Tucson, Arizona, warehouse. Evidence linked the warehouse operation to a Los Angeles investigation, a New York operation, a Michigan transportation group, and a trafficking cell connected to the Carrillo-Fuentes organization. On December 13, the same state troopers stopped a tractor trailer truck in Tyler, Texas, and seized 2,700 pounds of marijuana from a hidden compartment in the ceiling of the vehicle. The investigation revealed that traffickers were smuggling cocaine to the New York City area in concealed compartments in the roofs of tractor trailer trucks and in hollowed-out five-foot tall stacks of plywood. The same trucks were being used to transport the cash in kilo-sized packages of $5, $10, and $20 bills, back to Mexico.

On April 9, 1997, the U.S. Customs Service found $5.6 million in street cash hidden in a tractor trailer truck ceiling compartment in an Operation Reciprocity seizure in El Paso, Texas. This operation resulted in 41 arrests, as well as the seizure of 7 tons of cocaine, 2,800 pounds of marijuana, and more than $11 million. Meanwhile, an investigation initiated by the DEA's Imperial County, California Resident Office in August 1996 developed into Operation Limelight, which involved several state, local, and U.S. Treasury agencies, including the IRS and the U.S. Customs Service. The investigation focused on the Alberto Beltran transportation and distribution cell, which was part of the Carrillo-Fuentes organization.

Operation Limelight resulted in the arrest of 48 people and the seizure of over 4,000 kilos of cocaine, over 10,800 pounds of marijuana, and over $7.3 million. State and federal investigators believed this Beltran cell was responsible for the monthly smuggling of at least 1.5 tons of cocaine, typically concealed in crates of vegetables and fruits and trucked across the United States by Mexican nationals.

In March 1996, the head of the Beltran organization in the United States, Gerardo Gonzalez, was arrested by Operation Limelight investigators. The arrest was the result of the "carrot case," which also led to the New York seizure of 1,630 kilograms of cocaine hidden in a 30-ton shipment of chopped up carrots used for horse feed. At that time, the New York Drug Enforcement Task Force also seized $1.3 million and arrested nine organization members. Eight more members of the organization, including Gonzalez's wife, were arrested on August 1, 1997, in the second phase of this investigation.



Operation Reciprocity investigators discovered packages of cocaine hidden in this compartment cut out of a five-foot tall stack of 4x8 sheets of plywood.



Operation Reciprocity investigators found $5.6 million in street money hidden in this ceiling compartment of a truck during the El Paso seizure on April 9, 1997.

Legalization in California and Arizona (1996)

In the early 1990s, as many communities were overrun by crime and violence, a small, but vocal group of people believed that the legalization of drugs would reduce drug abuse, lessen the violence, and restore peace to our cities. Because the DEA believed that legalization would exacerbate the drug problem, not solve it, the agency sponsored a forum in 1994 on the issue of how police chiefs and others could address arguments calling for the legalization of drugs [see Anti-Legalization Forum on page 109]. The findings of that conference were published in a manual that police chiefs and others used to speak out against the legalization issue.

In 1996, powerful, wealthy special interest organizations pushed for the legalization of marijuana, and in California and Arizona, they were successful in putting the issue before the voters. Through slick advertising media campaigns, voters were led to believe that the initiative would simply allow medical doctors to treat terminally ill and suffering patients with marijuana for the relief of pain symptoms. In Arizona, voters were led to believe that this proposition included provisions to toughen criminal justice systems.

The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) released resolutions that officially expressed the group's opposition to the propositions in Arizona and California to legalize marijuana. In these resolutions the IACP stated the grounds for its objections: marijuana is more carcinogenic than tobacco and other Schedule I drugs; it compromises brain functions, the immune system, the lungs, and hormonal responses to stress and metabolic changes; and makes diseases such as tuberculosis, asthma, and multiple sclerosis worse. The IACP also maintained that marijuana did not prevent blindness due to glaucoma and that no national health organization had accepted marijuana as medicine. In addition, the resolutions contained a list of organizations that asserted that marijuana had not been scientifically proven to be safe or effective as a medicine. These organizations included: the American Medical Association, American Cancer Society, National Multiple Sclerosis Association, American Academy of Opthamology, National Eye Institute, National Cancer Institute, National Institute for Neurological Disorders and Strokes, National Institute of Dental Research, and the National Institute on Allergy and Infectious Diseases.

Unfortunately, despite such widespread objections, the propositions passed in both states. California's Proposition 215 allowed anyone who received a doctor's recommendation to possess and use marijuana for cancer, AIDS, glaucoma and "any other illness for which marijuana provides relief." It allowed doctors to verbally "recommend" marijuana use to minors, prisoners, individuals in sensitive positions, or anyone who claimed to have a medical condition. The proposition, by extension, also allowed individuals to smoke and cultivate marijuana openly, on the premise that marijuana had been recommended for the individual's medical condition.

The Arizona proposition was more restrictive than the California version in that a physician had to cite a study confirming the proven medical benefits of the Schedule I drug and provide a written prescription which was kept in the patient's medical file, and the patient was required to obtain a written opinion from a second physician confirming that the prescription for the Schedule I substance was "appropriate to treat a disease or to relieve the pain and suffering of a seriously ill patient or terminally ill patient." The Arizona proposition, however, also provided for other actions that erode effective, tough drug policies, including the release of prisoners previously convicted of personal possession or use of a controlled substance.

Despite the differences between the two ballot initiatives, there was an indisputable similarity: both states allowed individuals to possess substances that have no legitimate medical use. Both California and Arizona, despite what the proponents claimed, had taken the first steps toward the proponents' ultimate goal of legalizing drugs. Based on the success of legalization proponents in California and Arizona, campaigns for legalization began to organize in other states.

Operation Zorro II

As part of the Southwest Border Initiative that was launched in 1994, the Zorro II investigation targeted Mexico-based cocaine smuggling and distribution organizations, as well as the partnership groups based in Colombia. Working together, these organizations were responsible for importing and distributing almost six metric tons of cocaine throughout the United States.

Zorro II illustrated the close and efficient partnership that existed between the drug organizations from Mexico and Colombia. More importantly, this case showed that the international drug trade was a seamless continuum, a criminal enterprise that stretched, without interruption, from the jungles of South America—across transit zones, such as Mexico—to the cities and communities of the United States.

Zorro II was particularly important because, for the first time, law enforcement dismantled not only a Colombian organization that produced the cocaine, but also the organization in Mexico that provided the transportation. During the course of the 8-month investigation, law enforcement officers coordinated and shared information gleaned from more than 90 court-authorized wiretaps. The operation involved 10 federal agencies, 42 state and local agencies, and 14 DEA field divisions across the country. As a result of the investigation, over $17 million and almost 5,600 kilos of cocaine were seized, and 156 people were arrested. Zorro II confirmed that Mexico-based traffickers were not just transporters, but had their own distribution networks throughout the United States.

Jose Ivan Duarte (1997)

In 1982, Jose Ivan Duarte and his conspirator Rene Benitez were hired by Colombian drug traffickers to plan and execute the kidnaping of DEA Special Agents Charles Martinez and Kelly McCullough. The agents were taken from their hotel in Cartagena, Colombia, and were transported by car to a secluded area 15 miles away. Agent Martinez was shot for the first time while still within city limits. Then Duarte and Benitez stopped the car and shot Martinez again. At that point Agent McCullough fled. He was shot as he ran into the jungle. SA Martinez escaped when his captors' gun jammed as they attempted to shoot him for a third time. Both SA Martinez and SA McCullough managed to escape despite their wounds. They reached Cartagena the next day and phoned the U.S. Embassy for assistance. They were airlifted out of the country by a U.S. Air Force plane from Panama.

Both Duarte and Benitez eluded capture. Warrants for their arrests were issued in June 1982. Benetez was eventually captured in Colombia, extradited, and imprisoned in Miami in 1995. Duarte continued to evade authorities until August 1997, when he was detained in Ecuador. The Ecuadorian government expelled the fugitive and he was then transported to the United States to stand trial. His capture marked the end of a 15 year investigation and search. According to Administrator Constantine, "Duarte's expulsion by the Ecuadorian government shows great courage and commitment to battling drugs.

DEA/Wal-Mart Partnership (1997)

As part of the nation's continuing efforts against the production of methamphetamine, on April 9, 1997, the DEA and Wal-Mart formed a partnership to control large-scale purchases of three over-the-counter products—pseudoephedrine, ephedrine, and phenyl- propanolamine—used in clandestine manufacture of methamphetamine and amphetamine. Wal-Mart, one of the nation's largest employers, implemented a chain-wide policy limiting sales of these allergy, cold, and diet products. The cash registers of Wal-Mart stores across the country were programmed to limit sales to 3-6 packages of these items per customer. In addition, they discontinued the 100-count bottle of their brand of pseudoephedrine tablets that had been found at illegal labs and replaced them with small-count blister packs. Wal-Mart's initiative also limited the sale of blister packs, which were generally exempt from federal regulations. Wal-Mart's initiative dovetailed with federal regulations stipulated under the second phase of the Methamphetamine Control Act of 1996.

WAL*MART
Signage
WAL*MA
COLD MEDICATION
& DIET AID ALERT

Wal-Mart's counter-diversion display informed customers about the store's partnership with the DEA.

DEA Heroin Conference (1997)

The use of heroin increased significantly in the United States in the mid-1990s. The Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN) statistics for 1995 reported heroin to be second only to cocaine in terms of hospital incidents. DAWN statistics showed the annual number of heroin-related emergency room mentions increased from 33,384 in 1990 to 76,023 in 1995. In addition, the number of heroin overdose deaths nationally rose from 4,188 in 1994, to 4,625 in 1995. Purity levels also rose from 7 percent in 1985 to 40 percent in 1995. In some areas, particularly the Northeast, 80-90 percent purity was reported.

The heroin problem grew worse as South America began to play a bigger role in heroin trafficking. Soon, heroin from South America dominated the East Coast and accounted for the majority of heroin seized by the DEA. Another reason why heroin use increased was that drug dealers were actively marketing their product. In order to increase demand for heroin, drug traffickers began to include free samples of heroin in shipments of cocaine. This marketing scheme introduced heroin to cocaine dealers and abusers.

In response to this growing problem, Administrator Constantine held a National Heroin Conference in February 1997 in Reston, Virginia. In attendance were more than 300 federal, state, local, and international law enforcement officials, as well as demand reduction/prevention experts. The conferees gathered to assess the heroin threat to the United States and share effective strategies for addressing the problem.

Included in the submitted 26 recommendations were the following:

1. Develop a national media campaign against heroin use;
2. Support the development of community-based educational/awareness drug campaigns;
3. Increase law enforcement and interdiction training regarding heroin concealment and transportation;
4. Enhance the Heroin Signature Program and Domestic Monitor Program;
5. Bolster interagency intelligence sharing; and
6. Identify a national heroin strategy.

National Drug Pointer Index (1997)

For many years, state and local law enforcement envisioned a drug pointer system that would allow them to determine if other law enforcement organizations were investigating the same drug suspect. Despite the existence of some statewide and regional drug pointer systems, none extended to national participation. At the direction of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, the DEA took the lead in the development of a national drug pointer system to assist federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in investigating drug trafficking organizations.

The DEA Survivors' Benefit Fund (1998)

In April 1998, Administrator Constantine announced the creation of the DEA Survivors' Benefit Fund. The fund was established to assist the surviving family members of DEA employees and task force officers killed in the line of duty. The fund also supported programs that preserved the memory of those killed in the line of duty. In addition, the benefit fund provided financial assistance for family members of employees who died as a result of non-job-related causes. The Survivors' Benefit Fund was created by combining existing organizations, namely, the Enrique Camarena Fund in Miami; the Seema/Montoya Fund in Los Angeles; the Rick Finley Memorial Foundation in Detroit, the Richard Fass Foundation in Phoenix; and the New York Drug Enforcement Agents Scholarship Foundation. Respectively, these foundations had been established to honor Enrique Camarena, who was kidnapped and murdered by drug traffickers in Mexico in 1985; Special Agents Paul S. Seema and George M. Montoya, who were both killed while performing an undercover operation in Los Angeles in 1988; Special Agent Rick Finley, who was killed in a plane crash in 1989 while returning from a DEA operation in Peru; and Special Agent Richard Fass, who was killed while performing an undercover methamphetamine investigation in 1994. Many of these organizations held annual events to raise funds to support the families of DEA agents killed in the line of duty. Representatives of these various funds agreed to come together to support one national fund, realizing that this would enable them to assist more people. Each fund was also able to maintain a separate identity by continuing to hold individual annual fund raisers. Financial support for the Survivors' Benefit Fund came from donations by the general public, as well as profits from the various fund rasing events held across the country.

Justice Training Center

Since 1985, the DEA and FBI had shared training facilities at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia. With the expansion of both agencies and with increasingly complex training requirements for DEA special agents, the need for additional space became critical. In May 1991, a study was completed by the Department of Justice that indicated that the best and most efficient way to satisfy the training needs of both the DEA and FBI was to pursue an expansion at Quantico. The securing of necessary funding to construct a new training center became a major priority of Mr. Constantine when he was appointed Administrator. Congress provided funding for a new training academy in the FY 1997 appropriations. The $29 million academy, called the Justice Training Center, was constructed on land made available to the DEA by the Marine Corps and located within the FBI complex. The new center will enable the DEA to provide state-of-the-art training for DEA basic agents, state and local law enforcement officials, and international law enforcement counterparts. It was designed to house a 250-bed, double occupancy dormitory, classrooms, office space for staff, a cafeteria, and an international training room equipped for simultaneous translations. Adjacent to the new academy is a special facility for clandestine laboratory training. Special purpose facilities—ranges, a driver training course, a swimming pool, a gymnasium, and an auditorium—will continue to be shared with the FBI. Construction on the new center began in April 1997 and was completed in April 1999.

A new curriculum was planned for all training courses. In March 1998, Administrator Constantine commissioned the Office of Training to conduct a review of all DEA training programs, from entry-level basic agent training to specialized and supervisory/management training. This review was requested in anticipation of the completion and subsequent opening of the Justice Training Center in order to ensure that each training program was current and state-of-the-art. This review was conducted by a team of selected supervisory and special agents from the field, diversion investigators, chemists, DEA headquarters personnel, and members of the training staff. This team completed the training review and offered its suggestions in June 1998.

Digging the first shovelful of earth on April 21, 1997, for DEA's new training academy were, from left: Brig. Gen. Edwin C. Kelley, Lt. Gen. Paul K. Van Riper, Mr. Benjamin F. Burrell, SAC David Westrate, Administrator Thomas A. Constantine, FBI Director Louis J. Freeh, Mr. Steven S. Honigman, Rear Adm. David J. Nash, Mr. Harold J. Parmelee, and Mr. Everett Medling.

Training

Upon taking office in 1994, DEA Administrator Constantine requested a review of DEA's training curriculum to ensure that state-of-the-art procedures and techniques were being provided in all DEA training. The goal was to have every DEA employee fully trained and prepared to operate successfully in the ever-changing environment of drug law enforcement. As a result of the re-evaluation of training procedures, a number of significant changes were instituted:

- Training programs for basic agents, diversion investigators, intelligence analysts, and chemists were required to devote more time to legal issues, integrity, and personal responsibility.

- Basic agent training was extended to 16 weeks. Also, in order to support the increased emphasis on personal responsibility, the DEA structured 25 hours of formal ethics and integrity sessions into the basic agent training program. These "life training" sessions emphasized the positive aspects of integrity and police ethics and equipped new agents with the moral tools needed to successfully tackle ethical dilemmas.

- The Field Training Agent Program was instituted to provide continuous training and direction to probationary agents after completing basic agent training.

- An in-service training course, to be held every 18 months, was developed for all core series employees. The program stressed reviews of internal regulations, oral and written communication skills, legal issues, case law, operational and tactical procedures, integrity, and personnel issues, such as sexual harassment. The course also included an ethics curriculum similar to that used for basic agent training.

- A Training Advisory Committee, which met twice a year, was established to assess the training curriculum and increase field input into specific training programs.

From 1995 to September 1998, the DEA trained 1,586 basic agents, and from 1994 to September 1998, over 110,000 state and local law enforcement officers.

Aviation

Compared with its 1971 aviation budget of $58,000, the Air Wing's 1998 operating budget of $24,400,000 covered a fleet of 98 aircraft and 108 special agents/pilots. On a daily basis, Air Wing personnel work in close support of domestic offices and provide sophisticated electronic, air-based surveillance.

Creation of the 22nd Field Division: El Paso (1998)

Because of its proximity to the Southwest Border, the El Paso, Texas, region was an area that experienced a great deal of drug trafficking. For this reason, The FBI and the U.S. Customs Service established field divisions in the El Paso region. In order to focus on the drug problem on the U.S.-Mexican border and to better cooperate with other federal law enforcement efforts in that area, Administrator Constantine requested the creation of an El Paso Field Division. This request became a reality in June 1998, and the El Paso Field Division became the DEA's 22nd field division. The reorganization realigned the former El Paso District Office from the Houston Division; the Alpine, Texas, Resident Office from the Dallas Division; the Albuquerque, New Mexico, District Office from the Denver Division. It also realigned the Las Cruces, New Mexico, Resident Office from the Denver Division to the new El Paso Division. In addition, the reorganization transferred the responsibility for the Billings, Montana, Resident Office from the Seattle Division to the Denver Division. By establishing the El Paso Division, adjoining geographical areas facing a common drug threat were combined under a single authority. With a separate field division to manage the El Paso region, the DEA focused directly on the significant drug threat facing the West Texas and New Mexico areas, thereby enhancing the agency's effectiveness along the entire Southwest Border.

Technology

In late 1995, the DEA replaced its aging office automation system (UNISYS BTOS) with a network of Pentium-grade personal computers. This system, known as "Firebird," represented a major effort to improve the DEA's automated infrastructure ($150 million) through establishment of a secure, centralized computer network that standardized the DEA's investigative reporting system, case file inventories, administrative functions, and electronic communications. Firebird was made available at DEA headquarters and all 22 division offices, and allowed access to the electronic headquarters file-room, easy access to the DEA community through electronic mail and bulletin boards, and use of a common suite of office automation functions. These capabilities increased user productivity and provided improved access to many automated tools essential to investigative activities. Plans were also made to install Firebird in the 180 DEA field offices, El Paso Intelligence Center, Air Wing, Laboratories, and several overseas offices.

Two of the major on-line resources available to DEA employees were Webster and IMPACT. Webster was the familiar name for the DEA Electronic Library project. As the core of the DEA's "intranet," its objectives included building an electronic library for distributing official, up-to-date documents and news, providing secure access to DEA users worldwide via Firebird and Department of Justice mainframe/Teleview that allowed full-text search and retrieval and assisted DEA in expanding its presence on the public internet. The second on-line resource was the Investigative Management Program and Case Tracking (IMPACT) system, which was initiated in 1996. This program was a mission-oriented, field-led initiative that focused on the collection, use, and dissemination of case-related information at the field level with the emphasis on the group supervisor and agent.

In 1988, the DEA awarded a contract to investigate and evaluate a preliminary Intelligence Analyst Workstation that would assist intelligence analysts in developing their reports. This project evolved into the third on-line resource, Merlin—a system that supports the classified processing needs of intelligence analysts and special agents. Merlin was deployed to DEA headquarters, the Special Operations Division, and the Houston, San Diego, and the Los Angeles Field Divisions. The Merlin project plan calls for seven additional divisions and one foreign office to be completed by the end of fiscal year 2000.

Laboratories

DEA laboratories continued to use the latest in forensic science technology to aid DEA investigations. Beginning in the 1980s, technology used by the DEA saw a quantum leap in microprocessor and computer technology. DEA laboratories engaged in extensive programs to convert to state-of-the-art instrumentation. For example, the outdated vacuum sweep apparatus that was used to collect traces of material for later laboratory analysis was replaced by the Ionscan. The Ionscan unit was a portable instrument that was used to both collect trace materials and provided preliminary on-the-spot identification. In 1994 alone, the Ionscan unit was used to develop evidence in cases that led to the seizure of 22 vehicles, 19 buildings, two aircraft, and over $350,000 in cash.

In 1995, the Department of Justice Inspector General conducted a study of the DEA Laboratory System. In a survey of all DEA and FBI field offices, U.S. Attorney's Offices, and Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces, 96 percent of the respondents expressed their overall satisfaction with the DEA's laboratory services. "The DEA is justifiably proud of the contributions made by all laboratory system employees to maintain such a high level of accomplishment," stated Aaron Hatcher, Deputy Assistant Administrator for the Office of Forensic Science.

Pictured above is Chicago's North Central Lab, which opened in 1994. Senior forensic chemist Robert Krefft is shown in the state-of-the-art facility among various instruments used in the analysis of drug evidence.

The DEA continued to upgrade and expand its laboratory facilities. In 1994, a new lab, the North Central Laboratory, was built in Chicago. In 1998, the DEA planned to build new replacement labs to update the Mid-Atlantic Lab in Washington, D.C., the Southeast Lab in Miami, the Southwest Lab in San Diego, the Western Lab in San Francisco, and the Special Testing and Research Lab in McLean, Virginia. These expansions were necessary to accommodate staffing increases. The new Special Testing and Research, Mid-Atlantic and Southeast labs were scheduled to begin operation during the last quarter of 2000; while a schedule for the openings of the new Western, Southwest, and South Central labs had not yet been established. Funding for such expansions was provided by Congress.



Julie Town, a forensic chemist at the Mid-Atlantic laboratory in Washington, D.C. is pictured above examining a vial containing material that had been processed by a lab robotics workstation.

The DEA further expanded its laboratory capabilities by developing mobile labs. Mobile labs, small laboratories that were driven from site to site, enabled DEA forensic chemists to conduct on-the-spot analysis of seized drugs. Analyzing drugs at the scene of the seizure accelerated the prosecution of drug traffickers and provided intelligence that identified other drug activity in the local area.

Killed in the Line of Duty

Richard E. Fass
Died on June 30, 1994
DEA Special Agent Fass was fatally shot during an undercover methamphetamine investigation in Glendale, Arizona.

Juan C. Vars
Died on August 27, 1994
Juan C. Vars was one of five DEA special agents killed in a plane crash during a reconnaissance mission near Santa Lucia, Peru, as part of Operation Snowcap.

Jay W. Seale
Died on August 27, 1994
Jay W. Seale was one of five DEA Special Agents killed in a plane crash during a reconnaissance mission near Santa Lucia, Peru, as part of Operation Snowcap.

Meredith Thompson
Died on August 27, 1994
Meredith Thompson was one of five DEA Special Agents killed in a plane crash during a reconnaissance mission near Santa Lucia, Peru, as part of Operation Snowcap.

Frank S. Wallace, Jr.
Died on August 27, 1994
Frank S. Wallace, Jr. was one of five DEA Special Agents killed in a plane crash during a reconnaissance mission near Santa Lucia, Peru, as part of Operation Snowcap.

Frank Fernandez, Jr.
Died on August 27, 1994
Frank Fernandez, Jr. was one of five DEA Special Agents killed in a plane crash during a reconnaissance mission near Santa Lucia, Peru, as part of Operation Snowcap.

Kenneth G. McCullough
Died on April 19, 1995
DEA Special Agent McCullough was killed when a car bomb exploded outside the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.

Carrol June Fields
Died on April 19, 1995
Carrol June Fields, a DEA Office Assistant, was killed in the Oklahoma City bombing.

Rona L. Chafey
Died on April 19, 1995
Cleveland County Sheriff's Office Secretary Rona L. Chafey, who worked in a DEA, State, and Local Task Force, was killed in the Oklahoma City bombing.

Shelly D. Bland
Died on April 19, 1995
DynCorp Legal Technician Shelly D. Bland, who was working under contract to the DEA, was killed in the Oklahoma City bombing.

Carrie A. Lenz
Died on April 19, 1995
DynCorp Legal Technician Carrie A. Lenz and her unborn son, Michael James Lenz III, were killed in the Oklahoma City bombing.

Shaun E. Curl
Died on December 12, 1997
Special Agent Curl was killed in the line of duty while assigned to the Miami Division.

DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION

[illegible]

1999-2003

DEA

Donnie R. Marshall
Administrator
June 2000-
June 2001

The most significant development in U.S. drug trafficking and abuse in the period 1999-2003 was the array of synthetic drugs that became popular, particularly among young people.

Following Administrator Thomas A. Constantine's retirement on July 2, 1999, Mr. Donnie R. Marshall was named DEA Acting Administrator. Marshall was formally nominated by President Clinton to serve as DEA Administrator on February 9, 2000, and was sworn in on June 19, 2000, by Judge Sterling Johnson, Jr., the U.S. District Judge for the Eastern District of New York, and a former DEA Executive Liaison Officer. During Administrator Marshall's swearing in, Attorney General Janet Reno described him as a strong, yet personable leader. "I have watched him. He gets very firm and very quiet when he needs to and he acts with great strength." Mr. Marshall was the first DEA Special Agent ever to be named as Administrator.

Donnie Marshall's career in law enforcement began in 1969 when he became a Special Agent for the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. Mr. Marshall served DEA as a Resident Agent in Charge in Texas, Country Attache in Brazil, Deputy Regional Director of the Latin America Region, Senior Inspector of the Office of Professional Responsibility, Chief of the Statistical Services Section, ASAC of the Dallas Division, SAC of the Aviation Division, Chief of Domestic Operations, and Chief of Operations. Mr. Marshall served as Acting Deputy Administrator from February 23, 1998, to September 24, 1998, when President Clinton nominated him as Deputy Administrator.

Mr. Marshall's confidence in DEA's future was evident in a statement he released the day of his swearing in ceremony. "As DEA Administrator, I plan to direct all of our resources against those criminal groups degrading the quality of life in our country...the DEA remains committed to bringing to justice those who violate our nation's drug laws. We accept this challenge and pledge to promote a safer and drug-free country for all citizens."

Mr. Marshall retired on June 30, 2001, and became the Executive Vice President for Homeland Defense at SAIC, one of the world's leading providers of information technology services.

The most significant development in U.S. drug trafficking and abuse in the period 1999-2003 was the array of synthetic drugs that became popular, particularly among young people. Foremost among these laboratory-produced drugs was Ecstasy, a combination stimulant and hallucinogen sold in tablet form. It was touted as a "feel good" drug with an undeserved reputation for safety. In 2000, it was estimated that about two million tablets were smuggled into the United States every week. Other synthetic drugs like methamphetamine remained popular and continued to hit small-town, rural America particularly hard. Still other synthetic drugs with chemical sounding names like GHB, Rohypnol, GBL, and 1,4 BD were used both voluntarily as a way to get high, but even more tragically, concentrated doses of the drugs were slipped into the drinks of unsuspecting people, who then became victims of sexual assault.

Another challenge drug law enforcement faced in the late 1990s was the growing diversion of legal prescription drugs into the illegal market. In 1998, 2.5 million Americans admitted abuse of prescription drugs. By 2001, that had almost doubled to 4.8 million. OxyContin, a powerful prescription analgesic, became heavily abused. DEA implemented a National Action Plan to combat diversion and abuse of that drug.

More traditional drugs such as cocaine, heroin, and marijuana, which are produced from agricultural products, continued on the drug scene as well. Marijuana remained the

DEA Special Agents
1999..... 4,535
2003..... 4,841

DEA Budget
1999..... $1,477.0 million
2003..... $1,897.3

most popular drug of choice across the country, and cocaine—while use was down significantly since its peak in the mid-1980s—was the second most commonly used illicit drug in the United States. Heroin saw a surge in trafficking and use, particularly on the East Coast, where high-purity Colombian heroin dominated the market. According to the 2001 National Household Survey on Drug Abuse, during the 1990s heroin incidence rates rose to a level not reached since the 1970s. By 2000, there were 146,000 new heroin users in the country.

DEA worked in partnership with its international counterparts to target the most significant drug trafficking organizations to disrupt supply. Colombian drug trafficking organizations continued to dominate the international cocaine trade. However, unlike their cartel predecessors, the Colombian cocaine trafficking groups of the late 1990s and early 2000s typically specialized in one aspect of the cocaine industry, with no one group of traffickers dominating all aspects of the illicit trade. DEA continued its productive working relationship with the Colombian National Police and dismantled several major cocaine and heroin trafficking groups based in Colombia.

In Mexico, with the election of President Vicente Fox in 2000 and his administration's unprecedented commitment to ending the unchallenged reign of drug trafficking cartels there, DEA's relationship improved greatly with its Mexican counterparts, and inroads were made into Mexico-based cartels. Likewise, DEA forged productive relationships with European law enforcement to deal with the smuggling of Ecstasy since that drug was produced almost exclusively in Europe.

DEA took on additional responsibilities in the aftermath of the September 11th, 2001, terrorist attacks on America. The FBI reassigned hundreds of agents from narcotics investigations to counterterrorism activities. As a result, DEA reallocated resources to meet changing needs.

DEA joined the fight against terror by continuing conspiracy drug investigations and cutting off a funding source for terrorists through drug profits. The Office of National Drug Control Policy launched a major ad campaign to make Americans aware of the connection between drugs and terror.

In addition to its drug interdiction activities, DEA strengthened prevention, education, and treatment initiatives at the local level through DEA's Demand Reduction program and other initiatives. DEA instituted a number of programs like the Mobile Enforcement Team II (MET) program and the Integrated Drug Enforcement Assistance (IDEA) program to offer comprehensive help to local communities in establishing strong, coordinated anti-drug strategies.

While the vast majority of Americans supported DEA's efforts and the national anti-drug strategy, a well-financed and vocal legalization lobby spent huge amounts of money to encourage a greater tolerance for drug use. A number of states passed referendums to permit their residents to use drugs for a variety of reasons, particularly the use of marijuana for supposed medicinal purposes. The citizens who voted in these referenda often relied on the misinformation presented by the sponsors of expensive campaigns to legalize drugs. DEA initiated an anti-legalization campaign as a way to counter that information and publicize the many successes of current drug policy.

National Conference on Drugs, Crime, and Violence in Mid-Sized Communities (1999)

DEA hosted the National Conference on Drugs, Crime, and Violence in Mid-Sized Communities on February 23, 1999. The focus of the Conference was to seek solutions and draw attention to the drug crisis that had rapidly permeated mid-sized communities nationwide. Survey results from delegates showed that cocaine and marijuana were the two most prevalent drugs affecting small cities and rural areas. However, one quarter of the participants noted that methamphetamine was a major concern. The conference allowed participants to share information and learn from the experiences of other cities and communities that had faced the problems of drug trafficking and drug-related violence.

DEA Opens New Justice Training Center (1999)

First envisioned in the mid-1970s, the new Justice Training Center (JTC) opened on April 28, 1999, at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia. The JTC is a 185,000 square foot building that contains a 250-bed, double occupancy dormitory, an assortment of classrooms (including practical training areas for fingerprinting, interviewing, and wiretap capabilities) and offices, a cafeteria, and an international training room equipped with simultaneous translation equipment. Prior to the opening of the JTC, DEA shared facilities with FBI. (See 1998 JTC entry for full history of the center.)

The JTC is used for DEA Basic Agent training, Basic Diversion Investigator training, Basic Intelligence Research Specialist training, Basic Forensic Chemist training, In-Service training, Certification training, specialized training, and supervisory, management, and executive level training. The JTC is also used to conduct drug training seminars for state and local law enforcement personnel, and through the use of specially equipped classrooms, conduct international drug training seminars for foreign law enforcement officials.

The Jay Leno Show honors Members from the Hispanic American Police Command Officers Association Annual Conference

Opening of the DEA Museum (1999)



On May 11, 1999, the DEA Museum and Visitors Center officially opened at DEA headquarters in Arlington, Virginia. Occupying 2,200 square feet, the museum features a unique exhibit entitled "Illegal Drugs in America: A Modern History" that traces the history of illegal drugs in the United States from opium dens in the mid-1800s to the international drug mafias of the late 20th century. The exhibit includes historical photos, artifacts, text, and interactive computer displays that show the effects of drugs on American society and the efforts by federal law enforcement to combat the drug problem. The exhibit highlights major trends in illegal drug use as well as milestones and accomplishments of DEA and its predecessor agencies.



Many of the museum's artifacts were donated by former and active Special Agents, and members of the Association of Former Federal Narcotics Agents volunteered to give tours._In its first year, the museum drew 5,000 visitors and by 2003, that number was expected to reach 10,000. Visitors include student groups, law enforcement officials, international visitors, and tourists to Washington, D.C.

Regional Enforcement Teams

Early in 1999, DEA created the Regional Enforcement Team (RET) program to address the threat of drug trafficking groups using established networks of compartmentalized cells to facilitate their illegal activity. While in the past these organizations had typically maintained their operations in larger cities, pressure from law enforcement led to their movement into smaller locations throughout the United States. The RET Program consists of four teams of agents, analysts, and support staff that are responsible for addressing increased rates of drug abuse, trafficking, and violent crime in these smaller locations.

There were 18 RET deployments from 1999 to early 2003. In that time, 36 drug trafficking organizations were dismantled, more than 500 people were arrested and more than 22,000 pounds of drugs were seized.

Mobile Enforcement Teams

Since its inception in 1995, the Mobile Enforcement Team (MET) program continued to fight drug-related violent crime in communities throughout the United States. The MET Program consists of 21 Teams based in 20 DEA Field Divisions across the country. Working with local law enforcement organizations who lack manpower and resources, DEA's MET Teams combat violent drug organizations in specific neighborhoods and restore safer environments for the residents.

From 1999 to 2003, DEA deployed MET Teams to 380 locations nationwide. Communities across the country felt a significant impact in areas where MET Teams were deployed. As of 2003, MET Teams arrested more than 15,000 people and took more than 10,000 pounds of illegal drugs off the streets.

In Virginia's Shenandoah Valley, the MET Team targeted two trafficking organizations. One group was responsible bringing wholesale quantities of methamphetamine from Mexico for delivery to distributors throughout the Shenandoah Valley for distribution, while the other brought in crack cocaine from New York City. Both organizations were dismantled, and the work of the MET Team is likely to impede future drug trafficking in the area.

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Mobile Enforcement Team II Program (1999)

In 1999, DEA initiated the Mobile Enforcement Team (MET) II program as a follow-up program to communities where DEA's MET teams had deployed. MET teams were groups of specially trained DEA agents sent to communities at the request of law enforcement to help remove violent drug trafficking organizations. The MET II program's goal was to ensure that successful law enforcement operations were reinforced by a vigorous community effort to prevent the reemergence of drug-related violent crime.

DEA, with financial assistance from the Bureau of Justice Assistance and technical support from the National Crime Prevention Council, provided cutting-edge regional training to communities where MET teams had been deployed. Each community sent a team of up to five members that included local and state elected officials; judicial and law enforcement officers; city, school, and program administrators; community activists; representatives of the business and faith communities; and other key decision makers. In 1999, the program was piloted in three regional sessions to leaders of 40 MET communities. In 2000, DEA held four regional sessions to 42 community teams and another four sessions to 37 MET communities in 2001.

The program's goals were met by community leaders committing to developing and employing broad-based strategies for improving citizen safety and equipping these leaders to plan and implement prevention programs. majority of communities trained through the MET II program conducted far more prevention activities than prior to the training. By 2001, the MET II program evolved into the Integrated Drug Enforcement Assistance (IDEA) program.

Operation Ramp Rats I and II (1999)

In August and September 1999, DEA's Miami Division concluded two successful airport-based investigations of ramp workers ("ramp rats") who used their positions relating to baggage handling, cleaning, fueling and servicing airplanes to smuggle drugs. The investigations disrupted large-scale smuggling of heroin and cocaine into the United States along with the distribution of drugs, weapons, and explosives throughout the country. In addition, Miami Dade County instituted immediate security measures at Miami International Airport, making it more difficult to smuggle contraband through the area.

Operation Juno (1999)

Operation Juno was a significant and innovative investigation targeting money laundering operations. It began after the seizure of approximately 386 kilograms of liquid cocaine, which had been found concealed and shipped in frozen fish from Cartagena, Colombia in July 1995. It had been shipped under the name of Colapia S.A., a Colombian company whose U.S. distribution center was based in Atlanta. During the investigation of Colapia, it was revealed that the Atlanta owner was a partner with a prominent Cali, Colombia, narcotics trafficker. In 1996, DEA and the Internal Revenue Service began a pro-active undercover money laundering "sting" investigation named Operation Juno. Based in suburban Atlanta, with a company called "Airmark", DEA and the IRS gained permission from the Attorney General to oprn a legitimate stockbrokerage firm that served to validate the undercover money laundering operation.

The owner of Colapia S.A. referred the Operation Juno stockbrokerage firm to other drug trafficking organizations in need of financial and money laundering services. Operation Juno targeted those drug trafficking organizations by offering financial services to launder their drug proceeds. Those proceeds, which were in U.S. dollars, were sold on the Colombian black market peso exchange market via a third-party money exchanger in Colombia. Once the Colombian pesos were deposited into the designated bank accounts, the money laundering contract with the narcotics traffickers was fulfilled. A total of 55 arrests were made in the U. S. during the investigation. Civil seizure warrants were also brought against 59 domestic bank accounts worldwide and approximately $26 million in drug proceeds were targeted for seizure. Additionally five Colombian nationals were indicted.

Attempted Cop Murder-Drug Ring Investigation (1999)

In 1999, DEA, Fairfax County, Virginia Police, and the Maryland State Police completed a 3-year investigation of a drug trafficking, money laundering, and "cop killing" criminal group. Since at least 1994, Sergio Barrios and Gregory McCorkle were involved in a conspiracy to distribute cocaine in the Washington, D.C. area. In December 1995, McCorkle was driving his frequent route from New York to DC, when Maryland State Police Trooper David Hughes arrested him for possession of one kilogram of cocaine.

Shortly after his arrest, McCorkle plotted to kill Trooper Hughes in an attempt to have the case dismissed. On August 27, 1996, an associate of McCorkle's shot a trooper as he drove his car into the Hughes' family driveway. The person he shot and wounded was Trooper Michael Hughes, the brother of the trooper who arrested McCorkle, who was also a Maryland State Trooper. Through a complex investigation supported by the DEA-supervised Intelligence Group of the Washington-Baltimore HIDTA, the task force was able to successfully link Barrios and McCorkle to the attempted murder. In May 1997, they and nearly twenty others were incarcerated for a variety of drug charges, and several were convicted of attempted murder. The investigation continued until the arrest of McCorkle's drug supplier in 1999. The task force that investigated the murder-drug ring, including three DEA agents, later received the nation's prestigious Top Cop award and were recognized at a White House ceremony with President Clinton and Attorney General Reno. David Hughes later became a DEA Special Agent.

Mexico

Between 1999 and 2003, Mexico remained the key transit country for cocaine en route to U.S. markets, as well as a significant source country for heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamine destined for the United States.

Among the most important changes that occurred in Mexico between 1999 and 2003 was the July 2000 election of President Vicente Fox-Quesada, ending the 70-year rule of a single political party in Mexico. President Fox ran on a platform of restoring public security and putting an end to corruption. The Fox administration made some significant progress towards those extremely ambitious goals by restructuring the Attorney General's office to reduce corruption and taking action against leaders of significant drug trafficking organizations. Mexican police and the military had effected the arrests of significant drug traffickers within virtually every major drug trafficking organization operating in Mexico.

As a result of this renewed dedication to fight drug trafficking, the level of cooperation in the counterdrug area reached unprecedented levels. Information sharing between DEA and the Government of Mexico was extremely productive and brought about very positive results in joint enforcement operations. By 2003, DEA's relationship with its counterparts in the Government of Mexico was better than ever.

Operation Impunity I and II (1999-2000)

In September 1999, the Amado Carrillo-Fuentes drug trafficking organization suffered a big hit when DEA and its counterparts arrested three of its major cell heads and 90 of its members. The arrests disabled all facets of their organization—the group's headquarters in Mexico, the U.S. cell heads, the drug and money transportation systems, and the local distribution groups. As a result of Operation Impunity, 12,434 kilos of cocaine and more than 4,800 pounds of marijuana were seized, along with $19 million in U.S. currency and another $7 million in assets. The Amado Carrillo-Fuentes organization had operated without fear of capture or prosecution in the United States, believing that only their low-level operatives were at risk. Operation Impunity effectively demonstrated that even the highest level drug traffickers based in foreign countries could not conduct drug operations inside the U.S. with impunity.

Operation Impunity II continued to target the Amado Carrillo-Fuentes organization and concluded in December 2000 with the arrest of 155 individuals, the seizure of 5,490 kilograms of cocaine, 9,526 pounds of marijuana, and $11 million in U.S. currency. Those arrested faced a variety of federal charges for their involvement in smuggling thousands of pounds of cocaine and marijuana from Mexico across the Southwest Border into Texas. Some of the defendants arrested during Operation Impunity II were organization leaders who replaced those arrested in the previous investigations. The three phases (Operation Limelight in 1996 was the first phase) clearly demonstrate the tenacity of some trafficking organizations and the need for law enforcement to continuously investigate groups that are large and well-established.

Colombia

By the mid-1990s, Colombian law enforcement began targeting leaders of the Cali cartel based on extensive investigation by DEA. The arrests or surrenders of six top Cali leaders during the summer of 1995 marked the beginning of the decline of the Cali cartel.

Although some elements of the Cali cartel continued to play an important role in the world's wholesale cocaine market, they no longer dominated the international cocaine trade.

Following the dismantling of the Cali cartel, experienced traffickers who had been active for years, but who worked in the shadow of the Cali drug lords, seized the opportunity and increased their role in the drug trade. However, unlike their cartel predecessors, the Colombian cocaine trafficking groups of the late 1990s and early 2000s were decentralized and typically specialized in one aspect of the cocaine industry. No one group of traffickers dominated all aspects of the trade because, with the reintroduction of extradition in Colombia in December 1997, the major Colombian traffickers were increasingly willing to allow their foreign criminal associates (in particular, Mexican and Dominican transportation groups) to play an expanded international role in the cocaine trade. The strategic objective of these Colombian drug lords was to further conceal their own overt criminal acts in the United States or Europe that would be the basis for extradition.

The main Colombian trafficking groups primarily were based in two regions in Colombia. One was the Northern Valle del Cauca region located near Colombia's west coast. The second area was Colombia's north coast. While traffickers in these regions operated more independently than the Medellin and Cali cartels, they nevertheless remained very powerful. By working with their counterparts in Mexico, these drug traffickers were responsible for most of the world's cocaine production and wholesale distribution.

Operation Millennium (1999)

In October 1999, a major joint DEA-Colombian National Police (CNP) investigation called Operation Millennium resulted in the arrest of two of the most powerful drug traffickers in the world—Alejandro Bernal-Madrigal, also known as Juvenal, and Fabio Ochoa. Bernal-Madrigal was the head of the most significant Colombian narcotics transportation organization and had taken the cocaine transportation function to unprecedented heights. Evidence obtained during this investigation demonstrated that Bernal-Madrigal's organization was responsible for transporting between 20-30 tons of cocaine per month from Colombia to the United States via Mexico, primarily in containerized cargo. Fabio Ochoa was one of the top leaders of the Medellin cartel. He was imprisoned in 1991, released in 1996, and continued his trafficking operations with Bernal-Madrigal and others after his release.

Beginning in May 1998, DEA worked with CNP to investigate the drug trafficking activities of Bernal-Madrigal. The investigation focused on authorized electronic intercepts of Bernal-Madrigal and the leaders of other Colombian drug trafficking organizations. At one point during the investigation, CNP in conjunction with DEA was managing 66 simultaneous authorized electronic intercepts on principal targets. These intercepts revealed the inner workings of the cocaine industry and focused on the most significant drug traffickers and their respective organizations in both Colombia and Mexico.

In Operation Millennium, Bernal-Madrigal and 30 of his top criminal associates, including Ochoa, were arrested. In September 2001, Ochoa was extradited to the United States after a long battle to remain in Colombia. He was the 30th Colombian national and 13th Operation Millennium defendant to be extradited to the United states since the reintroduction of extradition in 1997. More than 1,500 Colombian prosecutors and CNP officials participated in Operation Millennium, which, according to the CNP, was one of the largest law enforcement actions undertaken by the Government of Colombia against drug trafficking.

Extradition of Caracol (2000)

Alberto Orlandez-Gamboa, aka Caracol (the Snail), headed a major cocaine trafficking organization based in Barranquilla, Colombia. The organization transshipped significant amounts of cocaine to the United States and Europe via the smuggling routes it controlled from Colombia's North Coast through the Caribbean. As head of the organization, Caracol depended on his close associates to conduct the organization's operations and to insulate himself. As is typical with many Colombia-based organizations, Caracol compartmentalized his business dealings. In addition, the success of Caracol's Barranquilla-based drug trafficking organization was attributed, in part, to the respect the drug organization received from other traffickers operating on Colombia's North Coast. Intelligence indicated that traffickers paid taxes to Caracol's organization in order to be allowed to ship drugs out of the North Coast. His influence in this region was so strong that traffickers even asked him for permission before conducting assassinations.

On June 6, 1998, Caracol was arrested in Barranquilla, as a result of an ongoing joint investigation between DEA's Barranquilla Resident Office and the CNP. After his arrest, Caracol immediately was flown to Bogota, Colombia, where he was held on murder, kidnapping, and terrorism charges. He was extradited to the United States in August 2000.

On March 13, 2003, Caracol pleaded guilty to participating in a narcotics trafficking conspiracy that smuggled tens of thousands of kilograms of cocaine into New York and other cities. His plea was announced on the morning he was to go on trial in Federal District Court in Manhattan after losing a crucial appellate ruling.

Retiring CNP Director Serrano Honored (2000)

DEA presented retired Colombian National Police (CNP) Director General Rosso Serrano with the first-ever honorary Special Agent badge at a ceremony at DEA headquarters on July 19, 2000. It is the DEA's highest award, and is presented only in exceptional cases to individuals outside DEA who have had a monumental impact on drug law enforcement nationally or internationally. "I can think of no one who so embodies the spirit of this award but General Serrano. He has put service to his country, his people, and the world before his personal safety, " stated Administrator Donnie Marshall at the ceremony.

General Serrano joined the CNP in 1963 as a second lieutenant and advanced steadily through the ranks until becoming Director in 1995. The accomplishments of CNP under General Serrano debilitated major international drug traffickers and affected the drug trade worldwide. Under his command, the CNP declared war on drug cartels and joined forces with the DEA in dismantling the infamous Cali organization. Other CNP accomplishments under Serrano include the arrests of Jose Santacruz-Londono, Pacho Herrara, Henry Loaiza-Ceballos, and Juan Carlos Ramirez-Abadia. Cooperation between DEA and CNP continued as new independent drug organizations were created. One of the most significant was Operation Millennium, in October 1999, that dismantled the "Juvenal" transportation organization, which had been supplying between 20 and 30 tons of cocaine per month to the United States and Europe.

Drug Submarine Seized in Colombia (2000)

On September 7, 2000, the CNP seized a partially constructed, steel double-hulled submarine from a warehouse outside Bogota, Colombia. Once assembled, it would have been nearly 100 feet long. All information suggested the submarine could have been used to transport up to 10 metric tons of illicit drugs from Colombia to remote off-load sites in Latin America and the Caribbean. The seizure of this high-tech submarine demonstrated the vast resources and ingenuity of Colombian drug traffickers and the lengths they were willing to go to transport their product.





Operations Odessa/ Atlantico/Journey (2000)

Maritime illicit drug smuggling organizations were the target of Operations Odessa, Atlantico and Journey. Operation Odessa/Atlantico involved multiple cocaine and money seizures from organized maritime Greek drug smugglers who worked closely with Colombian traffickers. These operations took place from 1998-2000. Operation Odessa was an investigation of many initiatives launched by the Hellenic Republic. Thanks to cooperation from the Greek Government, assets worth $7 million were seized, as was the M/V Bulk Princess.

Operation Journey also targeted maritime smuggling operations in Colombia that moved their operations to Venezuela as a result of Operation Odessa. Thanks to the sharing of information between various law enforcement authorities, Operation Journey seized more than nine tons of cocaine hidden by the De La Vega drug trafficking organization.



DEA Support to United States Government Drug Production Estimates

Any reality-based illicit drug production estimate must start with the most accurate information available on crop yields and clandestine laboratory operations. Accordingly, since 1993, DEA intelligence analysts and forensic chemists have collected and analyzed unique science-based data on coca and opium poppy cultivation as well as cocaine and heroin production in the Andean Region of South America. This research revolutionized U.S. Government cocaine and heroin production estimates. In 1999, for example, the U.S. Government more than doubled the previous estimates of Colombia's potential cocaine base production due to DEA's coca yield and cocaine laboratory studies. Likewise, in 2002, again as a result of new data from DEA, the U.S. Government slashed by more than fifty percent the previous estimates of Colombia's potential heroin production. As of 2003, this program had conducted crop yield and clandestine laboratory efficiency studies only in the Andean Region.

Operation New Generation (2000)

A significant international drug trafficking and money laundering organization was dismantled in November 2000. Since November 1998, DEA had been investigating the drug trafficking and money laundering activities of the Colombia-based Carlos Mario Castro-Arias cocaine transportation organization. Castro-Arias was a significant drug trafficker responsible for smuggling large quantities of cocaine concealed in

Although Castro-Arias evaded authorities, the investigation yielded 102 arrests, 2,110 kilograms of cocaine, 1,400 grams of heroin, six tons of miscellaneous chemicals, and $2.3 million in U.S. currency.

DEA Special Agent Richard Fass's Killer Apprehended (2000)

On June 30, 1994, DEA Special Agent Richard Fass and his partner Special Agent Michael Pelonero were working an undercover investigation targeting a large-scale methamphetamine trafficking organization in the Phoenix area. The organization was headed by Agustin Vasquez- Mendoza, a Mexican national, with whom Special Agent Fass had been arranging the sale of ten kilograms of methamphetamine. At the time of the sale, however, Vasquez- Mendoza's colleagues, Rafael Rubio-Mendez and Juan Vasquez -Rubio, shot and killed Special Agent Fass in an apparent robbery attempt. Both men were arrested near the scene while attempting to flee and later received life sentences for the murder. Vasquez -Mendoza—the leader and mastermind of Fass' killing—fled to Mexico, and the manhunt for him became one of the most intense in recent U.S.-Mexico history, lasting more than six years.

A Fass Task Force was formed in the Phoenix Division, dedicated to locating Vasquez-Mendoza. The task force worked closely with U.S. and Mexico law enforcement entities, including the Mexican Military. For several years, the pursuit of the fugitive concentrated in a remote mountainous region in Michoacan where residents lived in wooden shacks with out telephones or electricity. Mexican law enforcement was reluctant to enter the region because of the dangerous drug traffickers who protected these areas. The Fass Task Force used more than 30 confidential sources to infiltrate these areas.

The task force also conducted a media blitz, participating in three "America's Most Wanted" shows, two "Unsolved Mystery" programs, and one Latin television show called *"Placas."* By 1998, the reward for Vasquez-Mendoza had reached $2.25 million, and he had been placed on the FBI's Ten Most Wanted list. In addition, the task force created a tip hotline, which was manned around the clock to follow leads. DEA's Mexico office also conducted a media blitz in Mexico, and Mexican law enforcement conducted road blocks of highways leaving the mountainous area where Vasquez-Mendoza was believed to be hiding. The Fass Task Force eventually arrested more than 40 fugitives wanted by other jurisdictions.

By 2000, investigators narrowed their search to the town of Puebla, Mexico. Mexican law enforcement lead the search there and learned that Vasquez-Mendoza had married and assumed a new identity. Investigators located a pay phone his wife frequently used to call her parents, and on July 9, 2000, the Mexican police surrounded Vasquez-Mendoza walking away from the phone and arrested him without incident. Phoenix SAC Tom Raffanello stated that, "This investigation has helped strengthen and build a stronger relationship with Mexican law enforcement officials. During this entire operation, they were constantly amazed that DEA was so relentless in tracking this fugitive." As of 2003, Vasquez-Mendoza remained in custody in Mexican prison pending extradition to the United States.

Operation Green Air (2000)

In April of 2000, DEA's Special Operations Division successfully concluded an 18-month investigation of a Jamaican-based marijuana trafficking organization that used Federal Express (FedEx) as it exclusive method of transportation. FedEx cooperated with DEA to uncover drivers, a security official, and several customer service representatives who were receiving substantial bribes from the traffickers. It is estimated that more than 4,000 packages of marijuana, supplied by the Mexico-based Arellano Felix organization, were smuggled into FedEx hubs including Atlanta, New York, Boston, Connecticut, Fort Lauderdale, Orlando, Philadelphia and Newark. Operation Green Air resulted in the arrests of more than 100 individuals including 25 FedEx employees.

LSD Laboratory Seizure (2000)

When DEA seized an LSD manufacturing laboratory in November 2000 in an abandoned nuclear missile silo in Wamego, Kansas, containing approximately 3.9 million dosage units of LSD, it had a huge impact on LSD manufacturing in the United States. According to DEA's Special Testing and Research Laboratory, the Wamego lab had the capacity to produce 258 million dosage units of LSD. In Fiscal Year 2000, DEA projected that the worldwide LSD demand was 100 million dosage units. Following the Wamego lab seizure, there was a tremendous 98% decline in LSD submissions for source determination analysis during FY 2001. In FY 2002, there were no LSD exhibits submitted to DEA laboratories for analysis. In March 2003, the two men arrested for operating the LSD lab were convicted on charges of conspiracy and possession of LSD with intent to distribute.

Operation Tar Pit (2000)

In March 2000, a concluded Operation Tar Pit, an investigation targeting black tar heroin trafficking group based in Mexico. This joint DEA/FBI investigation, conducted exclusively within the United States, linked the Nayarit, Mexico, based organization to transportation and distribution cells throughout the United States from San Diego, California to Steubenville, Ohio. Further, the investigation linked the high-purity black tar heroin to numerous heroin overdose deaths in the small town of Chimayo, New Mexico. DEA, FBI, and state and local law enforcement agents arrested nearly 200 individuals in 12 cities.

DEA Participation in Making of Award-Winning Movie Traffic (2000)

In December 2000, the movie ***Traffic*** opened to critical acclaim and was a box office hit across the country. Featuring Michael Douglas, Catherine Zeta-Jones, Benicio del Toro, Michael Cheadle, Erika Christensen, and Dennis Quaid and directed by Steven Soderbergh, the movie showed intertwining vignettes to tell the modern day story of fighting drugs. The winner of four Academy Awards, the movie focused a great deal of media and public attention on DEA and the problems of illicit drugs in America. Parts of the movie were filmed on location at DEA's El Paso Intelligence Center, and several DEA agents had small roles in the film. DEA offered considerable input into the movie's portrayals of the drug situation, and most believed it accurately depicted the challenges law enforcement faced.

Ecstasy and Predatory Drugs

By the late 1990s, a drug called MDMA (3,4-Methylenedioxymethamphetamine)— more often known as Ecstasy—emerged in full force in American youth culture. A hallucinogen sold in a small ingestible pill form, often imprinted with colorful logos and designs, Ecstasy gained popularity initially at raves. Raves are all-night dance events, generally operating from approximately 10:00 p.m. until 7:00 a.m. the following morning and characterized by loud, rapid, tempo ("techno music"), light and laser shows, smoke or fog, and psychedelic screen images. Ecstasy use by 12th graders nearly doubled in 5 years from 1996 to 2001. By 2002, there was a slight decrease in that usage, possibly signaling a leveling off.

Other drugs like Gamma Hydroxybutyric Acid (GHB) and Ketamine are also used at raves, and they all came to be known as club drugs. However, by 2002, DEA began calling this subset of drugs "predatory drugs" because many of them, particularly GHB and Rohypnol, could be slipped into a victim's drink. The drugs are odorless and tasteless and render the victim unconscious. Criminal predators use these drugs to commit rape and sexual assault.

Another measure of these drugs' popularity is emergency room mention of the drugs. In 1998, there were 1,282 mentions of GHB in hospital emergency rooms. That number rose almost three-fold to 3,340 in 2001. DEA seizures are also a good indicator of the level of abuse. For instance, in 1999 DEA seized 4,552 dosage units of Ketamine, and by 2001, that had risen to 7,020,317. DEA took a number of enforcement, prevention, and legislative measures to combat Ecstasy and predatory drugs.

DEA's Legislative Response to the Problem of Club Drugs

GHB is a central nervous system depressant that was originally marketed as a releasing agent for growth hormones that stimulates muscle growth. It generates feelings of euphoria and intoxication and is often used with alcohol, which enhances its effect and increases the potential for respiratory distress. GHB is also used in the commission of sexual assaults because it renders the victim incapable of resisting and causes memory problems that complicate case prosecution.

In response to the increasing abuse of GHB, DEA's Office of Diversion Control initiated a scheduling review incorporating data on the abuse, diversion, and trafficking of GHB sent to the Department of Health and Human Services for its review in 1997. In the late 1990s, DEA provided abuse, diversion, and trafficking data to Congress in support of legislative action. In early 2000, the "Hillary Farias and Samantha Reed Date-Rape Prohibition Act of 1999" (Public Law 106-172) became law, placing GHB in Schedule I, as well as the related chemical GBL. GHB is now subject to Federal regulatory controls and the criminal, civil, and administrative sanctions specified in the Controlled Substance Act.

Ecstasy-like substances, touted as "legal" substitutes, had been found in clubs and advertised over the Internet. In September 2002, DEA published a final rule in the Federal Register temporarily placing pharmacologically related and chemically similarly structured chemicals like BZP, TFMPP, and 2C-T-7 in Schedule I pursuant to the Controlled Substances Act emergency scheduling provision, due to imminent hazard to public safety. In early 2003, DEA's Diversion Control office continued to gather information regarding the abuse, diversion, and trafficking of these substances to place them permanently in Schedule I. In January 2003, DEA published a proposal in the Federal Register temporarily placing AMT and 5-MeO-DIPT as well into Schedule I, pursuant to the emergency scheduling provision of the Controlled Substances Act. Finalization of this order was expected later in 2003.

DEA's Ecstasy & Club Drugs Conferences (2000-2001)

To focus national attention on the Ecstasy threat, DEA hosted the International Conference on Ecstasy and Club Drugs in partnership with about 300 officials from the domestic and foreign law enforcement, judicial, chemical, prevention, and treatment communities. The conference was held in Arlington, Virginia, from July 31 to August 2, 2000, and centered on the growing threat of Ecstasy, GHB, Rohypnol, and Ketamine. By hosting this conference, DEA took the lead on identifying the gravity of the issue and the efforts to combat the club drugs problem in the country. Medical experts provided information on the harmful physical effects of club drug abuse, and media representatives offered their perspectives on the club drug epidemic. During the conference, a working group developed several objectives that were adapted into DEA's Demand Reduction plan. These goals included advancing drug education and prevention, enhancing parental knowledge of raves and club drugs, and educating high school and college students about the realities of raves and the dangers of club drugs.

As a follow-up to the International Club Drugs Conference, DEA held three regional club drugs conferences during 2001. These were held in Atlantic City, New Jersey; Oak Brook, Illinois; and San Diego, California. All three gathered 200-250 participants from regional law enforcement, education, pre vention, treatment, medical, and the health areas to develop area-wide plans to address the problem. In addition, each domestic DEA division held numerous club drug seminars and training in their areas.

Arrest of Salvatore Gravano (2000)

In December 1999, DEA's Phoenix Division and the Phoenix Police Department initiated a joint Title III investigation of a major international Ecstasy organization headed by former mob underboss Salvatore "Sammy the Bull" Gravano and his son. This three-month investigation resulted in the arrest of Gravano, his son, and 38 co-defendants, the confiscation of tens of thousands of Ecstasy pills, and approximately $500,000 in asset seizures. The Gravano organization was importing large quantities of Ecstasy directly from Europe and is believed to be the largest Ecstasy organization ever dismantled in Arizona.

In the 1990s, the former underboss of the New York Gambino crime family had admitted killing 19 people but received leniency in exchange for his testimony against mob boss John Gotti and others. He served five years in prison, then moved to Phoenix under the witness protection program. He pled guilty to both Arizona and New York federal drug charges and is currently serving a 20-year concurrent sentence.

Operation Rave Review (2000)

DEA's New Orleans Field Division Office initiated OCDETF Operation "Rave Review" in January 2000, in cooperation with the U.S. Attorney's Office and the New Orleans Police Department. The investigation centered on raves held at the State Palace Theater in New Orleans and was prompted by the large number of drug overdose incidents among clubgoers reported by local emergency rooms. More than 500 teenagers and young adults had been treated in a two-year period, and all had attended raves at the State Palace Theater. A 17-year-old girl had also died after overdosing at a rave event at the State Palace Theater. The investigation further determined that most of the Ecstasy distribution in the city of New Orleans was being conducted at the raves, which were attended by as many as 4,000 teenagers and young adults. DEA agents worked in an undercover capacity at these raves and made numerous purchases of illegal drugs. Undercover agents observed that 50% to 60% of the rave patrons were under the influence of club drugs.

Based on DEA's investigation, a federal grand jury returned indictments against the three managers of the rave promotion company for federal narcotics violations in January 2001. The indictment marked the first time a rave promoter and/or manager had ever been charged in violation of Title 21 United States Code, Section 856(a)(2) establishment of manufacturing operations, otherwise known as the "crackhouse statute."

The impact of this investigation was observed immediately in New Orleans as the number of club drug related overdoses dropped by a phenomenal 90%. In addition, the State Palace Theater Corporation, "Barbecue of New Orleans," pled guilty to all charges in the indictment and was fined $100,000.00. Furthermore, this case inspired Senator Joe Biden, a member of the Senate Judiciary Committee and author of the 1980's federal "crack house" laws, to expand the "crack house" statutes to include any businessman, club owner, or promoter on whose premises or at whose events illicit drugs are used or sold. Under the legislation's provisions, property owners, promoters, and event managers could be fined up to $250,000 and face up to 20 years in prison on Federal criminal charges.

Operation Red Tide (2001)

Operation Red Tide began as a result of the largest single seizure of Ecstasy—2.1 million tablets in July 2000 in Los Angeles. An 18-month investigation ensued that targeted a multi-ethnic, transnational Ecstasy and cocaine distribution organization. It came to a climax when Dutch National Police arrested seven co-conspirators, executed search warrants at 17 locations, and seized several hundred thousand U.S. dollars, as well as several hundred thousand Dutch guilders. More than 22 suspects in four U.S. cities and four European countries were arrested.

Approximately 3.3 million tablets linked to the syndicate were seized during this effort. Administrator Marshall stated, "The success of Operation Red Tide has ensured that a large volume of Ecstasy that would have made it into the hands of our youth never hit the streets."

Would-Be Killers of Special Agents Charles Martinez and Kelly McCullough Convicted and Sentenced (2001)

In February and March 2001, Jose Ivan Duarte Acero and Rene Benitez were each convicted in Southern Florida courts in separate trials for the 1982 kidnapping and attempted murder of DEA Special Agents Charles Martinez and Kelly McCullough. On June 8, 2001, Duarte and Benitez received life sentences.

The sentencing marked the end of DEA's longest-running investigation—a 19-year effort to track, capture, try, and convict in American courts the men who kidnapped and nearly killed Martinez and McCullough in Colombia. "This case, once again, sends a clear message to violent drug traffickers who attempt to harm DEA agents: DEA will never waiver, not for a second, in its efforts to commitment to bring you to justice," said Administrator Marshall at the time.

In 1982, Duarte and his conspirator Benitez were hired by Colombian drug traffickers to kidnap the DEA Special Agents. The two agents, who were assigned on temporary duty to Colombia as pilots, were abducted from their hotel in Cartagena and transported by car to a secluded area 15 miles away. Agent Martinez was shot while they were still within city limits. Then Duarte and Benitez stopped the car and shot Martinez again. At that point, McCullough fled. He was shot as he ran into the jungle. Martinez escaped when his captor's gun jammed as they attempted to shoot him for the third time.

Even though Martinez and McCullough each suffered multiple gunshot wounds, both had the courage and the presence of mind to elude their captors and escape into the night. They separately reached Cartagena the next day and phoned the U.S. Embassy for assistance. The physician who examined them after the shootings were amazed that the bullets had not struck any vital organs. Shortly thereafter, both agents were airlifted out of the country by a U.S. Air Force plane from Panama. Meanwhile, Duarte and Benitez became fugitives, with warrants issued for their arrest in June 1982. Benitez was eventually captured in Colombia, extradited, and imprisoned in Miami in 1995. Duarte continued to evade authorities until August 1997, when he was detained in Ecuador. The Ecuadorian Government ultimately expelled the fugitive, and he was then transported to the United States to stand trial. Agents Martinez and McCullough both returned to duty after recovering from their wounds and continued to serve with DEA until retiring in the late 1990s.

Operation White Horse (2001)

In January 2001, DEA, along with FBI, IRS, and the US Customs Service, concluded a 10-month investigation to dismantle an organization responsible for placing high-purity Colombian heroin on America's streets. Operation Whitehorse, an Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) operation, brought together the previously mentioned federal agencies, the Colombian National Police (CNP), and state and local law enforcement in an effort that netted 96 arrests and the seizure of approximately $1.3 million in U.S. Currency. In essence, Operation Whitehorse wiped out an entire international heroin trafficking organization from its headquarters in Colombia to its street-level dealers in Philadelphia.

U.S. Supreme Court Decision on Marijuana as Medicine (2001)

In November 1996, California voters enacted a medical marijuana initiative measure entitled the Compassionate Use Act of 1996. The measure provided Californians with the right to obtain and use marijuana for medical purposes. The measure created an exception to California laws prohibiting the possession and growing of marijuana by a patient or his primary care giver who for the patient's medical purposes upon the recommendation or approval of a physician. Several groups, including the Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative (Cooperative), organized medical cannabis dispensaries to grow and distribute marijuana to qualified patients.

Under the measure, a person was required to pro-



HANDS OFF
OUR MEDICINE

vide a written statement from a treating physician assenting to marijuana therapy and submitting to a screening interview. If accepted by the Cooperative, the patient received an identification card entitling him to obtain marijuana from the Cooperative. In January 1998, the United States sued the Cooperative in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California to prevent it from distributing and manufacturing marijuana. The United States argued that, while the Cooperative's activities were legal under California law, they violated the Federal Controlled Substances Act. The District Court issued an order that prohibited the Cooperative from possessing, manufacturing, and distributing marijuana. The Cooperative continued to distribute marijuana and claimed that the distributions were medically necessary. The District Court held the Cooperative in contempt and authorized the U.S. Marshal to seize the Cooperative's premises. The Cooperative appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Court of Appeals held that medical necessity is a legally cognizable defense to violations of the Controlled Substances Act.

The Government appealed to the United States Supreme Court. The Cooperative claimed that it was entitled to a medical necessity defense. On May 4, 2001, the Supreme Court rejected the medical necessity defense and held that marijuana has no accepted medical use under Federal law and stated that the Controlled Substances Act reflects a determination that marijuana has no medical benefits worthy of an exception outside the confines of a Government-approved research project.

Operation Marquis (2001)

Operation Marquis, an 18-month nationwide investigation, brought together agents from DEA, FBI, and the U.S. Customs Service, as well as state and local law enforcement officers. The operation targeted a Mexico-based drug trafficking organization responsible for putting tens of millions of dollars worth of cocaine and marijuana on the streets of at least a dozen U.S. cities. The organization was alleged to have brought the drugs into the United States from Mexico into Southern Texas where they were warehoused before being transported to established distribution cells throughout the United States. Operation Marquis brought about the arrest of more than 300 individuals and the seizure of over $13 million U.S. currency, 8,645 kilograms of cocaine, 23,096 pounds of marijuana, and 50 pounds of methamphetamine.

Operations Caribe and Wirecutter (2001)

These two related investigations, which took place in 2001, focused on money laundering and the Colombian black market peso exchange. Caribe, spearheaded by DEA's Caribbean Division, led to the seizure of more than a million dollars in cash, 347 kilograms of cocaine, 3.8 kilos of heroin, and 15 arrests. Wirecutter, a joint US Customs and DEA Bogota case, also targeted both drug traffickers and the black market peso exchange in Bogota. Wirecutter resulted in 10 arrests, the seizure of approximately 4000 kilos of cocaine, 5.5 kilos of heroin, and $2,304,843 in currency.

The Cancun Case (2001)

DEA's Merida, Mexico, office played a significant role in arresting Mario Ernesto Villanueva, Mexico's most wanted fugitive for more than two years. As the former Governor of Quintana Roo, one of the wealthiest states in Mexico, Villanueva had created Mexico's first "narco-state," a government that worked for, and with, some of the world's largest drug traffickers. The television show *60 Minutes* dedicated an entire episode to his corruption and his belief that he was untouchable.

For three years, DEA's Merida office conducted an intense, focused investigation that eventually put an end to the narco-state of Quintana Roo and the men who ran it. The two main goals of the investigation were to arrest Villanueva and dismantle the cell of the Juarez Cartel operating in the Yucatan Peninsula and being run by Alcides Ramon, aka El Metro.

Ramon corrupted Mexican officials at all levels throughout the Yucatan peninsula to include Quintana Roo Governor Villanueva. Ramon paid the Governor $400,000 to $500,000 for each shipment of cocaine that was smuggled through the state of Quintana Roo. Between 1994 and 1997, the Juarez Cartel allegedly transported between 17 and 27 tons of cocaine monthly through Quintana Roo.

In 1998, after a number of failed attempts to significantly disrupt the Ramon organization, the dedication and determination of Mexican law enforcement and DEA agents began to pay off. Between October 31 and November 11, 1998, more than 300 million dollars worth of luxurious water front properties, yachts, jet skis, boats, cars and motorcycles were seized by the Mexican Government. In addition, over 115 arrests and/or indictments took place during the course of this investigation. eral law enforcement between the Governments of Mexico and the United States.

Less than a month later on June 12, 2001, Alcides Ramon was arrested by elements of the Mexican military in Villahermosa, Tabasco, Mexico. The two bosses of Cancun, Ramon and Villanueva, remained in custody at the maximum-security prison "La Palma" in Almoloya, Mexico, as of early 2003.

Caribbean Initiative/UNICORN

The transit of illegal drugs throughout the Caribbean created unique challenges to law enforcement. One of those was an intelligence void about trafficking organizations operating out of the region and a lack of cooperation among law enforcement agencies. As a result, DEA's Caribbean Field Division created the UNICORN system (Unified Caribbean On-Line Regional Network) in 1998 to establish a communications network among Caribbean law enforcement agencies to share information and establish better cooperation and communication regarding drug trafficking activity in the area. This operation was the first step in developing a systematic regional strategy in narcotics investigations. Operation UNICORN led to the development of Regional Intelligence Centers throughout Mexico, Colombia, and the Dominican Republic. This concept and the global exchange of information eventually spread to 36 countries, including those in Eastern and Western Europe. Using the groundwork laid in UNICORN, at least four major drug trafficking organizations targeted by the international law enforcement community were dismantled.

The first operation to employ the UNICORN system was Operation Genesis, a bi-national initiative to foster and maintain cooperation between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Conducted in late 1998, Genesis resulted in 126 arrests throughout Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Prior to this, these two countries had never before coordinated their anti-drug efforts. DEA assisted the exchange of information through the UNICORN system.

Operations Conquistador and Colombus

Operation Conquistador and its preceding operation, Colombus, both used UNICORN to facilitate the exchange of information among counterdrug agencies in the Caribbean area and source countries. Conquistador combined the efforts of 26 countries and embodied the overall objective of developing effective regional strategies to disrupt drug trafficking organizations and criminal organizations. Executed by the DEA's Caribbean Field Division with assistance from the U.S. Coast Guard and ATF in March 2000, the operation resulted in the arrest of over 2,000 people and the seizure of almost 5,000 kilograms of cocaine, 362 metric tons of marijuana, and 3,370 dosage units of dangerous drugs.

Operation Colombus, was a multi-national regional enforcement effort focused on air, land and maritime interdiction; eradication; and airstrip denial. The operation, targeting the operations of Caribbean-based drug trafficking groups, had unprecedented arrest and seizure statistics for the region. Involving Colombia, Venezuela, Panama and the island nations of the Caribbean, the investigation brought about over 1,000 arrests and the seizure of 900 kilograms of cocaine and nine kilograms of heroin.

A press conference of recent maritime seizure where 15 countries, DEA, U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Customs participated.

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A press conference to announce the successes of joint operations with the Caribbean, Mexico, Central and South America.

Operation Liberator

In November 2000, DEA concluded Operation Liberator, a multinational regional operation focused in the Caribbean and South America that also achieved success due to UNICORN. The operation, consisting of three weeks of raids, was intended to disrupt trafficking in the Caribbean and South America region, consolidate counterdrug efforts in the Caribbean transit zone, continue development of a regional strategy, and develop a cohesive environment among source and transit countries in the area. The effort, which was led by DEA with the collaboration of 36 countries, brought about the arrest of several leaders of drug trafficking organizations, one of whom was thought to ship two tons of Colombian cocaine into the United States each month.

DEA and Explorers

Since 1980, DEA Demand Reduction Coordinators (DRCs) have worked with Law Enforcement Explorers throughout the country to assist youth interested in "exploring" law enforcement as a profession. This partnership continued through the late 1990s and early 2000s. In some cases, DEA sponsored the Explorer Post. DRCs provided training in the area of narcotics enforcement, community involvement, and general drug abuse issues. The Demand Reduction Section participated in the bi-annual Law Enforcement Explorer Conference as well as in Explorer Leadership Training sessions held at both the DEA and FBI Academies during the summer. The Law Enforcement Explorer Program was additionally a recruitment program, since many Explorers become either police officers or federal agents.

DRUG ENFOR NT ADMINISTRATIO
REAT OF DRUGS
GHB
ROHYPNOL

Above: Patrick Hurley mans exhibit at Georgia Tech in Atlanta explaining DEA careers and efforts to reduce the demand for drugs.
Below: DEA Explorer Post 9910 sponsored by the New York Division shows off t-shirts designed for the event.

Asa Hutchinson

**August 2001-
January 2003**

When Donnie Marshall retired on June 30, 2001, William Simpkins, a career DEA agent, was named Acting Administrator. In June 2001, President George W. Bush nominated Asa Hutchinson, a 3rd term Congressman and former U.S. Attorney from Arkansas, as Administrator. He was confirmed by the Senate on August 1 and sworn in as the DEA's eighth Administrator on August 8, 2001.

Before coming to DEA, Mr. Hutchinson represented the third district of Arkansas in Congress. As a Congressman, he was a stalwart supporter of the fight against drugs. He was a member of the Speaker's Task Force for a Drug-Free America; supported tougher penalties for trafficking in illegal drugs, particularly methamphetamine; voted to increase penalties for possessing club drugs, such as Ecstasy and GHB; supported Plan Colombia; and championed drug courts. He gained national recognition as one of the House managers during the Senate impeachment trail of President Bill Clinton. From 1982 to 1985, Mr. Hutchinson served as U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Arkansas. He was, at age 31, the youngest federal prosecutor in the country at the time.

At his swearing-in ceremony, Mr. Hutchinson explained his dedication to the fight against drugs. He said, "I have seen the drug war from all sides—as a member of Congress, as a federal prosecutor, and as a parent—and I know the importance of fighting this battle on all fronts...[but] More than experience, I will bring my heart to this great crusade. My heart will reflect a passion for the law; a compassion for those families struggling with this nightmare; and a devotion to helping young people act upon the strength and not the weaknesses of their character."

In January 2003, Mr. Hutchinson left DEA to serve as Undersecretary for Border and Transportation Security at the new Department of Homeland Security.

Foreign Offices Opened 1999-2003

Beijing, China—1999
Hanoi, Vietnam—2000
Tashkent, Uzbekistan—2002
Kabul, Afghanistan—2003

Operation Green Clover (2001)

Operation Green Clover was a one-year investigation of an Ecstasy trafficking organization that was a primary source of the drug in Colorado that concluded in August 2001. Named after the green clover logo on their Ecstasy pills, DEA and its law enforcement partners arrested 55 individuals in Colorado and California and seized 85,000 Ecstasy tablets as well as significant amounts of other drugs. Operation Green Clover was an important investigation not only because it dismantled a significant trafficking organization, but also because it was one of the first to call public attention to the dangers of Ecstasy use. The investigation had been sparked by the death of Brittney Chambers, who died on her 16th birthday in Colorado after taking one Ecstasy pill that had been distributed by the organization. Brittney's mother participated in the Operation Green Clover press conference and later opened a teen center to promote drug awareness and alternatives to drug use for teens in Colorado.



Operation Triple X (2001)

In October 2001, DEA dismantled a major methamphetamine and Ecstasy drug laboratory in Escondido, California. This takedown, dubbed Operation Triple X for the logo on the organization's Ecstasy tablets, resulted in 20 arrests and seizures of 48,000 Ecstasy tablets, 1 pound of methamphetamine, 48 kilos of 3,4-Propene (which produce 500,000 Ecstasy tablets) 700 pounds of Camphor oil (which produce one million Ecstasy tablets), 45 gallons of GBL (used to produce GHB), other precursor chemicals and laboratory equipment, and $429,000 in U.S. currency. This case was important because the vast majority of Ecstasy in the United States was produced in labs in Europe; the lab seized in Operation Triple X was one of the most significant Ecstasy labs ever dismantled in this country.

Operation Landslide (2001)

Operation Landslide, an organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) investigation, resulted in 38 U.S. arrests and five Mexican arrests in November, 2001. Drug seizures from this operation totaled over 770 pounds of heroin, 34 pounds of methamphetamine and three kilograms of cocaine. Thanks to Operation Landslide, U.S.-based drug trafficking cells operating in San Francisco, San Jose, and Los Angeles were revealed.

Operation Perfect Storm (2001)

Initially targeted toward lower distribution cells in the greater Boston area, Operation Perfect Storm identified sources of supply for the Boston trafficking cells. These groups were operating out of New York, New Jersey, and Florida and were already being targeted by federal authorities on unrelated investigations. This multi-agency law enforcement effort resulted in the arrests of at least 144 defendants, the seizure of over 2,700 kilograms of cocaine, 17 kilograms of heroin, and $3 million in cash.

September 11th Terrorist Attack and DEA (2001)

On Tuesday, September 11th, 2001, America was attacked by terrorists who hijacked commercial airplanes and crashed them into both towers of the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia. A third hijacked plane—believed to be headed for either the White House or the Capitol—crashed in rural Pennsylvania. More than 3,000 Americans died in the attack. The terrorists were part of Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda terrorist network, based in Afghanistan.

The DEA Headquarters building—which directly overlooks the Pentagon—was immediately impacted. Many employees witnessed the plane hitting the Pentagon, and the headquarters building shook from the impact. The building was secured, and employees were immediately evacuated. The Washington Division office maintained a command center. Agents and Intelligence Research Specialists were detailed to the FBI to assist in following up on investigative leads, and other agents were detailed to support the FBI's efforts at the Pentagon crash site and help with evidence collection. Testing was also conducted to verify the safety of the headquarters building.

In New York, DEA's office, approximately 40 blocks from the World Trade Center, was secured, and it was determined that all employees were safe. Some agents were immediately deployed to the FBI Command Center, and the enforcement group located at conjunction with Customs, established perimeter security at the airport's Building 75, which housed various Federal agencies. The New York office also helped with the apprehension and detainment of five individuals suspected to have participated in the attack as they attempted to travel outbound from JFK. The office also supplied technical equipment to help in the search and rescue operation as well as telephone lines to assist in Title III interceptions. DEA further assisted in intelligence gathering, translation of



foreign documents, execution of search warrants, and provision of temporary office space.

DEA's Aviation Division also significantly contributed to rescue and recovery efforts. From September through January, the Aviation Division completed a variety of missions, which included transporting personnel, equipment, and critical blood supplies, as well and providing airborne video and Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) camera systems. This equipment included technology to detect signals given off by electronic devices such as cell phones. The FLIR camera systems were used to assist the New York City Fire Department by providing thermal imaging technology to determine "hot spots" within the World Trade Center buildings so they could determine where to deploy fire fighting equipment and extinguish underground fires located near subterranean fuel storage tanks.

When Attorney General Ashcroft asked for volunteers from Department of Justice agencies to serve as Air Marshals, over 1,000 DEA Special Agents offered their help within hours of the request. More than 250 DEA Special Agents served as Air Marshals for 7 months following the attack to increase in-flight security.

As a result of the terrorist attacks, increased security measures were put into place at DEA facilities, such as x-ray screening of visitors, restrictions on vehicles entering the property, and revised occupant emergency plans. Overseas, DEA's office in Peshawar, Pakistan, was evacuated, and DEA's Islamabad, Pakistan, office was reduced to essential staff. Security measures at all overseas DEA facilities were upgraded.

Shortly following the 9/11 attacks, there were anthrax exposures throughout the country, which prompted more security measures in DEA, particularly with mail handling operations. Fortunately, no DEA facilities tested positive for anthrax exposure.

Narco-Terrorism

The drug trade and terrorists have been connected for centuries as various rulers and terrorist organizations have used the vast profits from the drug trade to arm, equip, and train members of their violent groups. However, it was the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001, that brought that connection to the attention of the American public. Drug money contributed in part to the ability of the al Qaeda organization to carry out the 9/11 attacks.

DEA defines narco-terrorism as a subset of terrorism, in which terrorist groups participated directly or indirectly in the cultivation, manufacture, transportation, or distribution of controlled substances and the monies derived from these activities. A third of the international terrorist organizations identified by the State Department are linked to illicit drug activities. For example, in South America, Colombia's two major insurgent groups—the FARC and the ELN—as well as the right wing AUC, are linked to drug trafficking. In Peru, the Shining Path—a terrorist organization—most likely extracts a revolutionary tax from the cocaine base operators.

While DEA does not specifically target terrorists, the agency targets and tracks down drug traffickers and drug trafficking organizations involved in terrorist acts. For example, in January 2002, DEA announced the successful conclusion of Operation Mountain Express III, which targeted suppliers of pseudoephedrine, the chemical essential to making methamphetamine. The operation yielded the seizure of more than 30 tons of pseudoephedrine and arrests of more than 370 people in 12 cities. Many arrested were citizens of Middle Eastern countries who were sending their sizable drug profits back to the Middle East. The DEA investigated the flow of money, and there were indications that some of the money funded terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah and Hamas.

Drugs and Osama bin Laden

In Afghanistan, the former ruling Taliban built its financial base from heroin trafficking. They used it as a major source of funding by taxing opium production, lab operations, and the movement of drugs. U.S. intelligence confirmed a connection between the Taliban and international terrorist Osama bin Laden and the al Qaeda organization. In addition, DEA's intelligence indicated that bin Laden was involved in the financing and facilitation of heroin trafficking activities. Afghanistan was a major source country for the cultivation, processing, and trafficking of opiate products, producing over 70 percent of the world's supply of illicit opium in 2000.

Narco-Terrorism Symposium (2001)

On December 4, 2001, DEA hosted a ground-breaking symposium entitled "Target America: Traffickers, Terrorists, and Your Kids" to call attention to the link between drug trafficking and terrorism. The symposium, held at DEA Headquarters, was moderated by Robert Novak, the long-time syndicated columnist and TV political commentator. Hosted by the AFFNA DEA Museum Foundation , a 6-member panel of experts discussed the significant and complex relationships between terrorism and drug trafficking before a full house of invited guests—including Members of Congress and their staff representatives—and DEA employees. Following the event, Mr. Novak wrote a column featuring the event and DEA's important role in the war against terrorism.

Operation Containment

Operation Containment is an intensive, multi-national, law enforcement initiative that was congressionally mandated and is led by DEA. It began in 2002 and was ongoing in 2003. It involves 19 countries from Central Asia, the Caucases, Europe, and Russia. The goal is to implement a coordinated post-Taliban heroin counternarcotics strategy to deprive international terrorist groups of some of their financial basis for their activities. While each country had unilaterally or jointly conducted similar interdiction operations in the past targeting Afghanistan heroin transporters, Operation Containment is the first coordinated, large-scale operation.

Working to diminish the availability of heroin and morphine base along the Balkan and Silk Road trafficking routes, the operation focuses on interdiction at specific land, air, and sea border checkpoints, intelligence sharing, database connectivity, and collective targeting of drug traffickers and organizations. The operation eliminates duplication of efforts and effectively allocates limited counterdrug law enforcement resources throughout the region. The operation also targets other illicit commodities such as precursor chemicals, weapons, ammunitions, and currency that could be used by terrorist organizations to finance their operations.

Operation Containment also included re-opening the DEA office in Kabul, Afghanistan (which had been closed for security reasons in 1980) and expanding existing offices in Asian and European cities. DEA's communications intercept and intelligence capabilities also grew in support of agencies conducting counterterrorism investigations in the United States.

Operation Containment continued into 2003, and has proven to be one of the most successful drug interdiction initiatives to be undertaken on a multi-regional basis. During a mid-2002 blitz operation, 1,705 kilos of heroin were seized, with an estimated value between US $28 million and US $51 million. Also seized were 5,329 kilos of marijuana, 355 kilos of opium, 2,013 poppy plants, as well as significant amounts of cocaine, weapons, cigarettes, and amphetamines. The operation was responsible for collecting much information on terrorist activities in the region.

Just as important, Operation Containment laid the groundwork for closer cooperation among the countries for future operations—the mutual participation of 19 countries in a common operational and intelligence sharing action had not been undertaken before. It is significant that the Russians and Chinese traveled to Turkey for operational planning, the Pakistanis and Indians who were at conflict with one another put their differences aside, as did the Turks, Macedonians, and Greeks to achieve the common goal of depriving violent terrorists of drug-derived funds.



Left: Destruction of seized drugs
Above right: Concealed Heroin
Above left: Concealed marijuana
Below: Kyrgyz Customs checkpoint

New Museum Exhibit on Narco-Terrorism (2002)

America: Traffickers, Terrorists
POLICE LINE DO NOT CROSS

As a continuation of the effort to educate Americans about the historic and strong link between terrorists and drug trafficking, DEA opened a new exhibit at the Headquarters Museum called "Target America: Traffickers, Terrorists, and You." The exhibit is housed in a new 1,500 square foot addition to the DEA Museum. Administrator Hutchinson opened the exhibit at a ceremony on September 3, 2002, and was joined by former New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani, Attorney General John Ashcroft, and ONDCP Director John Walters.

The exhibit opens with a sculpture composed of rubble and artifacts from the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and it uses the events of September 11th as a starting point for the historic story of the connection between the violent drug trade and terror from the Silk Road in the 11th century to the present. Interactive kiosks allow visitors to follow the trafficking of drugs, the movement of money, and the use of terrorism worldwide. Photo essays and artifacts detail the impact of drugs and terrorism, show individuals and groups responsible for terrorist acts, examine America's response to drugs and terrorism, and present visitors information on getting active with an anti-drug message in their communities to allow them to deny funding to terrorists.

The exhibit stayed at the DEA Museum through August 2003, then began a nationwide tour with planned stops in New York, Chicago, Detroit, Dallas, and Los Angeles.

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Sean Fearns, DEA Museum Director, envisioned the exhibit as one that will travel to museums all over the United States. The first stop will be the Dallas Science Museum, with an opening in September 2003, then to Chicago, Detroit, and New York with other cities to follow.

DEA Turkey Seizes Worldwide Record 7.4 Tons of Morphine Base (2002)

On March 31, 2002, Turkish Jandarma officials, accompanied by Istanbul Resident Office personnel, arrested15 individuals and seized 7.4 tons of morphine base. The morphine base was discovered beneath piles of hay during the search of a warehouse located in Hendick, Turkey, approximately 120 miles east of Istanbul. This seizure marked the culmination of five days of arrests and searches executed by the Jandarma in conjunction with DEA, targeting a multifaceted organization led by Attila Ozyildirim. This organization was involved in the production, transportation, and distribution of multi-hundred kilograms quantities of morphine base and heroin. Intelligence indicated that Ozyildirim and his associates maintained strong connections with other significant Turkish traffickers as well as sources of supply in Afghanistan and Iran.

Although large shipments of morphine base and heroin are common in Turkey, according to the Jandarma, this was the largest seizure of morphine base ever in the country. In addition, it was one of the largest seizures of opiates in Europe. During all of 2000, according to the U.S. Department of State, Turkish authorities seized approximately 1.7 metric tons of morphine base. This single seizure is almost six metric tons larger than the annual total for 2000. Given the 1:1 ratio for the conversion of heroin from morphine base, this amount of morphine base would have provided a significant amount of heroin to the European market.

FARC Indictments and Arrest (2002)

In March 2002, the Department of Justice indicted for the first time members of a known terrorist organization on drug trafficking charges. Three members of the Colombian narco-terrorist group Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarios de Colombia (FARC), were indicted on charges of conspiracy to manufacture cocaine, then transport and distribute it in the United States. The FARC is a Colombian Marxist terrorist organization whose stated goal is to overthrow the Colombian Government. The U.S. State Department called the FARC the most dangerous international terrorist group based in the Western hemisphere. The organization is heavily engaged in drug trafficking.

In December 2000, DEA's Bogota office opened an investigation of Tomas Molina-Caracas, the commander of the FARC's 16th Front. He was using territory in a sparsely populated area in eastern Colombia controlled by the 16th Front to manufacture and export multi-ton quantities of cocaine. Molina and the 16th Front completely controlled a small village and its airstrip as a center for the collection and exportation of cocaine. By 2000, Molina was manufacturing and exporting between one and three tons of cocaine per month, the majority of which was shipped to the United States and Europe.

During 1999 and 2000, Molina began purchasing large quantities of weapons and military equipment for the FARC. Some of the transactions were direct trades of weapons for cocaine, and at other times, arms were purchased with cash derived from the sale of drugs. By early 2002, DEA had enough evidence to seek an indictment against key members of the Molina organization. In March 2002, the indictment was unsealed charging Molina, two other members of the FARC, a Colombian cocaine lab operator, and three Brazilian traffickers with conspiracy to produce and export cocaine knowing and intending that it be smuggled into the United States.

In June 2002, Carlos Bolas—one of those FARC members indicted in March on drug charges—was arrested by Surinamese authorities using a false Peruvian passport. Bolas appeared before a magistrate in Suriname, and knowing that he was wanted in the U.S. on drug trafficking charges, Surinamese authorities expelled him and turned him over to U.S. authorities. On June 19, Bolas was transported to the Washington D.C. area where he was arraigned in U.S. District Court.

Administrator Hutchinson explained the significance of Bolas' arrest by saying, "This arrest takes our fight against narco-terrorism to a new level. For the first time we have not only indicted a member of a terrorist organization involved in drug trafficking, but we have also arrested him. This means that narco-terrorists will be held accountable to the justice system and to the rule of law in both United States and Colombia."

AUC Indictments and Arrests (2002)

Attorney General John Ashcroft announced the indictment of leaders of the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), also known as the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, on Sept 24, 2002, on charges of trafficking over 17 tons of cocaine into the United States and Europe beginning in early 1997. The indictment was based on a 2 ½- year DEA investigation that gathered witness testimony as well as evidence from Colombia, Spain, Portugal, Chile, and Puerto Rico.

The AUC is a right-wing paramilitary group in Colombia listed on the State Department's Foreign Terrorist Organization List. The AUC operates in most regions of Colombia and is principally funded by drug trafficking. The organization is estimated to have more than 8,000 paramilitary fighters with operations that vary from multi-ton cocaine distributions to the U.S. and Europe, to assassinations, and involvement in guerrilla combat units. According to the Colombian authorities, in 2002, the AUC was responsible for 2,601 deaths and 182 kidnappings and is considered by international human rights groups and the U.S. Department of State to be responsible for 70 percent of the human rights violations in Colombia.

Carlos Castano-Gil was Commander in Chief of the AUC until he resigned in May 2001 to become a member of the AUC's Political and Military Directorate. However, he retained the title of Commandante of the Autodefensas Campesinas de Cordoba and Uraba (ACCU), the largest paramilitary group that fell under the AUC umbrella. For several years, multiple sources of information cited Castano as one of the most powerful drug traffickers in Colombia.

During an interview broadcast on September 8, 2002, Castano expressed his willingness to surrender to Colombian and United States authorities should he be indicted on narco-trafficking charges by the United States. After the announcement of the indictment on September 24, Castano reiterated this stance and said that he planned to surrender to authorities pending the further review of the charges by his lawyer in the United States Castano also stated that he could no longer remain in a position of authority in the AUC and the ACCU because of the damage that these charges would do the organization's credibility. As of early 2003, Castano had neither surrendered to authorities nor given up his leadership position.

In a separate DEA/FBI investigation, two other commandants of the AUC were arrested in Costa Rica on November 6, 2002, for their involvement in a multi-million dollar cocaine-for-arms deal. In March 2003, DEA and Colombian authorities conducted the takedown of Operation Pegasus II. This case targeted a large drug trafficking organization with close ties to the AUC Bloque Libertadores del Sur.

Legalization

The small, but vocal minority of drug legalization advocates who had been pushing for decriminalization and outright legalization of drugs for a number of years continued unabated in the late 1990s and early 2000s. These groups, such as the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws, focused on the state ballot initiative process as a way to achieve their goals. These organizations are financially backed by several multi-millionaire sponsors and have the means to launch all-out, ill-informed publicity campaigns. While they were successful in a number of states, by 2002, community coalitions across the country were beginning to make marked gains in opposing these legalization initiatives.

Administrator Hutchinson Debates Legalization Advocates (2001-2002)

During his tenure at DEA, Administrator Hutchinson engaged in three public debates about drug legalization. He viewed them as important opportunities to deliver a positive, anti-drug message and help educate Americans about the dangers of drug legalization and drug use. His first debate was one month after taking office when he was pitted against New Mexico Governor Gary Johnson—a proponent of legalized drugs. It was the first time a DEA Administrator formally debated the issue of drug legalization in a public forum. National Public Radio (NPR) hosted the event entitled "Directing America's Drug War: Which Way to a Safer Society" on September 10, 2001, at the University of New Mexico in Albuquerque.

Before a packed house of hundreds of students and citizens as well as numerous protesters, Administrator Hutchinson and Governor Johnson debated the issue and took questions from the audience for 2 hours. Mr. Hutchinson emphasized a balanced anti-drug strategy that encompasses education and treatment in addition to law enforcement. He pointed out the many successes in the fight against drugs and offered areas where the country could do better. The debate was broadcast at a later date on NPR.

Administrator Hutchinson and Governor Johnson continued the debate in November 2001 at Yale University's Law School. Mr. Hutchinson discussed the history of illegal drugs, pointing out that the country had legalization in the 19th century, and it was a failure. He also discussed the connection between drugs and terrorism.

In April 2002, Fordham University's School of Law hosted a debate entitled "America's Oldest War: The Efficacy of United States Drug Policy." This time, Administrator Hutchinson debated Graham Boyd, a lawyer for the American Civil Liberties Union. The debate focused largely on the issue of marijuana as medicine, with Mr. Hutchinson arguing that safe and effective medicines must be determined by science and the regulatory process, not by referenda sponsored by the legalization lobby.

Marijuana Research

Repeated attempts by proponents of marjiuana legalization in the late 1990s to remove marijuana from Schedule I of the CSA, thereby effectively legalizing the drug, were definitively curtailed with the April 2001 publication in the *Federal Register* of DEA's denial of the Jon Gettman/*High Times* magazine petition to reschedule marijuana. In January 2001, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) returned a scientific and medical evaluation on this petition and recommended that marijuana and THC continue to be subject to control under Schedule I of the CSA. In its decision, HHS clearly reaffirmed that marijuana has a high abuse potential and is not approved for medical use.

However, in response to national interest in the potential therapeutic use of marijuana for treating the symptoms of a variety of illnesses, DEA registered eight researchers to study the effects of smoked marijuana. These registrations were granted upon close and thorough review of study protocols by an independent review board and panels from HHS and the Food and Drug Administration. By early 2003, neither the medical community nor the scientific community had found sufficient data to conclude that smoked marijuana was the best approach to dealing with these important medical issues. The most comprehensive, scientifi-

Above: Special Agent Lowell J. Maxey and Special Agent/Pilot Brian D. Winnell.

cally rigorous review of studies of smoked marijuana was conducted by the Institute of Medicine, an organization chartered by the National Academy of Sciences. In a report released in 1999, the Institute did not recommend the use of smoked marijuana, but did conclude that active ingredients in marijuana could be isolated and developed into a variety of pharmaceuticals.

One of those was Marinol, which was brought to market in the 1980s after DEA granted researchers authorization to work with marijuana. Marinol is a prescription drug containing synthetic THC, which has been found to relieve the nausea and vomiting associated with chemotherapy for cancer patients and to assist with loss of appetite with AIDS patients. Unlike smoked marijuana—which contains more than 400 different chemicals, including most of the hazardous chemicals found in tobacco smoke—Marinol was proven safe, and its therapeutic value was supported by clinical evidence.

San Francisco Marijuana Raids/Protests (2002)

On February 12th, 2002, DEA Agents confiscated more than 8,000 marijuana plants and made several arrests at a San Francisco cannabis club, known as the Harm Reduction Center. The operator, Kenneth Hayes, was cultivating large quantities of marijuana in San Francisco and Sonoma County and was also participating in smuggling of high-grade Canadian marijuana into the Bay Area.

The arrests received considerable publicity and press coverage in relation to California's medical marijuana law. The cannabis club was affiliated with the City and County of San Francisco to provide "medical" marijuana to "patients." Additionally, one of the arrestees was Edward Rosenthal, longtime contributing editor of High Times and Cannabis Culture magazines and the author of several "how to" books on marijuana cultivation.

The investigation determined that the cannabis club was engaged in marijuana trafficking in violation of federal law. While the club claimed to distribute marijuana to sick people, it was in fact selling marijuana to anyone. Four operators were charged federally with cultivation, conspiracy, and maintaining a location for drug manufacturing.

Two pled guilty, and as of early 2003, are awaiting sentencing. The third defendant, Rosenthal, went to trial, and his case resulted in a guilty conviction. The fourth, Hayes, sought asylum in Canada.

Coincidentally, on the same day of the cannabis club raids, Administrator Hutchinson spoke before a sold-out audience at San Francisco's Commonwealth Club, a prestigious public affairs speech forum. San Francisco, caught between conflicting state and federal laws concerning medical marijuana had long been home to intense debate regarding drug laws. Mr. Hutchinson's visit and the cannabis club arrests prompted public protests from San Francisco residents and elected officials.

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When Administrator Hutchinson arrived to deliver his speech, over 200 protestors had gathered outside the Commonwealth Club. Chanting "DEA, go away," and waving banners, protestors expressed their disapproval of the marijuana arrests. Simultaneously, protest groups launched a "web attack" against the DEA website. They attempted to shut down the DEA site by visiting it repeatedly. The site received 30,000 hits at once, but service was not disrupted. "In many ways, this debate is a good thing," said Administrator Hutchinson of his not-so-warm welcome. "If nothing else, it shows everyone how important this issue is and it helps the DEA get our message across. DEA must follow the law-we don't judge what is use and what is abuse. We judge what is legal and what is illegal."

Speaking Out Booklet and Grass Roots Movement

To get DEA's message out about why drug legalization would be a catastrophic failure and why marijuana should not be legalized for medicinal or recreational use, DEA's Public Affairs office initiated an informational campaign. An entire section on anti-legalization was created on the website, which included many materials about the subject. One of the most comprehensive was "Speaking Out Against Drug Legalization," a 25-page booklet that logically laid out the top ten facts on legalization. It detailed national, international, and local statistics and examples of failed prior legalization experiments and also discussed the many successes of current drug policy.

DEA's Demand Reduction section also began a new, proactive emphasis on outreach and coalition-building. The agency reached out to other anti-drug and pro-law enforcement organizations already organized and on the ground—those who interacted with the media and public on a regular basis and those who were intimately involved in their communities. The Demand Reduction section's mission was to pro-actively engage the support of these coalitions. The number of neighborhood anti-drug coalitions in this country was huge, but largely unorganized. DEA made it a goal to help those groups develop a better network of communication to both build local, state, and national support for the fight against drugs, and build local, state, and national support for the DEA.

2002 Election Results on Legalization Initiatives

The results of the grass roots movement supporting current drug policy paid immediate dividends. In the fall of 2002, drug decriminalization or legalization initiatives were on the ballot in several states. The legalization lobby was behind these initiatives and had greatly assisted with funding, signatures, and wording of the initiatives. Widespread passage was expected, but because of a strong grass roots movement by parents, anti-drug coalitions, and law enforcement, four of the six initiatives failed—showing the American public's support for drug enforcement. The results were:

- Arizona: 57% of voters killed a plan (Proposition 203) that would have made state law enforcement the broker for medicinal marijuana.
- Nevada: 61% of voters opposed a proposal that would have allowed anyone to possess up to 3 ounces of marijuana.
- Ohio: 67% opposed a proposal (Issue 1) that would have allowed nonviolent drug offenders to seek treatment instead of serve jail time.
- South Dakota: 62% of voters defeated an industrial hemp initiative.
- Washinton DC: 78% of voters approved an initiative that would offer drug rehabilitation instead of prison for some nonviolent offenders.
- San Francisco: 63% approved a measure to have the city study growing and dispensing marijuana for medical purposes.

Methamphetamine

From 1999 to 2003, methamphetamine abuse had become a national problem as this drug epidemic spread eastward. Its use was initially mainly confined to the West and Midwest, but has now surfaced in other areas, especially the Southeast. Florida in particular has seen an increase in abuse and clandestine laboratory production. In 1999, law enforcement seized 22 methamphetamine labs in Florida, but by 2002, that had increased to 109. Similarly, 30 meth labs were seized in Alabama in 1999; by 2002, that had risen to 198.

In last five years, there has been a dramatic increase in then number of small, toxic methamphetamine labs in rural communities. While the meth trade is still dominated by Mexico-based traffickers producing the drug in larger "super labs" on the West Coast, the increase in small labs has been significant. The growing numbers of small, dangerous clandestine laboratories has strained communities and state and local police forces. Effective and safe clean-up of these labs is very costly and drains community resources and manpower. In response to this new pressure on local law enforcement, DEA is working with the COPS program to provide state and local clan lab clean-up training to increasing numbers of police officers.

Traffickers' methods of producing methamphetamine and obtaining pseudoephedrine, a chemical necessary to make meth, have changed in recent years. The growing numbers of small labs led to an increase in the use of the over-the-counter "blister packs" of cold and allergy medication as a source of pseudoephedrine. The medications are packaged in such a way that they would be impractical as a source of supply for a super labs where massive quantities of the drug are made. But they have been used more and more by small lab operators.

Canada emerged as a source of supply for pseudoephedrine after DEA's Operation Mountain Express I & II effectively stopped the illegal pseudo trade within the United States. Discussions between the United States and Canada led to tighter restrictions on pseudo production and transportation in Canada.

In 2002, a new meth threat began to emerge – meth in tablet form, called "yaba," that comes from Southeast Asia. Yaba accounted for only a small percentage of meth used in the United States by 2003, but law enforcement is concerned about its increasing potential for abuse since its appearance is similar to the popular drug Ecstasy.



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Operation Mountain Express I, II, and III (2000-2002)

In August 2000, DEA Special Agents stunned the methamphetamine production underworld, arresting more than 140 individuals in eight cities with a promise of more arrests to follow. The arrests marked the first of three phases of Operation Mountain Express. The operation combated the production of methamphetamine by targeting those who produced and illegally distributed pseudoephedrine, a chemical essential to the manufacture of methamphetamine.

Phase One of the operation yielded arrests in Los Angeles, Denver, Fort Lauderdale, Orlando, San Diego, Portland, Houston, and Lodi, California. In addition, DEA suspended chemical registrations of 10 companies, 770 chemical registrations were surrendered, and 29 wholesale chemical companies closed. The arrested defendants faced federal charges for their involvement in a loosely structured national network that trafficked in pseudoephedrine. In the late 1990s, pseudoephedrine (pseudo) had become widely used in the production of methamphetamine because of its ready availability in over-the-counter cold and allergy medications. The operation focused on the transfer of pseudo produced for legal purposes to those who used it illegally to produce meth.

IA Melissa Conway and SA Sean Stephen King examine more of the Mt. Express seizures.

SA Efren G. Lapuz and INS Pat Comey at the Carlesbad Resident Office.

Operation Mountain Express continued with phase two, using information gained in phase one of the operation to identify registrants (physicians or pharmacists who are authorized to handle controlled substances) who were involved in the illegal diversion of pusedo and to cancel their registrations. The rogue registrants were not subject to criminal prosecution, but were prohibited from working with controlled substances.

Operations Mountain Express I & II effectively shut down the illegal pusedo trade within the United States. Traffickers began to look for sources of supply in Canada and the illegal trade and transport between Canada, and the U.S. grew. Operation Mountain Express III was created when DEA pursued this new pseudo trafficking market in Canada. Intelligence indicated that traffickers were purchasing large amounts of pseudo in Canada and then returning to the U.S. with the product, often via the Ambassador Bridge in Detroit. As a result, Detroit and nearby Chicago became hubs of pusedo distribution. From these points, pusedo was transported to California and distributed to meth "super labs" where it was converted to methamphetamine by Mexico-based drug traffickers.

The successful conclusion of Operation Express III was announced by DEA Administrator Asa Hutchinson, U.S. Customs Commissioner (and former DEA Administrator) Robert Bonner, and IRS Deputy Commissioner Bob Wenzel. Operation Mountain Express III ended on January 10, 2002, when DEA Special Agents, assisted by the U.S. Customs Service, Internal Revenue Service, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police arrested 54 traffickers, in addition to the 67 previously arrested as part of the investigations.

Operation Mountain Express did unprecedented damage to the methamphetamine trade. In 2001, there were a total of 6,000 pounds of meth seized by the DEA; the three phases of Operation Mountain Express resulted in the seizure of nearly 30 tons of pseudoephedrine, which could produce 37,000 pounds of meth. The operations also yielded 371 arrests and the seizure of 269 pounds of meth, 151 vehicles, 13 weapons, and nearly $17.5 million. DEA also tightened regulatory controls over DEA-registered chemical handlers. Legislative initiatives were also undertaken to address weaknesses in the regulatory framework. Additionally, the investigation traced large amounts of profit being sent to individuals in the Middle East, who had possible ties to terrorist organizations.

Methamphetamine Summits (2000-2002)

In the early 2000s, DEA co-sponsored methamphetamine summits across the country in partnership with the National Crime Prevention Council and local communities. These summits were training conferences at which a state, county, or city developed a strategic plan for reducing methamphetamine use and trafficking in the area. The summits brought together hundreds of people from the community who were involved in different aspects of the methamphetamine problem: law enforcement, social workers, school officials, local officials, prevention experts, treatment providers, parents, and environmental firms. The goal was to coordinate these various groups and mobilize resources to prevent and reduce the proliferation of meth and meth labs. Meth summits were held in Sacramento, California in 2000; in Bellevue, Washington in 2001; and in Indianapolis, Indiana; Little Rock, Arkansas; Lexington, Kentucky; Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; and Hawaii County, Hawaii in 2002.

Meth in America Tour (2002)

In the spring of 2002, Administrator Hutchinson launched a nationwide tour to call attention to the country's growing methamphetamine problem. The campaign, called "Meth in America: Not in Our Town" began in May and continued through July 2000. DEA took the tour to 32 states over the course of the 3 months. Many of the stops were smaller states that were struggling with the social and financial impact of the drug.

At each site, Administrator Hutchinson held press conferences in conjunction with state and local officials, and often the tour was combined with scheduled meth summits. The focus was the meth problem in that community and the resources and options available to help combat the problem. Administrator Hutchinson emphasized the federal response to methamphetamine trafficking, but also cited the many innovative actions communities were taking to combat the problem. He also cited the many community coalitions that were impacting the meth problem. The tour received much national and local attention and raised overall awareness of the meth problem and sparked discussions on solutions.

Hazardous Waste Cleanup Program

Since 1980, the Environmental Protection Agency's hazardous waste regulations have required generators of hazardous waste to properly manage their waste. DEA along with state and local law enforcement agencies, become the "generator" of hazardous waste when clandestine drug laboratories—which are generally methamphetamine labs—are seized. As the generator, law enforcement bears the responsibility for ensuring that the wastes from clandestine laboratories are managed in compliance with all applicable health, safety, transportation, and environmental requirements.

The DEA Laboratory System established a program in 1990 to address environmental concerns from the clean up of clandestine drug laboratories. The amount of waste material and chemicals from a clandestine drug laboratory varies from a few pounds to several tons, depending on the size of the laboratory and its manufacturing capabilities. Wastes can be highly toxic, flammable, corrosive, reactive and, in some cases, radioactive. These wastes can cause injury and death to laboratory operators, and can cause fires and explosions that can contaminate the interior of homes, apartments, motels,etc.

In some instances, these wastes have been indiscriminately dumped into pits, streams, lakes, septic tanks, and along the roadside.

Cleaning up a seized clandestine drug laboratory can be a complex, dangerous, and expensive undertaking. The DEA hazardous waste program has been successful, however, in promoting the safety of law enforcement personnel and the public, protecting the environment, and minimizing the agency's liability. Through the use of nation-wide contracts, DEA's program promoted the safety of law enforcement personnel and the public by using highly qualified companies with specialized training and equipment to perform the removal of the wastes at the seized laboratory. Using these contractors reduces the risk of injury to law enforcement personnel and the public from the clean up of the seized laboratory.

The program has become increasingly more efficient as DEA gained more experience in cleaning up clandestine drug laboratories. The average cost per cleanup in the FY1991-1992 time frame was $17,000. While the number of clandestine drug laboratory cleanups rose, the average cost per cleanup continued to go down. Through contract improvements and DEA's contract management experience, the costs of a removal were subsequently reduced to approximately $4,000 in FY2000 and to less than $3,300 in FY2002.

New hazardous waste contracts became effective in FY2003. The new contracts include many time and cost saving tools to help address the field's concerns and the dramatic increase in workload. The new contracts are expected to significantly improve the response time by increasing the number of Contract Areas from 29 to 44 and requiring response facilities in each. The greater competition created by smaller Contract Areas and new cost reduction factors should result in additional cost savings for the government, while maintaining strict environmental compliance standards. In addition, the new contracts contain provisions for weekly pickups from containers in states that establish a container storage program and have entered into a Letter of Agreement with DEA to provide this service. DEA began discussions regarding a pilot container program with several states in FY2002 to determine the feasibility and degree of cost savings associated with the approach.

Targeting the Arellano-Felix Trafficking Organization (2000-2002)

The Arellano Felix Organization (AFO), often referred to as the Tijuana Cartel, was considered one of the most powerful and violent drug trafficking organizations in Mexico. At the height of its power, the AFO was responsible for the transportation, importation, and distribution of multi-ton quantities of cocaine, marijuana, and large quantities of heroin and methamphetamine into the United States from Mexico—primarily from Tijuana into San Diego and Los Angeles.

DEA offices in Mexico and the United States, most notably Tijuana, San Diego, and Los Angeles, relentlessly pursued the principal members of this organization in an effort to bring about their downfall. The most prominent members of the AFO were brothers Benjamin, Eduardo, Ramon, and Francisco Javier Arellano Felix; Ismael Higuera Guerrero; Jesus Labra Aviles; Manuel Aguirre Galindo; and Ismael Higuera-Guerrero. Jesus Labra Aviles, long considered the financial mastermind of the organization, was arrested in Mexico City in March 2000 by the Government of Mexico with the support of DEA's Tijuana office. This was followed by the arrest of major AFO Lieutenant Ismael Higuera-Guerrero two months later in May 2000. He, too, was arrested by the Mexican Government in coordination with DEA's Tijuana office.

Higuero-Guerrero had been the most blatant member of the AFO directing operations in Tijuana for years.

At the beginning of 2002, AFO was dealt two huge blows: First, its infamous and brutal enforcer and assassin Ramon Arellano Felix was killed in a street fight with drug trafficking competitors and Mexican police, then, a month later, the AFO's overall Chief of Operations, Benjamin Arellano-Felix, was arrested in Puebla, Mexico, by the Mexican Military.

Operation Crossfire (2002)

On April 10, 2002, Operation Crossfire, a bi-lateral anti-corruption investigation conducted in collaboration with federal Mexican Government officials, resulted in the arrest of 42 active federal, state, and local law enforcement officers from Mexicali, Tijuana, and Ensenada. These arrests included the Tijuana Chief of Police, heads of the State Judicial Police in Tijuana, Tecate, and Mexicali; and the Assistant State Attorney General. All of them were assisting the Arellano-Felix Organization.

Drug Smuggling Tunnels



Reports of drug smuggling tunnels increased significantly in late 2002 and early 2003. Traffickers may have increased their use of subterranean smuggling in light of increased border security, either real or perceived. Mexican drug trafficking organizations had used tunnels as a smuggling method since at least 1990. All of the narco-tunnels seized were in California (in the San Diego-Tijuana area) and Arizona (Douglas, Naco, and Nogales). At least 13 tunnels were discovered. Narco-tunnels ranged in sophistication from a 16-inch PVC pipe; to tunnels dug off of drainage systems; to well-engineered tunnels equipped with electricity, ventilation, and rails.

DEA, in cooperation with Mexico's Policia Federal Preventiva, discovered one of the most significant drug smuggling tunnels on February 27, 2002. It was approximately 4 feet by 4 feet, more than 800 feet long, and 20 feet underground. It was equipped with its own ventilation system, lighting, and rails on which an electronic cart moved drugs. The Mexican entrance was hidden behind a fireplace in a home near Tecate, Mexico, and the U.S. exit was concealed under a stairway in a home in Boulevard, California. About 300 pounds of marjuana were seized from inside the tunnel. Ownership of the tunnel was attributed to the Jose Albino Quintero-Meraz organization.

San Ysidro U.S. Border Patrol agents investigating a lead found a cargo truck with 3,3337.7 pounds of marijuana which led to the discovery of a tunnel leading to a manhole and a storm drain located behind the parked truck. The tunnel was one foot underground and led to a small window on the side wall of the manhole. The window was sealed with the cement block that braced a 2 X 4 stud from inside to prevent discovery. The 20-30 foot tunnel led to a wood structure where the direction changed and headed toward Mexico.

DEA S/A Darren Lee, DEA G/S Pedro Pena, U.S.B.P. Agent Greg Torres, and U.S. Customs Agent Taekuk Cho.



95 East Bungalow – GPR Data

- Soil disturbance corresponding to water and possibly gas into house can be seen
- Storm sewer and other utilities can be seen in street



Technology has created new methods to locate tunnels.

Integrated Drug Enforcement Assistance program (2001)

In late 2001, Administrator Hutchinson launched a new initiative that grew out of the MET II program called the Integrated Drug Enforcement Assistance (IDEA) program. IDEA combined law enforcement action with strong community efforts to find solutions to the problems that often cause drug abuse and create a welcoming environment for drug traffickers. IDEA was considered innovative because, while many programs focused only on law enforcement or only on treatment, IDEA brought diverse community groups together to work out problems. Instead of MET II's regional approach, it focused on one community at a time. IDEA addressed not only drug problems, but also the underlying issues that are the root of drug use and trafficking.

DEA and state and local law enforcement identified drug trafficking targets and executed enforcement operations. Concurrent to drug enforcement action in a community, the IDEA program provided communities with long-term support in developing and implementing prevention and treatment programs. The goal was to partner law enforcement with community coalitions. Summits were held at each site to bring together large numbers of community-based organizations, businesses, faith-based organizations, parks and recreation departments, schools, drug courts, law enforcement, and community leaders to form new and lasting partnerships and identify problems and long-term solutions. Once enforcement efforts were complete, IDEA encouraged that 15% of law enforcement seized assets be directed to community prevention, education, and treatment programs.

In 2001 and 2002, three sites piloted the program. They were: North Charleston, South Carolina, Allentown, Pennsylvania, and Portsmouth, Virginia. Three additional sites were added later in 2002 and 2003: Springfield, Missouri, Mobile/Prichard, Alabama, and Pueblo, Colorado. DEA provided a full-time Special Agent to each site to work with experts in crime prevention, alternative judicial systems such as drug courts, restorative justice initiatives, drug testing, and law enforcement training. Administrator Hutchinson established an IDEA National Advisory Council comprising law enforcement, judiciary, government officials, substance abuse, and crime prevention experts to consult with DEA on program design, implementation, and evaluation. To support the IDEA program and emphasize demand reduction activities on the whole, Administrator Hutchinson committed to doubling the number of Demand Reduction Coordinators across the country.

The IDEA program was ongoing at all six sites in 2003, and all reported significant arrests and seizures from law enforcement efforts and encouraging results in the prevention, education, and treatment areas. IDEA communities reported increased participation in community drug programs, better identification of funding sources for anti-drug efforts, stronger and better organized community coalitions, greater awareness of the community's drug problems, and more enthusiasm in solving the drug problems. While IDEA's funding was eliminated in DEA's 2003 budget due to tightening fiscal concerns relating to national security, DEA continued to provide non-monetary support to IDEA communities through its Demand Reduction Coordinators and local offices so that successes could continue.

Drug Treatment Courts

Drug treatment courts are specialized community courts designed to help stop the abuse of drugs, alcohol, and related criminal activity. Non-violent offenders who have been charged with simple possession of drugs are given the option to receive treatment instead of a jail sentence. A judge oversees each case from the beginning and traces progressions and lapses through random drug testing and monitoring attendance to treatment sessions. If a participant fails to meet the minimum requirements set forth by the court, immediate sanctions are imposed. For determined individuals, completion of the program might bring about dismissal of charges, a reduced sentence, a lesser penalty, or a combination of these.

Drug courts have seen rapid growth since their inception in 1989—by 2003, there were about 700 nationwide. Administrator Hutchinson was a champion of drug courts during his tenure at DEA. He visited several drug courts across the country to encourage and support participants and spoke at many graduation ceremonies. Drug courts were a centerpiece of his message that, to make progress in the fight against drugs, it was necessary to heal the addicted—to restore their lives and make them productive citizens again and help reduce the demand for drugs in this country.

Israeli Ecstasy Traffickers Extradited (2002)

Two Israeli Ecstasy traffickers were extradited to Miami in August 2002, marking the first time that Israeli citizens were extradited to the United States on drug charges. The two men, Meir Ben David and Josef Levi, were indicted in October 2000 in Miami for conspiracy to import Ecstasy and possession with intent to distribute Ecstasy into the Southern District of Florida. The investigation, initiated by DEA's Fort Lauderdale office in 1998, revealed that Ben David and Levi were part of an Israeli organized crime syndicate responsible for smuggling large quantities of Ecstasy from Europe into the United States. Ben David coordinated shipments of Ecstasy from Europe into the United States using body couriers and parcel couriers. Levi assisted the organization by distributing Ecstasy at various nightclubs throughout South Florida as well as to other Israeli

Ecstasy traffickers. During the course of the investigation, hundreds of kilograms of Ecstasy were documented as being imported into the United States by this organization.

Operation X-Out (2002-2003)

In late 2002, DEA began Operation X-Out, a multi-faceted, 12-month initiative that focused on identifying and dismantling organizations that were producing and distributing Ecstasy and predatory drugs in the United States and abroad. DEA committed to invest more resources in Ecstasy and predatory drug investigations and increase these kind of investigations from 5% of DEA's total cases to at least 10%. Airport interdiction task forces were increased at certain airports and new tasks forces were created in cities like New York and Miami that were primary entryways for the drugs. Also created within DEA was a task force that focused on Internet drug trafficking.

Operation X-Out also included an awareness campaign to educate students, parents, educators, and the health and law enforcement communities about the dangers of Ecstasy and predatory drugs. DEA held press conferences and town hall meetings across the country that focused on enforcement and prevention efforts at the local level. The first was held in November 2002 in San Diego, where Administrator Hutchinson launched Operation X-Out and called attention to the growing problem of Ecstasy and predatory drug abuse. The press conference was followed by a town hall meeting attended by about 300 educators, health experts, students, rape crisis centers, and concerned citizens who discussed solutions to the problem in their community. Similar events were held during 2003 throughout the country, with a particular emphasis on college campuses.

Three Largest Ecstasy Seizures

As of early 2003, the following seizures were the largest made in the country. The millions of tablets involved showed the huge extent to which Ecstasy was being smuggled into the country by international drug trafficking organizations and the drug's tremendous popularity in the United States.

1. In July 2000, DEA and the U.S. Customs Service seized approximately 2.1 million Ecstasy tablets at the Los Angeles International Airport. The tablets, labeled as clothing, arrived on an Air France flight from Paris concealed in an airfreight shipment. Several individuals, who were responsible for overseeing and coordinating this shipment, were arrested. DEA later connected these individuals to a significant Israeli trafficking organization that was responsible for importing multi-kilogram quantities of Ecstasy into the United States. (see Operation Red Tide)

2. The second largest seizure was made by the New York Police Department when they seized 1.6 million Ecstasy tablets from two Israeli nationals at a Manhattan apartment. The pills had an estimated street value of $40 million and were sold in 100,000 tablet quantities to mid-level distributors in the area.

3. The third largest Ecstasy seizure occurred in conjunction with arrests made in October 2002 by DEA New York. DEA arrested three Israeli nationals in connection with a seizure of 1.4 million Ecstasy tablets with an estimated value of $42 million. The investigation began by DEA's Belgium office where they received information from Belgian law enforcement about the tablets, which were bound for New York. It was the second largest seizure in Europe.



1.2 million ecstasy tablets seized in New York inside a diamond cutting apparatus.

DEA Website Reaches Millions

In DEA's early years, the concept of internet communications would have seemed like a sci-fi fantasy. But by 2003, in an age when websites are the main sources for finding or providing information, DEA kept up with the demand for a thorough and informative webpage. When DEA's website, www.dea.gov first went on-line in 1996, it contained just a few web files of information—in 2003, the website contained 2,500 files that addressed every aspect of the agency and its mission. The website featured: recent news stories that changed almost daily, current drug facts and statistics, recruiting and training information, and photos of major fugitives. In late 2002, the website expanded to include webpages for each of DEA's divisions. Individual divisions used their sites to promote local drug news and reach out to their communities.

DEA became adept at using the DEA.gov as a way to reach out to the public, to community, schools, the media, and our law enforcement partners. When the site was first created, it had one million visitors. By 1998, the number of visitors had grown to 18 million. In 2002, after a major over-haul of the site and increased efforts to publicize it, the DEA.gov received 100 million visitors. This staggering growth represented continued increase in public interest in the DEA and the agency's improved capability to provide important information to the American people.

DEA World Goes Hi-Tech (2001)

In September 2001, the popular DEA in-house publication, DEA World, was distributed electronically for the first time. Switching to an electronic format allowed for quicker and much more frequent publication of the news-magazine and ensured that everyone in DEA would have easy access to it.

The new publication featured many of the same types of stories as the older print version but was much more timely and current. DEA World was published on Webster, the internal computer network, and each issue had the appearance of a miniature website. Soon after the first electronic newsletter was released, entries for the new publication poured in from all over the field. Employees were eager to share their local news with the global DEA community. Stories in a typical issue featured successful cases, awards won by employees, community service events, and information about employee services.

This new communication tool serves as a way for employees around the world to stay in touch with each other and to share the agency's news and accomplishments.

Operation Webslinger (2002)

In a first-of-its kind investigation, Operation Webslinger targeted predatory drugs such as GHB and its derivatives, GBL and 1,4 Butanediol (1,4 BD), sold over the Internet. This operation was also groundbreaking because e-mail addresses and web page communications of Internet drug traffickers were identified for Title III interceptions. While not the first time this method of intercept was used, Operation Webslinger was one of the earliest to use Internet intercepts on a national and international scale. These Internet intercepts revealed key information about the traffickers' operations, including their sources of supply and the amount of drugs they were selling. Perhaps most important was these intercepted Internet communications proved the sites were selling the chemicals not as the industrial solvent as advertised, but for human consumption—which is key to prosecuting traffickers under the drug analog statutes.

In September 2002, DEA successfully concluded this operation with the eventual arrest of 175 individuals in more than 100 cities across the United States and Canada. Those arrested were sources of supply, midlevel brokers, and users. DEA and law enforcement partners dismantled four nationwide distribution rings of these drugs, which are used both to induce a high and in the commission of sexual assault. DEA seized approximately 25 million dosage units of predatory drugs and more than $1 million in assets. The operation had an immediate impact on Internet drug sales, with users complaining in chat rooms they were no longer able to purchase these drugs.

Operation Arctic Heat (2002)

A savvy, flexible drug operation involving Alaskan traffickers was the target of Operation Arctic Heat. These traffickers did business all over the United States, including New York and Los Angeles. In November 2002, DEA Agents arrested more than 60 individuals and seized more than 160 kilograms of cocaine, $2 million in cash, and $35,000 in counterfeit money. Seizures also took place in Anchorage, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Salt Lake City, Chicago, and Grand Junction. This drug operation also targeted money laundering and movement of drug proceeds and worked on an extensive embezzlement scheme designed to "smurf" money out of the United States and into the Dominican Republic.

Lebanese Opium and Marijuana Eradication Program Resumes (2002)

With urging and support from DEA and other international drug liaison officers, Lebanon re-engaged their opium poppy and cannabis eradication initiatives in 2002. In February 2002,



the Lebanese Internal Security Forces, assisted by the Lebanese military and the Syrian military, eradicated approximately 7 million square meters of opium poppy in the Bekaa Valley. In August 2002, approximately 9 million square meters of cannabis were eradicated in the Bekaa. DEA Specials Agents, along with other drug enforcement liaison officers, were invited to witness the eradication initiatives. Being in the Bekaa Valley for a DEA Agent was likened to finding the Holy Grail for an archeologist. This eradication initiative was expected to have a significant impact on the availability of heroin and marijuana in Western Europe in 2003.

Operations Pipedreams/ HeadHunter (2003)

On February 24, 2003, DEA successfully completed Operations Pipedreams and Head Hunter, a nationwide sweep of major drug paraphernalia distributors and businesses. The coordinated operations netted 55 individuals across the country and seized $150,000 cash. As a result of this operation, 11 Internet sites were taken offline and redirected. Targeted companies sold half of the nation's supply of drug paraphernalia and accounted for more than a quarter of a billion dollars in retail drug paraphernalia sales annually. Using both traditional retail stores and Internet websites, the distributors were one-stop shops for drug dealers and users, selling everything from miniature scales, pipes, bongs, cocaine freebase kits, and cutting agents to dilute processed drugs in their raw form. Approximately 115 tons of drug paraphernalia with an estimated wholesale value of $15-20 million were removed from the sites as well.

Critical to the success of Operation Pipedreams was the use of Internet intercepts on e-commerce sites and e-mail accounts to track the money and domestic and international shipments of drug paraphernalia. Operation Pipedreams was conducted by DEA offices in Des Moines, Iowa; Boise, Idaho; and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

Arrest of Osiel Cardenas-Guillen in Mexico (2003)

On March 14, 2003, Mexican officials brought the reign of Osiel Cardenas-Guillen to an end. He was arrested at a residence in Matamoros, Tamaulipas, Mexico, following a fierce firefight with Mexican police. Before his arrest, Cardenas was the head of a drug trafficking organization that controlled large-scale marijuana and cocaine trafficking through the smuggling corridor between Matamoros, Mexico and Brownsville, Texas. Cardenas had numerous resources that enabled him to maintain 15 to 25 heavily armed bodyguards at all times, protection and support from all levels of Mexican law enforcement, and technical assistance from the Mexican phone company.

Through the combined efforts with the Government of Mexico, the DEA, FBI, and U.S. Customs, the Cardenas reign on the Northeastern Mexico corridor came to a halt. This investigation, called "Operation Golden Grips" was an important arrest because it sent a message to traffickers that violence and intimidation did not protect them from law enforcement.

The catalyst of this operation was the November 1999 assault and attempted kidnapping of 2 U.S. Federal agents and a confidential source. During the assault, Cardenas and 12 to 15 members of his organization, armed with assault rifles, surrounded a vehicle occupied by the agents and attempted to kidnap them and a confidential source who was in the car. Only after an extensive discussion between one of the agents and Cardenas were the agents allowed to leave the scene and travel directly to the border. The agents were followed to the border by members of the Cardenas organization.

HempRule (2003)

On March 21, 2003, DEA announced two final rules that address the legal status of products derived from the cannabis plant. These cannabis products, also known as "hemp" prode ucts, often contain the hallucinogenic substance tetrahydrocannabinols (THC). THC is the primary psychoactive chemical found in the cannabis (marijuana) plant.

These rules set forth what products may contain "hemp." Under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), THC is a Schedule I controlled substance. Schedule I consists of those controlled substances that have not been approved as medicine by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The CSA provides that anything that contains "any quantity" of a Schedule I hallucinogenic controlled substance is, itself, a Schedule I controlled substance, unless it is an FDA-approved drug product. Thus, the CSA prohibits human consumption of any non-FDA-approved product that contains any amount of THC.

In some cases, a Schedule I controlled substance may have a legitimate industrial use. The CSA allows for industrial use of Schedule I controlled substances, but only under highly controlled circumstances. The rules announced by DEA create an exemption in the law that removes all CSA regulatory restrictions for legitimate industrial products made from cannabis plants. Exempted industrial products include paper, rope, and clothing (which contain fiber made from the cannabis plant), animal feed mixtures, soaps, and shampoos (which contain sterilized cannabis seeds or oils extracted from the seeds). DEA is exempting these types of industrial cannabis products from control because they are not intended for human consumption and do not cause THC to enter the human body.

The rules prohibit cannabis products containing THC that are intended or used for human consumption (foods and beverages). This approach is consistent with the long-standing rule under federal law disallowing human consumption of Schedule I controlled substances outside of FDA-approved research. The rules became effective April 21, 2003.

International Drug Enforcement Conference

The International Drug Enforcement Conference (IDEC) was established in 1983 in an effort to institutionalize regional cooperation among executive-level drug law enforcement officials from South, Central, and North America, as well as the Caribbean. IDEC is an "operationally oriented conference." In the earlier years, IDEC served as a forum to discuss country-specific enforcement problems and programs, and later to topical- related issues. The principal purpose of the yearly conference was to share drug-related intelligence and develop an operational strategy to successfully attack trafficking organizations at every link in the drug chain. IDEC XX was the first conference that included new members as well as observers from Asia, Europe, and Russia.

IDEC XVII: 1999, Washington, D.C., United States "Identifying and Attacking Major Trafficking Organizations"

IDEC XVIII: 2000, Buenos Aires, Argentina "Multi-Regional Investigations and Operations Targeting Major Traffickers"

IDEC XIX: 2001, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic "Multi-Regional Investigations and Operations Targeting Major Traffickers and Their Organizations"

IDEC XX: 2002, Santa Cruz, Bolivia "Combating Major International Drug Trafficking Organizations Through Global Cooperation and Partnership"

IDEC XXI: 2003, Panama, Panama City "International Counternarcotics and Terrorism"

Diversion

Many problems associated with drug abuse are the result of legitimately manufactured controlled substances being diverted from their lawful purpose into illicit drug traffic. By 2003, the number of people who abuse prescription drugs each year roughly equals the number who abuse cocaine—about 2 to 4 percent of the population. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, abuse of prescription drugs was a growing problem.

In 1998, 2.5 million Americans admitted abuse of prescription drugs. By 2001, that had almost doubled to 4.8 million.

OxyContin Abuse

The problem of prescription drug diversion was brought to the attention of many Americans because of the abuse of OxyContin that began in the late 1990s. OxyContin is a twelve-hour controlled release formulation of the Schedule II drug oxycodone, a powerful analgesic. The drug was introduced in 1996 and experienced exponential growth, becoming the number one controlled pharmaceutical in terms of sales by the year 2000. This rapid growth was accompanied by similar increases in diversion and abuse. The number of people reporting use of OxyContin for non-medical purposes at least once in their lifetime increased from 221,000 in 1999 to 399,000 in 2000 to 957,000 in 2001.

OxyContin was being diverted through fraudulent prescriptions, over-prescribing, theft and illegal sales, and "doctor shopping"—the practice of going to different doctors until one prescribes the narcotic the patient seeks. The drug had become a target for diverters and abusers due to the large amounts of active ingredients and the ability of abusers to easily compromise the controlled release mechanism. Simply crushing a tablet negates the timed effect of the drug, enabling abusers to swallow, inhale or inject the drug for a powerful morphine-like high. The Drug Abuse Warning Network reported that emergency room mentions for oxycodone, the active ingredient in OxyContin, were more than 100 percent higher in 2000 than in 1998.

OxyContin abuse appears to have begun in rural areas of the eastern United States, then spread to suburban and urban areas in many parts of the country. Numerous communities experienced an upswing in crime as a direct result of the OxyContin problem. Additionally, medical examiners reported overdose deaths associated with the abuse of oxycodone, the active ingredient in OxyContin.

In response to this escalating abuse and diversion, DEA embarked on a comprehensive OxyContin Action Plan that was implemented in FY 2001. This was the first DEA plan to target a specific brand of controlled substance. It focused on enforcement and regulatory investigations targeting key points of diversion. This plan brought the problem of diversion and abuse of OxyContin to the attention of numerous federal, state and local agencies; advisory committees; and to the general public through meetings, presentations, interviews, Demand Reduction and Internet sites.

The Action Plan had a significant impact. There was a four-fold increase in DEA OxyContin cases opened in FY 2001 over FY 2000. Arrests made in conjunction with OxyContin investigations rose seven fold from FY 2000 to FY 2001. OxyContin cases opened in FY 2001 and 2002 totaled 305, and arrests for the same period totaled 351.

Pain Management Initiative

For years, the issue of adequate pain management was a source of controversy in the medical community. DEA's role enforcing the Controlled Substances Act and regulating the most powerful narcotics used in the treatment of pain was viewed by some as inhibiting pain medication availability, when, in fact, both diversion control and pain management constitute health issues.

Recognizing the need to reconcile differences and work together to ensure optimum pain treatment as well as drug diversion control and drug abuse prevention, the Office of Diversion Control developed consensus on the issue with 21 prominent health organizations. The result was a joint statement entitled "Promoting Pain Relief and Preventing Abuse of Pain Medications: A Critical Balancing Act." Emphasizing that patients' ability to receive proper care, including pain management, should not be hindered by drug abuse prevention efforts, the statement pledges cooperation between the health care community and law enforcement, and states: "The roles of both health professionals and law enforcement personnel in maintaining this essential balance between patient care and diversion prevention are critical."

The Office of Diversion Control continues with its efforts to strike a balance regarding the use of narcotics to effectively treat pain. On-going relationships have been developed with renowned pain specialists and medical groups to develop educational materials for physicians and investigators concerning both diversion and acceptable medical practices. These efforts were essential and continued into 2003 as DEA confronted complex drug policy issues.

On-line Investigations Project

By the late 1990s and early 2000s, the worldwide web had become a ready source of pharmaceuticals including controlled substances. Many of these sales are suspect because they circumvent the doctor/patient relationship that is necessary for the legitimate prescribing of controlled substances. Realizing that this easily accessible outlet greatly increased the potential for the abuse and diversion of controlled substances, DEA needed to combat this problem in its early stages of development. However, searching the Internet for possible diversion activities was beyond the reach of Diversion Investigators, so it was evident that an integrated, focused, data-mining activity was necessary to identify, collect, and analyze this data.

To meet this need the Office of Diversion Control initiated the On-line Investigations Project. The purpose of the project is to develop a state-of-the-art computer system, maintain a data warehouse to store data collected from the worldwide web, and develop an information management system to manage the collection of web site text, image, and other relevant data from the worldwide web. The project will correlate information, detect patterns through link analysis and uncover trends by sifting through large amounts of data stored in the warehouse to provide constant and timely leads to the field. The On-line Investigations Project is expected to advance the investigative tools available to Diversion Investigators and have a dramatic impact on the ability to conduct investigations on the worldwide web to detect the diversion of controlled substances.

Targeting International Precursor Chemical Diversion: Operations Purple and Topaz, and Project PRISM

Illicit drug production is dependent upon the availability of legally produced, internationally sourced and marketed precursor and/or essential chemicals that have widespread industrial applications. The responsibility for dealing with issues of drug/chemical trafficking is shared by all nations. The ability to prevent chemicals from being diverted from legitimate commerce to clandestine drug manufacture is a powerful weapon in the global struggle against the spread of illegal narcotics and synthetic drugs. As a result, and in response to a resolution of the United Nations General Assembly Special Session, the Office of Diversion Control, together with regulatory and enforcement counterparts world wide, embarked on several informal, multilateral chemical control and enforcement initiatives. These initiatives showed marked success in preventing and detecting diversion of key chemicals used in the illicit production of cocaine, heroin, and amphetamine-type stimulant chemicals. These initiatives seek to identify, intercept, and prevent diversion attempts; identify criminals; gather intelligence on traffickers' diversion methods; take appropriate administrative, civil and/or criminal action; and obtain intelligence on chemical trafficking trends and shipping routes.

The first such initiative, Operation Purple, targets potassium permanganate, an oxidizing agent used in the clandestine cocaine process. Developed together with Germany, Operation Purple brought together the potassium permanganate producing, major importing, and illicit cocaine source countries. The operation tracked every shipment of potassium permanganate from the producing country through any transit countries, and ultimately, to the end-user. The success of this operation—the prevention of diversion of tons of the chemical, identification of "rogue" chemical companies and suspect individuals, gathering of intelligence on trafficker diversion methods, improved regulatory control of the chemical—led to two subsequent chemical targeting initiatives, Operation Topaz and Project PRISM.

Operation Topaz is an international initiative aimed at preventing the diversion of AA, a chemical utilized by traffickers in the illicit production of heroin. Topaz began on March 1, 2001, and is a cooperative effort by drug law enforcement and regulatory officials from 40 countries and regions, as well as the International Narcotics Control Board, ICPO/ Interpol, European Commission, and the World Customs Organization. Based on the premise that the prevention of the diversion of certain industrial chemicals to the clandestine production of illicit drugs is a critical element of any drug enforcement effort, Operation Topaz was developed as a long term monitoring program of AA.

Project PRISM aimed to assist Governments in developing and implementing operating procedures to more effectively control and monitor trade in amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS) precursors in order to prevent their diversion. Project PRISM targets multiple chemicals used in the clandestine production of ATS, including ephedrine and pseudoephedrine for illicit production of amphetamine and methamphetamine, and safrole and methylenedioxyphenyl-2-propanone for production of MDMA and its analogs.

All of these initiatives have resulted in a broad level of international agreement regarding the actions that must be taken to prevent chemical diversion, thereby impacting clandestine, illicit drug production.

Bolivian/DEA Seizure

Dr. Eddie Sfeir-Byron, Bolivian Drug Czar and Vice Minister for Social Defense, along with Bolivian officials witnessing destruction of 344 pounds of cocaine and 17 metric tons of coca leaf seized by DEA and Bolivan authorities.

Aviation

During 1998 to 2003, the Aviation Division recognized the ever increasing role aviation support was in obtaining DEA enforcement objectives. The Division implemented long-term strategic plans in order to provide more effective and efficient service. A component of these plans was an effort to modernize and standardize the fleet.

Older, maintenance–intensive aircraft were replaced with new Cessna 206 surveillance aircraft, Pilatus PC-12 cargo aircraft, and Eurocopter A-Star helicopters. Standardization was reflected in the acquisition of Beech Super King Air cargo aircraft, which replaced other aging turboprops.

The Aviation Division applied the same upgrade policy to its technology by purchasing new day/night video surveillance cameras to replace less dependable, less capable equipment. In 2003, the Division created a state-of-the–art Aviation Communications Center capable of tracking and flight-following all OA assets through the use of high frequency radio, very high frequency radio, and satellite communications. The Center facilitates the maximization of Aviation asset usage and produces cost savings by eliminating the requirement for contractor-flight following.

The Division expanded its representation and support assets in the Caribbean and poised itself for future mission expansion worldwide with the acquisition of a Learjet 60 aircraft. This aircraft significantly increased mission profiles and represented an asset that is capable of global deployment.

National Forensic Laboratory Information System (NFLIS)

As the nation's primary agency charged with enforcing the controlled substances laws and regulations of the United States, DEA invested in strategic and operational information sources at the Federal, State, local, and even foreign levels. The National Forensic Laboratory Information System (NFLIS), a DEA program that systematically collects drug analyses results and other associated information from state and local forensic laboratories nationwide, is enhancing DEA resources for carrying out its core mission. NFLIS has proved to be an effective information source for better understanding and monitoring our nation's drug problems. It improves DEA's ability to track national, regional, and local drug abuse trends, including providing timely and geographically specific information on emerging drug problems. NFLIS can also be used to identify specific drug characteristics including commonly reported abused drugcombinations.

One of the key advantages of NFLIS is that it collects forensic laboratory data verified by chemical analysis that has the highest degree of validity.

Sponsored by the Office of Diversion Control, NFLIS is the only database available in the U.S. that provides actual and estimate nationwide and regional scientifically validated data on drugs associated with law enforcement activity. Initiated in 1997 to provide reliable data for drug scheduling, NFLIS has grown into a fully operational system with interest from other DEA offices and government agencies. By 2003, 32 out of 50 state laboratory systems and 48 out of 72 local laboratories participated in the NFLIS; over 800,000 drug analyses results were collected during 2001. Participation in NFLIS was totally voluntary, but the ultimate goal is to enlist all of the approximately 300 forensic laboratories.

Training

From 1999 to 2003, DEA's Training Division continued its mission to ensure that DEA employees were provided the technical and professional competencies and ethical and leadership skills to accomplish the DEA mission. This training took place at DEA's new Justice Training Center, which opened in April of 1999 in Quantico, Virginia.

One of the most significant developments at the DEA Training Academy was the establishment of the new Clandestine Laboratory Tactical Training School in Fiscal Year 2000. The course is needed because of the increase in the number of clandestine laboratory seizures throughout the country, with the corresponding escalation of problems confronting state and local agencies that are called to the scene of these laboratories. Often referred to as "chemical time-bombs," these labs present unique dangers to users, neighbors, law enforcement, and the surrounding environment. Often, it is state or local police who first encounter these laboratories and must ensure that they are investigated, dismantled, and disposed of appropriately and safely.

The class is designed for Special Agents and narcotics officers who are involved in clandestine laboratory raids, but had limited tactical training and experience. Their training included the full use of issued equipment including air purifying respirators and self-contained breathing apparatus.

The DEA Basic Clandestine Laboratory Certification School is the most widely recognized law enforcement sponsored clandestine lab training course that met OSHA standards. The Unit also conducted an Advanced Site Safety Officer school for DEA and state and local officers. This school is designed to certify attendees as Clandestine laboratory Site Safety Officers, an OSHA requirement for every clandestine Laboratory site. Advanced assessment and investigative techniques are taught at this school.

From 1999 to 2003, DEA continued its mission to conduct and sponsor counternarcotics training to thousands of foreign law enforcement counterparts. Since 1969, DEA and its predecessor agencies trained officials in more than 243 countries. DEA continued its participation at the four International Law Enforcement Academies, including one in San Jose, Costa Rica, scheduled for opening later in 2003. These academies have been successful in increasing the professionalism of participants through the exchange of law enforcement techniques and investigative strategies and in strengthening transnational crime fighting.

Technology

DEA's secure, centralized computer network, Firebird, which standardizes investigative reporting, case file inventories, administrative functions, and electronic communications, was successfully deployed to approximately 97% of DEA's offices (domestic and foreign) by 2003. This was accomplished in part by the Small Firebird Initiative that provided full Firebird functionality to those DEA offices where the installation of the Firebird desktop was either cost prohibitive or a security issue. Only those offices with security or facilities related issues did not have Firebird connectivity. In addition, Firebird technical refreshment of all division network and shared servers was completed and the replacement of workstations was initiated.

DEA was the first component in the Department of Justice to electronically transmit information through the Department's Joint Automated Booking System (JABS) to the FBI's Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) through the Firebird Booking Station (FBS). FBS provides rapid identification of individuals under arrest or detention through automation of the booking process and electronic access to IAFIS, with an average response time of 30 minutes; it minimizes duplication of data entry during booking; and it promotes data sharing of arrest records among Department law enforcement agencies and other authorized parties through an interface with the Nationwide JABS.

Investigative Management Process and Case Tracking (IMPACT), an automated case management system, was developed to support DEA Special Agents, Intelligence Analysts, and Diversion Investigators in their daily case management activities. IMPACT was designed to improve mission performance and achieve greater operational efficiency in the establishment, recording, accessibility, and analysis of information pertaining to DEA investigations. In 2003, IMPACT was deployed as a pilot to the Phoenix and Miami Divisions with over 800 field users.

DEA transitioned to a full, on-line Electronic File Room. All Investigative Reports from 2002 forward and millions of earlier records are available for full text search from the desktop of any DEA office with access to Firebird or SFI.

Communication capabilities were improved through the use of Internet technologies and new trusted dial-up communication capabilities. A Web Architecture was developed and used to publish the Administrator's Newsletter, providing improved access to information available on the DEA Website. In addition, by 2003, DEA was using the DOJ/FBI sponsored Law Enforcement Online (LEO) secure dial-up network to provide trusted access to and among federal and state law enforcement organizations.

DEA implemented a Centralized Call Data Delivery system for intercepted cellular pen register data for the field. This system enables each division to obtain cellular call data without the need to establish a dedicated connection to individual cellular companies, thus generating substantial cost savings to DEA.

Laboratories

Reaccredidation (1999)

In 1999, the Office of Forensic Sciences' laboratory system was reaccredited by the American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors/Laboratory Accreditation Board (ASCLD/LAB). The first accreditation was completed in 1994. This accomplishment was significant because DEA laboratories were recognized as conforming to national and international technical and operational standards. The areas of forensic drug analysis, fingerprint examination and Source Determination Program analysis (tablet and capsules toolmark examinations) were the technical specialties accredited by ASCLD/LAB.

Strategic Planning Conference (2000)

In 2000, the Office of Forensic Sciences held a Strategic Planning Conference at the Justice Training Center in Quantico, Virginia. Attendees focused on analyzing the needs and expectations of the DEA Laboratory System's many customers and developing ways to meet them. Specific goals, objectives, and strategies to improve service, strengthen the organizational structure, utilize technology more effectively, and to obtain additional facilities and resources were identified. The resulting Strategic Plan helped the laboratory system position itself over the next five years to meet future expected, and unexpected, challenges in the coming decade.

The International Drug Profiling Conference (2002)

The International Drug Profiling Conference (IDPC) convened in December 2002 and was the first-ever forensic science conference to bring delegates together to define and standardize "drug profiling" to meet the enforcement and intelligence requirements of international drug law enforcement. The IDPC was comprised of delegates from the United States, Australia, Great Britain, Finland, Sweden, Germany, Japan, Switzerland, Hong Kong, the United Nations Drug Control Program, and The Netherlands. The first IDPC ended with an agreement among delegates that they would set realistic and achievable goals that could be implemented internationally. By consensus, the first two goals the delegates chose to pursue were the development of drug profiling databases and the development of programs dealing with the profiling of heroin and Amphetamine Type Substances.

New DEA Laboratory Construction (2002 and 2003)

During 2002 and 2003, DEA replaced four of its aging laboratory facilities—three regional laboratories and the Special Testing and Research Laboratory. The four new state-of-the-art laboratories are located in Dallas, Texas; Dulles, Virginia; Largo, Maryland; and Vista, California. These newly constructed multimillion-dollar modern laboratories are capable of providing a full line of analytical support to drug law enforcement agents.

Laboratory System Reorganization (2003)

In 2003, through the support of DEA's Executive Management, several changes were implemented that were identified as critical needs in the Laboratory System's FY2000-2005 Strategic Plan. The changes included reorganizing the Office of Forensic Sciences to create a Quality Assurance Manager position and a second Associate Deputy Assistant Administrator position at Headquarters. The reorganization also affected the laboratories by creating an Associate Laboratory Director position in each laboratory and by creating a new Digital Evidence Laboratory for the forensic examination of digital evidence.

Creation of DEA's Digital Evidence Laboratory (2003)

DEA's commitment to supporting its drug investigations in the 21st Century achieved a major milestone with the February 2003 establishment of a Digital Evidence Laboratory within its Office of Forensic Sciences. In the short period of just nine years, DEA built a world class digital forensic program from what first started out as a small engineering program, that is capable of handling the full range of digital evidence including computers, servers, Personal Digital Assistants, Global Positioning System navigational devices, satellite phones, two-way pager devices, and cell phones. This new laboratory provides needed forensic support at the field level to acquire digital evidence from drug investigations thereby leaving no stone unturned. The elevation of the digital evidence function to a laboratory status organizational level reflects the present and future importance that this relatively new forensic science plays in DEA investigations in the new millennium.

The Scientific Working Group for the Analysis of Seized Drugs

The mission of the Scientific Working Group for the Analysis of Seized Drugs (SWGDRUG) is to recommend minimum standards for the forensic examination of seized drugs and seek their international acceptance. SWGDRUG is a cooperative effort between the DEA's Office of Forensic Sciences and the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) to address the following:

- Recommend minimum standards for forensic drug analysts' knowledge, skills, and abilities.
- Promote the professional development of forensic drug analysts.
- Provide a means of information exchange within the forensic drug analyst community.
- Promote the highest ethical standards of practitioners in all areas of forensic drug analysis.
- Recommend minimum standards for drug examinations and reporting.
- Establish quality assurance recommendations.
- Seek international acceptance of SWGDRUG minimum standards.

The SWGDRUG core committee is comprised of representatives from federal laboratories and regional forensic science associations in the United States, the European Network of Forensic Science Institutes (ENFSI), the United Nations Drug Control Program, Australia, Great Britain, Japan, Canada and Germany. A forensic science educator and a representative from an internationally recognized standards writing organization also participate on the committee. The SWGDRUG process evolved since 1997 to be recognized as one of the most successful scientific working groups in the world.

Sub-Regional Laboratories and Mobile Operations

DEA's first sub-regional laboratory became operational in FY 1997 in support of the Midwest High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA). This laboratory was established to bring analytical and support services closer to the source of illicit drug activity—clandestine manufacture of methamphetamine. In 1999, the laboratory was relocated from the Food and Drug Laboratory in Kansas City, Kansas, to the Kansas City Regional Crime Laboratory in Kansas City, Missouri.

In Fiscal Year 1999, DEA opened a second sub-regional laboratory in San Juan, Puerto Rico. This laboratory provides analytical and support services to the Caribbean Division as well as other federal agencies within the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. This laboratory is collocated with the Food and Drug Administration Laboratory.

In Fiscal Year 2000, DEA took delivery of a 38-foot mobile laboratory. Equipped with a fume hood, bench space, support infrastructure, and appropriate analytical instrumentation, the laboratory is capable of operation by either shore-power through a 100 amp, 200 volt shore line or an on-board diesel generator. In early 2001, the mobile laboratory was deployed to Tucson, Arizona, where two chemists provided additional forensic support along the Southwest Border of the United States. In late 2002, the mobile laboratory was moved to El Paso, Texas to provide much needed forensic laboratory support in that region.

Microgram

The 35th Anniversary Issue of Microgram was published in 2002. This periodical has progressed from a sporadically published "communication" from the Bureau of Drug Abuse Control and Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs in the late 1960s to the dawn of electronic posting by the DEA in the 21st century. By 2003, over 1,400 offices around the world received Microgram each month.

In FY 2002, the Office of Forensic Sciences determined that there was a need to convert Microgram into two separate publications entitled Microgram Bulletin and Microgram Journal. Microgram Bulletin includes all the material previously included in Microgram, except scientific articles. Additional and/or expanded information was also incorporated into Microgram Bulletin. Microgram Journal is a quarterly journal dedicated solely to the publication of scientific articles on the detection and analysis of suspected controlled substances for forensic/law enforcement purposes. It was the intent of the Editor and the Office of Forensic Sciences that Microgram Journal become a premier scientific journal in this discipline.

Additionally, starting with the January 2003 issues, the Bulletin and the Journal moved from a law enforcement restricted status to an open, unclassified status, and both were posted on DEA's Internet website.

Inspections

DEA's Inspection Division is responsible for maintaining the integrity of DEA and providing security for its employees. DEA's integrity system is comprised of three primary components within the Inspection Division: the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR), the Office of Inspections, and the Office of Security Programs.

Technological upgrades and resource enhancements were acquired, enabling the Inspection Division to more effectively and efficiently carry out its mandate. The vulnerability of our infrastructure was made evident by the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. The challenges posed by terrorism and new technology available to criminals were matched by DEA's security apparatus.

DEA remained committed to ensuring the integrity and professionalism of its employees and thoroughly investigated all credible allegations of employee misconduct. In October 2000, OPR opened a field office in Dallas, Texas. DEA's presence along the Southwest Border and the power and influence of drug trafficking organizations that operate in this area necessitated the expansion of OPR there.

The Office of Inspections, through the annual Division Inspection Program (DIP) and the three-year cyclical on-site inspection process, ensures that managers maintain the highest-level of operational, financial, and organizational integrity, as well as compliance with internal and external controls, policies and procedures, Federal laws, and sound auditing practices. IN investigates all shooting incidents related to DEA Special Agents and DEA-sponsored State and Local Task Force Law Enforcement personnel to determine the circumstances involved and accountability of an incident. Due to a major IN organizational realignment and the establishment of the DIP and cyclical on-site processes, IN assisted managers in identifying issues that improved operational and financial efficiency and effectiveness in all DEA program areas and offices.

The most dramatic changes in the Inspection Division were in the Office of Security Programs (IS). This office experienced significant growth in recent years. By the end of 1997, the office had a staff of 28 employees. As of spring 2003, the staff had expanded six-fold to 189 employees and contractors. The office is now divided into three sections: Information Security, Physical Security, and Personnel Security— each headed by a Supervisory Special Agent.

IS provides a wide variety of continuing security services and equipment to the entire agency and also inspects and issues compliance orders to headquarters, domestic and foreign offices with regard to security and safety. Furthermore, with the expansion, IS offers more specialized, technically forward services and operations.

As of 2003, IS has several initiatives in progress, including an aggressive reinvestigation program and intrusion detection system. This system has auditing capabilities to monitor the utilization of computer systems, which enhances early detection of integrity-related issues.

Killed in the Line of Duty

Royce D. Tramel
Died on August 28, 2000
DEA Special Agent Tramel was assigned to the Dallas Office. He was struck by a car and killed.

Alice Faye Hall-Walton
Died on March 1, 2001
Diversion Investigator Hall-Walton was assigned to the Dallas office. She was killed in an automobile accident.

DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION



During the early years of the 21st century, DEA realized significant success in combating the national methamphetamine epidemic and disrupting and dismantling drug cartels.

2003-2008

During the early years of the 21st century, DEA realized significant success combating the national methamphetamine epidemic, attributable to a number of factors including legislation adopted by 43 states that curtailed availability of the three meth precursor chemicals and similar national legislation, the Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act of 2005. Contributing as well to impacting the U.S. meth problem were focused enforcement efforts by DEA and successful investigations such as Operations Northern Star, Imperial Emperor, and Wildfire; domestic initiatives, including increasing meth priority target investigations, and expanding the primary focus of DEA clan lab enforcement teams; and international initiatives, including, in particular, partnership efforts with the Government of Mexico to target the most significant meth trafficking organizations on both sides of the border. These concerted efforts paid off: meth superlab seizures in the United States declined 93 percent between 2002 and 2007 and small toxic lab seizures likewise declined 73 percent in 2007 from a peak in 2003; 2007 workplace drug tests showed a 50 percent decline in nationwide employee meth use compared to 2005; and meth price and purity data from DEA's System to Retrieve Intelligence from Drug Evidence showed a 19 percent decline in meth purity between 2007 and 2008, and a 56 percent increase in price per pure gram over the same timeframe.

In the international arena, increased drug law enforcement cooperation with the Government of Mexico yielded additional positive results: since assuming office in December 2006, the government of Mexican President Felipe Calderon arrested a number of high-level drug traffickers and in 2007 extradited an unprecedented 83 criminals, including the kingpin of the Gulf Cartel, Osiel Cardenas-Guillen. DEA investigations led to the extradition in January 2007 of 15 criminals from Mexico, many of them leaders in Mexico's four major drug cartels. Cooperation with authorities in Colombia also yielded impressive results: Colombian authorities made unprecedented progress against the narco-terrorist organizations FARC, AUC, and North Valley Cartel, capturing, killing, or extraditing nine Consolidated Priority Organization Target (CPOT)-designated targets who were members of those organizations. In addition, the infamous Cali Cartel followed in 2006 the dismantled Medellin Cartel when its remaining leaders, brothers Miguel and Gilberto Rodriguez-Orejuela, pled guilty in U.S. court to drug smuggling and money laundering charges.

Special Agents		DEA Budget	
2003	4,841	2003	$1.9 billion
2008	5,235	2008	$2.4 billion

DEA's Drug Flow Attack Strategy implemented in mid-2005 yielded promising results designed to significantly disrupt the flow of drugs, money, and chemicals between the source zones in Latin America and the United States through aggressive, well-planned, and coordinated enforcement operations with host-nation counterparts in global source countries, transit zones, and arrival zones. Successful operations that were part of this strategy included All Inclusive 2005-2007 and Imperial Emperor. The average U.S. price per pure gram of cocaine three months following Operation All Inclusive implementation was found to have increased 43 percent compared with the three months prior. During the first three quarters of 2007, the average U.S. price per pure gram of cocaine increased 44 percent, while average purity fell 15 percent, indicating the success of the Drug Flow Attack Strategy's large-scale operations.

On the other side of the globe, DEA expanded on its Operation Containment multilateral strategy, begun in 2002, to choke off the flow of drugs and precursor chemicals into and out of Afghanistan, training and mentoring Afghan narcotics officers via Foreign-deployed Advisory Support Team personnel and assisting in operations that resulted in 33 arrests of targets for violations of Afghan and U.S. narcotics laws and/or terrorist-related offenses. DEA investigations led, in 2005, to the first time to successfully taking custody of a drug trafficker, CPOT Haji Baz Mohammad, in the United States, and the U.S. arrest of Afghan warlord and CPOT narcotics trafficking co-conspirator Haji Bashir Noorzai (convicted on Sept. 29 in the Southern District of New York). Arrests and U.S. custody of additional Afghan heroin and opium traffickers followed.

These five years marked a period of record-breaking domestic and foreign assets seized: by 2007, a total $3.5 billion was seized, compared to $1.6 billion in 2005. There were also record-breaking single cocaine and cash seizures, both in 2007: $207 million in cash seized from a chemical broker based in Mexico who was supplying chemicals to Mexican cartels to manufacture meth; and 23.5 metric tons of cocaine seized by Mexican authorities in Manzanillo, Mexico, based upon DEA-supplied intelligence. A difficult challenge to DEA that unfolded during these years was prescription drug abuse and diversion. The source of supply for these drugs of abuse typically was not a street dealer, but the medicine cabinets of private residences and the Internet. Illegal cyber pharmacies facilitated the problem, as evidenced by the fact that only about 11 percent of the prescriptions dispensed daily by a traditional brick and mortar pharmacy involved controlled substances, while 95 percent of the prescriptions filled each day by a typical cyber pharmacy were for controlled substances, primarily pain killers. In addition to directing expanded cyber crime investigative capabilities toward this problem, DEA also focused regulatory and enforcement efforts on wholesale distributors who were linked to rogue Internet pharmacies that handled far more controlled substances than the many individual pharmacies they supplied. This put a chokehold in the Internet supply chain by cutting off the source of supply used by rogue Internet pharmacies.

DEA

Karen P. Tandy
Administrator
July 2003 - November 2007

On July 31, 2003, Karen P. Tandy was unanimously confirmed by the U.S. Senate as ninth Administrator of DEA and sworn in on September 17, 2003. Ms. Tandy was a career Department of Justice (DOJ) attorney prior to her appointment as DEA Administrator. She had been serving as Director of the Department's Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF), to which she was appointed in 2001.

Other positions Ms. Tandy held at DOJ since her initial appointment in 1979 as Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia and in the Western District of Washington included Chief of DOJ's Asset Forfeiture Office Litigation Unit, Deputy Chief of the Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Section, and DOJ Associate Deputy Attorney General.

In Ms. Tandy's Senate confirmation testimony, she stated her intention to apply her OCDETF experience to the DEA mission: "Using our resources to go after, and dismantle, and disrupt the most significant drug trafficking organizations are what DEA is all about and what OCDETF has been about for 20 years." Upon assuming leadership of DEA, Ms. Tandy immediately established financial investigations as a top priority.

Over her next four years in office, DEA proceeded to exceed all previous annual asset seizure and asset denial totals, attaining a total of $3.5 billion in revenue denied, and $1.9 billion in total assets seized for 2007. Ms. Tandy also presided over substantial increases in domestic and international priority organization target investigations as well as Consolidated Priority Target indictments, arrests, and extraditions.

Ms. Tandy retired on November 10, 2007.

DEA

Michele M. Leonhart
Acting Administrator
Deputy Administrator
March 2004 - Present

Special Agent Michele M. Leonhart became DEA's Acting Administrator on November 11, 2007. On April 15, 2008, President George W. Bush announced his intention to nominate her as DEA Administrator. Previously, she had been unanimously confirmed as the Deputy Administrator of the DEA by the U.S. Senate on March 8, 2004, following her nomination by President Bush.

Ms. Leonhart, a career DEA Special Agent, is the chief operating officer of the $2.6 billion agency, responsible for all enforcement, intelligence, administrative and regulatory operations, and approximately 11,000 employees across the U.S. and in 87 foreign offices. Ms. Leonhart is currently the Acting DEA Administrator and has served in that role since November 2007.

Prior to becoming DEA Deputy Administrator, Ms. Leonhart held several positions within DEA's Senior Executive Service (SES). She was the Special Agent in Charge of DEA's Los Angeles Field Division from 1998-2003. In that capacity, she commanded one of DEA's largest Field Divisions and was responsible for all enforcement and administrative operations in the Los Angeles area, as well as Nevada, Hawaii, Guam, and Saipan. She previously held the position of Special Agent in Charge of DEA's San Francisco Field Division from 1997-1998. Ms. Leonhart's first appointment within the SES was in 1996 when she spearheaded DEA's Special -Agent Recruitment efforts at DEA Headquarters.

As a career DEA Special Agent, Ms. Leonhart held several key positions as she moved through the ranks of DEA. In 1995 she was promoted to the position of Assistant Special Agent in Charge of the Los Angeles Field Division, responsible for Southwest Border enforcement operations and division administrative functions. Between 1993 and 1995, Ms. Leonhart held management positions within DEA Headquarters to include Career Board Executive Secretary, Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) Inspector, and Staff Coordinator in the Operations Division. Ms. Leonhart's first supervisory position was as Group Supervisor of an enforcement group in DEA's San Diego Field Division. Prior to that, Ms. Leonhart initiated major drug investigations and conspiracy cases in Minneapolis and St. Louis, and served as a DEA Special Agent recruiter.

While at DEA, she attended Boston University's Leadership Institute, and is the recipient of numerous awards and commendations, to include the Law Enforcement Exploring William H. Spurgeon Award in 2006, the Women in Federal Law Enforcement Outstanding Federal Law Enforcement Employee Award in 2005, the rank of Distinguished Executive in 2004 and the Presidential Rank Award for Meritorious Service from President Bush in 2005, the Presidential Rank Award for Meritorious Service from President Clinton in 2000, and the DEA Administrator's Award in 1993.

Ms. Leonhart began her law enforcement career as a Baltimore City Police Officer after graduating from college in Minnesota with a B.S. degree in Criminal Justice in 1978. A native of Minnesota, Ms. Leonhart is married and has two sons.

Operation Trifecta and Indictment of Ismael Zambada-Garcia

DEA Special Operations Division (SOD)-led, OCDETF investigation "Operation Trifecta" was initiated shortly after the December 2001 seizure of 9,291 kilograms of cocaine from the fishing vessel Macel, off the Pacific coast of Mexico. As a result of the Macel seizure and several ongoing DEA and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) operations, the investigation focused a nationwide effort on the communications of the domestic cells of the Zambada-Garcia organization. More than 80 separate investigations across the country were coordinated over a 19-month period. Those investigations led to the arrests on July 31, 2003, of over 240 individuals, and the seizure of 11,759 kilograms of cocaine, 24,409 pounds of marijuana, nearly 108 pounds of methamphetamine, and more than $8.3 million. These multi-national investigations revealed the vast scope of the Zambada-Garcia organization's operations, ranging from the organization's Colombian sources of supply, to Mexican maritime and border smugglers, to domestic distribution cells operating in various cities in the United States. "The success of Operation Trifecta is based on unprecedented cooperation between Mexican law enforcement and U.S. counterparts...Information sharing reached new levels. DEA Special Agents, working side by side with agents and officers from 7 federal agencies and over 60 state and local departments, crippled the powerful Zambada organization," said DEA's Acting Administrator William Simpkins.

Ismael Zambada-Garcia was indicted in July 2003. The indictment alleged that between August 2001 and June 2002, the Zambada-Garcia organization delivered 1,003 kilograms of cocaine with an estimated value of $17 million to the New York/New Jersey area; 1,770 kilograms of cocaine with an estimated value of $30 million to the Chicago area; and 23 kilograms of cocaine with an estimated value of $391,000 to California. Zambada-Garcia emerged as one of the top drug smugglers in Mexico after a bloody battle with the Arellano-Felix Organization, the once-powerful Tijuana cartel, and consolidated his control over the smuggling routes from the Mexican state of Sonora into Arizona.

The Arellano Felix Organization and Operation United Eagles

On June 3, 2004, in an impressive show of force and without incident, 67 specially trained Mexican Federal Agents arrested two key Arellano-Felix organization (AFO) lieutenants, Efrain Perez and Jorge Aureliano-Felix. The action came as a result of "Operation United Eagles," initiated in July 2003, that combined the efforts of the U.S. and Mexican governments to aggressively pursue, locate, and apprehend indicted CPOTs, including Eduardo and Javier Arellano-Felix and other members of the AFO, operating or living in the United States or Mexico. Operation United Eagles was successful in apprehending numerous Tier I (CPOTs) and Tier II (first and second line operational and financial supervisors) targets.

The AFO carried out numerous murders and kidnappings and corrupted state and municipal police officers and federal police officials: law enforcement intelligence showed the AFO was responsible for more than 100 drug-related murders in the United States and Mexico, including rival drug traffickers, suspected cooperators, uncooperative Mexican law enforcement and military personnel, and members of the Mexican news media who printed stories unfavorable to the AFO. DEA systematically pursued members of the AFO since the 1980s. Seven brothers and four sisters of the Arellano-Felix family inherited the Tijuana Cartel from Miguel Angel Felix Gallardo in 1989, after his arrest for drug trafficking. Gallardo has been indicted in the United States for his involvement in the torture and brutal murder of DEA Special Agent Enrique "Kiki" Camarena.

The AFO is alleged to have operated one of the world's most violent criminal drug trafficking organizations during the 1990s and early 2000s. It is believed to have been responsible for the brutal execution of special prosecutor Jose "Pepe" Patino Moreno and two of his colleagues. According to Mexican investigators, Patino, a special prosecutor targeting the AFO for the Mexican Attorney General's drug unit, and two fellow agents endured brutal torture by medieval methods. The AFO was also accused of recruiting, training, and arming groups of bodyguards and assassins who were responsible for protecting their leaders. The AFO transported and distributed multi-ton quantities of cocaine and marijuana, as well as significant quantities of heroin and methamphetamine through Tijuana to the San Diego area. They used many and varied smuggling methods, including sending numerous small loads, known as shotgunning, concealing loads in commercial and passenger vehicles, couriers who concealed smaller amounts on their persons, transportation through underground tunnels, and body carriers riding on commercial buses.

"Chapo" Guzman Reward

On December 20, 2004, DEA announced up to a $5 million reward through the State Department's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs for information leading to the arrest and prosecution of Joaquin Guzman-Loera, a.k.a. "Chapo" Guzman. Guzman remains wanted in the Southern District of California for conspiracy to import cocaine, possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, money laundering and criminal forfeiture. In the 1980s, Guzman was associated with Miguel Angel Felix-Gallardo, a.k.a. El Padrino, head of the most powerful drug trafficking group in Mexico at that time. He left the El Padrino organization and soon gained notoriety as the head of his own international criminal enterprise.

Guzman was known for his use of a sophisticated tunnel located in Douglas, Arizona to smuggle cocaine from Mexico into the United States in the early 1990s. In 1993, a 7.3 ton load of his cocaine destined for the United States, concealed in cans of chili peppers, was seized in Tecate, Baja California Norte, Mexico. In May of that year, members of the rival Arellano-Felix Organization coordinated a failed attempt to assassinate Guzman in Guadalajara, Jalisco, Mexico, which resulted in the much publicized murder of the prominent Catholic Cardinal Jan Jesus Posadas-Ocampo.

At about the same time, an even more sophisticated tunnel that stretched from Tijuana, Baja California Norte, Mexico to the Otay Mesa, California area was discovered. The following month, Guzman was arrested in Mexico on homicide and drug charges. In January 2001, he escaped from a maximum security prison located in Mexico and quickly regained full control of his internationally based drug trafficking organization.

WANTED
Drug Enforcement Administration
1-866-DEA-PHNX
ALL CALLS STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

In November 2003, DEA unveiled two billboards along Interstate 10 in southern Arizona seeking information and offering a reward for the capture of Mexican drug lord Ismael "El Mayo" Zambada-Garcia.

Oscar Arriola-Marquez, Mexican Drug Kingpin, Arrested

On February 3, 2006, Mexican drug kingpin Oscar Arturo Arriola-Marquez, head of an international drug distribution network whose operations extended from Mexico across the U.S. border and throughout the United States, was arrested in Mexico as a result of a joint operation between DEA and the Mexican authorities. The Arriola-Marquez cartel was a violent criminal organization responsible for trafficking thousands of kilos of cocaine and marijuana into the United States and laundering the resulting illegal proceeds. As part of this investigation, Mexican government officials seized approximately $32 million in assets from the Arriola-Marquez cartel. The cartel was investigated under the Money Trail Initiative for its role in laundering drug money proceeds.

Francisco Javier Arellano-Felix Arrested

On August 14, 2006, AFO leader Francisco Javier Arellano-Felix was arrested by the U.S. Coast Guard in international waters on a recreational vessel off the coast of Mexico based on DEA intelligence. Also taken into custody and arrested at the same time was Manuel Arturo Villarreal-Heredia, a member and one of Arellano's top six under bosses, in command of crews that carried out enforcement operations and drug trafficking activities on behalf of the AFO. Both men were subsequently indicted and charged with racketeering, drug trafficking, money laundering offenses, and with operating a continuing criminal enterprise, under which they are eligible for the death penalty.

Francisco Javier Arellano-Felix is the youngest of four Arellano-Felix brothers who controlled the Arellano-Felix drug cartel since the late 1980s. He was put in charge of AFO daily Tijuana/Mexicali operations in 2000, and assumed control of the cartel in March of 2002 following the incapacitation of his older brothers Benjamin (arrested in Mexico in March 2002) and Ramon (killed in Mexico in February 2002). Chief of Operations Michael Braun said at a press conference announcing Javier's arrest: "For over a decade, the Arellano-Felix family dominated the Mexican drug trade and flooded our nation with literally tons of cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamine. That dynasty, built on drugs and violence, began to topple in 2002 with the death of one Arellano-Felix brother and the arrest of another, and was further weakened with the 2003 indictments of the major remaining organization leaders.

The DEA has pursued those leaders relentlessly ever since. The capture of Francisco Javier Arellano-Felix is the successful culmination of years of hard work by the Drug Enforcement Administration and our counterparts here and in Mexico ...We've got this brutal organization in a chokehold and we're not letting up."

Gulf Cartel Boss Extradited with 14 Other Mexican Traffickers

On January 19, 2007, Osiel Cardenas-Guillen, head of Mexico's Gulf Cartel that controlled large-scale marijuana and cocaine trafficking from Mexico to the United States, was extradited to the United States, along with 14 other of the world's most violent and ruthless criminals. Cardenas-Guillen was captured on March 14, 2003, by law enforcement in Mexico, with the assistance of DEA, the FBI, and U.S. Customs. Cardenas-Guillen was one of the most wanted, feared, and violent drug traffickers in the world. The Gulf Cartel was responsible for the transportation of thousands of kilograms of drugs into the United States from Colombia through Mexico's Northeastern region. Administrator Tandy said of the historic extraditions: "It was a clean sweep-those extradited include leaders from all four of Mexico's major drug cartels: a gatekeeper who controlled drug smuggling across the border for the Juarez cartel; two top echelon lieutenants of the Tijuana cartel; the kingpin of the Gulf Cartel, Osiel Cardenas-Guillen; and two high-level lieutenants, two mid-level lieutenants, and both a high and mid-level transportation coordinator for the Federation. These extraditions are unprecedented in the history of Mexico."

Traffickers constructed this sandbag bridge to transport drugs via vehicles across the U.S.-Mexican border.

Operation Imperial Emperor

Operation Imperial Emperor, a long-term investigation into a Mexican drug trafficking organization and its U.S.-based distribution cells, resulted in the arrest of more than 400 individuals nationwide and the seizure of $45 million and 18 tons of drugs. The operation, which concluded on February 28, 2007, targeted the Mexico-based Victor Emilio Cazares-Gastellum, a.k.a. "Victor Emilio Cazares-Salazar," drug trafficking organization, which had been supplying multi-ton quantities of cocaine, as well as large amounts of methamphetamine and marijuana, monthly to distribution cells throughout the United States. The organization had also laundered millions of dollars generated from this illegal activity.

The 20-month DEA-led investigation resulted in the seizure of approximately $45.2 million in U.S. currency, 27,229 pounds of marijuana, 9,512 pounds of cocaine, 705 pounds of methamphetamine, 227 pounds of pure methamphetamine or "ice," and 11 pounds of heroin. "The Cazares-Gastellum drug empire that rose to such heights of power in only two years, fell today at the hands of DEA and our partners," said Administrator Tandy. "This sprawling drug domain, headquartered in Mexico, penetrated deep into all corners of this country. Today we ripped out this empire's U.S. infrastructure from its commanders and transportation coordinators to its local distribution cells across the country and stripped it of $45 million in cash."

$207 Million Seized in Mexico City

On March 20, 2007, $207 million was seized in Mexico, the largest single drug cash seizure the world had ever seen. This record-setting feat was the result of tremendous police work by Mexican law enforcement in collaboration with DEA. The money was seized from chemical brokers who were supplying chemicals to Mexican cartels to manufacture huge quantities of methamphetamine—most destined for the United States. Mexican law enforcement seized the money from the residence of Zhenli Ye Gon, the owner of a pharmaceutical wholesale business based in Mexico City.

Ye Gon was arrested by DEA on July 23, 2007, in Maryland on drug and money laundering charges for allegedly conspiring to aid and abet the manufacturing of methamphetamine, knowing that it would be imported into the United States. Administrator Karen Tandy explained the significance of the arrest by saying: "With the arrest of Zhenli Ye Gon, we've apprehended not only the man behind the money, but the man behind the meth. He may never have touched the drugs, but he made it all possible, facilitating the massive meth trade by brokering chemicals to kingpins."

DEA, Coast Guard Make Record Maritime Cocaine Seizure

On March 21, 2007, the DEA and the U.S. Coast Guard announced the record maritime seizure of 42,845 pounds of cocaine aboard the Panamanian flagged motor vessel Gatun off the coast of Panama. A Coast Guard boarding team conducted a search and discovered the cocaine hidden in two containers aboard the ship. The 14 Panamanian and Mexican crewmembers of the Gatun were arrested and transferred to the United States and Panama for prosecution. The cocaine denied Mexican drug lords an estimated $300 million. Previously, the largest cocaine seizures by the Coast Guard were: 30,109 pounds from the stateless vessel Lina Maria in 2004; 26,397 pounds from the Cambodian-flagged vessel Svesda Maru in 2001; and 26,369 pounds from the Belize-flagged vessel San Jose also in 2004. —and 23.5 metric tons of cocaine seized by Mexican authorities in Manzanillo, Mexico, based upon DEA-supplied intelligence.

Operation Funk 49

On December 6, 2007, the culmination of Operation Funk 49 was announced by DEA San Diego. Operation Funk 49 was a three-year undercover investigation targeting an international drug trafficking operation originating in Guadalajara, Mexico with a vast distribution network based in San Diego County. The operation began in April 2004, after a tip to law enforcement from a low-level drug user. Investigators followed the drug trail to key distributors in San Diego. During the undercover operation, law enforcement targeted dozens of suspects and continued to patiently follow the complicated drug distribution web to cities across the country. The drug organization smuggled large quantities of methamphetamine, cocaine, and heroin from Guadalajara, Mexico, through Tijuana, Mexico into the United States. From there, it was distributed across the country. In San Diego County, more than a dozen warrants were issued, resulting in the arrests of 59 individuals and the confiscation of two pounds of heroin, 1,246 pounds of cocaine, 604 pounds of methamphetamine, and more than $9.1 million in cash.

Fabio Ochoa Convicted and Sentenced on U. S. Drug Charges

On May 30, 2003, Fabio Ochoa, who, along with his brothers, Pablo Escobar, and others made up the Medellin Cartel in the 1980s, was convicted in Miami federal court on drug conspiracy and money-laundering charges based on his role in a conspiracy to ship 30 tons of cocaine per month into the United States from 1997-1999. On August 26, 2003, he was sentenced to 365 months in prison. Said Miami SAC Tom Raffanello at his conviction: "It's tremendously gratifying, and I speak for agents past and present. The conviction should send shock waves to his compadres." Ochoa was extradited by Colombian authorities to the United States in September of 2001on charges emanating from Operation Millennium, a 1999 case that targeted the Alejandro Bernal Madrigal cocaine trafficking organization. In addition to drug trafficking, Ochoa was indicted by a federal grand jury for his involvement in the murder of informant Adler "Barry" Seal weeks before Seal was supposed to testify against Ochoa's older brother, Jorge Luis. As part of the Medellin Cartel, which existed until Escobar's death in 1993, Ochoa and his confederates waged a campaign of terror and bribery to pressure the Colombian government to prohibit the extradition of native Colombians. Pablo Escobar and several other Medellin leaders, labeled "The Extraditables," took increasingly violent measures to try to force the government to accept legislation that would protect them from extradition. The cartel was responsible for the assassination of dozens of government officials, and the bribery of many more. In July 1991, the Colombian congress adopted a new constitution that prohibited the extradition of Colombian natives, handing a major victory to the Medellin Cartel. Several months prior, in December 1990, Ochoa surrendered to Colombian authorities and served prison time from 1991 to 1997. Ochoa ran his drug operation from prison during this time.

Operation Double Trouble

OCDETF investigation "Operation Double Trouble" culminated on August 29, 2003. Launched in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, in 1999, it had expanded to five states and two continents. It successfully targeted and disrupted key Colombian drug and money brokers who operated between the United States and Colombia. United States and Colombian law enforcement personnel, in a coordinated enforcement effort, arrested 55 drug traffickers and money brokers and seized 36 bank accounts from 11 Colombian banks, over $12.8 million, 353 kilograms of cocaine, and 21 kilograms of heroin. The initial target of the investigation was CPOT target Ivan Henao, who was arrested in South Florida by DEA agents, and his Colombia-based money laundering and cocaine trafficking organization. Henao was well-known among Colombian drug trafficking cells operating in the United States as a drug money broker. At least 18 drug distribution cells throughout the United States were using Henao's money laundering services. The investigation documented that, from June 1999 to August 2003, the Henao Organization laundered at least $30 million in drug proceeds using a money laundering system known as the Black Market Peso Exchange (BMPE). Administrator Tandy said at the operation's conclusion: "Double Trouble signals a reenergized effort by DEA to attack the financial infrastructure of drug cartels. We are focusing on drug trafficking organizations as if they are Fortune 500 companies, which must be eliminated as single business entities from top to bottom, from the boardroom and purse strings, to the street corner." Operation Double Trouble led to investigations into Bank Atlantic and American Express International for violations of anti-money laundering regulations, that resulted in forfeitures of $10 million and $55 million, respectively. Operation Double Trouble also resulted in deferred prosecutions.

RICO Charges against North Valley Cartel

RICO charges were unsealed on May 6, 2004, against nine leaders of Colombia's most powerful cocaine-trafficking organizations, including the North Valley Cartel, allegedly responsible for exporting more than 500 metric tons of cocaine worth more than $10 billion from Colombia to the United States. Three of the charged defendants had been designated among the "most wanted" international drug trafficking targets by federal law enforcement. In addition, one of the defendants has been added to the FBI's "Ten Most Wanted" Fugitives list. According to the indictment, the defendants worked together with various Colombian drug transportation specialists to transport multi-ton loads of cocaine from Peru, Colombia, and other locations within South America to Colombia's Valle del Cauca region where the cartel principally operated. The defendants then used trucks or airplanes to transport the cocaine to the Pacific Coast port city of Buenaventura. The cartel members also associated themselves with Mexican transportation groups that shipped the cocaine loads to Mexico via speed boats, fishing vessels, and other maritime conveyances, for ultimate delivery to the United States. According to the indictment, between 1990 and 2004, the North Valley Cartel exported more than 1.2 million pounds - or 500 metric tons - of cocaine worth in excess of $10 billion from Colombia to Mexico and ultimately to the United States for resale.

Operation Jump Start

On February 15, 2005, DEA announced the successful culmination of SOD-supported OCDETF "Operation Jump Start," which represented a first for DEA: disrupting an established trend involving the flow of Colombian heroin, typically shipped in multi-kilogram quantities hidden in car batteries, on a specific route from Guatemala through Mexico to Texas, and eventually to New York and other parts of the United States. The culmination of this operation was a highly orchestrated multi-jurisdictional, multi-national takedown resulting in 100 arrests, including key targets of the Colombian and Guatemalan leadership of the trafficking organization. Nine of the defendants were the first individuals extradited from Guatemala for federal narcotics violations since 1992. The removal of the senior directors of the organization effectively dismantled this drug cartel. Operation Jump Start began in October 2003 when a drug seizure made by the Louisiana State Police was connected by SOD to an ongoing drug investigation started in 2002 by the DEA Washington Division Greenbelt, MD, HIDTA Task Force and Montgomery County, MD, Police Department. The New York Drug Enforcement Task Force had also initiated an investigation during the same time period. The Maryland and New York efforts led to investigations in 14 additional judicial districts, as well as the DEA Country Offices in Guatemala and Colombia. Over the course of this investigation, 100 individuals linked to this powerful drug trafficking organization were arrested and 22 kilograms of heroin, 80 kilograms of cocaine, and over $1 million in U.S. currency were seized.

FARC Leaders Extradited and Convicted

On December 31, 2004, top leftist Colombian rebel Juvenal Ovidio Ricardo Palmera Pineda, aka Simon Trinidad, was the first leader of the violent Colombian narco-terrorist guerilla group Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) to be sent to face prosecution in a U.S. federal court. Former Chief of Operations and Finance of the FARC's Caribbean Bloc, he was wanted by Colombian authorities on charges of kidnapping, homicide, conspiracy, personal injury, assault, terrorism, assassination, and rebellion. He faced U.S. drug and terrorism charges following the FARC's refusal to free dozens of hostages, including three Americans and a German. Simon Trinidad is currently serving a 60-year sentence on kidnapping charges. FARC leader Nayibe Rojas Valderama, aka Sonia, was extradited from Colombia to the United States to face prosecution on drug charges on March 9, 2005. In February 2004, Sonia, finance officer and part of the command and control structure of the FARC 14th Front, was captured in Colombia in a joint DEA-Colombian military operation. Her brother Leonel, aka Farol, and 13 other FARC members, including Sonia's security force and two minors, were taken into custody during the enforcement operation. On February 20, 2007, Sonia was convicted on drug charges by a jury in Washington, D.C. and later sentenced to 200 months in prison. The FARC controlled large portions of Colombia and financed its violent conflict with the Colombian government by engaging in drug trafficking, augmented by other means including kidnapping and extortion. DEA estimated that the FARC controlled approximately 70 percent of Colombia's cocaine trade. The FARC is still in operation today.

Rodriguez-Orejuela Brothers Extradited and Pled Guilty

Miguel and Gilberto Rodriguez-Orejuela, brothers who ran the infamous Cali Cartel in Colombia that was responsible for importing tons of cocaine into the United States over the last two decades, pled guilty on September 26, 2006, to a charge of conspiracy to import cocaine into the United States. They also pled guilty to conspiracy to commit money laundering by hiding the proceeds of narcotics trafficking. Under the terms of the plea deal, the Rodriguez-Orejuela brothers agreed to the entry of a final judgment of forfeiture in the amount of $2.1 billion to be levied against their narcotics-related assets and businesses found anywhere in the world. That included any narcotics-funded assets previously put in the names of family members in an effort to thwart forfeiture. "These guilty pleas deal a final and fatal blow to the Cali Cartel, a violent drug trafficking organization that once operated outside of the law," said Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales.

The brothers were arrested by Colombian authorities in 1995 and were sentenced to 30 years in prison based on their illegal conduct after 1997, when Colombia lifted the seven-year-long prohibition against extraditing its nationals. While imprisoned in Colombia, they continued to run their cartel from prison by working through Miguel's son, William Rodriguez-Abadia, and others who oversaw various aspects of the cartel using new routes and new methods - such as hiding cocaine in shipments of empty chlorine gas cylinders and, later, the placement of cocaine in containers of pumpkins for surreptitious removal by co-conspirators working at the Port of Miami. On March 8, 2006, William Rodriguez-Abadia pleaded guilty in Miami to his involvement in this drug trafficking conspiracy and was sentenced to more than 21 years in prison. After Colombia lifted its ban on the extradition of nationals in 1997, U.S. law enforcement and Colombian counterparts continued to investigate the Rodriguez-Orejuela brothers, resulting in criminal charges in Miami and New York. Then in December 2004, Gilberto Rodriguez-Orejuela was extradited from Colombia, and Miguel was extradited in March 2005 to face prosecution on those charges.

The brothers were leaders of the Cali Cartel that for many years was the largest supplier of cocaine to the United States, responsible for sending a total of more than 200 tons of cocaine to this country. Drug shipments were smuggled in using a variety of concealment methods, including secreting the cocaine in concrete posts, ceramic tiles, and coffee. The cartel was a sophisticated criminal enterprise handling all aspects of the cocaine trade, including production, transportation, wholesale distribution, and money laundering. At the height of its reign, the cartel used violence to terrorize would-be competitors and potential witnesses, and relied upon corruption to influence and gain control of many Colombian institutions.

Although the Rodriguez-Orejuela brothers were imprisoned by Colombia in 1995, the money laundering conspiracy charges against them, to which they agreed to plead guilty, alleged that they laundered the illicit fortune of the Cali Cartel through a pharmaceutical drug empire that included more than 400 retail drug stores across Colombia and pharmaceutical drug laboratories that manufactured the drugs. By investing millions of cocaine-trafficking dollars in these ostensibly legitimate companies, the Rodriguez-Orejuela brothers succeeded in laundering millions of dollars of Cali Cartel cocaine proceeds. In addition to the agreements entered by the brothers, 28 of their family members entered into an agreement with the United States in which they agreed to forfeit their right, title, and interest in all Rodriguez-Orejuela business entities and other assets worldwide, as well as all assets of any nature in the United States.

The convictions of the Rodriguez-Orejuela brothers resulted from OCDETF investigation Operation Cornerstone, an ICE-led investigation that began in August 1991 with the discovery of more than 12,000 kilograms of cocaine at the port of Miami hidden inside a cargo of cement posts imported from South America. Subsequent investigation led to the arrest of several individuals and provided evidence that the Cali Cartel had become the greatest drug trafficking threat to the United States, eclipsing the dying Medellin Cartel. Operation Cornerstone yielded several major seizures of cocaine, including the cocaine hidden in products shipped from Central America. Since it began, Operation Cornerstone led to the conviction of 105 defendants, the seizure of 47,500 kilograms of cocaine, and documentation through seized records and witness testimony of 200,000 kilos of cocaine being smuggled into the United States, representing $2.1 billion in drug proceeds.

Operation Angry Sapo/Ambush of CNP Officers

Initiated in September 2005 by DEA and the Policía Nacional de Colombia Dirección de la Policia Judicial y Investigaciones de Cali (CNP DIJIN - Cali), SOD-supported Operation Angry Sapo was a multi-national, multi-jurisdictional, multi-agency wire intercept investigation targeting a corrupt group of CNP and retired CNP officials. These individuals represented the North Valley Cartel, specifically the Wilber Varela organization, and were known to identify elements in the ranks of the CNP that were critical to their trafficking efforts where they could facilitate and foster corruption. These corrupt officials used their contacts and/or former positions within the CNP to approach other police officials to gain access to information or exert influence to facilitate the shipment of narcotics from Colombia into Mexico, Europe, and the United States. This operation began when cooperating source information exposed a corrupt CNP underworld operating out of the Bogota International Airport shipping multi-ton quantities of cocaine to Mexico via commercial airlines.

Operation Angry Sapo employed some first time investigative techniques, such as using active CNP officers working in undercover capacities and the judicial interceptions of Avantel "push to talk" phones. The active duty CNP officers that were involved in this investigation as "undercovers" and potential witnesses were part of the Bogotá Airport Antinarcotics Unit, as were two of the targets of this case.

On December 1, 2005, DEA Bogotá presented this case to a Grand Jury in the Southern District of New York which returned a sealed indictment charging 10 defendants. Two of these individuals were active CNP officers, one individual was an Avianca Airline security officer, and seven were former CNP officers who were working for the North Valley Cartel. On April 3, 2006, DEA Bogotá in conjunction with the CNP DIJIN successfully executed seven provisional arrest warrants related to the Leonidas Molina trafficking organization. Due to the involvement of corrupt active and retired CNP officers in this investigation, security (both operational and physical) was a primary concern. As a direct result of the successes of this case, threats were made against members of the DIJIN Cali unit.

On May 22, 2006, CNP officers arrived in the town of Jamundi, Colombia, following a lead from an informant who told them they would find at least 100 kilograms of cocaine near a psychiatric center, just outside of Cali. When the police pulled up, they were ambushed by Colombian soldiers, acting on the orders of cashiered army Lt. Col. Byron Carvajal. Most of the officers died of shots to the head, neck and chest, while not a single soldier was wounded. The slain officers, belonging to the most elite unit of Colombia's judicial investigative police, were among those working closely with DEA.

On February 18, 2008, Lt. Col. Carvajal and 14 soldiers were convicted of murdering 10 CNP officers in that ambush that marked the depth of corruption in Colombia's security forces. On May 7, 2008, Carvajal was sentenced to 54 years in prison, Carvajal's second-in command was sentenced to 52 years, and the other 13 soldiers were sentenced to 50 years for their participation in the ambush and slaughter of the CNP officers.

In honor of the slain CNP officers, a plaque with the pictures of each of the fallen heroes is on display at DEA/SOD as a memorial to the officers who gave the ultimate sacrifice:

Ramon Dario Gavis Londono
Gilmar Mamian Jiménez
William Andres Rodriguez Montero
Carlos Alberto Murillo Castaneda
Pedro Leon Perea Galindo
Jose Luis Rodriguez
Franklin Oswaldo Sanchez Bautista
Luis Alberto Farfan Castiblanco
Elkin Molina Aldana
Roosevelt Garcia Ramirez

Puppies Used to Smuggle Heroin

On February 1, 2006, DEA concluded a two-year multi-agency investigation that identified an organization based in Medellin, Colombia that was using varied and unique concealment methods for its drug smuggling, including surgically implanting heroin packets in pure-bred puppies. The international round-up included 18 search warrants in six different Colombian cities, and the arrest of 22 Colombian nationals. During the course of the investigation, there were 14 separate seizures of heroin totaling 24 kilograms and one seizure of six kilograms of cocaine. The organization's distribution network reached from Miami to New York City. The story of the puppies, many of which survived the cruel surgery and were adopted by Colombian families, received huge attention in the national and international media, becoming one of DEA's most popular media stories to date. DEA and CNP received a certificate of thanks from the People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, saying, "Their work in this case has spared untold numbers of animals from painful surgeries, stressful transport across the border, and an uncertain fate in the name of illegal profit."

50 Leaders of Narco-Terrorist FARC Indicted

On March 1, 2006, 50 leaders of the FARC, a designated foreign terrorist organization, were indicted on U.S. charges of importing more than $25 billion worth of cocaine into the United States and other countries. In addition, the United States Department of State announced more than $75 million worth of rewards for information that leads to the capture of the remaining FARC leaders. The FARC was supplying more than 50 percent of the world's cocaine and more than 60 percent of the cocaine that entered the United States. The paramilitary organization initially taxed other narcotics traffickers involved in the manufacture and distribution of cocaine in areas the FARC controlled. Recognizing the increased profits available, beginning in the 1990s the FARC moved to become directly involved in the production and distribution of cocaine by, among other criminal and violent activities, setting the prices to be paid to farmers across Colombia for cocaine paste, the raw material used to produce cocaine, and transporting cocaine paste to jungle laboratories under FARC control where it was converted into ton quantities of finished cocaine and then shipped out of Colombia to the United States and other countries. Recognizing that cocaine was the "lifeblood" of the FARC, the charged FARC leaders collected millions of dollars in cocaine proceeds and used the money to purchase weapons for the FARC's terrorist activities against the government and people of Colombia.

Operation Twin Oceans

The results of DEA-led "Operation Twin Oceans" were announced on May 17, 2006, culminating a three-year multi-jurisdictional and multinational investigation that targeted the cocaine trafficking organization of Colombian national and CPOT target Pablo Rayo-Montano, who was responsible for smuggling more than 15 tons of cocaine per month from Colombia to the streets of the United States and Europe. The organization's information technology-savvy managers used highly sophisticated methods to coordinate the movement of cocaine north and illegal drug proceeds south, by means of a vast array of marine vessels, such as fast boats, fishing boats, submersibles, and containerized cargo vessels. The organization was associated with the AUC, FARC, and the North Valley Cartel. An international coalition spearheaded by the Brazilian Federal Police, Panamanian Judicial Police, Colombian National Police, and DEA was responsible for dismantling this international drug cartel. The investigation resulted in over 100 arrests and the seizure of 52 tons of cocaine and nearly $70 million in assets. As part of Operation Twin Oceans, three islands off the coast of Panama, personally owned by the Rayo-Montano organization, were seized. Additional seizures included assets such as yachts, fishing trawlers, art galleries, and the largest fishing and boating store in Panama. Administrator Tandy described the operation this way: "The Rayo-Montano organization had its own private, rogue navy to run a drug business that was nearly as sophisticated as a small nation. As well-equipped and complex as this enterprise was, it was a matter of time before law enforcement caught on, and now Rayo-Montano's decadent, drug-funded lifestyle has caught up with him. This morning, his real estate holdings went from three islands to one jail cell."

Kingpin Salazar-Espinoza Extradited and Found Guilty

On June 18, 2007, a jury in Manhattan convicted Manuel "Hoover" Salazar-Espinosa on cocaine importation and money laundering charges. Manuel Hoover Salazar-Espinosa was a CPOT and had conspired with notorious Mexican cocaine cartel leaders Armando Valencia-Cornelio and Oscar Navavalencia to import ton-quantities of Colombian cocaine, through Mexico, to the City of New York, on a weekly basis. Salazar-Espinosa had also assisted in the laundering of $14 million in narcotics proceeds per week during the period 2002 to 2005, and was responsible for a 1.3-ton cocaine shipment destined for the United States that was seized while concealed in the arm of a crane in Panama in July 2005. Colombian authorities, pursuant to a request for a provisional arrest from the United States, arrested Salazar-Espinoza in Cali, Colombia on May 23, 2005. He was extradited from Colombia on August 23, 2006.

Colombian Police Officers and Airline Employees Arrested

On November 28, 2007, five individuals, including Colombian law enforcement and airport and airline personnel, were arrested in Colombia and charged with conspiracy to import heroin into the United States. Three others, including two Colombian law enforcement officials, were previously arrested as part of the same investigation. Since August 2006, Humbeiro Carvajalmontoya led a drug trafficking organization that smuggled heroin into the United States from Colombia through the Jose Maria Cordoba International Airport in Medellin, Colombia. The organization included law enforcement officials and airport and airline personnel who facilitated the export of heroin through Medellin Airport. Couriers for the organization smuggled heroin into the United States inside layers of clothing, within the linings of suitcases and handbags, beneath false bottoms of suitcases, inside computers, and inside international cargo, among other means. Organization couriers traveled at least once a month from the Medellin area to New York City, each time carrying between several hundred grams to several kilograms of heroin at a time. New York SAC John P. Gilbride stated, "Due to these arrests, millions of dollars of heroin will cease to land in our neighborhoods and those responsible will face the consequences of their actions."

FARC Associate Extradited to United States

On April 22, 2008, Juan Jose Martinez Vega, aka "Gentil Alvis Patino," aka "Chiguiro," was extradited from Colombia to the United States to face cocaine importation conspiracy charges. Martinez Vega was a FARC associate who worked closely with the FARC's 16th Front and assisted the FARC in procuring weapons, ammunition, money and other materials in exchange for cocaine and cocaine paste. Over several years, Martinez Vega made dozens of such deliveries to the 16th Front, including a delivery in February 2002 of 37 tons of weapons and ammunition in exchange for 2,500 kilograms of cocaine paste and 750 million Colombian pesos. Martinez Vega also led, in 1996, a squad of FARC members that executed four other FARC members suspected of stealing arms which the FARC purchased with cocaine.

Afghanistan

Afghanistan Five Pillar Plan

On November 17, 2004, DEA joined with coalition partners, the State Department, and the Department of Defense in announcing its involvement in the U.S. Embassy Kabul Counternarcotics Implementation Plan. This represented an expansion of the DEA-led 19-country Operation Containment multilateral strategy begun in 2002 to choke off the flow of drugs and precursor chemicals into and out of Afghanistan before they can spread to broader markets. The Five Pillar Plan provided DEA unique opportunities to reduce heroin production in Afghanistan, the world's leading opium producer, and contribute to the stabilization and rebuilding of the war-torn country. The Five Pillar Plan also called for DEA to continue lending its expertise by providing drug enforcement training to counterparts in the Counternarcotics Police Afghanistan to build Afghanistan's institutions of justice and strengthen internal counternarcotics capabilities. Under the "Interdiction Pillar," DEA assists with the goal of destroying clandestine labs and seizing precursor chemicals, opium, and opiate stockpiles. To achieve that, DEA expanded its presence in Afghanistan by permanently stationing additional Special Agents and Intelligence Analysts to enhance that country's counternarcotics capacity.

FAST Teams Deploy

In November 2004, as part of the Afghanistan Five Pillar Plan, DEA announced a program aimed at reducing heroin production and contributing to the stabilization and rebuilding of the war-torn country: in conjunction with coalition partners, the State Department, the Department of Defense (DOD), and DEA pledged to deploy Foreign-deployed Advisory and Support Teams (FAST). The FAST consisted of five teams of DEA Special Agents and Intelligence Research Specialists rotating on a TDY basis to Afghanistan. These teams provide guidance and conduct bilateral investigations that identify, target, and disrupt illicit drug trafficking organizations. The FAST mission is to mentor, train, and advise the National Interdiction Units (NIU), a specialized group formed from members of the Counter Narcotics Police-Afghanistan (CNP-A). While FAST focuses primarily on Afghanistan's heroin threat, it also assists Afghan authorities in bilateral investigations by identifying, targeting, and disrupting illicit drug trafficking organizations. With DOD's support, FAST also assists with the destruction of existing opium storage sites, clandestine heroin processing labs, and precursor chemical supplies. During January 2005, initial advanced training of FAST personnel commenced at the US Army's Ft. Benning, Georgia, with instruction by the U.S. military. This training consisted of familiarization with communication equipment, weapons training, cultural awareness, improvised explosive device familiarization, combat lifesaving courses, land navigation, ground assault, small unit tactics/patrolling, airmobile operations (with the MI-8 helicopter), and urban terrain assault training. In April 2005, the first two FAST squads (Alpha and Bravo) departed on a U.S. military flight for Afghanistan. They immediately started to assist the Kabul Country Office in its mission. One of the FAST squads was based at the U.S. Embassy Kabul, and the other was based at the U.S. military airfield in Bagram, Afghanistan. Since its inception, FAST personnel have deployed 13 times to Afghanistan, three times to Haiti, twice to Kyrgyzstan, and once to Guatemala and Honduras. FAST has also upgraded its capability through unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and technical targeting to support operations against high-value targets and hostage rescue operations in remote and hostile environments worldwide.

The FAST and counterparts have realized significant successes, including numerous large-scale operations shutting down drug labs and seizing significant amounts of precursor chemicals, opium, and heroin, and arresting high-and mid-level traffickers. One such successful operation occurred on June 9, 2008, when a FAST, DEA Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU), the Afghanistan National Interdiction Unit (NIU), Afghan Special Narcotics Force (ASNF), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) completed Operation ALBATROSS, a two-phase operation targeting a super-lab complex protected by the Taliban in the Kandahar Province. The initial phase of this operation resulted in the seizure of approximately 3.4 metric tons of hashish, while the second phase resulted in the seizure of approximately 262 metric tons of hashish, the largest seizure of hashish in history.

First Afghan Drug Trafficker Successfully Brought to Justice in the United States

In October 2005, Haji Baz Mohammad became the first Afghan heroin kingpin under the authority of Afghanistan President Hamid Karzaiever brought to the U.S. justice system. Since 1990, Baz Mohammad had led an international heroin-trafficking organization that provided financial support to the Taliban in Afghanistan, in exchange for which the Taliban provided protection for the organization's opium crops, heroin laboratories, drug-transportation routes, and members and associates. The organization was responsible for manufacturing and distributing more than $25 million worth of heroin in Afghanistan and Pakistan, some of which the organization ultimately sold in the United States. Baz Mohammad stated that selling heroin in the United States was a "Jihad" because they were taking the Americans' money at the same time the heroin they were paying for was killing them. Baz Mohammad and Bashir Noorzai, arrested by DEA in April 2005 on heroin-importation charges, are the only Afghan narcotics traffickers to have been sanctioned by the U.S. President under the Kingpin Act. Baz Mohammad pled guilty on July 11, 2006, and was sentenced to more than 15 years in prison on October 5, 2007. DEA Administrator Tandy summed up the significance of the arrest, extradition, and sentencing by saying, "The sentencing of Haji Baz Mohammad—the first person ever extradited from Afghanistan to the United States—demonstrates both our nations' resolve to destroy the hold opium lords have on Afghanistan. This drug kingpin bragged that he waged Jihad against Americans by poisoning them with his heroin. His attack was unconventional, and his massive drug profits funded the Taliban and other extremist organizations dedicated to destroying freedom and justice. Today, as Mohammad loses his own freedom, he begins a long, hands-on lesson in the certainty of American justice."

Arrest of Taliban-Linked Afghan Heroin Trafficker

Mohammad Essa was arrested on May 11, 2007 and was charged with conspiring to import $25 million worth of heroin from Afghanistan and Pakistan into the United States and other countries. Essa, previously in custody in Afghanistan, consented to his removal to the United States, and arrived in New York on April 27, 2007. From 1990 until January 2005, Essa was a member of the Baz Mohammad heroin trafficking organization. Essa is one of the co-conspirators alleged to have managed the distribution of heroin by the Baz Mohammad organization's operatives in the United States and elsewhere. From 1994 through 2000, Essa and his co-conspirators had collected heroin proceeds in the United States for the Taliban.

Afghan Taliban Member Convicted on Narco-Terrorism

On May 20, 2008, Khan Mohammed, a member of an Afghan Taliban cell, was convicted on charges of narcotics distribution and narco-terrorism. The conviction represented the first time a defendant had been convicted in U.S. federal court of narco-terrorism since the statute was enacted in March 2006. Mohammed had been investigated by the DEA for weapons and narcotics offenses. The investigation revealed that Mohammed was part of a Taliban plan to obtain rockets to attack U.S. military and Afghan civilian personnel at Jalalabad Airfield in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. A cooperating witness working with the DEA met with Mohammed on several occasions to plan the rocket attack. Evidence presented at trial established that Mohammed had previously engaged in similar rocket attacks against other Afghan targets. During the investigation, Mohammed also sold opium and heroin that he knew was intended for importation into the United States.

Prevention of Hostile Acts in Afghanistan

DEA provided actionable intelligence that has deterred hostile acts, including rocket and IED attacks, against U.S. and Coalition personnel and interests inside of Afghanistan on more than 19 occasions since December 2005. In addition, DEA intelligence has also led to the apprehension of high-value targets and the seizure of Taliban weapons caches. DEA's investigative efforts have been vital not only to capturing Afghanistan's top drug barons, but also in stabilizing Afghanistan and contributing to the security of all Coalition forces there.

Arrests and Seizures in Afghanistan

DEA assisted in operations targeting narcotics traffickers, money launderers, and the Taliban/insurgent forces in Afghanistan, which resulted in total arrests and seizures of narcotics and precursor chemicals between 2005-2007 of:

Opium—51.3 metric tons (from 27.6 in 2005)
Heroin—6.6 metric tons (from 2.8 in 2005)
Chemicals—14.5 metric tons (from 7.7 in 2005)
Clandestine Conversion Laboratories—279 (from 27 in 2005)
Morphine Base—362 kilograms
Hashish – 144.9 metric tons
Arrested/Detained—144 individuals (from 69 in 2005)

DRUGS

Methamphetamine

Operation Northern Star

On April 15, 2003, "Operation Northern Star" culminated after an 18-month investigation. This DEA-led OCDETF investigation was conducted in cooperation with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and disrupted the Canadian supply of pseudoephedrine, an essential chemical used in methamphetamine production, to Mexican drug traffickers. The investigation led to 78 arrests across the United States and in Canada, and established a connection between drug proceeds, U.S.-based Middle Eastern organizations, and terrorist organizations. The investigation employed a comprehensive top-to-bottom strategy targeting the entire methamphetamine trafficking process, including the suppliers of precursor chemicals, chemical brokers, transporters, manufacturers, distributors, and the money launderers who helped conceal their criminal proceeds. As part of the operation, agents targeted and arrested six executives from three Canadian chemical companies. The executives had all sold bulk quantities of pseudoephedrine to methamphetamine manufacturers in the United States with full knowledge that their sales were intended for the illegal production of the highly addictive and dangerous drug methamphetamine. Roger Guevara, DEA's Chief of Operations, said, "Operation Northern Star sends a message to people at all stages of meth production that the community of nations is becoming far less tolerant of executives who are willing to destroy other people's lives so they can line their own pockets."

Operation Brain Drain

On September 23, 2004, DEA announced the successful culmination of "Operation Brain Drain." This 17-month joint U.S./Royal Canadian Mounted Police OCDETF investigation identified and dismantled the most significant source of ephedrine-one of the major ingredients used to manufacture methamphetamine-that was smuggled from Canada to the United States. Operation Brain Drain targeted Canadian bulk ephedrine distributors and their U.S. associates, as well as U.S.-based Mexican methamphetamine manufacturers and distributors. The operation yielded 90 arrests, including five major traffickers, 92 pounds of methamphetamine, 2,735 pounds of ephedrine powder, nearly 1.7 million ephedrine pills, two kilograms of cocaine, 62 pounds of precursor chemicals, 5 gallons of meth solution, two large clandestine meth labs, and $3.5 million in Canadian currency.

Operation Wildfire

DEA announced the successful culmination of "Operation Wildfire," the largest nationally coordinated anti-methamphetamine law enforcement initiative in U.S. law enforcement history on August 30, 2005. It was designed to target all levels of the meth manufacturing and distribution chain in the United States and to fight its further spread. This unprecedented effort culminated in August 2005 and involved over 200 U.S. cities, and resulted in the arrest of 427 individuals. The coordinated efforts of federal, state, and local law enforcement in the execution of 96 search warrants resulted in the seizure of 209 pounds of methamphetamine, over 200,000 tablets of pseudoephedrine, 158 kilograms of pseudoephedrine powder, and close to 225,000 tablets of ephedrine. Fifty six clandestine laboratories were seized in the nationwide sweep and 30 endangered children were removed from their meth environments. Administrator Tandy said at the culmination of Operation Wildfire: "Methamphetamine abuse has ruined families, destroyed neighborhoods and put a tremendous strain on all levels of law enforcement and social services. This historic enforcement effort illustrates our commitment to extinguishing this plague and protecting innocent Americans from the harmful ripple effects meth leaves behind."

2005 Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act (CMEA)

The Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act (CMEA) of 2005 was signed into law on March 9, 2006 to regulate, among other things, retail over-the-counter (i.e. nonprescription) sales of products containing the List I chemicals ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, and phenylpropanolamine, common ingredients found in cough, cold, and allergy products. The three chemicals can be used for clandestine methamphetamine manufacture. Retail provisions of the CMEA included daily sales limits and 30-day purchase limits, placement of product out of direct customer access, record keeping requirements on most sales, customer ID verification, employee training and self-certification of regulated sellers. The CMEA was passed to curtail their availability for diversion to the illicit manufacture of methamphetamine or amphetamine. The CMEA mandated that, to purchase products containing ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, and phenylpropanolamine, an individual must show identification and sign a log book at pharmacies. DEA, along with state and local law enforcement, were responsible for monitoring these log books to identify if any one person is purchasing more than 9 grams within a month's time. Additional provisions of the CMEA mandated that DEA establish total annual requirements, import quotas, individual manufacturing quotas, and procurement quotas for the three meth precursors; limit the domestic production and importation of materials containing ephedrine and pseudoephedrine to quantities necessary for medical, scientific and other legitimate purposes; and eliminate exemptions for chemical mixtures containing these chemicals regardless of concentration or form.

United States/Mexico Methamphetamine Partnership

U.S. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and Mexican Attorney General Daniel Cabeza De Vaca announced new anti-methamphetamine initiatives and new partnerships between the United States and Mexico at a National Methamphetamine and Chemicals Initiative Strategy Conference in Dallas held May 17-18, 2006. The goals of the new initiatives and partnerships were improved enforcement, increased law enforcement training, improved information-sharing, and increased public awareness concerning U.S./Mexico anti-trafficking efforts.

The initiatives included:
--establishing specialized meth enforcement teams on either side of the border, to whom DEA donated six refurbished trucks used in clan lab enforcement operations;
--collaborative intelligence efforts focused on investigating large-scale meth trafficking organizations that were operating in Mexico and the United States;

--establishment of a Bi-National Law Enforcement Working Group to focus on meth production and trafficking from both an enforcement and intelligence perspective;

-- joint DEA/Mexican police development of a Most Wanted list of chemical and methamphetamine trafficking organizations, focus on the biggest threats;

--and exchanges of DEA/Mexican chemical regulatory personnel to enable both sides to observe, learn best practices, and implement joint strategies.

In addition, DEA offered training for nearly 1,000 Mexican police officials in locations throughout the United States, Mexico, and Central America on investigative, enforcement, and regulatory methods related to meth trafficking. Domestic U.S. efforts were planned to focus on a redirection of DEA clan lab enforcement teams and direct them toward identifying and dismantling U.S.-based transportation and distribution cells. In addition, DEA established a national meth registry at the DEA website identifying locations of U.S. properties at which meth labs or chemical dumpsites were found; and a new, state-of-the-art clan lab training facility was planned for the DEA Academy at Quantico.

Mexican Law Enforcement Officials Graduate From DEA Academy Anti-Meth Training

On September 7, 2006, DEA completed its first ever clandestine methamphetamine laboratory safety training class for Mexican law enforcement officers conducted at the DEA Training Academy in Quantico, VA. Forty-nine officers from the Mexican-based Federal Preventive Police (PFP) and 6 prosecutors from the Federal Organized Crime Division Prosecutors (SIEDO) received a month-long course. The training was part of the larger agreement between DEA and the Government of Mexico to establish specialized methamphetamine enforcement teams on both sides of the border. In Mexico, these Mexican enforcement teams focused on investigating and targeting the most wanted Mexican methamphetamine drug trafficking organizations in five meth hot spots in the Mexican states of Sinaloa, Michoacan, Jalisco, Sonora, and Baja California Norte. The training covered the latest techniques in clandestine lab detection, enforcement, chemical identification. During CY 2006 through the end of CY 2007, more than 3,300 Mexican law enforcement officers were trained by DEA to improve their methamphetamine trafficking law enforcement skills. This training included the first opportunity for Mexican officers to be certified in clandestine laboratory investigations.

National Methamphetamine Awareness Day

President George W. Bush issued a proclamation declaring November 30, 2006, National Methamphetamine Awareness Day-the largest single nationwide educational effort warning against the dangers of using methamphetamine. It was part of a nationwide effort highlight national efforts to increase awareness and decrease demand for the drug. Leading this effort, the Department of Justice coordinated over 100 events across the country by working with partners at the federal, state and local level, in the government, private, and non-profit sectors. DEA held press conferences, town hall meetings, presentations, and informational meetings across the country and set up mock meth labs to demonstrate the dangers.

DEA Creates First-Ever National Meth Site Registry

On December 5, 2006, the DEA announced that DEA's webpage would post locations in each state where known methamphetamine clandestine labs or dumpsites were located, so that individuals could be aware of possible meth-contaminated sites within their communities. This was the first such national listing of seized former meth sites available to the public. The new website captured addresses reported by a variety of law enforcement agencies where chemicals or other items related to meth production were found or dumped.

Results of Meth Enforcement and Initiatives

By 2008, DEA realized significant success combating the national methamphetamine epidemic, attributable to a number of factors including: legislation adopted by 43 states that curtailed availability of the three meth precursor chemicals; the Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act of 2005; and strong enforcement efforts by both the U.S. and Mexico. Focused enforcement efforts by DEA; successful investigations; domestic initiatives, including increasing meth priority target investigations and expanding the primary focus of DEA clan lab enforcement teams; and international initiatives, including, in particular, partnership efforts with the Government of Mexico to target the most significant meth trafficking organizations on both sides of the border paid off. Mexico instituted stricter and more comprehensive controls over methamphetamine precursor chemicals than any other government in the world. Meth superlab seizures in the United States declined 93 percent from 144 in 2002 to 11 in 2007. Small toxic lab seizures likewise declined 73 percent nationally from a peak in 2003 of 10,146 to 2,732 in 2007.

Meth seizures along the Southwest Border of the U.S. increased from 1,170 kilograms in 2001 to 2,008 kilograms in 2007, a 71 percent increase. Furthermore, between 2001 and 2007, meth use by teens plummeted 64%. 2007 workplace drug tests showed a 50 percent decline in nationwide employee meth use compared to 2005. Finally, meth price and purity data from DEA's System to Retrieve Intelligence from Drug Evidence showed a 19 percent decline in meth purity between 2007 and 2008, and a 56 percent increase in price per pure gram over the same timeframe.

Marijuana

Proliferation of Cannabis-Derived "Hemp" Products

Beginning in the late 1990s, DEA began receiving inquiries about the legal status of products made from the cannabis plant (marijuana), which were being marketed as "hemp" products. Among the cannabis-derived products being sold in the United States were food and beverage products, personal care items (such as soaps and shampoos), and industrial products (such as rope, textiles, and paper products). Those who marketed the food and beverage products, as well as the personal care items, claimed that the products contained oil from cannabis seeds. Since marijuana and tetrahydrocannabinols (THC) are schedule I controlled substances, questions arose whether these cannabis-derived products were likewise schedule I controlled substances. DEA received such questions from a variety of sources, such as employers whose employees had undergone drug screening and tested positive for THC, only to claim that the results were due to "lawful" ingestion of "hemp" products. DEA also received inquiries from Customs inspectors who requested guidance on the legal status of "hemp" products that were being presented for importation into the United States. After carefully reviewing the matter, DEA issued a series of rules and regulations in 2001 and 2003 that were designed to address definitively the legal status of these products. DEA took the position that it would follow the plain language of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), which expressly states that anything that contains "any quantity" of marijuana or THC is a schedule I controlled substance. However, as a reasonable accommodation, DEA exempted from control legitimate industrial products that contained THC but were not intended for human consumption (such as clothing, paper, and animal feed). Shortly after DEA issued these rules, a group of companies that manufactured cannabis-derived food products challenged the rules in the ninth circuit federal court of appeals. Despite the plain language of the statute supporting DEA's position, the ninth circuit ruled in 2004 that the DEA rules were impermissible under the statute and therefore ordered DEA to refrain from enforcing them. Subsequently, in 2006, another federal court of appeals (the eight circuit) took a different view, stating, as DEA had said in its rules: "The plain language of the CSA states that schedule I(c) includes 'any material. . . which contains any quantity of THC' and thus such material is regulated." United States v. White Plume, 447 F.3d 1067, 1073 (8th Cir. 2006) (emphasis in original). Thus, the federal courts have expressed conflicting views regarding the legal status of cannabis derivatives.

Cultivation of Marijuana for Industrial Purposes

Coincident with the increase in marketing of cannabis-derived "hemp" products, there has been an increased interest among some in the United States to grow marijuana to produce these products. Under the CSA, anyone who seeks to grow marijuana for any purpose must first obtain a DEA registration authorizing such activity. However, several persons have claimed that growing marijuana to produce so-called "hemp" (which purportedly contains a relatively low percentage of THC) is not subject to CSA control and requires no DEA registration. All such claims have thus far failed, as every federal court that has addressed the issue has ruled that any person who seeks to grow any form of marijuana (no matter the THC content or the purpose for which it is grown) must obtain a DEA registration. New Hampshire Hemp Council, Inc. v. Marshall, 203 F.3d 1 (1st Cir 2000); United States v. White Plume, supra; Monson v. DEA, 522 F.Supp.2d 1188 (D. N.D. 2007), appeal docketed, No. 07-3837 (8th Cir. 2007). Another related development during this same time period is that several states have enacted laws declaring cannabis grown for industrial purposes to be "hemp" - not marijuana - and treating such cannabis as a noncontrolled substance. These laws conflict with the CSA, which does not differentiate, for control purposes, between marijuana of relatively low THC content and marijuana of greater THC content. Because of this conflict with federal law, the Governor of California twice vetoed (in 2006 and 2007) bills that would have decontrolled cannabis with a relatively low THC content. Nonetheless, advocates of "hemp" continue to lobby state legislatures to enact such laws.

One of 14 marijuana fields located in the Crabtree Nature Preserve.

California Cannabis Clubs

DEA offices throughout California opened investigations and served numerous search warrants on marijuana distribution facilities including, among other things, cannabis clubs and "cooperative" grow sites that were growing marijuana to supply other cannabis clubs. One notable San Francisco investigation worked in conjunction with IRS involved the Norton brothers, who operated the for-profit Compassionate Patients' Cooperative, a large-scale marijuana distribution center in Hayward, California. The distribution center's sales in the first six months of 2007 allegedly totaled more than $26 million. As a result of the investigation, law enforcement seized several hundred pounds of marijuana, approximately $200,000 in cash, bank accounts, IRAs, two luxury vehicles, a residence, and a commercial building. The indictment of the Norton brothers charged them, among other things, with possession with intent to distribute marijuana, and money laundering. In one egregious Los Angeles case, the indictment of the owner and the manager of a chain of marijuana stores located in seven different California cities alleged that their West Hollywood-based store had an ATM machine and credit card readers to facilitate marijuana purchases; in a single month, the store was alleged to have sold more than $1.7 million in marijuana and THC-laced products.

Public Lands Cannabis Eradication

Between 2003 and 2008, marijuana remained the most commonly used illicit drug in the United States. The number of cannabis plants destroyed at outdoor cultivation sites in the United States increased since 2004. The majority of the plants were located on public lands, and the largest seizures occurred in California and Kentucky. Other leading states for outdoor cannabis cultivation in 2007 were Ohio, Hawaii, Michigan, and Tennessee. The average number of plants eradicated at each site also increased. 4.7 million cannabis plants were eradicated on public and private lands in California alone—over 3.9 million of them on public lands. In September 2007, DEA led a multi-agency three-week operation targeting large-scale cannabis grows on public lands in California, Oregon, and Washington. This three-state surge, dubbed Operation Green Acres, resulted in the seizure of 1.09 million cannabis plants, 5,144 pounds of marijuana, and the arrests of 224 individuals. In July 2007, over 38,000 cannabis plants were removed from 14 cultivated fields located inside the Crabtree Nature Preserve in Barrington, Illinois—the largest such removal in a single state outside of California. Two individuals were charged with cultivating marijuana and criminal damage to land. It was the fourth marijuana eradication in the Cook County Forest Preserves to take place during 2007. In addition to the marijuana fields, investigators located more than one encampment with tents, cots, and supplies, including food, a cooking area, shower area, and fertilizer bags. Also found near one of the encampments was a reinforced underground bunker, lined with four-inch logs and covered with dirt.

Marijuana-Laced Candy Manufacturers Busted

On March 16, 2006, DEA arrested 12 individuals on charges of distribution of marijuana. As a result of searches in the San Francisco Bay area conducted at the time of the arrests, law enforcement seized four sophisticated indoor marijuana grows, thousands of marijuana plants, a large amount of U.S. currency, two semi-automatic weapons, one revolver, and hundreds of pot-laced candy and soft drinks. This investigation began in October 2005, when the DEA obtained information that Beyond Bomb, a manufacturer of marijuana candy in Oakland, CA, was in operation. The marijuana-laced candy and other edibles manufactured by the company mimicked the name and appearance of well known name brand candies and products, such as Stoney Ranchers, Munchy Way, Rasta Reece's, Buddafingers, and Pot Tarts.

Ecstasy

Operation Candy Box

On March 31, 2004, DEA announced the culmination of "Operation Candy Box," a two-year SOD-coordinated OCDETF investigation that encompassed 16 cities in the United States and three in Canada. This was a two-nation crackdown on a huge drug trafficking ring whose members manufactured bulk quantities of Ecstasy and marijuana in Canada and then shipped them to cities around the United States. The organization was capable of distributing up to one million MDMA tablets per month in the United States and Canada. The investigation revealed that, Ecstasy trafficking, previously controlled by Russian and Israeli gangs, had now spread to groups with ties to Southeast Asia. The two principal targets of this investigation were Ze Wai Wong, a Chinese national, and Mai Phuong Le, a Vietnamese national. It used a sophisticated money laundering network of money remitters and travel agencies in both the United States and Canada to launder millions of dollars in drug proceeds. Operation Candy Box culminated in late March 2004 with the arrest of more than 140 members of an Asian organization located in 16 U.S. cities and Canada, including Priority Target and leader of the targeted organization Ze Wai Wong. In early January 2005, DEA Priority Target Ze Wai Wong was extradited from Canada to the United States to face charges related to Operation Candy Box. Seizures in Operation Candy Box totaled 407,000 MDMA tablets, 1,370 pounds of marijuana, 6.5 pounds of methamphetamine, and $8.9 million in currency.

The dismantlement of Ze Wai Wong's international drug trafficking organization sent a significant aftershock in the U.S. Ecstasy market. Most significantly, findings of the December 2004 Monitoring the Future Survey indicated that MDMA use by high school seniors had plummeted 57% from 2001 to 2004. The Survey also reported a 24% decline in perceived availability of MDMA by high school seniors.

Operation Sweet Tooth

On November 17, 2005, DEA announced the culmination of "Operation Sweet Tooth," a two-year, SOD-coordinated OCDETF investigation that targeted international Ecstasy and marijuana trafficking rings whose drug smuggling and money laundering operations ranged from the back alleys of the Far East to the neighborhood streets of Canada and the United States. It followed Operation Candy Box that dismantled an international ring importing one million MDMA tablets a month into Canada for distribution in the United States. Operation Sweet Tooth was comprised of DEA-led investigations in 12 separate U.S. judicial districts and resulted in the arrest of 291 individuals and the execution of 98 search warrants both in the United States and Canada. The seizures totaled 931,300 MDMA tablets, 1,777 pounds of marijuana, and $7.75 million in U.S. assets. The leaders of the criminal organizations targeted in Operation Sweet Tooth refined and improved on the methods used by those in the Operation Candy Box organization: the Operation Sweet Tooth organizations were responsible for distributing 1.5 million tablets of MDMA per month, equivalent to more than 22 percent of the estimated 8 metric tons of MDMA imported into the United States in 2003. Operation Sweet Tooth identified drug trafficking networks that imported MDMA powder into Canada, established clandestine pill press warehouses, and smuggled bulk quantities of MDMA tablets into the United States. The financial aspect of the investigation revealed that the drug trafficking syndicates laundered millions of dollars in drug proceeds through the use of bulk courier transport, money remitters and the Vietnamese underground banking system. Assistance provided by both the Vietnamese and Canadian authorities allowed Operation Sweet Tooth to identify the drug distribution and money laundering methods of the organizations.

Ecstasy Trafficker Extradited from Israel

On March 6, 2006, Israeli national and notorious criminal Ze'ev Rosenstein was extradited and appeared in federal court in the Southern District of Florida to face charges he was at the center of a conspiracy to smuggle hundreds of thousands of Ecstasy tablets into the United States for illegal sale. A significant part of the case against Rosenstein, worked with the assistance of Israeli authorities and local U.S. authorities in Florida and New York, was based on the seizure of 700,000 Ecstasy pills in July 2001. Rosenstein's indictment covered a two-year period during which he headed a sophisticated drug trafficking network whose operations spanned four continents and involved the shipment of well over one million Ecstasy pills to the United States. Administrator Tandy called him at the time, "the most infamous criminal in Israel." The July 2001 seizure occurred after one of Rosenstein's co-conspirators sold a sample of the Ecstasy pills to a confidential source in New York. Rosenstein pled guilty and was sentenced to 12 years in prison in January 2007.

Operation Triple Play

With the September 28, 2006, culmination of "Operation Triple Play," DEA announced the unsealing of charges in Manhattan federal court against 22 members of a massive Ecstasy-trafficking organization that smuggled more than $5 million worth of Ecstasy from Canada into the United States for resale. Nineteen defendants were arrested in New York, Pennsylvania, and Maryland, and one defendant was arrested in Canada. Law enforcement seized more than 50,000 Ecstasy pills worth more than $1 million, and over $100,000 in cash. According to a three-count indictment, since 2005, the criminal organization imported more than 250,000 Ecstasy pills — worth more than $5 million on New York City streets — from Canada into the United States for distribution. The organization was supplied by Jung Chao and Chung My Huong Nguyen, who were based in Canada and occasionally traveled into the United States to oversee the distribution of tens of thousands of Ecstasy pills. The indictment charged that Thuong Tri Tang, aka "Tang," was the criminal organization's primary distributor of Ecstasy in the United States. Tang had direct dealings with the sources of supply in Canada, receiving tens of thousands of Ecstasy pills at a time for distribution in the United States. After the Ecstasy pills were smuggled across the border from Canada into the United States, Tang arranged for the distribution of the organization's pills to the distribution cells on the East Coast. The distribution cells then sold the Ecstasy to retail drug dealers for resale to users in the street, in clubs, and in brothels. Once the Ecstasy was sold in the United States, members of the organization arranged for the drug proceeds to be collected and laundered back to the organization's sources of supply in Canada. The criminal organization stored the pills at self-storage facilities located in New Jersey. The Ecstasy pills were labeled with many different stamps or markings, including, among others: a cherry, the Versace and Louis Vitton logos, and a 6-point star.

Diversion and Prescription Drug Abuse

National Drug Control Strategy Focus on Prescription Drugs

Released March 1, 2004, the 2004 National Drug Control Strategy outlined the extent of prescription drug abuse in the United States and a coordinated drug strategy to confront the illegal diversion and abuse of prescription drugs. Data at the time indicated that prescription drug abuse, particularly of opioid pain killers, had increased at an alarming rate over the previous ten years:

- Non-medical use of narcotic pain relievers, tranquilizers, stimulants, and sedatives ranked second (behind marijuana) as a category of illicit drug abuse among adults and youth;
- In 2002, 6.2 million Americans were current abusers of prescription drugs;
- 13.7 percent of youth between the ages of 12 and 17 abused prescription drugs at least once in their lifetimes; and
- Emergency room visits resulting from narcotic pain relievers abuse increased 163 percent since 1995.

Because more than 10 million Americans were estimated to suffer from chronic pain, the Strategy sought to balance the need for effective pain management therapies with the prevention of misuse, abuse, and diversion of psychotherapeutic drugs.

DEA's Secure Electronic Ordering System

On September 1, 2005, DEA launched its cost and time-saving, error-reducing paperless Controlled Substances Ordering System (CSOS). This was a direct result of DEA's Office of Diversion Control cooperation during the previous several years with the pharmaceutical industry to develop an electronic version of the current ordering system for Schedule II controlled substances. It replaces a legally mandated three-part form generated by industry that was maintained by the supplier, the purchaser, and DEA for all purchases of Schedule II controlled substances. CSOS provides a secure and authenticated means for industry to electronically submit orders for Schedule II controlled substances directly to their supplier, streamlining the supply chain, and helping patients get necessary prescriptions more quickly.

DEA Policy on Pain Treatment

On September 6, 2006, DEA unveiled a proposed rule to make it easier for patients with chronic pain or other chronic conditions to avoid multiple trips to a physician. It allowed a physician to prescribe up to a 90-day supply of Schedule II controlled substances during a single office visit, where medically appropriate. The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking was accompanied by a policy statement, "Dispensing Controlled Substances for the Treatment of Pain," which provided information requested by medical professionals regarding DEA's position on this important issue. DEA also launched a new page on its website called "Cases Against Doctors." DEA's guiding principle was to prevent the abuse and diversion of prescription controlled substances, which had become increasingly popular and deadly, without impacting the ability of patients with legitimate need to have full access to pain relief prescribed by their physician. The new policy statement outlined the longstanding legal requirements on dispensing controlled substances for the treatment of pain. It addressed the requirement that controlled substances be prescribed only for a legitimate medical purpose, examined the issues surrounding the treatment of pain, and elaborated on DEA's policy for taking appropriate legal action against those very few physicians who illegally prescribe controlled substances. "We believe that the statement and proposed rule will help the medical professional ensure that only patients who need medication for pain relief get it. The statement reflects an awareness of patients' needs as well as the importance of preventing any illegal diversion of prescription drugs," added Administrator Tandy.

On November 19, 2007, DEA finalized its rule regarding the issuance by physicians of multiple sequential Schedule II prescriptions. Under the rule, physicians must, as they have always been required to do, determine whether the patient has a legitimate medical need for the controlled substance being prescribed, and must be acting in the usual course of professional practice. DEA's proposed regulation would then permit the physician to issue multiple Schedule II prescriptions, during a single office visit, allowing patients to receive a total of up to a 90-day supply of controlled substances according to the fill date that the doctor gives the pharmacist.

McKesson Corporation and Cardinal Health Pay Record-Setting Penalties

DEA addressed the growing problem of the abuse of prescription controlled substances by investigating and taking action against wholesale drug distributors. Many wholesalers were distributing unusually large amounts of narcotics to pharmacies that were participating in Internet diversion schemes. Dozens of pharmacies were filling Internet orders for controlled substances for individuals who did not have legitimate prescriptions. In order to fill these illicit orders, the pharmacies ordered amounts controlled substances that far exceeded legitimate demand. In spite of written and oral warnings that DEA had given to the wholesale distributors, many distributors continued to distribute large amounts of controlled substances to rogue pharmacies. DEA took administrative action to revoke the DEA registrations of more than distributors, including McKesson and Cardinal, the two largest distributors of controlled substances in the United States. In addition to taking administrative action, DEA pursued civil penalties against a number of distributors who failed to detect and report to DEA suspicious orders of controlled substances as required by DEA regulations. In May 2008, McKesson paid $13,250,000, to the United States for failing to report suspicious orders of controlled substances. The civil penalty against McKesson was the largest civil penalty in the history of the Controlled Substance Act. Five months later, McKesson's record-setting penalty was eclipsed by the $34 million civil penalty paid by Cardinal for failing to report suspicious orders of controlled substances. In addition to the civil penalties assessed against Cardinal and McKesson, both companies entered an agreement with DEA requiring implementation of enhanced diversion control measures at the 56 distribution centers operated by the two companies. DEA's actions against McKesson, Cardinal, and other distributors significantly reduced the availability of pharmaceutical controlled substances to pharmacies that divert these drugs into illegitimate channels.

Denying Assets to Traffickers

In 2004, it was estimated that $65 billion dollars changed hands for drugs each year in the United States. By 2003, DEA established financial investigations—"following the money"—as a top priority. The agency's attack on the financial infrastructure of drug cartels was reenergized to permanently dismantle these trafficking organizations, whose total profits would rank them 13th among Fortune 500 companies by revenue. In FY 2003, DEA established a new Office of Financial Operations in Headquarters and specialized Money Laundering Groups in each DEA domestic field division to aggressively address the drug trade as a business. DEA also established a Financial Investigations Team (FIT) in its Bangkok and Bogota offices. In addition, DEA increased interagency cooperation and information sharing through joint efforts with the Internal Revenue Service and Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement by collaborating on issues, such as the bulk currency program, which developed new investigations pertaining to seizures of large amounts of currency as well as linking these seizures to ongoing drug investigations. These efforts ensured the coordination of all U.S. highway interdiction money seizures since smuggling large sums of cash across our borders is the primary method used to expatriate drug proceeds. DEA also changed its investigative tactics to assure that money laundering investigations against the Black Market Peso Exchange (BMPE) inflict the most damage against the Colombian sources of drug supply. The BMPE is the largest known money laundering system in the Western Hemisphere, responsible for moving an estimated $4 billion worth of drug proceeds every year from the United States to Colombia. DEA added several financial targets to the CPOT list. Finally, DEA recruited Special Agents with finance and accounting backgrounds to further increase the financial investigative skills of agency employees.

As a result of the focus on targeting drug money, DEA set records attacking illicit drug proceeds and related assets beginning in 2004. From FY 2005 through the end of FY 2007, DEA denied drug trafficking organizations more than $7 billion in revenue through the seizure of both assets and drugs. DEA denied drug traffickers a record-setting $3.5 billion in FY 2007—a goal not anticipated reaching until 2009. Domestic and foreign asset seizures increased from $908 million in FY 2006 to $1.7 billion in FY 2007, an increase of $865 million, or 95%. Additionally, DEA assisted our domestic law enforcement counterparts in investigations that resulted in the seizure of $179 million in FY 2006, and $247 million in FY 2007, an increase of $68 million, or 38%.

Operation Money Clip

On October 19, 2004, DEA announced the culmination of "Operation Money Clip," an SOD-coordinated OCDETF investigation launched in October 2003 in a DEA initiative to focus investigations on the abilities, methods, and routes used to smuggle large amounts of currency from the United States to the sources of drug supply in Mexico and other foreign countries. It targeted a Mexican-based poly-drug trafficking organization with ties to the Mexican drug trafficking "Federation of Traffickers." Operation Money Clip dismantled an international money laundering and drug trafficking organization and resulted in the arrest of 83 defendants. DEA San Antonio and the Kimble County, Texas, Sheriff's Department began the investigation based on a bulk currency seizure of over $2.2 million in a traffic stop in rural Texas. Based on evidence seized at the traffic stop, Money Clip was ultimately expanded to 54 investigations spanning the nation, and agents found that the organization allegedly laundered as much as $200 million from various rural and urban American cities to Mexican targets over a two-year period. The ensuing investigation established that this organization allegedly distributed approximately 500 kilograms of cocaine, 200 pounds of methamphetamine, 20 kilograms of heroin, and 10,000 pounds of marijuana per month over a two-year period. Operation Money Clip resulted in 26 separate seizures for a total of $4.7 million, 2,526 kilograms of cocaine, 74 pounds of crystallized methamphetamine, 2.8 pounds of methamphetamine, and over 40,000 pounds of marijuana. The money was laundered through remitter services, businesses, and foreign bank accounts. Metropolitan areas of Chicago, Atlanta, New York, and Los Angeles were involved, as were rural sections in Virginia, Pennsylvania, Iowa, South Carolina, and North Carolina.

Operation Mallorca

On June 14, 2005, DEA announced the culmination of "Operation Mallorca," a 27-month investigation that targeted the money laundering activities of four Colombian-based money brokers who funneled drug proceeds through the Black Market Peso Exchange. It was learned during the course of the investigation that monies were laundered through approximately 300 wire transfers to 200 bank accounts, involving 170 separate account holders, in 16 U.S. cities and 13 foreign countries. In addition, investigative efforts revealed 13 different trafficking groups in Colombia. Operation Mallorca resulted in the arrests of 36 individuals in two countries, including 13 Colombian drug traffickers taken into custody as a result of the operation. In addition, during the operation, $7.2 million, as well as 947 kilograms of cocaine, 7 kilograms of heroin, and 21,650 pounds of marijuana were seized. Indictments were returned against 81 defendants and four businesses in the District of Puerto Rico and the Southern District of New York.

Money Trail Initiative

In 2005, DEA implemented its Money Trail Initiative, an innovative financial crime strategy that attacked the financing of the illegal drug trade and dismantled major drug trafficking organizations. In the first year and a half, the Money Trail Initiative was responsible for dismantling six national organizations involved in the transportation of bulk currency drug proceeds from various points in the United States to Mexico. As of July 2006, this initiative resulted in the arrest of 418 defendants and the seizure of $65.4 million in United States currency, $14.5 million in assets, 59.6 metric tons of marijuana, 9.7 metric tons of cocaine, 126.7 kilograms of methamphetamine, 9 kilograms of heroin, 249 vehicles, and 77 weapons. One of these SOD investigations, Operation Choque, resulted in the identification and arrest of Mexican CPOTs Oscar, Miguel, and Luis Arriola-Marquez, and the dismantlement of their organization, which, based on ledgers seized by Mexican authorities, was responsible for the smuggling of at least 14,000 kilos of cocaine into the United States and the smuggling of $240 million out of the United States. Based on information supplied by DEA, Mexican authorities have seized over $18 million of the Arriola-Marquez Organization's assets.

Internet Enforcement

Virtual Enforcement Initiative: Operations Cyber Chase, CyberRx, Gear Grinder

DEA's Virtual Enforcement Initiative (VEI) an SOD-led OCDETF Program, was launched in April 2005 to combat traffickers selling prescription drugs over the Internet. It included Operations Cyber Chase, CyberRx, and Gear Grinder, and resulted in the seizure of more than $21.6 million in cash, property, computers, and bank accounts.

- Operation Cyber Chase was the first major VEI effort, and resulted in the identification of over 200 web sites that illegally sold pharmaceutical drugs. Because of this year-long operation that began after the Philadelphia-based international Internet drug trafficking Bansal organization, headed by Indian nationals, was identified, more than 20 criminals were arrested in eight U.S. cities and four foreign countries. Until they were arrested, these "e-traffickers" had been operating in the United States, India, Asia, Europe, and the Caribbean, and were using their rogue pharmacies to distribute drugs worldwide.
- Operation CyberRx targeted for the first time e-trafficking taking place solely within the United States. The drug dealers who operated these rogue Internet pharmacies received prescription orders for controlled substances over the Internet that were then shipped to the doors of many U.S. citizens—sometimes without any prescription needed. These criminal pharmaceutical drug traffickers averaged more than $50,000 a day in profits from their illegal Internet-based enterprise.
- Operation Gear Grinder resulted in the largest DEA steroid bust in history. It was a 21-month investigation that targeted eight major Mexican steroid manufacturing companies, their owners, and their trafficking associates. DEA intelligence analysts and diversion investigators found that 82 percent of the steroids seized and analyzed were of Mexican origin. A large majority of those steroids originated from the eight companies identified in Operation Gear Grinder. These businesses conducted their sales via the Internet; DEA estimated their combined U.S. steroid sales exceeded $56 million per year.

Operation Cyber-Roid

On October 26, 2006, five defendants were arrested in two separate criminal cases involving illegal distribution of prescription drugs and anabolic steroids via the Internet. DEA, the FDA, and IRS began the investigation in 2005 following a complaint from a Massachusetts man that his son had used his credit card without permission to purchase anabolic steroids over the Internet from PMeds.com. Six defendants were charged with conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, including anabolic steroids, through the website PMeds.com. Beginning in January 2003, the website took orders from a residence in Massachusetts, forwarded the orders to a site in Metepec, Mexico, and then smuggled anabolic steroids and other controlled substances into the United States for shipment to customers. PMeds also used commercial carriers to ship steroids concealed in electronic equipment and women's shoes into the United States. Another defendant located in Georgia supplied PMeds with steroids and other controlled substances from his business in Belize.

Operation Click-4-Drugs

On January 29, 2007, "Operation Click-4-Drugs" was launched, targeting a Puerto Rico-based organization that distributed large quantities of Schedule III and Schedule IV controlled substances via the Internet. These Internet doctors issued thousands of illegal prescriptions via the Internet for drugs such as hydrocodone, phentermine, and diazepam. The physicians were involved with Internet Facilitation Centers and Internet pharmacies that solicited customers throughout the United States who were seeking controlled substances. These centers referred the customers to these physicians using numerous web sites and e-mail addresses. The doctors reviewed on-line questionnaires and electronically approved prescriptions via the Internet, with no legitimate medical examination. Pharmacies in the United States would then ship the controlled substances via private carriers to customers in numerous jurisdictions within the 50 states.

Major Operations

Operations Busted Manatee & Double Talk

DEA's Caribbean Initiative, a multi-faceted attack on major trafficking organizations operating in the Caribbean corridor, culminated in June 2004 in the indictment and arrest of Colombian drug trafficker Elias Cobos-Munoz, the reputed head of one of the largest drug trafficking and drug transportation organizations based in Colombia and Jamaica, and more than 50 other high-level traffickers. The 29-month-long OCDETF operations "Busted Manatee" and "Double Talk" focused on the Cobos and the Maycock/Smith drug organizations that were affiliated. The Cobos organization had operated since July 2000, importing large shipments of cocaine through transhipment points in the Caribbean and distributed that cocaine in the Miami area and elsewhere. The Maycock/Smith organization transported cocaine and marijuana via aircraft and boat into the United States. The aggregate gross proceeds generated from the cocaine and marijuana imported and distributed in the United States by these organizations was believed to exceed $275 million. The proceeds of cocaine sales were laundered through financial institutions in New York and elsewhere. During June 2004, DEA, assisted by domestic and law enforcement counterparts in six countries, executed arrest warrants for the members of the Cobos organization in Colombia, Panama, Jamaica, the Bahamas, the United States, and Canada.

Drug Flow ATTACK Strategy

DEA implemented its ongoing, multi-agency Drug Flow Prevention strategy in May 2005. It was designed to significantly disrupt the flow of drugs, money, and chemicals between the source zones in Latin America and the United States by attacking vulnerabilities in the supply chains, transportation systems, and financial infrastructure of major drug trafficking organizations. The strategy, which targeteds the command and control structures of foreign-based drug trafficking organizations responsible for violence in Mexico's border areas where they extended across U.S. frontiers and operated in the United States, revolved around aggressive, well-planned, and coordinated enforcement operations with host-nation counterparts in global source countries, transit zones, and arrival zones. At the 2007 International Association of Chiefs of Police convention, Administrator Tandy described the strategy this way: "At DEA, we stopped using that tired phrase—you have to do more with less—and started looking for the traffickers' Achilles Heel—that narrow chokehold where we could inflict the most damage with the least amount of resources; and use the traffickers' corrupt officials against them, causing them to make mistakes that we capitalize on to seriously disrupt their traditional lines of transportation for drugs, money and chemicals. We devised a strategy that did just that—the Drug Flow Attack Strategy. With this international strategy, we stepped up our game—in essence, we went from playing checkers to playing chess."

Successful operations executed as part of this strategy included Operation All Inclusive 2005-2007, the centerpiece of the Drug Flow Attack Strategy, and Operation Imperial Emperor. When the three-month periods before and after Operation All Inclusive 2005 were compared, the average U.S. price per pure gram of cocaine was found to have increased 43 percent. During the first three quarters of 2007, the average U.S. price per pure gram of cocaine increased 44 percent, while average purity fell 15 percent, indicating the success of the Drug Flow Prevention strategy's large-scale operations. Operation All Inclusive was a multinational, intelligence-driven Drug Flow Strategy initiative implemented in August 2005 to disrupt the flow of drugs and money between South and Central American source zones and the United States. Operation All-Inclusive 2005 targeted Central American transit zones resulted in the interception and seizure of more than 46 metric tons of cocaine and 21 metric tons of marijuana before the drugs reached Mexico. Operation All Inclusive 2006 resulted in the seizure of 43 metric tons of cocaine, including a 16 metric ton maritime seizure in the Eastern Pacific and Western Caribbean, and the seizure and dismantlement of 15 cocaine processing labs in Colombia that yielded 92.6 metric tons of precursor chemicals. Operation All Inclusive 2007 resulted in the seizure of 115 metric tons of cocaine, a quantity estimated to be 12 to 28 percent of the cocaine transported through transit zones to the United States during 2006.

Operation Long Wine

On October 12, 2005, the first phase of "Operation Long Wine" culminated. It was an OCDETF investigation coordinated by SOD targeting the Atlanta-based cell of a major Mexican meth and cocaine trafficking organization that trafficked hundreds of kilos of cocaine and pounds of meth into the United States. The organization also laundered millions of dollars of proceeds from the trafficking of these drugs, often attempting to transport the laundered money by smuggling it in vehicles back into Mexico to fund their criminal enterprise. This phase resulted in the arrest of 28 individuals, the seizure of over $8 million, 40 lbs. of "ice" meth, and over 592 kilos of cocaine. Operation Long Wine marked the second round of success in DEA's Money Trail Initiative, an innovative financial crime strategy that attacks the financing of the illegal drug trade in order to dismantle major drug trafficking organizations.

Operation Motor City Mafia

On October 28, 2005, a total of 47 members and associates of the self-named Black Mafia Family (BMF) were arrested and $14 million in currency and assets seized, along with nearly 635 kilograms of cocaine and numerous weapons, in a two-year SOD-coordinated OCDETF investigation that had been launched in October 2003. The BMF was a large-scale cocaine trafficking and money laundering organization based in Detroit, whose operations spanned the country and whose founders and ringleaders, brothers Terry and Demetrius Flenory, began their drug trafficking careers selling $50 bags of crack during their high school years in the mid-1980s. Expanding to other cities in the 1990s, the brothers extended their small scale trafficking organization into a multi-million dollar criminal enterprise operating in numerous states. Their organization distributed thousands of kilograms of cocaine and laundered millions of dollars in drug proceeds. BMF members and associates were responsible for trafficking approximately 2,500 kilos of cocaine monthly through their Atlanta hub. The organization used sophisticated "traps" (hidden compartments) in stretch limousines to conceal and transport drugs and money. In an attempt to foil drug-sniffing dogs, they equipped some of their vehicles with devices to mechanically expel drug-tainted air.

Operation Northern Impact

On November 30, 2005, DEA concluded "Operation Northern Impact," a 24-month SOD-coordinated OCDETF investigation that targeted an international cocaine and marijuana trafficking ring whose drug smuggling and money laundering operations ranged across the Southwest Border and into the northeastern United States. It identified and dismantled a multi-million dollar drug distribution network responsible for smuggling and distributing significant quantities of cocaine from Mexico to the United States, whose distribution network extended from the Southwest Border as far northeast as the Washington D.C.-Baltimore area. Three major drug transportation rings based in Greensboro, NC; Phoenix, AZ; and Los Angeles, CA were dismantled. Operation Northern Impact resulted in the arrest of 53 individuals on charges that included drug conspiracy and money laundering. Operation seizures totaled 341 kilograms of cocaine, 2,258 pounds of marijuana, and $1.4 million in U.S. assets.

Operation High Step

On November 30, 2005, DEA concluded "Operation High Step," a year-long DEA-led multi-jurisdictional, multinational investigation targeting all levels of a major heroin trafficking organization that smuggled the drug from Colombia to the streets of Boston, New York, Chicago, and Orlando. The organization concealed heroin bricks inside porcelain frames of paintings that would be shattered by drug dealers to retrieve the drugs for sale. The traffickers also concealed heroin in shipments of furniture, shoes, and sewn into clothing. The organization was responsible for smuggling 25 kilograms of heroin monthly into the United States. Following the drug's wholesale distribution stateside, the illegal proceeds were wire-transferred back to Colombia. Operation High Step resulted in 19 arrests in Colombia, including the two leaders of the organization.

TSA and Delta Employees Indicted in Drug Sting

On February 20, 2008, two employees of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and one of Delta Air Lines were indicted by a federal grand jury on charges relating to a drug-smuggling operation at Atlanta's Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport (HJIA). Beginning in December 2007, a DEA confidential source (CS) on three occasions over the next three months brokered deals with the TSA employees for the transportation of what the defendants believed were illicit drugs (cocaine on one occasion and heroin the other two, although the CS provided fake drug substitutes) through HJIA to New York. Their transportation fees were $5,000 for the first kilogram and $3,000 for each subsequent kilogram. The 'drugs' were transported by the Delta employee on Delta flights. Upon negotiating the third and final transaction, the Delta and TSA employees were arrested.

First Ever Canada / U.S. Tunnel Discovered

On July 21, 2005, the first sophisticated drug smuggling tunnel known to run between Canada and the United States—from British Columbia, Canada, into Washington State— was shut down. It had been under construction for more than a year and had been monitored by both Canadian and American law enforcement. On the Canadian side of the border, the entrance to the 360-foot long tunnel was hidden under a Quonset hut; on the U.S. side, the tunnel terminated beneath the living room floor of a home in Lynden, Washington. It ran at a depth of between three and 10 feet, and was reinforced with iron rebar and 2x6 wood supports. DEA agents apprehended several loads of marijuana and Ecstasy that the conspirators had tried to move through the tunnel.



The tunnel was one of a total of 34 cross-border tunnels discovered up to that point in time in the United States.

International Arms Dealer With Ties To Terrorist Organizations Arrested and Extradited

Monzer al Kassar, an international arms dealer, was arrested by Spanish authorities in Madrid on June 8, 2007, and was charged with conspiring to sell millions of dollars worth of weapons to the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) — a designated foreign terrorist organization — to be used to kill Americans in Colombia. He, and two associates, were arrested as they prepared to finalize the multimillion-dollar transaction to pay for the weapons. Since the early 1970s, Kassar had been a ready source of weapons and military equipment for armed factions engaged in violent conflicts around the world. Kassar had provided weapons and military equipment to such factions in Nicaragua, Brazil, Cyprus, Bosnia, Croatia, Somalia, Iran, and Iraq, among other countries. Some of these factions had included known terrorist organizations, such as the Palestinian Liberation Front, the goals of which included attacking United States interests and United States nationals. Between February 2006 and May 2007, Kassar and his associates agreed to sell to the FARC millions of dollars worth of weapons, including thousands of machine guns, millions of rounds of ammunition, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, and surface-to-air missile systems. During a series of recorded telephone calls, emails, and in-person meetings, Kassar agreed to sell the weapons to two confidential sources working with DEA who represented that they were acquiring these weapons for the FARC, with the specific understanding that the weapons were to be used to attack United States helicopters in Colombia. Kassar also promised to provide the FARC with ton-quantities of C4 explosives, as well as expert trainers from Lebanon to teach the FARC how to effectively use C4 and improvised explosive devices. In addition, Kassar offered to send a thousand men to fight with the FARC against United States military officers in Colombia.

At the time of his arrest, Administrator Tandy stated, "Monzer al Kassar commands a global munitions empire, arming and funding insurgents and terrorists across the globe, particularly those who wish to harm Americans. He operates in the shadows, the silent partner behind the business of death and terror. Kassar's capture is a testament to DEA's unique investigative skills and broad reach of its international intelligence network."

Kassar was extradited from Spain on June 13, 2008.

Extradition of Iranian Heroin Trafficker

On December 14, 2007, DEA announced the extradition from Austria of Hussein Karimi, aka "Hussein Karimi Rikabadi," aka "Hossein Salim Khani," an Iranian national previously living in Romania, was announced. He was extradited on charges relating to the importation of heroin into the United States from Afghanistan and Pakistan. Since 1998, Karimi led an international heroin trafficking organization (the "Rikabadi Organization") responsible for the worldwide distribution of thousands of kilograms of Southwest Asian heroin. The Rikabadi Organization purchased heroin from suppliers in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and arranged for the heroin to be transported through various countries including Iran and Turkey. The Rikabadi Organization's heroin was imported into the United States, Canada, and Western European countries and sold for hundreds of millions of dollars. Karimi controlled the heroin-trafficking activities of his organization from locations in Romania. Karimi was arrested in March 2007 while attempting to cross from Austria to the Republic of Azerbaijan.

Arms Dealer Indicted for Conspiracy to Kill Americans

On May 6, 2008, the indictment of international arms dealer Viktor Bout on terrorism offenses was announced for conspiring to sell millions of dollars worth of weapons to the Colombian terrorist organization FARC to be used to kill Americans in Colombia. Bout was arrested by Thai authorities on a provisional arrest warrant on April 9, 2008, based on a complaint filed in a New York federal court, charging conspiracy to provide material support or resources to a designated foreign terrorist organization. Bout had been in custody in Thailand since March 6, 2008. Bout, an international weapons trafficker since the 1990s, had carried out his weapons-trafficking business by assembling a fleet of cargo airplanes capable of transporting weapons and military equipment to various parts of the world, including Africa, South America and the Middle East. In 2004, as a result of his weapons trafficking activities in Liberia, the U.S. Department of Treasury placed Bout on the Specially Designated Nationals list, which prohibits any transactions between Bout and U.S. nationals, and freezes any of his assets that are within the jurisdiction of the United States. Bout had agreed between November 2007 and March 2008 to sell to two DEA CSs, who purportedly represented the FARC, millions of dollars worth of weapons, with the specific understanding that the weapons were to be used to attack U. S. helicopters in Colombia. The weapons were to include surface-to-air missile systems, armor piercing rocket launchers, AK-47 firearms, millions of rounds of ammunition, Russian spare parts for rifles, anti-personnel land mines, C-4 plastic explosives, night-vision equipment, "ultralight" airplanes that could be outfitted with grenade launchers and missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles. During a covertly recorded meeting in Thailand on March 6, 2008, Bout stated to the CSs that he could arrange to airdrop the arms to the FARC in Colombia, and offered to sell two cargo planes to the FARC that could be used for arms deliveries. Bout also provided a map of South America, and asked the CSs to show him American radar locations in Colombia. Bout said that he understood that the CSs wanted the arms for use against American personnel in Colombia, and advised that the United States was also his enemy, stating that the FARC's fight against the United States was also his fight. During the meeting, Bout also offered to provide people to train the FARC in the use of the arms

International Drug Enforcement Conference

On May 8, 2007, the DEA sponsored the 25th International Drug Enforcement Conference in Madrid, Spain. Participating countries had grown from 12 in 1982, to 84 countries from all corners of the world. The 12 charter countries were: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Peru, the United States, and Venezuela. Between 2004 and 2008, IDECs were held and focused on the following themes:

- IDEC XXII: 2004, Lima, Peru:
  "Combating International Drug Trafficking and Money Laundering"

- IDEC XXIII: 2005, Santiago, Chile:
  "Expanding Global Partnerships to Destroy Drug Trafficking and Money Laundering Organizations"

- IDEC XXIV: 2006, Montreal, Canada:
  "Targeting Drug Trafficking Money Laundering, and Diversion of Chemicals on a Global Level"

- IDEC XXV: 2007, Madrid, Spain:
  "Celebrating 25 Years of Cooperation"

- IDEC XXVI: 2008, Istanbul, Turkey:
  "Drug Law Enforcement in a Changing World"

International Drug Enforcement Conference
IDEC
XXVI
DEA
Istanbul July 8-10, 2008
Uluslararası Uyuşturucu İle Mücadele Konferansı

Richard Fass Murderer Extradited from Mexico and Sentenced to Life

Vasquez-Mendoza is escorted to a police vehicle.

The extradition on January 29, 2005, from Mexico of Agustin Vasquez-Mendoza, the murderer of Special Agent Richard E. Fass, culminated a long and arduous investigation led by the Phoenix Division with assistance from the Mexico City Country Office. On November 14, 2006, Agustin Vasquez-Mendoza was sentenced to life in prison for the first-degree murder of Special Agent. Fass. The sentencing was the fourth stemming from the June 1994 murder of Agent Fass during an undercover operation in Glendale, Arizona. Vasquez-Mendoza was convicted by a state jury in August 2006 on a 10-count indictment that included armed robbery, kidnapping, and first-degree murder charges. Evidence at trial proved Vasquez-Mendoza and three associates planned to rob Agent Fass of $160,000 in cash they believed was for the purchase of methamphetamine. At the time of sentencing, Phoenix SAC Tim Landrum said, "Twelve years ago, this agency was robbed of a brave and talented Special Agent. Twelve years ago, a family was robbed of a loving husband and father. Nothing can change that. So today is not a happy day, but it is a day of hard-fought justice. DEA will never forget Richard Fass, and we honor his memory by working tirelessly to put all violent drug traffickers behind bars."

Guilty Verdict Remains for Killer of Special Agents Seema and Montoya

Seventeen years after Michael Chia, a co-conspirator in the murder of Special Agents Paul Seema and George Montoya and the serious wounding of SA Jose Martinez, was convicted, he was again convicted in a re-trial in Los Angeles County on September 28, 2005. Michael Chia, who was not present at the agents' shooting, was arrested soon after. His intimate interaction with the conspirators during the hours preceding the shootings and his involvement in the plot to rob and kill the agents were debated extensively during his trial in 1988. He was ultimately convicted of two counts of first-degree murder, one count of attempted murder, and second degree robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery. Chia was sentenced to two consecutive life sentences in prison.

On February 28, 2002, the Ninth Circuit Court overturned Chia's original conviction and ordered that Chia's appeal be granted unless he was allowed a new trial within a reasonable period of time. On March 10, 2003, the United States Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit's reversal of Chia's conviction, and remanded it back to them for reconsideration. Almost a year later, the Ninth Circuit affirmed its previous ruling in People v. Chia when it ruled that Chia's due process rights were violated. The Court again ruled that Chia be granted a new trial. Several months after this decision, the United States Supreme Court denied the California Attorney General's petition to review the Chia case. The new trial of Michael Chia began on August 2, 2005. Although the decision to re-try Chia presented a challenge to DEA, the Los Angeles Field Division (LAFD) made his successful prosecution their highest priority. LAFD worked closely with the prosecutorial team to retry this 17-year old case, spending countless hours reviewing the facts and evidence of the case. In announcing Chia's re-conviction, LAFD SAC Stephen Delgado stated, "Justice was served today. This conviction is tremendously gratifying for agents past and present, as well as the families of George Montoya and Paul Seema."

DEA Response to Hurricane Katrina

DEA's response was nothing short of heroic in the wake of Hurricane Katrina that struck and devastated the New Orleans area on August 29, 2005. The United States Attorney for Eastern Louisiana said that as the last drop of rain from Hurricane Katrina fell on the streets of New Orleans, DEA Special Agents were the first federal law enforcement officers in the field. DEA employees provided assistance to citizens and city authorities, aiding in rescue and cleanup for weeks following the disaster. The Air Wing, along with the Dallas, Houston, Atlanta, St. Louis, and Miami Field Divisions collectively deployed 113 special agents and special agent/pilots to provide assistance to 13 law enforcement agencies in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. MET Teams provided patrol assistance on a rotating basis in 21-day shifts. Some 70,000 pounds of supplies and equipment (including night vision goggles, guns, and ammunition) were transported by the Air Wing to perform law enforcement and search and rescue efforts for DEA employees and Louisiana and Mississippi hurricane victims. DEA Special Agents worked with hospitals to transport medicine to law enforcement personnel to combat hepatitis A and B, which allowed DEA and law enforcement partners to sustain their rescue missions. DEA partnered with Texas and Arkansas pharmacy boards on emergency prescription refill procedures in response to requests from Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. DEA assisted with 24-hour security patrols and ultimately rescued over 3,340 civilians, including more than 70 abandoned elderly residents at a flooded nursing home. DEA located missing loved ones for survivors and rescued 63 family members of DEA employees. To meet local law enforcement needs, DEA secured 130 cars through the asset forfeiture fund and loaned them to local law enforcement departments that lost their vehicles. In addition to all of the on-site assistance DEA provided in the disaster areas, employees throughout the agency donated cash and needed items. The Aviation Division, which spearheaded the charitable donations and ensured the delivery of goods, estimated that a total of nearly $121,000 was collected to assist those in need.

The DEA team who rescued 70 elderly and infirm patients from a New Orleans nursing home trapped in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina won the Attorney General's Award was a finalist for the 2006 Service to America Citizen Services Medal for their impact on addressing the needs of the nation. The team, despite nearby gunfire, rising waters, and looters, carried the residents, many crippled in wheelchairs and bedridden, down five flights of stairs to safety and provided supplies to dozens more who were evacuated days later. For DEA's heroic actions in rescuing over 3,000 stranded Americans during Hurricane Katrina, Hearst Newspapers lauded DEA as one of only two agencies in the relief efforts to get the "people piece right" in its emergency response.

New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina.

DEA's New Orleans Field Division office was damaged by the Hurricane, but employees of the NOFD were able to reoccupy its Hurricane Katrina-damaged office space beginning November 7, 2005. DEA's Gulfport, Mississippi, office fared much worse, being badly destroyed by the Hurricane. Employees returned to that office in April 2006.

A few months after the storm, crime became a major issue in New Orleans. By Christmas 2006, murders, violence, robberies, and shootings started escalating out of control. New Orleans had twice the murders per capita than the next highest city. Attorney General Gonzales decided that federal resources were needed to help stem the surge in violent crime in the city. He gave DEA in New Orleans the power to arrest and enforce any federal law under any title, as opposed to just enforcing Title 21-the Controlled Substances Act. DEA is not aware of this ever happening in the past. NOFD detailed 21 SAs in New Orleans to various NOPD specialized units that included the Crime Abatement Team (CAT), Special Operation Division (SOD), and Major Narcotics Section. DEA also committed the HIDTA Task Force to the worst crime area in central city. DEA efforts centered on increasing prosecution of cases involving violent offenders, firearms, and drugs in the Federal system, and the results were tremendous. Over a 7-month period, 65 defendants were indicted on Federal charges in investigations in which DEA led or participated, 963 individuals were arrested on various State charges and a total of 142 firearms, 1 kilogram of heroin, 3 ½ kilograms of crack, 3 kilograms of cocaine powder, 15 kilograms of marijuana, 65 grams of methamphetamine, 3,404 dosage units of MDMA, and $194,838 dollars were seized.

In 2006, New Orleans SAC Bill Renton and Deputy Administrator for Operational Support Jim Craig (former Houston SAC) each received the prestigious Presidential Meritorious Executive Rank Award for their law enforcement leadership in the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.

NOFD SAC Bill Renton summed up DEA's response this way: "I sincerely believe that DEA's collective efforts in response to Hurricane Katrina, this country's worst natural disaster, was a seminal moment in our history. If any member of the DEA family had a relative, friend, or friend of a friend who lived in the area, they called the NOFD, and we found them and ensured they were safe. If somebody called and said they needed anything, we did it, and vice versa. When we called any DEA office, anything was possible. It was really good to see people and the media recognize what DEA did. We're a small agency, but we were by far the most visible federal agency in the city, bar none.... DEA's crowning achievement has to be that we rescued more than 3,000 people. When everyone else was waiting to start their SWAT operations, we were out there pulling people from their homes. They would absolutely have been dead if it weren't for us. No question."

DEA Declared a Great Place to Work

On May 3, 2007, DEA continued to distinguish itself as one of the highest performers among government agencies that employees rate as an outstanding place to work, according to the 2006 Federal Human Capital Survey and the Best Places to Work rankings in the federal government 2006. DEA ranked in the Top 20 best places to work in the federal government, placing 18 out of 222 agencies in the Partnership for Public Service's rankings of Best Places to Work in the federal government, which is based on responses from more than 221,000 civil servants. DEA significantly exceeded ratings of other Government agencies in many measures of performance culture. The survey revealed that the majority of DEA employees trust their supervisor, believe the workforce is representative of all segments of society, and would recommend DEA as a good place to work.

Spike TV Launches Original Series "DEA"

In the spring of 2008, Spike TV aired six one-hour weekly episodes of a new original narrative series "DEA" that offered viewers a never-before-seen look at the inner workings of the DEA. Produced by Al Roker Entertainment, Inc., in association with Size 12 Productions, Spike TV was given exclusive access to follow a group of Special Agents and Task Force Officers in the DEA Detroit division as they risked their lives daily in the ongoing battle against illegal drugs. The series followed Special Agents as they work cases ranging from street level dealers all the way up to international drug traffickers. "DEA" underscored the danger Special Agents experience on a daily basis in order to do their jobs. Viewers witnessed first-hand what it is like for Special Agents to go out on undercover missions and pose as drug dealers. The series also took a look at the complex relationship that DEA Special Agents have with informants, revealing the strange kinship they share with these criminals who see themselves not as arch enemies, but rather as opponents in "the game" of the illegal drug trade. Roker became interested in airing a series featuring DEA following his visit in 2006 to the DEA training facility in Quantico to tape a show concerning the U.S. meth epidemic.

The premiere of "DEA" on Spike TV was the network's highest rated non-scripted premiere in over two years and "DEA" was the #2 ranked show in its time slot for men 18-49 years old among all basic cable networks. "DEA" boosted the Spike network's viewership by 227% compared to the same time period the previous year. Also, "DEA" added to Spike TV's best ratings quarter in three years. The viewer statistics also reflect increased interest in DEA beyond pure entertainment. Following the April 2 debut, statistics revealed that the DEA.gov website received the largest number of 'hits' ever in one week-3.14 million. (In 2007, the site averaged 2.4 million hits per week)

DEA gave careful consideration to the hazards of disclosing the agency's inner workings, and an agreement was reached among all parties involved, including the state prosecutor, on the "rules of engagement" for the show. One stipulation was that cases that were highlighted in the series were ones that would be swiftly adjudicated in state court. Federally prosecuted cases were not included because of the length of time they take to be adjudicated. Additionally, care was taken that the enforcement operation methods depicted on the show, such as surveillance, undercover work, and the use of Confidential Sources, revealed nothing that was not already in the public domain, so as not to compromise DEA's operational effectiveness.

"DEA" received positive media attention. The New York Times review of "DEA" put it in perspective: "With so much attention focused in recent years on the war on terror and the dangerous work being done by American soldiers, the main contribution of 'DEA' may be to remind us that there is still a war on drugs being waged as well, with similar dangers and urgency."

Al Roker speaks with a member of the media during a conference call to announce the new series.

PROGRAMS

Intelligence

Special Field Intelligence Program Operation African Frontier

In FY-2007, DEA/Rome initiated Special Field Intelligence Program (SFIP) African Frontier that addresses a variety of significant intelligence gaps across the African continent. DEA personnel in Europe and Africa participated in broad-based intelligence collection efforts focused on cocaine, heroin, and precursor chemical trafficking organizations operating in Africa, as well as on groups involved in narco-terrorism and international money laundering activities. SFIP African Frontier has enabled DEA to develop an understanding of the drug threats in Africa, which has led to DEA's principle role in the development of USG counter narcotics and aid strategies across Africa. The target-specific data collected under the SFIP has allowed DEA to prioritize enforcement goals in Africa. The strategic-level intelligence has been briefed to senior DEA management, as well as to policy decision makers within the Intelligence Community, the Department of Defense, and the National Security Council.

Centers for Drug Information

The Centers for Drug Information Program (CDI) is an Internet-based information sharing system established in 2003 to assist foreign law enforcement elements worldwide in sharing information and coordinating law enforcement operations. The system offers standardized reporting forms, data storage in a central relational database with search capabilities, passport and fugitive database, an internal e- mail service, real-time chat, and other analytical tools. Presently, there are 51 participating countries and approximately 250 users sharing information on such topics as: drug movements, seizures, drug traffickers, alien smuggling, money laundering, weapons trafficking, and clandestine drug laboratories. Fifteen African countries have pledged to participate in the program. CDI participating nations continue to prove that the concept of sharing drug information leads to global operational successes. Through the CDI, DEA is strengthening partnerships among and with foreign law enforcement counterparts to maximize the impact of worldwide anti drug operations.



Domestic Monitor Programs

In 1979, the New York Field Division initiated the Heroin Domestic Monitor Program (HDMP), a retail heroin buy program whose goal is to provide information regarding the nature of the domestic heroin problem at the street level. New York's large heroin user market and strategic location as a gateway city for heroin distribution in the United States served as the impetus for instituting this program. The HDMP provides to federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement authorities, drug policymakers, and drug-abuse researchers, information on the price, purity, and geographic origin of retail-level heroin that is available in major metropolitan areas of the United States. Over the past 30 years, the HDMP has proven to be a valuable tool in identifying emerging heroin markets, the dominant type of heroin available, and new geographic sources of heroin. With this information, DEA has aggressively targeted emerging heroin problems, as well as developed strategies to counter them. The program has been expanded to 28 U.S. cities.

In 2006, DEA initiated the Cocaine and Methamphetamine Domestic Monitor Programs, modeled after the Heroin DMP. Due to the threat posed by cocaine and methamphetamine trafficking, these programs were instituted to provide data to federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement authorities, drug policymakers, and drug-abuse researchers on the prices and purity of cocaine and methamphetamine at the retail level. Cocaine DMP was initiated in 11 cities and the Methamphetamine DMP in 12 cities. These pilot programs are reflecting that there are wide variations in drug purity even within the same city that may indicate shifts in distribution and/or corroborate investigative intelligence regarding changes in availability.

Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) Fusion Center

Under DEA leadership, the OCDETF Fusion Center became fully operational in 2006 with the mission to fuse all investigative and regulatory reporting contributed by its participating agencies. The Center provides a common, central repository for all drug, drug-related financial, and gang-related case data from its participating agencies, as well as intelligence analysis generated by the Center. It provides a permanent, collective body of knowledge developed over time, as well as continually updated intelligence that is fused with new reporting. Through both human analysis and sophisticated link analysis tools, the Center conducts comprehensive analyses of available information, produces investigative leads for investigators in the field, and supports the coordination of multi-agency, multi jurisdictional investigations targeting the most significant drug trafficking organizations threatening the United States. At the heart of the OFC is a powerful computer with access to a massive database that applies advanced analytics to queries, as well as one of the most potent free text search engines available today.

National Virtual Pointer System

DEA, the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA), International Justice and Public Safety Network (Nlets), and Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS) managers created the National Virtual Pointer System (NVPS) that links existing target deconfliction systems to promote collaborative investigative activity. NVPS became operational in June 2004 and allows participating federal, state, local and tribal law enforcement agencies nationwide to determine what other law enforcement entities are focused on the same investigative target. NVPS facilitates coordination/deconfliction by providing connectivity between eighteen existing investigative target deconfliction systems and provides access to all participating databases through a single point of entry. NVPS provides participants with contact information for officers/agents working common targets. Currently, there are over 350,000 targets of active investigations within the NVPS system.

Support to the Diversion Control Program

The Intelligence Program has expanded its support to the DEA Diversion Control Program with the addition of 73 Intelligence Analysts. Intelligence analytical support to the Diversion Control Program can vary from support to criminal or regulatory investigations to strategic intelligence projects DEA Intelligence provided support to an investigation of the third largest pharmaceutical distributor in the country, ranked 19 on the Fortune 500 list of major corporations. The analysis indicated that the company disregarded DEA compliance requirements and sold millions of dosage units of hydrocodone to rogue Internet pharmacies. On October 2, the company agreed to pay a $34 million settlement for failure to report suspicious sales. Intelligence support to the Diversion Control Program also led to the designation of the first chemical Consolidated Priority Organization Target (CPOT). This organization attempted to illegally import into Mexico over 300 metric tons of pseudoephedrine tablets to supply Mexican methamphetamine producers, an amount that could have potentially produced approximately 60 metric tons of methamphetamine with an estimated street value of over $1 billion.

DEA Rejoins the Intelligence Community

In February 2006, with the signing of a joint memorandum by the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General, DEA re-joined the Intelligence Community (IC) through the designation of the Office of National Security Intelligence in the Intelligence Division as the 16th member of the IC. The DEA and the IC have a long history of partnering to produce strategic assessments and identify and disrupt drug trafficking organizations, a successful partnership that has facilitated the exchange of vital information and the leveraging of expertise. The Office of National Security Intelligence facilitates intelligence coordination and information sharing with other members of the intelligence, law enforcement, and homeland security communities by ensuring that DEA resources are responsive to national security requirements and leveraging the institutions, diversity, and capabilities of the Intelligence Community to strengthen and support law enforcement efforts. The Office of National Security Intelligence disseminates DEA intelligence products--operational and strategic--through cables and in finished intelligence format directly to partner agencies. Through its membership in the IC the Office of National Security Intelligence also represents DEA and its interests by ensuring that issues related to drug trafficking are brought to the attention of the highest levels of the Intelligence Community.

El Paso Intelligence Center

The El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) made a significant advancement in information collection and sharing by adding foreign government liaison officers to its staff. Representatives from the Colombian National Police and the Government of Mexico, Attorney General's Office, now serve in EPIC. The benefit of the foreign liaison presence was realized almost immediately with the facilitation of the exchange of information regarding the interdiction by Mexican authorities of a Self Propelled Semi-submersible (SPSS) vessel used in cocaine smuggling. Based on expanding trust, EPIC Intelligence Analysts participated in a debriefing of four crew members of the captured SPSS, as well as examining the seized SPSS vessel. The Colombian representative provided valuable information on SPSS activities. The Colombian and Mexican representatives provide weekly briefings to EPIC, which has increased the depth and significance of the information being shared. The weekly briefings and daily contact with the liaison officers are proving to be a significant opportunity for the exchange of valuable information that can and is being applied in law enforcement operations.

In an effort to expand support to the law enforcement community, EPIC launched a concerted effort in 2006 to make EPIC information more available through Internet technology under the EPIC Open Connectivity Project, which which provides web-based access to EPIC data. Users now can access EPIC data from their internet connection that can be in their offices or in their squad cars. The information available includes 34 years of drug information collected from state/local federal agencies. EPIC's Open Connectivity has proven very successful because of its ease of use, timely responses, and diversity of valuable, usable information that can be applied in a law enforcement setting.

As part of EPIC's Open Connectivity Project, a National Seizure System (NSS) was developed by EPIC and its many law enforcement partners. NSS captures via Internet communication drug seizures from around the world, with particular focus on those in the United States. The information available includes type and amount of drug, circumstances leading to the seizure, organizations associated with the seizure, information on arrestees, and post seizure/event information to include detainee and seizure photos, diagrams, charts, and maps. Users/contributors also can manipulate and analyze the data for strategic purposes within their areas of responsibility or beyond, or request that EPIC provide the analysis of that data set. There are now over 13,000 users who have registered to access EPIC's data, clearly indicating the value placed on this innovative tool developed by the law enforcement community.

EPIC initiated the Gatekeeper Project to research, analyze, and report information on the Mexican drug trafficking organizations that control entry corridors in Mexico for illegal goods being smuggled into the United States. The tracking and analysis of the operations and members/associates of these organizations provide specific information on command and control, organizational structures, and methods of operation of the traffickers operating on the US Mexican border. It also serves as a guide for policy makers to better understand drug smuggling across the border and initiate enforcement programs and prioritize US counter drug operations. EPIC has provided briefings on the Gatekeeper Project to many government and law enforcement officials to include members of Congress, all of whom recognize the value of this program.

EPIC receives information from many law enforcement, military, and Intelligence Community agencies. A perfect example of EPIC's collection, analytical, and coordination capabilities is reflected in the analysis of intelligence received about possible maritime drug movement in the Pacific Ocean. It was not known if this drug operation involved a surface transfer using go-fast vessels or a self propelled semi-submersible (SPSS) vessel. After several days of critical analysis of incoming intelligence, EPIC was able to locate the suspect vessel. The information was coordinated with the Joint Inter-Agency Task Force South and the Information Analysis Center in Mexico City. EPIC determined the vessel was possibly an SPSS – information that was passed onto the Mexican Navy that interdicted the SPSS and seized 5.8 metric tons of cocaine.

Scientific Studies on Drug Production

The Intelligence Division and the Office of Forensic Sciences have collected and analyzed scientific data on coca cultivation and cocaine processing in the Andean Region and, most recently, on opium poppy cultivation and heroin processing in Colombia and other parts of the world. These studies provide policy makers with unique forensic data and strategic intelligence on the global threats posed by illicit crop cultivation and drug production. The strategic objective of this ongoing initiative is to provide the U.S. counterdrug community with the scientific data required to more accurately estimate potential cocaine and heroin production and to provide senior USG policy makers with new insights critical to the creation of strategies for coca eradication, essential chemical control, and alternative development. This initiative has had a profound impact on the USG's understanding of the threat posed by South American cocaine and heroin production. For example, in September 2008, the USG decreased its estimate of Colombia's potential cocaine production by 155 metric tons over 2 years (2006-07). The revised estimates for Colombia are a direct result of several recent DEA coca yield studies in Colombia. DEA experts assess that this 155-metric ton decrease in Colombia's estimated potential cocaine production is largely due to the Colombian National Police's massive and sustained aerial coca eradication operations in certain growing regions of Colombia.

Information Sharing through One-DOJ

The One-DOJ System in the Department of Justice (DOJ) shares criminal law enforcement information across DOJ's internal investigative components, and connects with regional criminal law enforcement sharing initiatives, allowing authorized users to conduct searches of One-DOJ information. This concept reaches across all DOJ information sharing efforts, providing our partners with one access point for DOJ law enforcement information. DEA took a significant collaborative role in developing system policies and providing significant input to DOJ on practical issues regarding its use. DEA also assumed a leadership role as it pertains to data inclusion within the system and currently has over two and one-half million records within the One-DOJ System. DEA has taken an active role in delivering One-DOJ presentations to law enforcement audiences nationwide to detail the system's status and capabilities and encourage participation.

Establishment of Field Intelligence Managers

The Intelligence Division recognized the need to establish Field Intelligence Managers (FIM) within its field divisions and foreign regions in order to develop and manage a comprehensive drug intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination program within their areas of responsibility. FIM positions have been created within all DEA field divisions and foreign regions. FIM responsibilities include, but are not limited to:

(1) Identify and target for enforcement action significant drug traffickers/drug trafficking organizations impacting the United States from an international, national, regional, or local perspective; (2) Support all phases of DEA/multiagency investigations; (3) Produce strategic drug trafficking assessments on drug trafficking patterns and drug trafficking organizations; and (4) Conduct liaison with federal, state, local, and foreign agencies to facilitate and develop new information sharing programs.

The establishment of these FIM positions improved the identification of priority intelligence collection requirements, effectively allocated intelligence and enforcement resources for collection and analysis purposes, and streamlined the reporting criteria and protocols to ensure timely dissemination of intelligence.

Intelligence Assessments

One of the Intelligence Program's primary functions is to analyze and produce assessments on the various aspects of the drug traffic and those involved in the traffic. To highlight a few: The *Alternative Chemicals Sought to Produce Methamphetamine Precursors* report reflects that some drug trafficking organizations are manufacturing their own meth precursors that are not on domestic or international watch lists and thus can go undetected by law enforcement. The many reports published on drug money laundering and money flow highlight vulnerabilities of undeveloped economies, the types of businesses used to launder drug proceeds, identified the most prevalent business beneficiaries of trafficker-directed funds and demonstrated both the existing vulnerabilities of internet virtual worlds and how their extensive growth and evolution could represent significant challenges for drug law enforcement in the future. DEA also plays a central role in coordinating and leading Intelligence Community strategic intelligence projects. For example, DEA led an interagency effort that produced an assessment that identified crucial relationships between major Mexican and Colombian drug traffickers. The assessment focused on eight major cocaine transporters identified as playing key roles in coordinating activity between Mexican and Colombian drug traffickers. These eight transporters are now targets of joint USG and Government of Mexico intelligence collection and enforcement efforts. Three of the targets have been arrested by Colombian and Mexican authorities. DEA also led an effort to produce a comprehensive examination of the cocaine threat posed by West Africa, with a focus on Guinea-Bissau. DEA reporting and analysis also provided the basis for an assessment of shortages of cocaine in the United States. DEA's Intelligence Program, in cooperation with many US and Canadian federal agencies, produced *The U.S.-Canada Border Drug Threat Assessment 2007* that provided US and Canadian ministers an up-to-date picture of the current drug trafficking situation between the United States and Canada while highlighting areas of concern that needed to be addressed in future collaborative projects.

Drug-Related Violence

Through intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination, DEA's Intelligence Program has taken the lead in defining the critical and increasing threat from drug-related violence along the Southwest Border. DEA Intelligence Analysts lead or participate in formal collection programs, source debriefings, and investigations focused on this threat. The El Paso Field Division, for example, initiated SFIP Tigres del Norte to collect information concerning drug-related violence occurring along the El Paso-Ciudad Juarez trafficking corridor. This initiative collected valuable intelligence on the primary Mexican drug traffickers and assassination squads operating in Ciudad Juarez. The Houston Field Division expanded the aims of Tigres del Norte to encompass violence along the entire southwest border under SFIP Operation Black Flag. The DEA Intelligence Program also produces predictive reports based on the analysis of source debriefings and investigative information in order to forecast where "hot spots" of drug-related violence may surface and who may be targeted. The El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) also has devoted considerable intelligence resources to the problem of drug-related violence, focusing on the near-daily changes in the structure and leadership of the dominant drug trafficking organizations. Information provided by EPIC is tactical in nature, and is concerned with the real-time tracking and targeting of drug traffickers in Mexico.

Intelligence Analysts: Key to DEA's Success

Intelligence Analysts (I/A) were present when DEA Special Agents talked with a longtime Afghan heroin trafficker and warlord. Preparation for the debriefings and the follow up verification of his information kept the debriefing team working 10-14 hours per day. Topics ranged from heroin trafficking proceeds used to fund the insurgency in Afghanistan to the role of the Taliban in the opium trade. After years of analyzing his activities, the I/As literally sat face-to-face with the trafficker across a table, engaging in a give-and-take question and answer session that was essentially a chess match-like battle of wits.

In April 2007, a DEA I/A traveled with DEA Agents to Iraq to interview several alleged insurgents who had been detained by US forces near the Syrian border with a large amount of drugs. The team was investigating whether the suspects were using narcotics proceeds to fund attacks against coalition forces. A native Arabic speaker, the I/A participated in the debriefing of the detainees and provided invaluable support to the DEA team based on his language skills and vast knowledge of Iraqi cultural practices.

An I/A traveled to a Chinese prison to debrief a well known drug trafficker who worked for a Colombian trafficking organization responsible for transporting multi-kilo quantities of cocaine to China. This was the first time that the Government of China allowed DEA to participate in the debriefing of a Chinese criminal defendant.

The I/A assigned to support the investigation of a violent drug trafficking organization --Vineland Boys Organization (VBO), a distribution cell of CPOT Ismael ZAMBADA-Garcia - - successfully linked voluminous pertinent telephone calls with surveillance information, seizures, witness statements, and various criminal acts producing a clear picture of the organization's criminal activities. Significant sentences were handed down. VBO members had murdered two police officers and wounded one in 2003; one was arrested in Mexico and returned to the United States.

In 1988, DEA Special Agents Paul Seema and George Montoya were murdered in California. When a re-trial of the defendant was granted, preparation for this re-trial required the examination of evidence and reconstruction of testimony dating back 17 years. The I/A's tremendous efforts in evaluating documents, identifying pertinent non-drug evidence, providing assistance to the District Attorney's Office, and liaison abilities were vital to another guilty verdict of the defendant--sentenced to 61 years to life.

The New Orleans Field Division's Intelligence Analysts provided critical analytical support during and following Hurricane Katrina. They excelled in the vital roles of command and control throughout the crisis by ensuring DEA managers and field agents had the information they needed to perform law enforcement missions and conduct rescue operations. Following the storm, an immediate assessment of the changing drug trade in the New Orleans Field Division's area of operation was conducted and recommendations were made regarding the realignment of resources and personnel to meet the changing drug threat.

In early 2007, the Mexican government seized over $207 million, the largest drug related cash seizure in history from Zhenli Ye Gon. DEA I/As were collecting, researching, and analyzing data for months and were actually tracking his movements just before arrest. As a result of their efforts, several businesses were identified and searched, millions of dollars of assets were seized, witnesses were identified and questioned, and a criminal associate was identified and later indicted.



Demand Reduction

DEA's Teen Web Page

On August 30, 2005, DEA launched the teen website www.justthinktwice.com as part of its efforts to raise public awareness about the dangers of drugs and counter the messages that America's youth are bombarded with that drug use is a rite of passage and a normal part of adolescence. The website provides facts to teens about drugs like methamphetamine, including before and after photos of meth users that graphically depict the ravages of this drug on the user. In addition to the information on methamphetamine, the site contains material on prescription drug abuse, marijuana, steroids, and "club drugs," and provides teens with information on the legal consequences of drug trafficking and manufacturing. It also provides thought-provoking "real life" scenarios and teens' legal responsibilities in the areas of drugged driving, drug-facilitated sexual assaults, and providing drugs to their peers. Teens also can learn first hand about the tragedies of drug use through the personal stories of young people who lost their lives to drugs. The website won the Attorney General's Award for Excellence in Information Technology in 2006. The site proved to be tremendously popular and received 319 million hits from its launch until mid-2008.

First-Ever Candlelight Vigil for "Lost Promise" Held

On June 8, 2006, the first-ever Candlelight Vigil took place at Headquarters to bring together those involved in drug prevention, treatment, and education, and those who have lost loved ones—and their promise—to drug abuse. The Vigil was co-sponsored by Community Anti-Drug Coalitions of America, the National Institutes of Health's National Institute on Drug Abuse, and the Courage to Speak Foundation. The event was attended by about 500 people and included many families who suffered the loss of a loved one to drugs. Joining these families was Dr. Lonise Bias, mother of former University of Maryland basketball star Len Bias, who was a guest speaker 20 years after her son's cocaine-related death. As part of the event, a Memorial Wall and a Virtual Wall were established for families and friends to post photos and brief stories of loved ones lost to drugs. The Memorial Wall became part of the "Target America" traveling exhibit.



Museum

"Air, Land, & Sea" Exhibit Opened to Public

A Museum exhibit that explored the depth and breadth of the efforts that DEA and other agencies take to battle drug cartels and other criminals opened to the public at DEA Headquarters from November 2003 through December 2004. Key artifacts used to tell the story of "DEA: Air, Land, & Sea" included: a 1969 OH-6 helicopter used by DEA in surveillance and investigations; a 30 foot-long alcohol-fueled drag race car owned by Texas drug trafficker and seized by DEA worth over $200,000; and a 1999 SeaDoo brand jet ski seized by DEA through the asset forfeiture program during a crack cocaine investigation in Baltimore, Maryland.

"Target America" Exhibit Traveled Across America

The "Target America: Drug Traffickers, Terrorists, and You" exhibit, which was developed in the months after the September 11th attacks and illustrated the high price Americans pay for drug abuse, traveled the nation during 2003-2008. The exhibit, which was viewed by more than 8 million people during this time, began with an in-depth look at drug production, trafficking and money laundering—in a historical and present-day context—from trading opium on the Silk Road in the 1800s to the Columbian cocaine trade that exists today. Guests also discovered the many intricate ways different drugs are produced throughout the world. Displays illustrating drug production include a recreated jungle cocaine lab, an Afghan heroin factory and a toxic methamphetamine hotel "cook" room. Displays that focused on trafficking showed how drugs are smuggled in soles of shoes; soaked into fabrics; or even swallowed by drug "mules," people who perform the dangerous and sometimes lethal task of swallowing balloons full of drugs to transport the illegal cargo. The exhibit also explained where drug money goes and how it is secretly laundered, very often through wire transfers, and sometimes to the financial benefit of terrorist groups around the world. The opium and heroin connections of Afghanistan's Taliban regime were explored, as were the interrelationships between drugs and terrorism. Also included was a display on the link between drugs and terror that included a memorial containing wreckage and artifacts from the September 11, 2001 attacks at the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.

The exhibit touched upon the damage that drug production has on our environment, which is not often addressed. This included the clear cutting of the rain forests in Central and South America to plant coca fields, the destruction of natural forests in the United States to growing marijuana and the dumping of hazardous waste products into the water table after the manufacture of methamphetamine. At the end of the exhibit, guests reach the exhibit's "Discovery Corner," an area that offers many resources on how the cycle of drug abuse and drug-related violence can be broken with awareness, outreach and treatment.

"Target America is a powerful display showing how drugs eat away not just at individual users, but entire families, communities and our nation," DEA Administrator Karen Tandy said. "Drugs cost all of us dearly: from financing terrorism and causing crime, to increased health care costs, danger on the highways, economic loss and family breakdown." The exhibit also had a display of "Lost Talent," depicting everyday Americans and law enforcement officers killed in the line of duty whose lives and contributions to society were tragically cut short due to drugs and drug-related violence.

The exhibit was developed in partnership with The AFFNA DEA Museum Foundation, The Center for Substance Abuse Prevention, The National Guard, The National Institute on Drug Abuse, The Office of National Drug Control Policy, and The Partnership for a Drug Free America.

The Exhibit traveled to the following places:
—DEA Museum, Arlington, VA, Sep. 2002-Aug. 2003
—The Science Place, Dallas, TX, Sep. 2003-Mar. 2004
—Strategic Air & Space Museum, Omaha, NB, Apr. 2004-Aug. 2004
—One Times Square, New York, NY Sep. 2004-Mar. 2005
—New Detroit Science Center, Detroit, MI, Apr. 2005-Oct. 2005
—The Museum of Science and Industry, Chicago, IL, Aug. 2006-Dec. 2006

The "New York Story" portion of the exhibit focused on the drug trends in New York over time and on specific incidents that occurred in the NYFD.

"Good Medicine, Bad Behavior" Exhibit Opens

On November 13, 2007, a new DEA Museum exhibit opened on prescription drug abuse, "Good Medicine, Bad Behavior: Drug Diversion in America." The exhibit delved into the rising prescription drug abuse problem in America. It explored the history of prescription drug abuse and diversion in the United States, and efforts to combat the problem through time. The exhibit included re-creations of period pharmacies, depictions of significant cases, and displays that illustrated the impact of these substances on the human body. The rise of rogue internet pharmacies in the past ten years also was highlighted. The exhibit presented the science of how these medicines can have therapeutic effects on the body when taken properly, but detrimental effects when misused. There also was a resource area where visitors could read more about the issues surrounding prescription drug abuse, interact with key anti-drug abuse websites, and take home literature with more detailed information.

Aviation

Beginning in 2003, the Aviation Division reshaped itself to better meet the needs of an evolving DEA, developing a strategy to modernize its fleet with more capable aircraft. An aggressive effort to sell aging aircraft and replace them with more modern platforms resulted in DEA today operating one of the most modern fleet of aircraft of any agency in the Federal government.

The Division systematically replaced aging Cessna 206 surveillance aircraft that were the workhorses of the fleet. To better serve enforcement operations targeting the Caribbean and Central and South America, the Aviation Division acquired an ATR-42 medium cargo aircraft in 2004 for the transportation of prisoners and larger loads of cargo and sensitive equipment that proved to be one of the most used aircraft in the fleet. Also in furtherance of this strategy, four Bell 412 twin-engine helicopters were added to the Aviation Division fleet to support Caribbean operations and to provide logistical transport capabilities for DEA's developing Foreign-deployed Advisory and Support Team program.

The Aviation Division continued to seek out innovative technologies, pioneering the use of high-definition camera systems for the Federal government, installed by mid-2008, in four of DEA's largest divisions: Houston, New York, Newark, and the Los Angeles Divisions. The Aviation Division was working toward acquiring additional systems for use on the Southwest Border and in other DEA Divisions, anticipating ownership and operation of 11 systems by the end of FY2008.

In June 2006, the Aviation Division deployed the first of two King Air 350 aircraft to Kabul, Afghanistan, to provide a needed capability for DEA personnel and their counterparts to travel safely throughout a dangerous region. In June 2008 a second King Air 350 equipped with both video and signals intercept equipment was provided to offer the region an intelligence and reconnaissance capability unmatched by any other law enforcement agency.

On October 1, 2007, the Aviation Division assumed the aviation support role for OpBAT in Georgetown, Bahamas. This role had been filled by the United States Army for over 20 years, but given the need for helicopters to support the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, DEA was asked to take over the aviation role. DEA replaced the Army's helicopters with Bell 412 platforms and a uniquely outfitted surveillance aircraft known as the RU-38 Shadowhawk. The Aviation Division was positioned to assist the Nassau Country Office with this long-standing DEA program.

Laboratories

In 2005, the DEA laboratories became the first crime laboratories in the world to be accredited under the American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors/Laboratory Accreditation Board-International program. Accreditation was received in the disciplines of controlled substances, latent prints, and digital evidence.

A deadly drug mixture of heroin and fentanyl, a synthetic opiate 30 to 50 times more powerful than heroin, contributed to over 700 deaths nationwide, mostly in the Midwest and Northeast, between March 2005 and November 2006. This situation prompted federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in several major metropolitan areas to coordinate enforcement operations to identify the source of the fentanyl and eliminate it. (DEA Chicago HIDTA Group 43's Operation Snakebite took down the trafficking organization responsible for trafficking the deadly mixture in the United States.) By late spring 2006, investigative efforts led to the discovery of a large-scale operational clandestine fentanyl laboratory near Mexico City. Following a raid on this lab, U.S. and Mexican law enforcement, DEA forensic chemists from the Northeast Laboratory, North Central Laboratory, and the Special Testing and Research Laboratory worked in conjunction with the Mexican Police and numerous DEA Special Agents and Diversion Investigators from the DEA-Mexico City Country Office and collected evidence during two visits to the laboratory site.

In the wake of the Hurricane Katrina disaster, the FBI's Disaster Squad, which provides worldwide humanitarian support by identifying deceased victims of mass disasters from their fingerprints, sought help from DEA to cope with the sheer number of casualties overwhelming their capabilities. The DEA Office of Forensic Sciences coordinated DEA's Hurricane Katrina assistance effort with the FBI, providing a team of 11 fingerprint specialists from five of DEA's seven regional laboratories. Over a period of six weeks starting the second week of September 2005, teams of fingerprint specialists from various DEA labs provided assistance, working grueling seven-day rotations fingerprinting the bodies of victims lost in the catastrophe. The assignment gained in difficulty as the weeks advanced, due to the progressing deterioration of the remains.

Since its inception in 2003, the DEA Digital Evidence Laboratory has seen increasing demand for digital forensic support, especially for diversion investigations. Digital forensic examinations are extremely labor intensive and time consuming due to the typically very large number of exhibits, most of which are computers that contain proprietary databases and volumes of email and other invaluable information crucial to the successful prosecution of these investigations. One such case was Operation CYBERx, involving 23 rogue pharmacies and more than 4,600 rogue Internet pharmaceutical websites that yielded in excess of 100 evidence exhibits. The evidence showed that a doctor could make up to $1.7 million a year by approving illegal drug orders. The examination results facilitated guilty pleas from all identified defendants and assets seized in excess of $15 million.

Since 2003, forensic chemists from the Special Testing and Research Laboratory continued to respond to international clandestine drug manufacturing laboratories. The DEA-loaned chemists provided technical assistance during the dismantling, processing, and investigation of these laboratories that clandestinely manufactured such drugs as Ecstasy, LSD, methamphetamine, and cocaine. Assistance was provided all around the globe, from Indonesia to the UK, and Peru to Cambodia.

The Southwest and South Central Laboratories assisted in a meth study to determine chemical identities and exposure concentrations generated during a clandestine cook, contamination levels throughout a cook site, and contaminant persistence after cook completion. This study involved conducting controlled methamphetamine cooks in a condemned home in Colorado Springs, Colorado, and in two abandoned homes in Corsicana, Texas, using common appliances and household chemicals. The results of this research are anticipated to have far-reaching implications for legislative actions and remediation guidelines.

Environmental Management System (2004-2008)

Every federal agency is required by presidential Executive Order to undertake initiatives to improve the management of national resources through environmental management systems (EMS). In 2004, DEA formed a HQ panel to begin developing the agency's EMS structure for all facilities as a tool to incorporate environmental stewardship into daily operations to reduce federal agency environmental impacts and simultaneously increase operating efficiency. Federal EMS goals are established in areas such as energy and water management, green purchasing, sustainable building, electronic stewardship, toxic chemical and hazardous material reduction, and fleet management. DEA remained committed to improving the management of our nation's resources, and, by 2008, EMS was integral to 19 DEA facilities. Eventually it will be integrated into all DEA divisions and offices.

Active EMS's at all DEA laboratories and at a number of DEA divisions and offices made significant strides in improving DEA's management of natural resources through sustained environmental stewardship. The Office of Forensic Sciences made EMS a priority within laboratory operations, and EMS's throughout DEA have reduced energy usage, lowered electricity rates, reduced potential for hazardous spills, improved green purchasing, and implemented comprehensive recycling programs.

Many facilities with EMS's joined the Federal Electronics Challenge (FEC) to encourage electronic stewardship. In 2007, the Aviation Division won an FEC bronze award for their improved electronic stewardship. In 2008, 11 DEA facilities won FEC awards—seven went to DEA laboratories. And in 2008, the Aviation Division won a prestigious DOJ Energy and Environmental Management Award for their 2007 EMS efforts, saving over $68,000 in electricity costs, conserving over 480,000 gallons of water, and recycling nearly 43,000 pounds of paper, fuel and oil, absorbents, air craft tires, oil filters, and other items.

Hazardous Waste Cleanup Program (2004-2008)

Since FY 2003, the Hazardous Waste Cleanup Program became more efficient as DEA's Hazardous Waste Disposal Section increased it's environmental expertise for the safe and proper cleanup of clandestine drug laboratories. The number of clandestine laboratory cleanups peaked in FY 2004 at approximately 9,800; the 2005 Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act had a significant impact on the problem, resulting in DEA funding a greatly reduced 3,400 clan lab cleanups in 2007.

Technical requirements of new hazardous waste contracts that became effective in FY 2008 resulted in increased waste tracking and environmental compliance standards. The new contracts contained provisions for weekly pickups of hazardous waste seized from illegal methamphetamine laboratories by state and local law enforcement agencies and from temporary storage locations—Authorized Central Storage (ACS) sites—in participating states that have established container storage programs and entered into a Letter of Agreement with DEA to provide this service. The ACS's provided safe, temporary storage pending removal of waste from the ACS site by DEA contractors who consolidate and transport the waste to a final disposal facility. DEA and the Kentucky State Police established the first ACS sites in Kentucky during FY 2004. DEA expanded the program in FY 2007, implementing it in Alabama, Illinois, Indiana, and Oklahoma. During FY 2007-FY 2008, the program lowered the clandestine laboratory disposal cost in those states from an average of approximately $3,500 to approximately $610 per cleanup.

Technology

From 2003 through 2008, DEA committed significant resources to protect data, mindful of the importance of securing employee privacy, operational data, and sensitive records. The agency implemented best business practices and procedures that employ solid technology to support the war on drugs, and DEA remained diligently engaged in protection against cyber security attacks and recovery from disasters.

DEA's use of technology was continuously evolving as the agency strived to employ increasingly complex and sophisticated technologies in executing DEA's mission. Building on the unique and secure DEA Firebird computer network, the Office of Information Systems expanded the network into more of DEA's foreign locations for the first time, and communication capabilities were further extended with the addition of outside email traffic capability.

Wireless technologies were central to the everyday work of DEA Special Agents and staff—yesterday's pagers have been replaced with cell phones and PDAs to enable easy communication. The Office of Information Systems worked to keep pace with the growing array of wireless tools that assist law enforcement on notebook computers, scanners, and cameras.

The Office of Information Systems moved into a new, award-winning, state-of-the-art Technical Center in 2008. The culmination of this multi-year project brought DEA's equipment and systems into a secure technology center built with redundancy in power and telecommunications, backup generators, and cooling, enabling the relocation of contractor support staff into federal space that improved problem solving capability and systems reliability.

Training

In FY 2007, DEA's Office of Training (TR) broke ground adjacent to the DEA Training Academy for the new 31,600-square-foot Clandestine Laboratory Training Center at the DEA Training Academy in Quantico, Virginia, that was scheduled for completion in 2008. DEA trained, equipped, and certified thousands of state and local officers each year in compliance of Occupational Safety and Health Administration standards that govern hazardous waste operations. When completed, the multi-million dollar project will have two modern, 50-seat classrooms that can be reconfigured into a single, large room; the facility's administrative portion will have 26 work stations and a conference room. All of the venues specific to clandestine laboratory training and certification will be under one roof, including the equipment and dressing rooms, mat room, smoke house, equipment storage, air-tank, and generator storage. A two-story raid facility, physical training room, mock lab, break room for students, laundry, shower facilities, and an analytical lab, also will be integrated into the building.

During 2003-2008, TR continued its mission to ensure that DEA employees were provided the technical and professional competencies and leadership skills training necessary to accomplish DEA's mission. TR provided newly expanded Basic Agent training to over 1,300 new trainees; Diversion Leadership training to DEA diversion employees at the GS-12 and GS-13 level; Basic Intelligence Research Specialist training to more than 200 trainees; and training over 4,500 students in a newly-developed comprehensive financial investigation curriculum for DEA Special Agents, Task Force Officers, Intelligence Analysts, and Diversion Investigators, DOJ-component law enforcement personnel, and prosecutors.

TR continued during 2003-2008 to partner with other federal, state, and local counterparts, and provided Federal Law Enforcement Analysts Training over 1,000 law enforcement and intelligence personnel as a means to enhance critical thinking abilities, computer and interrogation and communications skills, and intelligence-related writing skills. Additionally, more than 200,000 state and local enforcement officers participated in TR training opportunities such as tactical aspects of drug enforcement, confidential source management, clandestine laboratory operations, legal issues for management, and executive decision making.

TR continued to lead the law enforcement community in the delivery of international law enforcement training:

- TR offered bilateral programs conducted by mobile training teams both in-country and regionally. Over 8,200 foreign law enforcement officers from more than 80 countries around the world participated in TRI's bilateral courses.

- TRI participated in the International Law Enforcement Academies program, developing foreign police managers' abilities to handle a broad spectrum of contemporary law enforcement issues and increases their capacity to investigate crime and criminal organizations. ILEAs currently operate in Budapest, Hungary; Bangkok, Thailand; Gaborone, Botswana; and San Salvador, El Salvador. Over 4,300 foreign law enforcement officers participated in TRI-conducted training at the four ILEAs.

- TR's Sensitive Investigative Units (SIU) training cooperatively trained, equipped, and supported specialized units within host nation police forces to develop and share intelligence in order to target, disrupt, dismantle, and prosecute major international drug trafficking organizations. Over 1,500 foreign law enforcement officers from countries including Mexico, Afghanistan, Panama, Colombia, Pakistan, Peru, Dominican Republic, and Uzbekistan have participated in TRI's SIU Program.

A TR initiative begun in 2008 was the DEA Learning Management System (DEALs), an enterprise-wide system solution to the delivery of on-line training courses that was being developed in conjunction with the Department of Justice. DEALs will allow for employee training at their Firebird terminal; hundreds of online courses and tools will be available, as well as the ability for employees to individualize employee development through a competency related learning plan.

Inspections

The Office of Inspections (IN) reorganized several of its internal operating structures to improve IN's overall ability to provide precise yet comphrensive on-site inspections, reviews, and guidance to the field. IN's staff, utilized the analogy that IN acted as the "guard rail" allowing DEA to move forward in a positive direction, yet within the policies and procedures in regards to the management and the integrity of DEA. IN conducted honest, fair, thorough, and consistent assessments of all DEA operations to meet this mandate.

The establishment of the Program Analysis Team (PAT) ensured that sufficient analytical resources and institutional knowledge were available to address specific projects and reviews within a cohesive team effort for sharing similar duties and responsibilities. This helped ensure a more efficient coordination for in-depth analytical assignments and streamline the entire IN review process enabling DEA to economically manage its mission while reducing operating costs.

Along similar lines IN has created a separate team of accountant/auditors and teamed with the Office of Financial Operations (FO) to conduct joint program reviews of DEA's Attorney General Exempt Operations (AGEOs) and of DEA's Sensitive Investigation Units (SIU). While reviews of these programs are mandated by statute, IN noted that IN and FO were conducting separate reviews, often duplicating efforts and wasting man-hours and resources. IN conducted joint reviews of these programs with FO, which reduced costs and disruption to field office activities, and resulted in a thorough and comprehensive review.

Another significant change within IN was the initiation of the IN-SITE program, an effort that partnered the field with IN. The Program provided IN management consulting services to the field and assisted DEA senior leadership in identifying and addressing problems outside the inspection process. IN, in a cooperative effort with the field office, helped develop solutions to evolving problems within the Division.

In addition to the DEA's internal inspection and evaluation practices, DEA's programs were subjected to external audits and reviews, as part of maintaining the public's trust in DEA's ability to manage resources in fulfillment of our mission. The Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General (OIG), and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) were the two primary auditing agencies that reviewed DEA's programs.

The outcome of external audits, whether positive or negative, had a significant impact on DEA's programs. In December 2006, the external review process was assigned to the Office of Inspections which established an Audit Liaison Team to become the central point-of-contact for all matters pertaining to external reviews conducted of DEA.

Since December 2006, the Audit Liaison Team has effectively overseen and coordinated 57 external audits and reviews of DEA program areas. During this time frame, GAO initiated 29 audits, OIG initiated 25 audits, and 3 audits were initiated by other agencies. Due to the high demand of requests for documents, interviews, and other information during the audit and review process, the Audit Liaison Team worked with DEA's Office of Chief Counsel and the OIG to formulate new policies and procedures that streamlined and standardized the process for sharing of information with external agencies. These policies and procedures were implemented to safeguard DEA's investigations, methodologies, and sensitive information. In addition to developing improved policies and procedures, the Audit Liaison Team also revised the Planning and Inspection Manual section regarding external audits.

In 2007, IN revised the scope of the Self Inspection Program (SIP) and tailored the program to assess the specific functions of domestic, foreign, and Headquarters offices to obtain a more uniform and useful report. To help eliminate any confusion, the entire self inspection program was scrutinized and all checklists and reporting procedures were standardized. The new internal review period cover fiscal year to fiscal year; as the previous method had caused confusion. The field was also given ample time to report their findings and establish specific plans for correcting problem areas, establish realistic time parameters for the completion of the corrective actions, and provide for Certification that the corrective action had been completed. IN intended to utilize these SIP reports submitted by offices to select problematic program areas for special reviews. In this way, IN could identify potential at risk areas earlier than in a three-year inspection cycle and ensure that these risks were addressed.

From 2003 through 2008, IN conducted 55 on-site inspections worldwide. The locations of these inspections consisted of 27 domestic divisions/lab offices, 7 foreign offices and 21 Headquarters offices.

The Office of Inspections was responsible for investigating or overseeing the investigation of all DEA shooting and assault incidents. IN inspectors made up the DEA Shooting Response Team and responded or oversaw all shooting and assault investigations. IN ensured that all shooting/assault investigations were thorough, factual, objective, and completed in a timely fashion.

Killed in the Line of Duty

Elton Lee Armstead
Died on March 18, 2003

DEA Telecommunications Specialist Armstead of the Chicago Field Division died as a result of injuries suffered from a fall while installing surveillance equipment on a grain silo in support of an ongoing narcotics investigation in Morris, Illinois.

Terrance P. Loftus
Died on May 28, 2004

DEA Special Agent Pilot Terrance P. Loftus was killed when the plane he was piloting crashed shortly after take off from Midway International Airport in Chicago, Illinois.

John "Jay" Balchunas
Died on November 5, 2004

DEA Task Force Officer John "Jay" Balchunas, a Narcotics Bureau Special Agent in the Wisconsin Division of Criminal Investigation, died as a result of fatal injuries sustained while conducting surveillance as part of the Department of Justice/FBI Fall Threat Initiative prior to national elections.

Thomas J. Byrne
Died on August 30, 2008

DEA Special Agent Thomas J. Byrne died as a result of injuries suffered from a physical assault during a TDY assignment in New Orleans, LA.

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EPIC Users Guide

DEA

US
DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION
SPECIAL AGENT

PASSPORT
US


Soozie & Katy
we're teaming up for your good health

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